State of Louisiana v. Antonio Loyd

Judgment rendered August 14, 2019.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 992,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 52,814-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

ANTONIO LOYD Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2017-173F

Honorable Marcus Hunter, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward K. Bauman

ROBERT S. TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JOHN GATES SPIRES
Assistant District Attorney

*****

Before MOORE, GARRETT, and STONE, JJ.

MOORE, J.

After a second jury trial, the defendant, Antonio Loyd, was convicted

of first degree robbery in violation of La. R.S. 14:64.1. The trial court

sentenced Loyd to 25 years hard labor without benefit of probation, parole,

or suspension of sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the

conviction and sentence.

Facts

Whitney Yates was working as a teller at Ouachita Independent Bank

(“OIB”) in Bastrop, Louisiana on December 14, 2016, when the defendant

entered the bank and approached her station. He handed Ms. Yates a note

which said his child had cancer, he needed money, and this was a robbery.

Yates testified that, after reading the note, she looked up at him, and “he let

me know that he had a gun, and he would shoot me if I did not get him the

money.” Although she did not actually see a gun, Ms. Yates testified that

the defendant indicated he had a gun by reaching into his left pocket. He

told her not to press the panic button and demanded large bills. He took the

money and left the bank.

A surveillance video captured the robbery. This video, lasting 1

minute and 13 seconds, was played for the jury. Ms. Yates had a clear view

of the defendant’s face: He did not wear a mask and only the width of a

desk separated the defendant from Ms. Yates. Ms. Yates identified the

defendant in open court as the person in the video who robbed her.

Shortly after the robbery, Captain Leondrio Reed of the Bastrop

Police Department interviewed Ms. Yates. He prepared a photographic

lineup, (State’s Ex. S-1), but Ms. Yates was too shaken over the incident to

attempt an identification. A week or so later, Captain Reed again met with

Ms. Yates and asked her to review the same photo lineup. (State’s Ex. S-2).

Yates did not identify anyone in the lineup as the robber.

In February, 2017, Captain Reed received a crime stoppers tip from

April Trahan of Sulphur, Louisiana. April told Reed that she was the sister

of Ashley Blakeman, who was Antonio Loyd’s girlfriend. Reed traveled to

Calcasieu Parish and interviewed Ms. Blakeman. Based upon Blakeman’s

statement to him, Captain Reed prepared a third photo lineup—this time

including a photo of Antonio Loyd (State’s Ex. S-5). He met with Ms.

Yates, and she positively identified the appellant as the robber.

Based on information Captain Reed obtained from Ms. Blakeman,

Bastrop Police Department Assistant Chief Anthony Evans went to the

Super 8 Motel in Monroe and obtained a motel receipt in the name of

Antonio Loyd for the night of December 13, 2016. (State’s Ex. S-3).

Captain Reed went to the Family Dollar store where he was able to obtain

surveillance video footage showing Loyd purchasing a pair of pants on the

afternoon of the robbery. (State’s Ex. S-7).

Captain Reed testified, without objection, that he confirmed that a

person named Antonio Loyd checked into the Westlake Isle of Capri, Lake

Charles, Louisiana, on the night of December 14, 2016, and stayed two

nights. This was after the robbery occurred earlier in the day on December

14, 2016.

Ashley Blakeman, Loyd’s former girlfriend, testified and identified

Loyd as the person with whom she traveled to Bastrop in December, 2016.

She said that she and Loyd spent the night at the Super 8 Motel in Monroe

on December 13, 2016. She reviewed the Super 8 Motel receipt, (State’s Ex.
2

S-3), and confirmed that the signature on the receipt was Loyd’s. On

December 14, 2016, they drove to Bastrop to visit Loyd’s brother. During

the day, they left his brother’s house and went to Family Dollar store where

Loyd bought a pair of sweat pants. He put them on in the car. They rode

around a few minutes and then went to a bank. Loyd told her to “lay her

seat down.” She asked him what was going on and he told her not to worry

about it.

