49115 Precedential Processed

Dick v. Phillips

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed January 20, 1969 · 218 So. 2d 299

Also decided on this docket: La., March 26, 1968 208 So. 2d 317

Cited by

Criticized in 1

Janet Jabbia v. Sawyer Southern, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Mallory Bonnett, & … La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2024
Jake Carmouche v. National Union Fire Ins. Company of Pittsburgh, Pa La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2024
Mealey v. Lopez 193 So. 3d 539 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2016
Brumfield v. Lind 54 So. 3d 769 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010
Dennison v. Incorporated WHC 885 So. 2d 16 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004
Netecke v. State ex rel. DOTD 715 So. 2d 439 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998
Orgeron v. Prescott 636 So. 2d 1033 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1994
Hadley v. Doe 626 So. 2d 747 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1993
Evans v. Olinde 609 So. 2d 299 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
Broadway v. State, Department of Transportation & Development 567 So. 2d 776 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
Coleman v. State, Through DOTD 524 So. 2d 1281 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
Fontenot v. Boehm 512 So. 2d 1192 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987

Opinion text

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting). I concur in the finding that Phillips was guilty of negligence, but I must dissent *381 from the conclusion that Dick cannot recover because of contributory negligence. The majority has assigned standards of care to a motorist in the inner traffic lane on one side of a divided expressway through the application of traffic regulations for streets and highways intersected by cross-streets. An inner lane of traffic on a divided expressway is intended for through motorists who are maintaining the faster rates of speed within the posted limits, and traffic in' the inner lane is continually passing the slower traffic in the outer lane. There can be no analogy between the standard of care required of a motorist passing at the intersection of a cross-street and that which should be required of a motorist passing in the inner or fast lane on a divided expressway at a point where traffic merges into the outer lane from another traffic artery; and the same rules do not apply in both situations. Moreover, I find no causal connection between the accident and the fact that Dick had pulled into the inner or passing lane only a few moments before the accident occurred. The evidence in this case shows that Phillips was not relying upon an open inner lane since he looked neither to the rear nor to the side to determine whether that lane, into which he suddenly moved, was clear. Even if Dick had been driving in that lane for a considerable time instead of just entering it to execute a passing movement, the accident would still have occurred because of the sudden emergency created by Phillips’ unexpected turn into Dick’s lane. I fail to find contributory negligence, and I therefore respectfully dissent.