In Re: Courthouse Security

Judgment rendered August 14, 2019.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 52,787-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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IN RE:
COURTHOUSE SECURITY

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Appealed from the
Forty Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of DeSoto, Louisiana
Trial Court No. M1064

Honorable Charles Blaylock Adams, Judge

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KENNETH P. HAINES Counsel for 1st Appellant
JODY TODD BENSON DeSoto Parish Police
Jury

KENNETH P. HAINES Counsel for 2nd Appellant
Gary V. Evans,
District Attorney

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Before MOORE, GARRETT, and STONE, JJ.

STONE, J.

This is a dispute between Judge Charles Adams, Chief Judge of the

42nd Judicial District Court (“JDC”), on one side, and the DeSoto Parish

district attorney and police jury (collectively, the “appellants”), on the other

side. The police jury allegedly owns the 42nd JDC courthouse. The following

narrative is taken from the briefs.

The upstairs courtroom in the 42nd JDC courthouse has two entrances.

For the last eight years or so, one of the entrances has been secured by the

posting of bailiffs there. During that time, the secure entrance has been used

as the judges’ primary entrance and as the entrance through which criminal

defendants in the sheriff’s custody are brought into the courtroom. The

court’s bailiffs occupied two offices near the secure entrance.

Recently, the police jury reallocated these offices to the district

attorney’s office, which, according to Chief Judge Adams, will use these

offices for meetings with witnesses and victims (who do not have security

clearance). The police jury relies on La. R.S. 33:4713 and 33:4715 as

authority for doing so. In relevant part, La. R.S. 47:13 provides:

A. Each parish shall provide and bear the expense of a
suitable building and requisite furniture for the sitting of
the district and circuit courts and such offices, furniture,
and equipment as may be needed by the clerks and
recorders of the parish for the proper conduct of their
offices and shall provide such other offices as may be
needed by the sheriffs of these courts and by the tax
collectors and assessors of the parish and shall provide
the necessary heat and illumination therefor.

La. R.S. 47:15, in full, states:

The police jury of each parish shall provide a good and
sufficient court-house, with rooms for jurors, and a good
and sufficient jail, at such place as they may deem most
convenient for the parish at large, provided that when the
seat of justice is established by law, they shall not have
power to remove it.

Chief Judge Adams asserts that this action by the police jury

effectively rendered the courtroom entrance unsecured. Pursuant to Uniform

Rules for District Courts, Rule 5.2, Chief Judge Adams issued an “Order As

to Courthouse Security” that “enjoined” the police jury from: (1)

implementing its resolution to remove the court’s bailiffs from the

aforementioned offices; and (2) re-allocating the probation office space on

the west side of the courtroom…without the approval of the Chief Judge.”

Rule 5.2 states:

The sheriff or his or her designated deputy shall provide
security for the courtrooms, chambers, judicial offices, and
hallways within the courthouse. Security procedures shall
be approved by the chief judge of the District Court or
other court. (Emphasis added).

Neither the district attorney nor the police jury filed a petition for

injunction or for declaratory relief challenging the subject order. In fact, no

pleadings whatsoever were filed in this matter. No hearing was held, no

evidence was taken, and no record was created.

The appellants a filed motion for appeal in the district court, which

Chief Judge Adams denied. The appellants then filed in this court an

application for a writ of mandamus ordering Chief Judge Adams to grant the

appeal. We found that the subject order seeks to permanently enjoin the

police jury from implementing its resolution reallocating the bailiffs’ offices

to the district attorney – and therefore constitutes an appealable judgment

under La. C.C.P. art. 3612(B). Accordingly, we granted the writ, remanded,

and ordered that this matter be perfected as an appeal.

That order has been fulfilled, and the matter is again before us. The

appellants have filed a brief. In response, Chief Judge Adams filed in this

court a “per curiam,” which is in substance an appellate brief. The subject

order and the two briefs constitute the entire record on appeal. The
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appellants’ assignment of error is as follows: “The trial court erred…by

issuing an injunction, without notice, without a hearing or due process and

usurping the power of the police jury to allocate space in the DeSoto Parish

courthouse.” The appellants argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

issue the subject order. The grounds for this argument are that a court’s

jurisdiction extends only to “actions” and “proceedings” before it, and

because no action had been filed, the court had no jurisdiction to issue the

subject order.

Chief Judge Adams asserts that the subject order is an “administrative

order” issued pursuant to his administrative authority under Rule 5.2, supra

(i.e., rather than civil or criminal jurisdiction). He argues that the proper

procedure for the appellants to challenge the subject order is to file an action

for declaratory relief.

La. C.C.P. art. 191 provides: “A court possesses inherently all of the

power necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted

expressly by law.” That article codifies the doctrine of inherent judicial

power, which has substantial constitutional underpinnings. The separation of

powers by our State Constitution “establishes an inherent judicial power

which the legislative and executive branches cannot abridge.” Singer Hutner

Levine Seemen & Stewart, etc. v. Louisiana State Bar, 378 So.2d 423 (La.

