State of Louisiana v. Raymond George Johnson

Judgment rendered August 14, 2019.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 992,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 52,762-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

RAYMOND GEORGE JOHNSON Appellant

*****
Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 348882

Honorable Katherine Clark Dorroh, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

RAYMOND GEORGE JOHNSON Pro Se

JAMES EDWARD STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON WAYNE WALTMAN
WILLIAM JACOB EDWARDS
CHARLES KENNETH PARR
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, McCALLUM, and THOMPSON, JJ.

McCALLUM, J.

Raymond Johnson appeals his conviction of second degree murder for

the stabbing death of his on-again, off-again girlfriend, Yolanda Moore.1

We affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS

At approximately 5:44 a.m. on April 29, 2017, Raymond Johnson

placed a 911 call from his cell phone to report that a female friend had cut

him as well as herself at his home in Shreveport. He requested medical

attention and told the 911 operator that his friend “was laying out on the

floor.”

Shreveport Fire Department (“SFD”) and Shreveport Police

Department (“SPD”) personnel arrived at Johnson’s home at 5:52 a.m.

Three minutes later, paramedics confirmed that Moore was dead. Moore

was 44 years old at the time.

The emergency responders immediately encountered the bloody

aftermath of a violent episode. Moore, wearing only unzipped jeans which

were not completely pulled up, was on her back atop a sheet on the dining

room floor. Many wounds were visible on her body, and a fan was

positioned to blow on it. Furniture was overturned in the dining room, the

adjoining living room, and a bedroom.2 Blood, whether in the form of a

drop, pool, or smear, was present throughout the house, as well as on a

neighbor’s porch and on the interior and exterior of Johnson’s car, which

1
Throughout this opinion the victim is referred to simply as “Moore.” While this
practice might appear brusque, it is done for purposes of clarity and accuracy due to the
number of individuals referenced in this lengthy opinion.
2
Although referred to separately, the dining room and the living room were
essentially one large room across the front of the house that was separated by only a
small built-in cabinet that extended from one wall. There was a recliner, chair, and sofa
in the dining room. The furniture in the living room included a recliner and two sofas.

was parked in his driveway. A bloody knife was recovered from the front

yard of Johnson’s home. When the emergency responders arrived they

found Moore’s lifeless body, Johnson, and no other individuals present.

Subsequently, Johnson was indicted for the second degree murder of

Moore in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. The State filed multiple notices of

its intent to use other crimes evidence against Johnson. These prior

incidents involved domestic abuse against Moore and another former

girlfriend, as well as violence against a friend of Moore’s. The trial court

found the majority of this evidence to be admissible.

Johnson filed a motion to suppress statements made to detectives

during custodial interrogation. Johnson contended that the detectives

continued with his interrogation despite his request for a lawyer. The

motion was denied and the matter proceeded to trial by jury.

Trial

Cassandra Pipkins, who lived next door to Johnson, testified that she

was awakened early on the morning of April 29 by knocking on her door.

Johnson, who was naked, asked Pipkins for a sheet. Pipkins did not consider

Johnson’s request unusual because he often had female companions at his

home, and she surmised that one had run him out of the house. Pipkins was

unsure of the time when Johnson came to her door, but knew she had gone

to sleep at 2:20 a.m. Johnson ran back to his house after she gave him the

sheet.

The State introduced a record of Johnson’s cell phone calls which

revealed that a call had been made from Johnson’s phone to Moore’s phone

at 7:29 p.m. on April 28. A call was made from Johnson’s phone to a “Sir

Dar. Pete” at 5:33 a.m. on April 29. This call lasted six seconds. At 5:35
2

a.m., a call was made from Johnson’s phone to a “Ronnie.” This called

lasted six minutes and 31 seconds. The 911 call followed at 5:44 a.m.

Answering the 911 operator’s instructions, Johnson checked Moore

for breathing and responded that he heard wheezing, which he described as

like a “snoring” sound. He reported cuts to her chest caused by her falling

onto a glass table. He then told the operator that he believed Moore was

breathing.

SPD Corporals Rodney Medlin and Michael Schulz were the first

emergency responders to enter Johnson’s home. Schulz found Johnson

straddling Moore with his hands around her shoulders. Moore’s body was

located in the dining room, approximately 15 feet from the home’s front

door. Moore was on a sheet that Pipkins recognized as the one she had

given to clothe Johnson. Medlin recalled that Moore was nonresponsive and

cool to the touch and felt it was immediately apparent that she was dead.

Medlin described the condition of several rooms as indicating that a

struggle had taken place. In the living room, two couches were flipped over,

a glass-topped table had been turned over, and what looked to be blood

splatter was on the walls. Dressers were turned over in the master bedroom,

and there appeared to be blood on the mattress, floor, and walls in that

bedroom. Medlin also observed what he thought was blood on the mattress,

floors, and in the hallway of a second bedroom.

Once the police officers could ensure their safety, paramedics entered

the home. Chris Henry is a fire engineer with SFD. Examining Moore for

signs of life, Henry found that she was cool to the touch and that her body

was showing signs of rigor mortis and dependent lividity.

