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Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Company, 221 So. 2d 816.

140 citing documents.

  • Chism v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation 332 So. 2d 784 La. 1976
    Gorbach v. Prager, Inc., supra; , (1968).
  • Conner v. Travelers Insurance Company 324 So. 2d 903 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1976
    Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., , (1968)
  • Williams v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 327 So. 2d 462 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1976
  • Leleux v. Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Company 318 So. 2d 15 La. 1975
    204 , (1972)]; , (1968)."
  • Roussel v. Colonial Sugars Company 318 So. 2d 37 La. 1975
    23:1021(1) and (7); Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So.2d *39 867 (La.1972); , (1969) (on rehearing).
  • Francis v. Gerlach Meat Company, Inc. 319 So. 2d 534 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1975
  • Gorbach v. Prager, Inc. 310 So. 2d 604 La. 1975
    See Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., supra; , (1968).
  • Leleux v. Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance 308 So. 2d 527 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
    Although our jurisprudence is mindful of the difficulty of pinpointing the cause or precise factor precipitating an attack as suffered here, , (1969), the plaintiff nevertheless still carries the burden.
  • Lucas v. Insurance Co. of North America 326 So. 2d 525 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
    3rd Cir. 1970); , (1969).
  • Gotte v. Cities Service Oil Company 298 So. 2d 920 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1974
    (1968) the criterion for causal connection between an accident and the disability is: "Has the accident changed the plaintiff's condition so as to render him disabled and unfit for his former employment."
  • Anderson v. Jefferson Mechanical Contractors, Inc. 301 So. 2d 420 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
  • Van Dyke v. Colfax Creosoting Company 295 So. 2d 589 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1974
    *592 " , (1968), our Supreme Court held, on re-hearing, that the legal criterion in compensation cases involving heart disease `should be whether the accident caused a change in the employee's physical condition which is disabling, and not whether the accident changed the diseased organ of the employee'.
  • Gradney v. Vancouver Plywood Co., Inc. 299 So. 2d 347 La. 1974
    Johnson v. Travelers Insurance Co., La., (1973); , (1968).
  • Campbell v. Kansas City Southern Railroad Co. 297 So. 2d 798 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
    3 Cir. 1966), ; , 221 So.
  • Farris v. Ducote 293 So. 2d 589 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1974
  • Newell v. Boland Machine & Manufacturing Co. 292 So. 2d 825 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
    (1969), the plaintiff had a history of heart disease, but was working full time.
  • Lyons v. Crescent Construction Co. 293 So. 2d 244 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
  • Jennings v. Louisiana and Southern Life Ins. Co. 290 So. 2d 811 La. 1974
    (1969) (and several other Louisiana cases), a plaintiff disabled with heart disease recovered compensation.
  • Babin v. Highlands Insurance Company 290 So. 2d 720 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
    (1969) the Supreme Court in evaluating the conflicting medical testimony there presented concerning a similar compensation claim stated at page 828 as follows: "Medical experts are unable to determine or state the cause, the time of on-set, the rate of or reason for acceleration or regression of arteri
  • Clement v. FAUCHEUX CHEVROLET COMPANY, INC. 285 So. 2d 276 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
  • Sherman v. Southern Scrap Material Company Ltd. 284 So. 2d 71 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1973
    (1969), as follows: "In a case such as the present one, where there is proof of an accident and of a following disability without any intervening cause, it is presumed that the accident caused the disability.
  • Hartsell v. Hooker Chemical Corp. 288 So. 2d 417 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    Co., 1969, , ; Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., La.1972, .
  • Prim v. City of Shreveport 287 So. 2d 593 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    (1969); Weber v. McLean Trucking Company, Inc., (La.App.
  • Johnson v. Travelers Insurance Co. 284 So. 2d 888 La. 1973
    (1969), we stated: "In a case such as the present one, where there is proof of an accident and of a following disability without any intervening cause, it is presumed that the accident caused the disability."
  • Hutchinson v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. of New York 278 So. 2d 910 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    he proof adduced before the trial judge establish a present disability in the plaintiff to do the same work he was doing at the time of his accident [heart attack], and, if so, is this present disability the result of that incident?” , (1969).
  • Allen v. Milk Haulers, Inc. 278 So. 2d 871 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    However, , (1969) which is particularly applicable to the case in question, we find that plaintiffs have carried the requisite burden of proof, and quote the following excerpt from the court's opinion in the Bertrand case: "In a case such as the present one, where there is proof of an accident and of a following
  • Ferguson v. HDE, Inc. 270 So. 2d 867 La. 1972
  • Smith v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 269 So. 2d 605 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    (1969), it was noted: “Medical experts are unable to determine or state the cause, the time of onset, the rate of or reason for acceleration or regression of arteriosclerosis or coronary sclerosis.
  • Dupre v. Calcasieu Southern Maid Paper Co. 269 So. 2d 308 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    Considering the foregoing findings of fact, , .
  • Fife v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 263 So. 2d 351 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    3 Cir. 1966), ; , (1968).” ( ) A careful review of the testimony convinces us that plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a causal connection between decedent’s employment activity and death resulting from his heart condition.
  • McGuire v. Everett Lowrance, Inc. 262 So. 2d 58 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    (S.Ct.1969), it was held by the Supreme Court that: “Where there is proof of' an accident and of a following disability without any intervening cause, it is presumed that the accident caused the disability.” Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Company, page 827.
  • Straughter v. Cesco, Inc. 262 So. 2d 126 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1972
    In addition, the trial court applied the rule of presumption of causal connection where a disabling condition follows an accident, , .
  • Brown v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation 250 So. 2d 99 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1971
    (1969), it was noted: "Medical experts are unable to determine or state the cause, the time of onset, the rate of or reason for acceleration or regression of arteriosclerosis or coronary sclerosis.
  • Bailey v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. 244 So. 2d 356 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
    (1968), the principle of law stated by the Supreme Court is applicable: “In a case such as the present one, where there is proof of an accident and of a following disability without any intervening cause, it is presumed that the accident caused the disability.
  • Mamon v. Western Waterproofing Co. 243 So. 2d 105 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970
    The criterion for causal connection between the accident and the disability is: Has the accident changed the plaintiff’s condition so as to render him disabled and unfit for his former employment?” , (1969).
  • Alford v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 231 So. 2d 394 La. 1970
    *480 Co., , under a pretext that their issue is whether an accident occurred rather than whether there was causal connection between the accident and disabiliy.
  • Alford v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 229 So. 2d 372 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    Bernard v. Louisiana Wildlife, La.App., and Peppers v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab.
  • Frame v. Majors 226 So. 2d 772 La. 1969
  • Mayes v. Crosby Chemicals, Inc. 225 So. 2d 57 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    (on rehearing 825 et seq.)
  • Holman v. M. L. Bath Co. 226 So. 2d 588 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
    3 Cir. 1966), ; , , (1968).