State of Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development v. Larry E. Clark, et ux consolidated with State of Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development v. Larry E. Clark, et ux consolidated with State of Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development v. Larry E. Clark, et ux consolidated with L & M Hair Care Products, Inc. v. State of Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development

Judgment rendered January 15, 2020.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 53,197-CA
No. 53,198-CA
No. 53,199-CA
No. 53,200-CA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

No. 53,197-CA No. 53,198-CA

STATE OF LOUISIANA STATE OF LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION & TRANSPORTATION &
DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT
Plaintiff-Appellee Plaintiff-Appellee

versus versus

LARRY E. CLARK, ET UX LARRY E. CLARK, ET UX
Defendant-Appellant Defendant-Appellant

No. 53,199-CA No. 53,200-CA

STATE OF LOUISIANA L & M HAIR CARE PRODUCTS,
DEPARTMENT OF INC.
TRANSPORTATION & Plaintiff-Appellant
DEVELOPMENT
Plaintiff-Appellee versus

versus STATE OF LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION &
LARRY E. CLARK, ET UX DEVELOPMENT
Defendant-Appellant Defendant-Appellee

****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 325511, 325512, 328772 and 363679

Honorable Ramon Lafitte, Judge

*****

LARRY E. CLARK Appellant
In Proper Person

CHARLES DAVID McBRIDE Counsel for Appellee
ANDREW GATES BARRY
TERRENCE J. DONAHUE, JR.

*****

Before STEPHENS, McCALLUM, and THOMPSON, JJ.

McCALLUM, J.

In 1986, Ronald Reagan was President of the United States, Margaret

Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Berlin Wall

separated East Berlin from West Berlin, rotary dial telephones were still in

common usage, and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of

Transportation and Development, began expropriation proceedings against

Larry E. Clark and his wife as the owners of three lots of land in Shreveport,

Louisiana, needed for construction of I-49. President Reagan and Prime

Minister Thatcher have passed away, the Berlin Wall has long since fallen,

and rotary dial telephones are extinct as practical options for

communication. However, the litigation born of the State’s expropriation of

the Clarks’ property lives on.

Before us is a pro se appeal by Larry E. Clark and his wife

(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Clark”), challenging three

judgments. The appellee is the State of Louisiana, through the Department

of Transportation and Development (“the State”). Clark and their

corporation, L & M Hair Care Products, Inc. (“L&M”), are seeking

nullification of a previous joint stipulation agreement and judgments dating

back to the distant origins of this matter. Clark argues that the trial court

erred when it granted a peremptory exception of res judicata and dismissed

the petitions to nullify. Clark argues that the court thereafter erred in

denying a motion for new trial. Clark finally argues that the court erred

when it denied relief in relation to Clark’s ex parte motion. In that ex parte

motion, Clark asked the trial court to order the State to refile and start afresh

the expropriations. As detailed below, Clark asks this Court to reverse the

trial court, nullify the joint stipulation agreement, and allow continued

progress to attempt to nullify and overturn the sundry decisions made during

the preceding three decades.

We note that Clark has filed his brief pro se. One of the consolidated

cases in this matter, however, involves L&M, not Clark. Although we have

concerns as to the legal capacity of Clark to represent or argue on behalf of

L&M, we will liberally construe the Clark briefs and appeals. Therefore, we

will address all issues regarding Clark and L&M, including the

constitutional and federal civil rights arguments made by Clark. For the

reasons given below, we affirm the trial court on all issues.

HISTORY

This case has its origins in three separate expropriation proceedings

commenced by the State of Louisiana nearly three and a half decades ago.

In 1986, the State sought to expropriate land from Clark for the construction

of I-49. The three suits were consolidated and set for trial. Prior to trial,

Clark and the State entered into a joint stipulated agreement. That

agreement resolved the issue regarding the taking of the three lots of land

and preserved only one issue for trial, the amount of compensation for the

relocation and loss of the uniqueness of the L&M location. L&M was a

lessee of a building that existed on the property.

The trial court found that Clark was entitled to compensation for the

loss. The trial court awarded Clark an additional $191,781.00 above the

stipulated agreement, plus other costs. It signed a judgment in accordance

with its ruling.

The State appealed that decision. This Court found in favor of the

State, reduced the total award, and reversed the portion of the award related

to L&M. This Court held that because L&M was not a party to the suit, the
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award for costs and losses associated with L&M was improper.