3

Henry noted a pool of what appeared to be blood on the porch, and

that some of it was wet. Henry thought it was peculiar that while furniture

was overturned in the living room, electronic equipment was untouched.

Henry also thought it was strange that Moore’s head was on a pillow and

that she had a fan at her feet.

Captain Jackie Hutchinson of SFD arrived on the scene with Henry.

She found Moore to be without respiration or a pulse. Hutchinson noted that

Moore was cold to the touch and had several injuries to her chest that were

incompatible with life. Hutchinson, who was a paramedic for 21 years and

an emergency room nurse for 13 years, explained to the jury that rigor

mortis is the sign of a death that had occurred more than one to two hours

earlier. She also explained that dependent lividity takes one to two hours

after death, if not longer, to occur. Hutchinson thought this case was

different from most other calls that she had responded to because Johnson

was walking around bleeding, Moore’s wounds had stopped bleeding, and

there was blood outside.

After Johnson was handcuffed, Schulz walked Johnson to his patrol

vehicle for questioning and to read the Miranda rights to him. Schulz

recalled that Johnson stated that he and Moore began arguing that morning

because Johnson had to go to work. When Moore began throwing things, a

struggle started and they fell through a glass table. Schulz testified that

while Johnson was being treated by paramedics, he changed his story to say

only Moore fell through the table. Schulz noticed a coffee table with a glass

top in the living room, but the glass was cracked and not shattered.

Schulz noted that Johnson had lacerations on his forehead and a

couple of them on his neck, and that some of the wounds were actively
4

bleeding. Schulz testified that Johnson never told him that Moore cut him

with a knife or another object.

Jarvis Johnson, a fire engineer with SFD, arrived at the scene in an

ambulance. He placed the defendant in the ambulance to examine him.

Johnson discovered that the defendant had some lacerations to his arm and

one to his forehead; most of these were superficial and were fresh, and the

defendant’s skin was still moist in the area of the lacerations. Johnson

explained that the defendant’s lacerations had not hardened, which is a

process that usually begins 20-30 minutes after lacerations occur. Johnson

transported the defendant to the hospital for treatment.

On the afternoon of April 29, Johnson was brought from the hospital

to the office of SPD’s violent crimes unit to be questioned by Detectives

Logan McDonald and Adam McEntee. They met with Johnson at 2:45 p.m.

A recording of the interrogation was played for the jury.3

Johnson was dressed in scrubs from the hospital and his head was

bandaged. He was also handcuffed. McDonald did not have Johnson sign

an acknowledgment card after being read his Miranda rights because his

hands were bloody and because the interview was being recorded.

Johnson expressed shock when the detectives told him that Moore had

died. He later uttered during the questioning that he thought a “corporal” at

the hospital was joking when this officer told him that Moore was dead.

However, McEntee reminded Johnson that he was the one who informed

Johnson at the hospital of Moore’s death. McEntee testified that when he

3
Jurors did not hear the portion of the interrogation when Johnson discussed his
prior criminal history.
5

told Johnson at the hospital of Moore’s death, Johnson did not have much of

a reaction other than to show a little surprise.

Johnson told the detectives that he was getting ready for work that

morning when Moore, who had been drinking, started a fight with him. 4

Johnson asserted that Moore had a history of becoming violent when she

drank alcohol. According to Johnson, Moore began wrecking his house by

knocking over furniture. He asserted that she cut him as she chased him

through his house, and that he bled as he ran. Johnson continued that as he

tried to leave the house, Moore grabbed him by the testicles, so he pushed

her off and picked up a sheet before leaving the house.

Johnson recounted to the detectives that as he spoke with his

neighbor, Moore came onto Johnson’s porch and sat on a chair. When the

neighbor remarked that Moore had fallen down, Johnson ran back to his

home, picked Moore up, and brought her into the house. Johnson insisted

throughout the questioning that he did not know how Moore sustained her

injuries. He contended that he only saw abrasions on her front when he

picked her up off the porch after Johnson had fallen face first. Johnson

attempted to explain to the detectives that the reason he told the officers

earlier that Moore had been cut by glass from the table was because he had

pushed her in that direction.

Early in the interrogation, Johnson told the detectives that he did not

know what Moore used to cut him. However, later during the interview, he

stated that she had used a knife. Johnson also explained that he called a

4
Johnson stated that he needed to be at work at 6:00 a.m.
6

friend to tell him that Moore had passed out, and the friend recommended

that Johnson call 911.

Corporal Marcus Mitchell is with SPD’s crime scene investigations

unit. Mitchell described the living room and the master bedroom in

Johnson’s home as looking like a tornado had gone through them. He noted

that the master bedroom was in a state of disarray, and he described the

mattress there as being heavily stained with blood.

Mitchell testified that Johnson had a wound to the top of his forehead,

several injuries to his right shoulder, and an injury to his arm. He further

stated that Johnson’s hands appeared to be stained with blood. Mitchell did

not note any injuries to Johnson’s groin area or recall any significant injuries

to his feet.

The bloody kitchen knife, found in the yard, had a three-inch blade.

