Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite State Ex Rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 255 So. 2d 85.

219 citing documents.

  • State v. Hardan 501 So. 2d 848 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987
    (1971); State ex rel LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La.
  • State v. Carson 495 So. 2d 307 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
  • State v. Brown 490 So. 2d 601 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
  • State v. Payton 490 So. 2d 554 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
    (1971), and held to apply to all pleas of guilty taken subsequent to December 8, 1971.
  • State v. Dufrene 488 So. 2d 225 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
    (1971) held there must be an express and knowing waiver of at least these three constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront the accusers.
  • State v. Domangue 476 So. 2d 986 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
  • State v. Rice 471 So. 2d 837 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985
  • State v. Terrase 468 So. 2d 729 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1985
  • State Ex Rel. Turner v. Maggio 463 So. 2d 1304 La. 1985
  • State v. Smith 461 So. 2d 417 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
    1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979), and adopted by Louisiana in State ex rel, , (1971).
  • State v. Johnson 459 So. 2d 1316 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
  • State v. Shuff 459 So. 2d 78 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
  • State v. Tuesno 455 So. 2d 1292 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
    the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted Boykin to require an express and knowing waiver of at least these three federal constitutional rights (i.e., the right against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers) as a predicate to a constitutionally valid guilty
  • State v. Arrington 455 So. 2d 1284 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1984
  • State v. Browning 454 So. 2d 1241 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
  • State v. Nuccio 454 So. 2d 93 La. 1984
    (1971), and the waiver must be on the record, which must unequivocally show that the waiver was free and voluntary.
  • State v. Britton 450 So. 2d 702 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
  • State v. Brown 444 So. 2d 1346 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984
    *1352 require that a defendant voluntarily and intelligently waive, when entering a guilty plea, his right to trial by jury, his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and his right against self-incrimination, before that guilty plea can be valid and used at a later time a
  • State v. Brown 441 So. 2d 828 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
    (1971) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct.
  • State v. Smithey 441 So. 2d 837 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1983
  • State v. Guin 444 So. 2d 625 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
  • State v. Cressy 440 So. 2d 141 La. 1983
  • State v. Murray 436 So. 2d 775 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1983
  • State v. Haney 434 So. 2d 1264 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1983
    (1971) presents an error not patent on the face of the record, then surely the trial court's failure to adequately explain the sentence exposure to defendant is also such an undiscoverable error.
  • State v. Godejohn 425 So. 2d 750 La. 1983
  • State v. Lewis 421 So. 2d 227 La. 1982
  • State v. Bland 419 So. 2d 1227 La. 1982
  • State v. Santiago 416 So. 2d 524 La. 1982
  • State Ex Rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly 416 So. 2d 82 La. 1982
  • State v. Bosworth 415 So. 2d 912 La. 1982
  • State v. Yarbrough 418 So. 2d 503 La. 1982
    Further, this case held at page 1376 that as to guilty pleas entered prior to December 8, 1971 ( , [1971] and LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La.
  • State v. Age 417 So. 2d 1183 La. 1982
    we held that a plea of guilty would not be considered as knowingly made with awareness of its consequences unless, at the time of the plea, the accused was informed of and made a knowing waiver of his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination
  • State v. Robicheaux 412 So. 2d 1313 La. 1982
    (1971), expounding Boykin, held that "in taking a *1317 plea of guilty, an express and knowing waiver of at least these three federal constitutional rights must be made which waiver cannot be presumed."
  • State v. Toney 412 So. 2d 1034 La. 1982
    (1975) expounding Boykin held that "in taking a plea of guilty, an express and knowing waiver of at least these three federal constitutional rights must be made, which waiver cannot be presumed."
  • State v. Smith 415 So. 2d 930 La. 1982
    (1971)] the state has the burden to prove by a contemporaneously recorded transcript of the colloquy between the trial judge and the defendant the advisement *934 and waiver of Boykin rights.
  • State v. Lee 407 So. 2d 1192 La. 1981
  • State v. Washington 406 So. 2d 191 La. 1981
  • State v. Washington 406 So. 2d 191 La. 1981
  • State v. McGinnis 413 So. 2d 1307 La. 1981
  • State v. Jones 404 So. 2d 1192 La. 1981
    (1971), apply to misdemeanor guilty pleas which will be used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment or conversion of a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony?
  • State v. Halsell 403 So. 2d 688 La. 1981
  • State v. Hicks 403 So. 2d 676 La. 1981
    (1971) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct.
  • State v. Bowick 403 So. 2d 673 La. 1981
  • State v. Woods 402 So. 2d 680 La. 1981
  • State v. Cusher 400 So. 2d 601 La. 1981
    (1971); State ex rel LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La.
  • State v. Warren 402 So. 2d 662 La. 1981
  • State v. Williams 400 So. 2d 868 La. 1981
    (1971), we held that pleas of guilty would be set aside absent a showing that defendant was informed of and expressly and knowingly waived his privilege against compulsory self incrimination, his right to a trial by jury and his right to confront his accusers.
  • State ex rel. Jarrell 395 So. 2d 1382 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981
    (1971), the court said: “Accordingly, we reach the merits of the petitioner’s contention — that his plea of guilty of February 24, 1970, must be set aside, as taken in violation of the federal constitutional standards prescribed by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct.
  • State v. Virgil 390 So. 2d 520 La. 1980
  • State v. Beatty 391 So. 2d 828 La. 1980
    (1971) and accepted the guilty plea, concluding that defendant was knowingly and voluntarily entering the plea.