Subsequently, L&M filed separately to recover its damages.

In that succeeding suit, the trial court awarded L&M the same amount

as it had in the previous ruling that had been reversed by this Court. The

State again appealed. However, before it was submitted, L&M and the State

reached an agreement to vacate the trial court ruling, withdraw the appeal

and remand the case to the trial court to reconsider the issue anew. This

Court allowed the agreement, rescinded the judgment and remanded.

Thereafter, L&M amended its petition to include new allegations and

claims against the State. For the new claims, the State filed an exception of

res judicata. The trial court ruled in favor of the State, dismissed the new

claims, and set the remaining, original issue for trial. Prior to trial, Clark

directed counsel for L&M not to comply with the trial court’s order to file a

pretrial order.

On the day of the trial, Clark maintained his directive to his lawyers.

With no pretrial order filed, Clark’s refusal to move forward with the trial,

and after multiple warnings given by the judge, the trial court dismissed all

of L&M’s claims with prejudice. We note that Clark even stated that he was

okay with the trial court dismissing his claims. On appeal, this Court

affirmed the trial court. L&M did not appeal that opinion.

Clark and L&M then started filing multiple suits, as detailed below, in

various state and federal courts. Those decisions ultimately led to a clear

and lengthy history of adverse outcomes for Clark and L&M. Those cases

reinforce our position that the trial court was correct in determining that res

judicata precludes Clark and L&M’s attempt to nullify the joint stipulations

and previous court rulings and opinions.
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DISCUSSION

Res judicata, taken from Latin, means “a matter judged.” At the heart

of the doctrine of res judicata are the desirable ideals of finality of judgment

and stability of law. A surplus benefit to res judicata is judicial economy. It

is necessary to safeguard the public’s confidence in the legal system as well

as to guarantee the efficient use of judicial resources. Res judicata allows

the public the ability to make future plans and take actions based on the final

judgments made by courts. By ensuring that matters that have already been

adjudicated are final and resolved, res judicata shields litigants from the

court system being used as a vehicle of harassment through the costs and

vexation of multiple lawsuits. See Allen v McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.

Ct. 411 (1980). It further safeguards the court system from a burdensome

depletion of resources that would be caused by the proliferation of frivolous

lawsuits that have already been adjudicated to finality.

Some incorrectly argue that res judicata is extreme, in that it deprives

a litigant of their day in court. Such an argument could not be further from

the truth. “Res judicata forecloses both the litigation of matters that have not

been litigated but should have been raised in the earlier suit (claim

preclusion) and matters previously litigated and decided (issue preclusion).”

Priority Nurse Staffing, Inc. v. Tanshi, LLC, 52,463 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/27/19), 265 So. 3d 1177, 1182; Alpine Meadows, L.C. v. Winkler, 49,490

(La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/14), 154 So.3d 747, writ denied, 2015-0292 (La.

04/24/15), 169 So. 3d 357. Therefore, at the heart of res judicata is the

principle that the litigant involved either failed to properly raise a now

precluded issue in the first lawsuit or the litigant in fact had a full trial, yet

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an undesirable outcome. Thus, res judicata starts with the premise that the

litigant, in fact, has already had his or her day in court.

It must be remembered that res judicata is designed to preclude

subsequent, redundant litigation. If we allow parties to litigate a second time

that which is already final merely because of their failure in previous suits or

their aversion for prior outcomes of the same issues, we would be endorsing

the idea that final judgments are meaningless. See Peter Wilbert Arbour,

The Louisiana Concept of Res Judicata, 34 La. L. Rev. 763 (1974).

“The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is

reviewed de novo on appeal.” Priority Nurse Staffing, Inc., 265 So. 3d at

1182; City of Bastrop v. Harris, 50,727 (La. App. 2d Cir. 6/22/16), 198 So.

3d 163. The scales of justice are weighted heavily against the appellants in

the case before us. Not including the countless state and federal district

courts that have tried and decided matters connected with the issues

presented before us now, Clark sought and received previous appellate

opinions in eleven different proceedings. Those decisions include opinions

and considerations from several different courts including the Supreme

Court of the United States, the Louisiana Supreme Court, the United States

Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit,

and this Court.

In 1989, this Court heard its first appeal of this matter. See State,

Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Clark, 548 So. 2d 365 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/23/89),

writ denied, 552 So. 2d 395 (La. 1989). At issue was the state’s appeal of

the trial court’s award in excess of the stipulated value of the property. Id.