The knife was measured, from the tip of its blade to the tip of its handle, as

being approximately eight inches in length.

Dr. Jessica Esparza, the DNA technical leader at the North Louisiana

Crime Lab, testified about the results of DNA testing on samples taken from

blood evidence at the crime scene. Johnson’s DNA sample was consistent

with the DNA collected in swabs taken from blood atop a hard drive and

from blood on the kitchen floor, the kitchen sink, the bathroom wall, and a

beer can in the refrigerator in Johnson’s home. His DNA sample was also

consistent with the DNA taken from blood found on Perkins’s porch.

Moore’s DNA sample was consistent with the swabs of DNA taken

from blood on the mattress in the guest bedroom, the hallway wall adjacent

to the master bedroom, the cracked television screen in the master bedroom,

and the passenger seat armrest of Johnson’s sedan.
7

Swabs of DNA taken from blood on the handle of the knife found in

Johnson’s yard, the door handle of the refrigerator in Johnson’s kitchen, a

beer can atop the refrigerator, and from the A-frame on the passenger side of

Johnson’s car were consistent with the DNA samples from both Johnson and

Moore.

A swab of DNA collected from a drop of blood on the fireplace

mantel in the living room of Johnson’s home was consistent with Johnson’s

DNA. A swab of DNA collected from another blood spot on the same

mantel was a mixture of DNA from two people. Moore and Johnson could

not be excluded as donors.

Blood found on Johnson’s bathroom sink, on the mattress in his

master bedroom, and on the blade of the knife found in his yard contained a

mixture of DNA from two people. Johnson and Moore could not be

excluded as donors of that DNA.

Dr. James Traylor, a forensic pathologist, performed the autopsy on

Moore. He counted 21 stab wounds, three of which, individually or

collectively, could have caused her death.5 Dr. Traylor testified that the stab

wounds were caused by a single-edge knife.

Dr. Traylor explained that one fatal wound was on the upper left chest

just below the collarbone, with the blade cutting the left subclavian artery.

A second fatal wound was on the right side of the upper chest near the

midline, with the blade puncturing the upper lobe of the right lung. The

third fatal wound was on the left chest wall, with the blade puncturing the

lower lobe of the left lung. Dr. Traylor explained that the wounds were fatal

5
Dr. Traylor characterized a stab wound as being a wound that measured deeper
than it is long or wide at the skin surface.
8

not only because of blood loss, but also because Moore lost her ability to

breathe once air and blood entered the pleural space.

Moore sustained nonfatal stab wounds to her left arm, back, neck, and

left buttock. Dr. Traylor also noted that Moore sustained abrasions,

contusions, and incised wounds. She had a contusion and an abrasion on

one forearm, contusions on the right knee, and contusions on both lower

legs. Dr. Traylor also found signs of a blunt force injury to the temple area

near her left eye, as well as defensive wounds to both of her hands.

The depth of Moore’s stab wounds ranged from 0.3 centimeters on the

left breast to 10.5 centimeters on the left buttock. Dr. Traylor did not think

that her stab wounds were consistent with falling into something made of

glass. Rather, he believed that the stab wounds were consistent with the

knife seized from Johnson’s yard. The deepest penetration, to the left

buttock, measured slightly longer than the blade length of the knife seized.

Dr. Traylor explained that a blade can make a wound a little deeper than the

blade length if the blade goes in at an angle. He further explained that

buttock fat is deformable, which allowed the blade to go in a little deeper

just by the knife pushing down into the fat. While Dr. Traylor could not say

for certain that Moore’s incised wounds were caused by the knife in

question, he insisted they were caused by a sharp object.

Dr. Traylor believed that it would have taken Moore several minutes

to die from her wounds. He thought Hutchinson’s assessment that Moore

had been dead for one to two hours before paramedics arrived was pretty

accurate. Dr. Traylor concluded that it was fair to say that Moore had been

dead for one to three hours based on the report of her body being cool to the

touch, her recognizable lividity, and the early stiffening of her jaw.
9

Moore’s blood alcohol content measured 0.203, and she had Benadryl,

marijuana, and nicotine in her blood at the time of death. Dr. Traylor

estimated that Moore had smoked marijuana within an hour of her death.

As noted earlier in this opinion, the trial judge allowed some

testimony about Johnson’s past treatment of Moore and a former girlfriend.

Reginald Fleming, who had been in a relationship with Moore, recounted

how Johnson had called Moore one night in April of 2017 when she was at

Fleming’s house. He heard Johnson tell Moore that time was short.

Fleming added that he believed that Johnson was upset with Moore for being

with Fleming at that moment.

Denise Taylor, who is Johnson’s cousin, worked with Moore and

considered her to be a close friend. She testified about an incident which

occurred at Taylor’s home in the summer of 2000. Taylor recalled that

Moore was in an upset emotional state when Moore came to Taylor’s house.

Johnson later came to Taylor’s house. Despite Johnson’s insistence that he

only wanted to talk to Moore, he pushed Moore back onto a couch after the

pair began arguing. Taylor positioned herself between them and told Moore

to head to the bedroom. Taylor recalled that Johnson threw an ashtray at

Moore, barely missing her. Johnson then proceeded to the bedroom, where

he pushed Moore down, hit her with his fists, and kicked her in the side.