Ms. Blakeman reviewed the bank video with the jury. She identified

Loyd in the video and said he was wearing the same clothing he had on

when he got out of the car and entered the bank. She said Loyd returned to

the car and drove away fast to his brother’s home in Bastrop where he pulled

up on the side of the house all the way towards the back.1 After a while, she

asked Loyd when they were going to leave, and he said a little bit closer to

dark. When they left, they returned to Calcasieu Parish by a different route

from that which they traveled to Monroe the night before. About halfway

there, Loyd told her they were going to the Isle of Capri.2 After they

checked in, they went to the room where Loyd pulled money from his

sweater. She said that it was thousands of dollars. He gave her several

hundred dollars.

1
She testified that when they first visited his brother earlier that day, he parked
the car in front of the house.
2
An exhibit (S-9) depicting a reservation at the Isle of Capri for that date was
offered subject to cross-examination and defense counsel elected to reserve his right to
cross-examine after the witness was tendered for cross-examination. On cross
examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Blakeman questions regarding the location,
route, and what happened after they got to the Casino, all of which she answered;
however, she acknowledged that she never saw a receipt or anything signed by anyone.
After this inquiry in the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to the admission of
this exhibit for lack of proper foundation and the objection was sustained.
3

Blakeman reviewed a still frame photo from the bank robbery video

and identified Loyd. (State’s Ex. 4). She stated she got a photo off the

Internet which led her to believe Loyd was involved in the robbery. On

cross examination, she was asked how she came to get a photo of Loyd

related to robbery. She stated that after they arrived at the Isle of Capri, she

put two and two together. She typed in (on the computer) Bastrop and the

date and multiple things popped up (about the robbery), including a picture

of Loyd. When asked why she just did not ask Loyd about it, she answered

“I did ask him, and he told me that it was none of my business, not to worry

about it.” She actually asked him multiple times and she got the same

answer. After obtaining Loyd’s photograph from the Internet, Blakeman

showed it to her sister, April Trahan. Ms. Trahan later contacted Captain

Reed.

On cross-examination, Ms. Blakeman admitted that she was pregnant

when the defendant broke off their relationship to go back to his wife. The

baby was 10 and ½ months old at the time of trial.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree robbery. The trial

court ordered a presentence investigation and fixed sentencing for July 19,

2018. Loyd was sentenced to serve 25 years at hard labor, without benefit of

probation, parole or suspension of sentence, and was advised of his rights

pertaining to post-conviction relief.

This appeal followed.

Discussion

By his first assignment of error, Loyd claims that under the standard

of review established by Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781,

61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), the evidence adduced by the state at trial was
4

insufficient to support a conviction of first degree robbery. Specifically,

Loyd focuses on some variations in the testimony of Whitney Yates, the

bank teller who identified Loyd as the robber. Additionally, he attacks the

credibility of the testimony from his former girlfriend, Ashley Blakeman.

Loyd contends that Blakeman’s testimony is highly suspect because he

broke off his relationship with her to go back to his wife even though she

was pregnant with his child.

Loyd contends that Ms. Yates’ identification of him is suspect

because she did not identify him as the robber in the first two photo lineups,

and it was not until the third photo lineup that she identified him. He notes

that she provided no discernable features to police despite the fact that he

has a prosthetic leg. Although she told Captain Reed that he had a gun, she

actually never saw a gun, but concluded Loyd was armed by the way he had

his hands in the sweater he was wearing and because he said he did not want

to hurt anyone. Loyd maintains that at trial her testimony varied from what

she had earlier told Capt. Reed because she testified that he said he indicated

he had a gun and did not want to shoot. Finally, he argues that because Ms.

Yates did not pick him out of the photo lineup until several months after the

robbery and said at trial that she remembered his nose and his eyes, her

identification was incorrect.

Loyd also attacks the credibility of his former girlfriend, Ashley

Blakeman, who did not testify in the first trial that ended in a mistrial. Ms.

Blakeman was charged with being an accessory after the fact, and was

incarcerated at the time of trial. She admitted that they were having

difficulties in their relationship before it ended.

5

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of evidence claim is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Carter, 42,894 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08),

974 So. 2d 181, writ denied, 08-0499 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1086. This

standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not

provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation

of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La.