1979).

The inherent powers doctrine necessarily is limited in
several respects. Since it is based on the separation of
powers, which includes the concepts of checks and
balances and functional differentiation, it serves primarily
to shield the courts' ability to judge independently and
fairly from improper interference due to the actions or
inactions of executive or legislative officials…[A] court's
inherent judicial power includes a measure of
administrative authority not unlike that primarily and
exclusively vested in the executive department, but only so
much as is reasonably necessary to its own judicial

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function. (Internal citations omitted).

Imbornone v. Early, 401 So. 2d 953, 958 (La. 1981).

The Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Imbornone, supra, addressed

a dispute over allocation of courthouse space and how the doctrine of

inherent judicial power applies in such situation. The events precipitating the

Supreme Court’s decision in Imbornone occurred in New Orleans. The city

court and district court shared a courthouse, and there was a shortage of

space. The judges of the district court complained about the shortage to the

mayor, who delegated whatever authority he may have had to allocate

courthouse space to the judges of the district court. Thereupon, the district

court judges issued an order for a certain city court judge to exchange

courtrooms and related chambers with a certain district court judge. The city

judge attacked that order by filing a petition for injunction and declaratory

relief in the same district court that had issued the order being challenged in

the action.

The district court denied the city judge’s petition. The city judge

appealed. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, initially holding: (1) the

district court had the authority to allocate courthouse space pursuant to the

doctrine of inherent judicial powers and/or the mayor’s delegation of his

authority; and (2) the district court’s exercise of that authority in ordering the

exchange of courtrooms and related chambers was not arbitrary and

capricious. However, as explained below, the LASC granted rehearing and

again affirmed the mandatory exchange of courtrooms, but on different

grounds.

Justice Dennis wrote a cogent dissent from the initial decision wherein

he argued: (1) the doctrine of inherent powers does not favor one lower court

over another lower court, and therefore, could not be used to validate the

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district court’s action against the city court; (2) while the mayor could

allocate space directly to either court, he could not delegate that authority to

the district court because such gave the district court administrative authority

over the city court. As to the latter, Justice Dennis stated that the mayor’s

delegation of authority to the district court impinged “upon the exclusive

power and authority of…[the LASC]…to administer the judicial system of

this state,” as granted by La. Const. art. 5, §§ 5 & 6.

“The Supreme Court has general supervisory jurisdiction over all other

courts. It may establish procedural and administrative rules not in conflict

with law.” La. Const. art. 5, §5(A). The chief judge of the Supreme Court “is

the chief administrative officer of the judicial system of the State, subject to

rules adopted by the court.” La. Const. art. 5, §6.

Justice Dennis suggested that the LASC should exercise its

constitutional administrative authority in determining the validity of the

district court’s action, but cautioned:

Nor should this Court decide the matter administratively in
the present posture without making several preliminary
decisions. We should determine whether the form of the
action will enable us to reach a fair, just and
administratively sound decision without impairing the
dignity of the judiciary. Although the trial judge who sat in
this case is of the highest caliber and without doubt a fair
and impartial jurist, I am now convinced that it was
improper of us to have him decide this case while sitting as
a member of one of the litigant courts.

Id. at 959.

After rehearing, the LASC issued a brief per curiam opinion which, in

full, stated:

We granted a rehearing to consider that portion of our
original opinion which approved the order of the Civil
District Court judges reallocating court space in the Civil
Courts Building. After carefully considering the evidence
in this case, we conclude that the record provides an
adequate basis for the exercise of our inherent judicial

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power and administrative authority. Exercising that power
and authority we find that the most practical stopgap
measure for dealing with the overcrowded condition in the
Civil Courts Building is for Judge Imbornone and Judge
Artique to exchange courtrooms, as set forth in the Civil
District Court judge's order. Accordingly, our original
opinion and decree are amended to direct such reallocation
of courtroom space as an administrative order of this Court.
Otherwise, the initial decision herein is affirmed.

Imbornone v. Early, supra at 961 (La. 1981). Thus, the LASC adopted the

reasoning in Justice Dennis’ dissent at least in part.

In promulgating rule 5.2 of Uniform Rules for District Courts, supra,

the LASC has made clear that it intends for the Chief Judge of a district court

to have administrative authority regarding courthouse security measures. In

this case, Judge Adams has invoked that authority in issuing the subject

order. The propriety of such an order is subject to challenge based on the

particular facts of the case. Here, however, there has been no record

developed – no evidence, no findings of fact – and thus there is nothing for

this court to review. We agree with Chief Judge Adams’ argument that the

proper means for the appellants to challenge the subject order is for them to

file an action for declaratory judgment, whereupon a proper record can be

developed.

CONCLUSION

As the police jury and district have not brought any proceeding in the

trial court regarding the “Order As to Courthouse Security,” we decline to

take any action regarding that order at this point, except that we remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REMANDED.

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