When Taylor again intervened, Johnson pushed Taylor and told her that he

would “get [her] too” if she called the police.

Taylor also recalled an injury that Moore sustained after Moore had

returned to her own home following a stay at Taylor’s home. Taylor was

called after Moore had gone to another friend’s home for her safety. Upon

meeting up with Moore, Taylor saw that the side of Moore’s face was
10

swollen, even though her face had been in normal condition when she had

left Taylor’s house. Moore refused medical treatment.

Dana Randle had an on-again, off-again relationship with Johnson

from 1981 until 2002. Johnson is the father of Randle’s three adult children.

Randle told the jury that Johnson had hit her in the face, grabbed her by the

hair, and had burned her on the side of the face with a cigarette. Randle also

testified that she and Johnson would fight when she declined to go out with

him or if she wanted to leave somewhere before he did. Randle described

how Johnson once stabbed her in the shoulder with a pen knife when she

attempted to leave their home.

Randle detailed other violent incidents. On one occasion, they began

fighting after Randle did not comply with Johnson’s request to leave with

him. Randle’s brother had to pull Johnson off of her that time. Johnson hit

her once during the fight as she wielded a knife to keep Johnson at bay. On

another occasion, while she and Johnson were staying at the Lakeshore Inn

in Shreveport, Johnson hit Randle when she attempted to leave. Randle did

not come home one night when she and Johnson were living together. Upon

returning home the next morning, Johnson hit her in the face and split her

left jaw.

Randle testified that she was dating the late Gregory Mims in January

of 1999. As she and Mims were walking to their apartment, Johnson pulled

alongside in his car and tried to get Randle to leave with him. When she

declined, Johnson pushed her, kicked her, and hit her in the head.

Randle recalled an incident in 2004 when Johnson asked Randle to

give him money and to leave with him. They began fighting when she

refused. Johnson hit her with a broom and tried to pull her from her house.
11

Randle, who was armed with a knife because she anticipated a fight, cut

Johnson across the nose.

Verdict and appeal

Johnson was convicted as charged by the jury. He filed a motion for a

post-verdict judgment of acquittal, which the trial court denied. Johnson

was sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment at hard labor

without benefits. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Johnson’s appeal counsel contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient

to prove that Johnson committed second degree murder, and the trial judge

erred in denying the motion for a post-verdict judgment of acquittal; (2) the

trial judge erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of other crimes

and acts by Johnson; and (3) the trial judge erred in denying the motion to

suppress despite Johnson unequivocally requesting an attorney at the onset

of questioning by detectives investigating the homicide.

Additionally, Johnson has filed a pro se appeal brief in which he

asserts that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of second degree

murder.

Sufficiency of the evidence

Johnson’s appeal counsel maintains that Johnson acted in self-

defense, arguing that he had the right to defend himself from an attack in his

own home. She argues that the State failed to meet its burden that Johnson

was not acting in self-defense when he stabbed Moore. In support of this

argument, she notes: (1) Moore had a high blood alcohol level; (2) Moore

had smoked marijuana within an hour of her death; (3) a struggle had

occurred as was evident by the condition of the house; and (4) Johnson
12

sustained injuries consistent with defensive actions. His counsel

additionally maintains that if Johnson was criminally culpable for Moore’s

death, then he was guilty of manslaughter and not second degree murder.

Johnson asserts in his pro se brief that Moore’s emotional state was

irrational and her functioning was impaired because of her “highly

intoxicated” condition. He contends that he was in imminent fear for his life

when Moore attacked him in his own home.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,

124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Carter, 42,894 (La. App.

2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So. 2d 181, writ denied, 2008-0499 (La. 11/14/08), 996

So. 2d 1086. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art.

821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own

appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford,

2005-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/14/09), 1 So. 3d 833, writ denied, 2009-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d

297.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct
13

evidence and inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient

for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State v. Sutton,

436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Robinson, 50,643 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 717, writ denied, 2016-1479 (La. 5/19/17), 221 So. 3d

78.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 629, writ denied, 2017-1894 (La. 6/1/18),

243 So. 3d 1064. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence,

that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.

R.S. 15:438; State v. Mingo, supra. The appellate court reviews the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines

whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational

juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State

v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. Garner, 45,474

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584.

An appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 1994-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442. A reviewing court accords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Casaday, 49,679 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So. 3d 578, writ denied,

2015-0607 (La. 2/5/16), 186 So. 3d 1162.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the
14

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Crossley, 48,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/13), 117 So. 3d 585, writ

denied, 2013-1798 (La. 2/14/14), 132 So. 3d 410. In the absence of internal

contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s

testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite

factual conclusion. State v. Johnson, 47,913 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13), 113

So. 3d 1209.

La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1) defines second degree murder as the killing of

a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict

great bodily harm.

A justifiable homicide committed in self-defense is recognized in La.

