Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Ree Corporation v. Shaffer, 260 So. 2d 307.
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Timothy Lynn Page v. William J. Wise
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2011
The Louisiana Supreme Court further stated in Ree Corporation v. Shaffer, [] (La.1972), “[T]he mere payment of taxes does not constitute the physical possession required by [La.Code Civ.P.
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Page v. Wise
58 So. 3d 1062
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2011
The Louisiana Supreme Court further stated in Ree Corporation v. Shaffer, [ ] (La.1972), “[T]he mere payment of taxes does not constitute the physical possession required by [La.Code Civ.P.
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Hawkins v. Ashuca Co.
649 So. 2d 766
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1994
App. 1st (Cir.l967) (holding that a mineral lease is a continuing disturbance in law and the prescriptive period to bring the pos-sessory action is interrupted as long as the lease exists, thus the controlling date for the commencement of the one year prescriptive period is not the date of registry or recordation, but is one year from the date said disturbance ceases); , (1972) (concurring opinion by Justice Albert Tate points out that revised La.Code Civ.P.
- Boneno v. Lasseigne 589 So. 2d 594 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
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Graham v. McRae Exploration, Inc.
493 So. 2d 705
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
writ granted on other grounds, affirmed on other grounds, A mineral lease falls under the definition of a disturbance in law and is not a disturbance in fact.
- Pitre v. Tenneco Oil Co. 385 So. 2d 840 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1980
- Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc. v. Lemoine 381 So. 2d 915 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1980
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Tenneco Oil Co. v. Houston
364 So. 2d 1056
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1978
1st Cir. 1967); , (1972); and A. Yiannopoulos Property in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 138 (Supp.1978).
- Montgomery v. Breaux 338 So. 2d 314 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977
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Picou v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.
345 So. 2d 509
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1976
As to the other three specifications of error concérning Interrogatories Nos. 15 through 20, as to whether relators are entitled to answers which relate to the period of time subsequent to the date on which suit was filed, both the Trial Judge and LL&E , (1972) for the proposition that the issue before the Court is whether plaintiffs in a possessory action had the type of possession required by the Code of Civil Procedure for more than a year prior to the disturbance complained of, Thusly, t
- Ryder v. Lacour 322 So. 2d 243 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1976
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Causeway Land Co. v. Karno
317 So. 2d 661
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
art. 3660; Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise-Property, § 138 (1966); , (1972).
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Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Myrick
317 So. 2d 632
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
1st Cir. 1971), affirmed , (1972); (La.App.
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Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.
303 So. 2d 866
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1974
(1972), our Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice McCaleb, recognized that under C.C.P.
- Thevenet v. Clause 302 So. 2d 649 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1974