2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517; State v. Dotie, 43,819 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 1

So. 3d 833, writ denied, 09-0310 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Robinson, 50,643 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 717, writ denied, 16-1479 (La. 5/19/17),

221 So. 3d 78.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred
6

according to reason and common experience. State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243

So. 3d 1064. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; State v. Mingo, supra. The appellate court reviews the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether an

alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could

not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway,

07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584, 587, writ not considered, 12-0062 (La.

4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

A reviewing court accords great deference to the jury’s decision to accept or

reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v. Casaday,

49,679 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/15), 162 So. 3d 578, writ denied, 15-0607 (La.

2/5/16), 186 So. 3d 1162.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Crossley, 48,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/13), 117 So. 3d 585, writ

denied, 13-1798 (La. 2/14/14), 132 So. 3d 410; State v. Speed, 43,786 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/14/09), 2 So. 3d 582, writ denied, 09-0372 (La. 11/6/09), 21

So. 3d 299. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of

7

fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Johnson,

47,913 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/13), 113 So. 3d 1209.

First Degree Robbery is defined by La. R.S. 14:64.1 as follows:

A. First degree robbery is the taking of anything of value
belonging to another from the person of another, or that is in the
immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation,
when the offender leads the victim to reasonably believe he is
armed with a dangerous weapon.

B. Whoever commits the crime of first degree robbery shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than three years and for
not more than forty years, without benefit of parole, probation
or suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.

We conclude that, when reviewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the state, the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Loyd

committed the crime of first degree robbery. Defendant’s arguments

attacking Ms. Yates’ testimony and identification are without merit. Clearly

Ms. Yates’ failure to identify Loyd in the first two lineups in S-1 and S-2

was because the defendant was not in the first two photo lineups. Ms. Yates

did not look at the first photo lineup because she was understandably

distraught over the robbery, and she did not identify the defendant in the

same lineup several days later because the defendant’s photo was not in the

lineup. The defendant’s photo was placed in the third photo lineup (S-5),

and she readily identified him. Ms. Yates testified that she never saw the

gun, but the way the defendant had his hand in his sweater indicated to her

he had a gun. She further testified that he told her he had a gun and did not

want to shoot anyone. She viewed the bank video surveillance tape with the

jury and identified the defendant in open court as the man who was depicted

in the bank surveillance video committing the actual robbery.

These facts alone are sufficient to support the conviction.
8

The jury clearly found that Ms. Blakeman’s testimony was credible.

Ms. Blakeman identified the defendant in the video surveillance evidence

from both the bank and Family Dollar store. She testified that she was with

the defendant at the Motel 8 in Monroe, and in Bastrop and outside the bank

in the car. She also testified regarding the trip back to Lake Charles where

the couple stayed at the Isle of Capri casino/hotel. Her testimony clearly

placed the defendant in Bastrop and Monroe during the time of the robbery.

Obviously, the jury did not buy into the argument that she fabricated the

story because she was bitter because the defendant left her when she was

pregnant with his child.

Accordingly, the evidence shows that the state’s evidence met its

burden of proof pursuant to R.S. 14:64.1, namely, (1) that defendant took

something of value belonging to another ($8,850 cash); (2) that the cash

taken was in the immediate control of Ms. Yates when it was taken; (3) that

the defendant used force or intimidation against the victim, Ms Yates, in

order to accomplish the taking (he told her he would shoot her if he did not

give her the money); and (4) that defendant led Ms. Yates to reasonably

believe that he was armed with a dangerous weapon (he told her he had a

gun and reached into his coat pocket). Furthermore, the evidence

established, beyond any reasonable doubt, that it was Antonio Loyd who

committed the robbery at Ouachita Independent Bank, in Bastrop, Louisiana,

on December 14, 2016.

This assignment is without merit.

By his second assignment of error, the defendant alleges that the trial

court erred by allowing Captain Reed to testify that the signature on the

Waiver of Rights form and Isle of Capri receipt looked the same.
9

The transcript of the relevant testimony reads as follows:

[Direct examination by the State]:

You still have the hotel receipt there. Right?

-Yes.

You can’t attest who signed that receipt at the hotel can you?

-No.

But you know who signed your rights waiver?

- Yes.

Do these signatures appear to be the same?

Mr. Brumfield: Objection, Your Honor. He’s asking for an expert
opinion.