R.S. 14:20, which states, in relevant parts:

A. A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably
believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or
receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to
save himself from that danger.
(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent
or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily
harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is
about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its
prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the
fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger
to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony
without the killing.
....
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and
who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no
duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this
Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with
force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the
possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not
the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that
deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to
prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great
bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.

15

When a defendant claims justifiable homicide by an act in self-

defense, the State has the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. Factors to consider in

determining whether a defendant had a reasonable belief that the killing was

necessary include the excitement and confusion of the situation, the

possibility of using force or violence short of killing, and the defendant’s

knowledge of the assailant’s bad character. State v. McGill, 52,600 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 346; State v. Johnson, 41,428 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So. 2d 711, writ denied, 2006-2615 (La. 5/18/07), 957 So.

2d 150. Although there is no unqualified duty to retreat, the possibility of

escape is a factor to consider in determining whether a defendant had a

reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to avoid the

danger. State v. Wilkins, 2013-2539 (La. 1/15/14), 131 So. 3d 839; State v.

Johnson, supra.

In State v. Wilkins, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered

La. R.S. 14:20, Louisiana’s “Stand Your Ground” statute. The Court stated:

[T]he effect of the 2006 La. Acts 141, amending La. R.S. 14:20
and adding subsections C and D to the statute, was two-fold: a
person may choose to defend himself or herself with deadly
force under the circumstances defined in R.S. 14:20(A), without
considering whether retreat or escape is possible, i.e., a person
“may stand his or her ground and meet force with force” (C);
and he or she may do so without fear that, if it came to it, a jury
may nevertheless second guess the decision not to flee from the
encounter in assessing whether the use of deadly force was
justified (D). The overall effect of the 2006 amendments was
thus to supplant a jurisprudential rule so deeply entrenched in
Louisiana law that some decisions continue to adhere to it to
this day. See, e.g., State v. Vedol, 12-0376, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir.
3/13/13), 113 So. 3d 1119, 1124 (“[T]his Court has continued
to recognize that while there is no unqualified duty to retreat
from an altercation, the possibility of escape is a recognized
factor in determining whether or not a defendant had a
reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to avoid the
danger.”).
16

Id. at pp. 1-2, 131 So. 3d at 839-40.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a self-

defense case, the question becomes whether, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in

self-defense or in the defense of others. State v. McGill, supra; State v.

Davis, 46,267 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/18/11), 69 So. 3d 538, writ denied, 2011-

1561 (La. 1/13/12), 77 So. 3d 952.

The evidence was overwhelming that Johnson did not kill Moore in

self-defense. Moore sustained 21 stab wounds. Her blood was found

throughout Johnson’s house as well as on his vehicle. She had defensive

wounds on her hands. In contrast, Johnson sustained only superficial

wounds, and these wounds appeared to be fresh even though his victim had

been dead for at least one hour. It is also notable, in light of the estimated

time of Moore’s death, that Johnson told the detectives that he heard a

gurgling sound and wheezing coming from Moore after he called 911.

Finally, Johnson demonstrated absolutely no urgency in seeking medical

help for Moore as he engaged in a six-minute telephone conversation with a

friend before calling 911.

Johnson’s self-defense claim is also belied by his statements to the

police and fire personnel who responded to the 911 call as well as to the

detectives investigating the murder.

Detective McDonald testified that he gave Johnson ample opportunity

during his interrogation to assert that he injured Moore in self-defense.

Johnson was adamant he did not inflict the injuries upon Moore. In fact, he

17

denied stabbing her and expressed disbelief when he was told that she had

been stabbed multiple times.

Johnson told detectives that he grabbed a sheet from the floor before

running from his house. He also said that he asked his neighbor to use her

phone. Pipkins testified when a naked Johnson came to her house, he asked

only for a sheet and never indicated that he was in danger or was hurt.

SFD Engineer Chris Henry recalled that Johnson’s initial version of

events was that he did not know who the victim was and that a stranger had

walked into his house as he was getting ready for work. The stranger would

not leave when Johnson asked her to leave.

After Johnson was moved to the patrol car to be treated, Henry

noticed that the name “Yolanda” was tattooed on Johnson and it was also the

name he gave of the woman in his house. When Henry asked Johnson if that

was merely a coincidence, Johnson hung his head. Johnson then replied that

he knew Moore and that he had tried to get her outside after the altercation.

SPD Corporal Michael Schulz testified that Johnson stated that they

had fallen through a glass table after they began struggling. He also testified

that while Johnson was being treated by paramedics, he altered his account

to say only Moore fell through the glass table. A coffee table with a glass

top was in the living room, but the glass was cracked and not shattered.

Johnson also gave varying statements regarding Moore’s condition at

the time he went to Pipkins’ home. Henry recalled that Johnson said he

went to the neighbor’s home for help in getting the stranger to leave, but he

returned to the porch when another person walking down the street told him

that someone was lying on his porch. When Johnson was asked how Moore

ended up on the porch, he admitted that there had been a brief altercation
18

and that he had pulled her inside and put a fan on her because he thought she

was exhausted.

