State, in Interest of Toler
Also decided on this docket: La., May 30, 1972 262 So. 2d 393
State, in Interest of Toler, 263 So. 2d 888 (La. 1972).
Cited by
- State of Louisiana in the Interest of B.J. Vs. La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2025
- Concha Chemical Pipeline v. Schwing 835 So. 2d 543 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002
- In Re Pitre 630 So. 2d 700 La. 1994
- Plunkett v. Plunkett 576 So. 2d 100 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
- Pensacola Const. Co. v. McNamara 558 So. 2d 231 La. 1990
- State ex rel. L.J. 545 So. 2d 684 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989
- Durham v. LA. STATE RACING COM'N 449 So. 2d 475 La. 1984
- Diaz v. Allstate Ins. Co. 433 So. 2d 699 La. 1983
- Shop-A-Lott, Inc. v. Town of Many 427 So. 2d 514 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
- General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Johnson 426 So. 2d 691 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
- Cancienne v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury 423 So. 2d 662 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
- Hord v. Hord 407 So. 2d 1314 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1981
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- In Re State in Interest of Elliott 206 So. 2d 802
Opinion text
BARHAM, Justice (concurring). We granted this writ because there was a conflict in the jurisprudence between the Second Circuit Court of Appeal and the Third Circuit Court of Appeal. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in In Re State in Interest of Elliott, 206 So.2d 802 (1968), declared R.S. 13:1579.1 unconstitutional insofar as it permitted “ * * * any character of evidence, including hearsay evidence and opinion evidence which the court, in its discretion, may deem proper * * * (Emphasis supplied.) Whether a juvenile court proceeding involves the possible custodial care of a juvenile in a state quasi-penal institution is immaterial in determining the application of this statute. In my opinion In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 , 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), cannot be distinguished on the basis that it applies only to a case involving commitment of a juvenile “to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed”. Every hearing involving the custody of a juvenile is a hearing in which that child’s future freedom is threatened. It is also a hearing at which fundamental parental rights may be threatened. The basic objection to hearsay testimony is that it contravenes the constitutional right to confront those who accuse or testify against a party. If hearsay testimony is to be admitted in juvenile hearings, a safeguard for the protection of this constitutional right of confrontation should be included. At least the names of those from whom the hearsay evidence has been acquired should be divulged to the party at interest so that if he desires, they may be subpoenaed into the juvenile court hearing for confrontation. In the absence of such a safeguard, a provision which gives to the court the vast discretion of admitting any character of evidence, including hearsay, is a denial of due process. The ills which such a statutory provision visits upon the parties appearing in these courts are apparent from the case before us. *571 I am of the opinion that the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Elliott correctly-viewed the statutory provision, and that the Third Circuit was in error in its holding in the instant case. I also believe that although the majority opinion can stand upon the factual determination made, we are as a court remiss in our duty to settle the law when there are differences of opinion between the appellate courts. For these reasons I respectfully concur.