By the Court: Sustained.

State: No, I’m not asking for an expert opinion, Judge. I asked him
his opinion do they appear to be the same.

Mr. Brumfield: still asking for an expert opinion.

By the Court: I sustain.

Q: You see any difference in them?

A. No.

Q: Thank you very much.

It is clear from the state’s exhibits admitted into evidence and the transcript

above that the “hotel receipt” signature that Capt. Reed was asked to

compare with was the Motel 8 receipt (Exhibit S-3), and the signature on the

“waiver of rights” form. (Exhibit S-10). There was no Isle of Capri receipt

proffered as evidence by the state. The state did, however, attempt to place

into evidence a reservation (Exhibit S-9) allegedly made by Loyd at the Isle

10

of Capri, but the court did not admit S-9 into evidence. It is clear that the

purpose of the reservation exhibit was to corroborate Ms. Blakeman’s

testimony that the couple stayed at the Isle of Capri on December 14 and 15.

Accordingly, the defendant also asserts in another assignment of error

that it was trial error to allow Capt. Reed to testify that he contacted the Isle

of Capri and obtained confirmation by a letter from the hotel that Loyd

stayed at the hotel on December 14 and 15, 2016.

The transcript above clearly shows that defense counsel objected to

the prosecution’s question whether the two signatures looked the same, and

the trial court sustained the objection. When the prosecutor asked Capt.

Reed if he saw any difference in the two signatures and he answered that he

did not, there was no objection.

Counsel on appeal also cites dicta from State v. Juniors, 03-2425 (La.

6/29/05), 915 So. 2d 291, 329-330, cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1115, 126 S. Ct.

1940 (2006) regarding authentication of handwriting:

As an initial matter, we note that pursuant to La. C.E. art.
901(B)(3), authentication of handwriting may be made by non-
expert opinion or by comparison with authenticated specimens
by the trier of fact or by an expert witness. Kid Gloves, Inc. v.
First Nat. Bank of Jefferson Parish, 600 So. 2d 779, 781 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 1992). Louisiana courts have long held the law
permits the trier of fact to compare for itself known and
contested handwriting samples. Citations omitted.

Since Captain Reed was not a handwriting expert, counsel maintains

he could not compare the authenticated “waiver of rights” signature with the

unauthenticated signature on the Motel 8 receipt. The record shows that the

trial court sustained the defense objections to Capt. Reed’s opinion that the

signatures were the same. When asked if he saw any difference in the two

signatures, Reed testified that he did not. There was no objection by the

11

defense, presumably because Capt. Reed did not state that the two signatures

were the same.

Additionally, the trial transcript clearly shows that the documents in

question were published to the jury and jury members were allowed to

examine the documents and thus they could decide if the signatures were the

same.

This assignment is without merit.

In his last assignment, appellant contends that the trial court erred

when it allowed Captain Reed to testify regarding his contact with the Isle of

Capri to confirm that Loyd stayed at the hotel on December 14 and 15, 2016.

Counsel complains that Capt. Reed received this confirmation by a letter that

was not signed under oath nor produced in court.

The testimony in question was elicited from Captain Reed, first, by

the state on direct examination, and second, by defense counsel on cross-

examination.

The trial transcript shows that the state asked Capt. Reed whether he

was able to track Loyd to any locations after the robbery. Without any

objection by the defense, Reed answered that he was able to track him to the

Isle of Capri in Westlake and that he had someone confirm that an individual

named Antonio Loyd did go there on the night of December 14th and he

stayed for two nights.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Reed if he went to the

Isle of Capri himself or sent other detectives. Reed responded that he spoke

with security and staff members, and they sent him a letter confirming that

he (Loyd) had been there.

12

The defense never raised an objection to the state’s questioning nor

Capt. Reed’s testimony regarding his efforts to confirm that Loyd spent

December 14 and 15 at the hotel. Furthermore, defense counsel’s cross-

examination elicited Reeds’ answers regarding confirmation of Loyd’s

presence at the casino on the night of December 14.

Because there was no timely objection raised regarding this line of

questioning, this assignment is without merit. La. C.E. Art. 103A(1).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the conviction and sentence of

the defendant.

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

13