Schulz recalled that when Johnson described his conversation with

Pipkins, Johnson indicated that he saw Moore walk to the porch before

returning inside. He then followed her inside.

Johnson recounted to the detectives that as he spoke with his

neighbor, Moore came onto the porch and sat on a chair. When the neighbor

remarked that Moore had fallen down, Johnson ran back to his home, picked

Moore up, and brought her into his house.

Pipkins, who could not see Johnson’s porch from where she was

standing while giving him the sheet, testified that she never pointed out to

him that she saw someone on his porch.

In summary, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that

Johnson stabbed Moore while having the specific intent to kill her or to

inflict great bodily harm upon her, and that the homicide was not committed

in self-defense or in the defense of others.

Johnson makes the alternative argument that if he was criminally

culpable for Moore’s death, then he was guilty of manslaughter and not

second degree murder.

Manslaughter is defined in La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1) as a homicide that

would be first degree or second degree murder, but the offense is committed

in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation

sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool

reflection.

For murder to be reduced to manslaughter, the following elements

must be proved: (1) the homicide was committed “in sudden passion or heat
19

of blood”; (2) that sudden passion or heat of blood was immediately caused

by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and

cool reflection; (3) the defendant’s blood did not cool between the

provocation and the killing; and (4) an average person’s blood would not

have cooled between the provocation and the killing. State v. Efferson,

52,306 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1153, writ denied, 2018-2052

(La. 4/15/19), 267 So. 3d 1131; State v. McGee, 51,977 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/3/19), 2019 WL 1461524, __ So. 3d ___. In a prosecution for murder, a

defendant who claims provocation (as a means of reducing murder to

manslaughter) bears the burden of proving these elements by a

preponderance of the evidence; additionally, provocation and the time for

cooling are questions for the jury to determine according to the standard of

the average or ordinary person. State v. Leger, 2005-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936

So. 2d 108, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100

(2007); State v. McGee, supra.

There was no evidence presented at trial by the defense in support of

a manslaughter verdict. Johnson never established that the killing was

committed in sudden passion or heat of blood. In fact, Johnson denied to

detectives that he was even responsible for Moore’s stab wounds.

Johnson’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are

without merit. His conviction of second degree murder was convincingly

supported by the evidence presented at trial.

Evidence of other crimes and acts

Johnson’s counsel contends in the next assignment of error that the

trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence of other crimes and

acts committed by Johnson.
20

The State filed five 404(B) notices in this matter seeking introduction

of evidence involving prior instances when Johnson threatened, attempted to

harm, or actually harmed Moore, other women, and one of Moore’s male

friends. Several hearings were held on this matter, with the court allowing

most of the evidence. Ultimately, Reginald Fleming, Denise Taylor, and

Dana Randle testified at trial. The earliest violent incidents, in 1992 and

1993, were testified to by Randle.

Johnson’s counsel maintains that the trial court improperly widened

the scope of admissible other crimes evidence. She attempts to distinguish

State v. Altenberger, 2013-2518 (La. 4/11/14), 139 So. 3d 510, on the

grounds that (1) the incidents occurred many years prior to the instant

offense and involved a different victim in some instances; (2) Randle

admitted at the hearing that she and Johnson had been using drugs when the

incidents occurred; and (3) Altenberger was accused of domestic abuse

rather than murder and the other crimes evidence involved the same victim.

Defense counsel argues that even if the evidence here was otherwise

admissible, its probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effects of

the evidence. Counsel maintains that the evidence was not used to show

motive or intent, but to impermissibly “paint Raymond as a bad guy.”

In State v. Taylor, 2016-1124, p. 12 (La. 12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283,

292, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained the concerns underpinning a

404(B)(1) inquiry:

Code of Evidence article 404(B)(1) embodies the settled
principle that evidence of other crimes may be admissible if the
state establishes an independent and relevant reason for its
admission. While the clear and convincing burden of proof set
forth in Prieur is no longer mandated, other jurisprudential
rules and guidelines derived from Prieur and its progeny
remain valid and applicable. Thus, the state is still required [to]
21

provide the defendant with written notice before trial that it
intends to offer prior crimes evidence. And, the safeguard in
Prieur providing for a jury charge regarding the limited purpose
for which other crimes evidence is presented remains valid.
Moreover, even when the other crimes evidence is offered for a
purpose allowed under Article 404(B)(1), the evidence must
have substantial relevance independent from showing
defendant’s general criminal character and thus is not
admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or to
rebut a defendant’s defense. Accordingly, the state cannot
simply rely on a boilerplate recitation of the grounds for
admissibility stated in La. C.E. art. 404(B). It is the duty of the
district court in its gatekeeping function to determine the
independent relevancy of this evidence. The district court must
also balance the probative value of the other crimes, wrongs or
acts evidence against its prejudicial effects before the evidence
can be admitted.

(Internal citations omitted).

When seeking to introduce evidence pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(B),

the State need only make a showing of sufficient evidence to support a

finding that the defendant committed the other crime, wrong, or act. State v.

Taylor, supra.

Once evidence is deemed relevant and otherwise admissible under La.

C.E. art. 404(B)(1), the trial court must still conduct a balancing test

pursuant to La. C.E. art. 403. In regards to this balancing test, the Taylor

court stated:

“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.” La. C.E. art.
403. Any inculpatory evidence is “prejudicial” to a defendant,
especially when it is “probative” to a high degree. As used in
the balancing test, “prejudicial” limits the introduction of
probative evidence of prior misconduct only when it is unduly
and unfairly prejudicial. “The term ‘unfair prejudice,’ as to a
criminal defendant, speaks to the capacity of some concededly
relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a
ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”

Id. at p. 18, 217 So. 3d at 295-6 (internal citations omitted).

22

In Altenberger, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that

evidence of the defendant’s pattern of domestic abuse went directly to rebut

defenses that he may raise at trial and demonstrated their independent

relevancy besides merely painting defendant as a bad person. In State v.

Rose, 2006-0402 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d 1236, evidence that the defendant

had physically abused the victim in the past was determined to be admissible

to show motive for her murder and to demonstrate the volatile nature of their

relationship. In State v. Hunter, 2015-0306 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/9/15), 176 So.

3d 530, prior instances of violence involving a couple were admissible to

establish motive and to rebut the defendant’s claim that he stabbed the

victim in self-defense.

The jurisprudence also supports the admissibility of prior acts when

the acts were done to a third person other than the victim in the prosecution

at hand. See State v. Colby, 51,907 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/30/18), 244 So. 3d

1260, writ denied, 2018-1256 (La. 3/25/19), 267 So. 3d 596. In State v.

Howard, 47,495 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/12), 106 So. 3d 1038, this Court

affirmed the trial court’s admission of past acts of domestic violence against

the defendant’s prior girlfriend as tending to prove motive or pattern of

domestic violence.

A district court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence

will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Taylor, supra.

Moreover, an erroneous introduction of other crimes evidence is subject to

harmless error review. State v. Reed, 43,780 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/3/08), 1 So.

3d 561, writs denied, 2009-0014 (La. 10/02/09), 18 So. 3d 100, 2009-0160

(La. 10/2/09), 18 So. 3d 103; State v. Gatti, 39,833 (La. App. 2 Cir.

23

10/13/05), 914 So. 2d 74, writ denied, 2005-2394 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So. 2d

511.

Erroneous admission of evidence requires reversal only where there is

a reasonable possibility that the evidence might have contributed to the

verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d

705 (1967). The relevant inquiry is whether the reviewing court may

conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e. was the

guilty verdict actually rendered surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v.

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993). See

State v. Casey, 1999-0023 (La. 1/26/00), 775 So. 2d 1022.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of

Taylor, Fleming, and Randle. The testimony of these three witnesses clearly

established a pattern of domestic abuse and, as noted by the Altenberger

court, the fact that the prior instances occurred years before the instant

offense is insufficient in and of itself to require exclusion of the evidence.

The evidence was properly admissible to show motive and intent. In

addition, the probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by any

unfair prejudice to Johnson. His long-term pattern of inflicting physical

abuse on his partners is highly probative of his intent to inflict great bodily

harm or death on Moore. Finally, even if the trial court erred in allowing

any or all of the testimony by Fleming, Randle, and Taylor, it was harmless

error. Their testimony aside, the remaining evidence was overwhelming that

Johnson stabbed Taylor at least 21 times with the intent kill her or to inflict

great bodily harm and that he did not do so in self-defense. This assignment

of error is without merit.

24

Request for counsel

In his final assignment of error, Johnson’s appellate counsel contends

that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements that

were made by Johnson to Detectives McDonald and McEntee. Counsel

maintains that the detectives continued to question Johnson even after he

made an unequivocal request for an attorney by stating “I guess I better get a

lawyer” early in the interrogation. Counsel further argues that the detectives

should have ceased questioning him at that point, and the failure to terminate

questioning warranted suppressing the statements.

The State counters that Johnson did not make an unequivocal request

for an attorney or to have counsel present before questioning continued.

Detective McDonald did not hear any request because he was talking at the

same time Johnson mumbled the remark. In addition, Johnson’s remark was

not an unambiguous or unequivocal request that would have led a reasonable

officer to believe that Johnson was invoking his right to counsel.

In reviewing a trial court’s pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress, the

appellate court must look at the totality of the evidence presented at the

hearing on the motion to suppress and may review the entire record,

including testimony at trial. State v. Bates, 51,890 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18),

246 So. 3d 672. Great weight is given to the trial court’s ruling on a motion

to suppress in regard to its factual findings because it had the opportunity to

observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v.

Thibodeaux, 1998-1673 (La. 9/8/99), 750 So. 2d 916, cert. denied, 529 U.S.

1112, 120 S. Ct. 1969, 146 L. Ed. 2d 800 (2000); State v. Odums, 50,969

(La. App. 2 Cir. 11/30/16), 210 So. 3d 850, writ denied, 2017-0296 (La.

11/13/17), 229 So. 3d 924. Accordingly, appellate courts review rulings on
25

motions to suppress under the manifest error standard for factual

determinations while applying a de novo review to the findings of law. State

v. Bates, supra.

Before the State may introduce a confession into evidence, it must

demonstrate that the statement was free and voluntary and not the product of

fear, duress, intimidation, menace, threats, inducements or promises. La.

R.S. 15:451; La. C. Cr. P. art. 703(D); State v. Blank, 2004-0204 (La.

4/11/07), 955 So. 2d 90. If a statement is a product of custodial

interrogation, the State additionally must show that the person was advised

before questioning of his right to remain silent; that any statement he makes

may be used against him; and, that he has a right to counsel, either retained

or appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.

2d 694 (1966). We may infer that the trial court concluded that the State had

satisfied both of these requirements.

A trial court’s finding as to the free and voluntary nature of a

statement carries great weight and will not be disturbed unless not supported

by the evidence. State v. Benoit, 440 So. 2d 129 (La. 1983); State v.

Washington, 51,818 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 245 So. 3d 1234, writ denied,

2018-0783 (La. 12/17/18), 259 So. 3d 343. Testimony of the interviewing

police officer alone may be sufficient to prove that a defendant’s statement

was given freely and voluntarily. Id.

The inquiry in cases where the defendant claims he invoked his right

to counsel is whether the statement was clear and unambiguous under the

circumstances so as to put a reasonable police officer on notice that

defendant was invoking his right to counsel during custodial interrogation.

State v. Payne, 2001-3196 (La. 12/4/02), 833 So. 2d 927.
26

Regarding the right to counsel during custodial interrogations, the

Louisiana Supreme Court has explained:

When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right
cannot be established by showing only that he responded to
further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has
been advised of his rights. Once an accused has expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations
with the police. It is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny
for the authorities, at their insistence, to reinterrogate an
accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to
counsel.
.....
The applicability of the “‘rigid’ prophylactic rule” of Edwards
requires courts to “determine whether the accused actually
invoked his right to counsel.” To avoid difficulties of proof and
to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is
an objective inquiry. Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel
“requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be
construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney.” If a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable police officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only that the
suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, the cessation of
questioning is not required. The suspect must articulate his
desire to have counsel present with sufficient clarity that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand
the statement to be a request for an attorney. In analyzing the
prophylactic rules of Miranda and Edwards, we are mindful
that the “value of any prophylactic rule ... must be assessed not
only on the basis of what is gained, but also on the basis of
what is lost.” “Admissions of guilt are more than merely
desirable; they are essential to society’s compelling interest in
finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.”

Id. at pp. 8-10, 833 So. 2d at 935-6 (internal citations omitted).

In Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F. 3d 588 (5th Cir. 2002), the appellate

court considered questions asked by Soffar during custodial interrogation

concerning whether he should get an attorney, how he could get one, and

how long it would take to have an attorney appointed. The 5th Circuit noted

27

that each question had been rejected as being procedural and too equivocal

to constitute a clear invocation of counsel.

In Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362

(1994), the Supreme Court declared that the suspect must “unambiguously

request” counsel “sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the

circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an

attorney” in order to cease custodial interrogation. The Court held that after

a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement

officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly

requests an attorney. Davis established a bright-line rule, under which a

statement either is an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not. Soffar,

supra.

The Davis court specifically declined to extend Edwards v. Arizona,

451 U.S 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), by requiring law

enforcement officers to cease questioning immediately upon the making of

an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney. In doing so, the Court

stated:

The rationale underlying Edwards is that the police must
respect a suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an
attorney present during custodial interrogation. But when the
officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know
whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the
immediate cessation of questioning “would transform the
Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to
legitimate police investigative activity,” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S. Ct. 321, 326, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1975),
because it would needlessly prevent the police from questioning
a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not
wish to have a lawyer present. Nothing in Edwards requires the
provision of counsel to a suspect who consents to answer
questions without the assistance of a lawyer.... We also noted
[in Miranda] that if a suspect is “indecisive in his request for
counsel,” the officers need not always cease questioning.

28

Davis, 512 U.S. at 460, 114 S. Ct. at 2355-6.

After being advised of his rights, Johnson asked the detectives if he

needed a lawyer. Detective McDonald advised Johnson that he could not

give him legal advice but told him that he could have an attorney if he

wanted one. Johnson freely answered questions thereafter. At 14:53 on the

recording, Johnson made the barely audible comment, “I guess I better get a

lawyer.” On the recording, Detective McDonald is talking at the same time

that this comment was made. The trial judge noted in her reasons for ruling

that she had to listen to the recording ten times to even discern what Johnson

was saying. Detective McDonald testified at the suppression hearing that at

no time did he understand Johnson to request an attorney. After hearing the

audio recording in court, Detective McDonald commented that he could hear

some vague possible reference to a lawyer, but he could not hear exactly

what was said.

Johnson failed to show that he invoked his right to counsel in a clear

manner such that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would

have understood the statement to be an unequivocal request for an attorney

and that custodial interrogation was to be terminated. Accordingly, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson’s motion to suppress

his statements to Detectives McDonald and McEntee. This assignment of

error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Johnson’s conviction and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

29