This Court reversed the trial court’s award, limiting it to the stipulated value.

Id. It further distinguished the rights of Clark as separate from the rights of
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L&M. Id. It reversed the trial court’s award of any damages associated with

L&M because it was not a party to the suit. Id. The Louisiana Supreme

Court denied writs.

In 1993, this Court heard its second appeal of this matter. See L & M

Hair Care Products, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 622 So. 2d 1194

(La. App. 2 Cir. 7/18/93), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 1126 (La. 1993). At issue

was an appeal by the State of the trial court’s denial of its exception of

prescription against L&M. Id. In that matter, L&M had now asserted its

separate action and the state filed an exception based on L&M’s cause of

action being prescribed. Id. The trial court denied the exception and this

Court affirmed. Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs.

In 1997, this Court heard its third appeal of this matter. See L & M

Hair Products, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 29,998 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/10/97), 704 So. 2d 415. At issue was L&M’s appeal of the trial

court’s dismissal with prejudice of all L&M and Clark claims. Id. Clark, as

both intervenor and as the president of L&M, refused to allow his and

L&M’s attorneys to file pretrial orders, despite the trial court’s direction to

do so. Id. Clark further refused to participate in the trial scheduled to

commence that day. Id. The trial court dismissed all the claims with

prejudice. Id. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Id. Neither

Clark nor L&M appealed that decision, making it a final judgment.

In February of 1999, this Court heard its fourth appeal regarding

issues related to this matter. See Clark v. Mangham, Hardy, Rolfs & Abadie,

30,471 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/24/99), 733 So. 2d 43. At issue was an appeal by

Clark and L&M of the trial court sustaining an exception of no cause of

action filed by the defendant law firm. Id. Clark and L&M had sued their
6

previous law firm for malpractice. Id. They had also filed a motion to

recuse the trial judge, which another judge of the district court denied. Id.

This Court affirmed the trial court on all issues. Id. Clark and L&M did not

apply for writs.

In June of 1999, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit,

heard its first appeal related to this matter. See Clark v. Louisiana ex. rel.

La. Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 184 F. 3d 816 (5th Cir. 1999). In the United

States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Clark and L&M

had filed suit against the State and numerous state and local officials. Id.

On appeal, in an unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

found that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the record showed that no

federal judgment had been entered in the case at the district court. Id. The

appellate court further cautioned Clark that any additional appeals filed

would invite the imposition of sanctions. Id.

Clark did not heed the warnings of the federal appellate court. Later

in June of 1999, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in an

unpublished dismissal without opinion, dismissed another appeal by Clark.

See Clark v. Pena, 189 F. 3d 467 (5th Cir. 1999). That appeal was in

relation to a separate federal suit by Clark and L&M against Federico Pena,

the United States Secretary of Transportation. Id. Thereafter, but related to

the dismissal by the federal appellate court, in August of 1999, the federal

appellate court issued an unreported order citing its assessment of sanctions

against Clark. See Clark v. Pena, 1999 WL 34844548 (5th Cir. 1999). It

approved and imposed $13,025.20 in sanctions against Clark. Id.

In 2008, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, heard its first

appeal related to this matter. See Clark v. La. Dept. of Transp. & Dev.,
7

2007-1364 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/08), 2008 WL 2065248, writ denied, 2008-

1549 (La. 10/10/08), 993 So. 2d 1286. That appeal and the subsequent,

unpublished opinion by the court is one of which we take particular note. At

issue were the same issues that now sit before us. Id. After recounting the

numerous, preceding opinions by this Court and the rulings and judgments

of the First Judicial District Court in Caddo Parish, the court detailed the

heart of the case before it as follows:

Thereafter, the Clarks and L & M filed several lawsuits in state
and federal court seeking additional compensation and damages
as a result of the expropriation that occurred in 1986. Among
the suits filed is the current matter, which was filed as a petition
for a writ of mandamus in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
in East Baton Rouge Parish on March 8, 1996. In the petition,
L & M named DOTD, its secretary, and its real estate
administrator as defendants. L & M later amended its petition
to add defendants and to seek additional relief, including
nullification of the expropriation judgments and judgments
rendered in other suits filed by the Clarks and L & M in state
and federal courts. Herein, the trial court, by judgments
rendered on October 31, 2005 and September 11, 2006,
dismissed all of L & M’s claims. It is from these two
judgments that L & M now appeals.

Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The trial court had found no basis for

nullification of the prior stipulated agreement and it found res judicata

precluded the issues before it. Id.

The First Circuit affirmed the trial court. Id. First, the court found no

valid claim for absolute nullity. Id. It held that the pleadings did not support

any ground for a vice to nullify the stipulated agreement. Id. Second, the

court found no reason to overturn the trial court’s application of res judicata.

Id. We liberally quote from the opinion of the First Circuit:

The objection of res judicata raised by peremptory exception is
ordinarily based upon a final judgment between the parties;
however, when parties put an end to a lawsuit by adjusting their
differences and entering into a written transaction or
compromise, that written instrument has the effect of a thing
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adjudged between the parties. As the Joint Stipulation
constitutes such an agreement, the document is properly held to
bar any subsequent litigation as to the parties and the matters
addressed therein. Although L & M was not a party to the
litigation that provoked the creation of the Joint Stipulation, it
nevertheless, as quoted above, was a party to the Joint
Stipulation and as a consequence, L & M is bound by the
effects of that agreement, including the effect of res judicata.
…
As for the additional claims of alleged federal civil rights
violations raised by L & M in the instant matter, the record
reveals that these claims have also been previously considered
and adjudged in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Louisiana, under Civil Action Number 98-1753.
…
Hence, it is clear that L & M’s claims of federal civil rights
violations have not only been previously presented, but have
also been considered and adjudged.
…
Considering that L & M had an opportunity to present its
separate claims for compensation and damages relative to the
expropriation proceedings and had even previously recovered a
judgment in its favor on its claims for relocation costs, on our
review of the record before us, we find that no exceptional
circumstances exist that would warrant granting L & M relief
from the res judicata effect of prior judgments addressing the
same issues raised in this lawsuit.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgments appealed.

Id. at 6-8. The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently denied writs.

In 2012, the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, heard yet

another matter related to the instant litigation. See Clark v. Pena, 471 Fed.

Appx. 398 (5th Cir. 2012). In an unpublished opinion, the court denied

Clark’s attempt to declare void previous decisions by the federal district

court and its own imposition of sanctions. Id. The court liberally construed

Clark’s pro se brief and denied any relief. Id. We note that those sanctions

were related to multiple, frivolous appeals related to the same issues as the

case now before us.

In 2013, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit heard its

second appeal in this matter. See Clark v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev.,
9

2013-0371 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/8/2013), 2013 WL 5972214, writ denied,

2014-0814 (La. 6/13/14), 140 So. 3d 1191, cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 713

(2014). At issue were the same issues before it previously, which we note

are the same issues now before us. Clark sought the nullification of all

previous state and federal decisions against them and L&M. Id. In short

order, the First Circuit affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion and

found the following:

Our review of the record before us confirms these findings of
the United States Fifth Circuit that the prior federal judgments
were not only valid, but serve to bar further litigation based on
res judicata.

In regards to the state court proceedings, we likewise find that
Mr. Clark is seeking the same relief that was previously
rejected by the trial court in this matter and affirmed by our
court on appeal. Thus, considering the record before us, the
state law of res judicata as provided in La. R.S. 13:4231, and
jurisprudence interpreting the same, we find no error of law or
abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment by summary disposition[.]1

Id. at 3-4. We note that not only did the Louisiana Supreme Court deny

writs, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Clark’s writ of

certiorari.

In review of the law and jurisprudence relating to res judicata and in

consideration of the lengthy procedural and case history of Clark and L&M

before this Court and several other state and federal appellate courts, we find

appellant’s arguments to be without merit. It is clear from the record that the

issues before us now have previously been adjudicated to finality.

1
In its previous 2008 opinion, the First Circuit explained that “[b]ecause L & M’s
petition in docket number 363,679[, the docket number from the original L&M petition in
Caddo Parish,] was filed before January 1, 1991, the preclusive effect of the judgments in
that suit is governed by the pre-revision law of res judicata.” Clark, 2008 WL 2065248 at
5.
10

Additionally, multiple state and federal courts have already held that res

judicata precludes relitigation of the same issues.

The joint stipulations and agreements entered into by Clark and the

State preclude the appellants from litigating the matters before us. Clark and

L&M were party to and joined in the stipulated agreement that they now

wish to have nullified. In our review of the record and the lengthy history of

this case we have found no vice or reason to nullify the agreements. The

agreements resolved the issues with regard to the expropriation of the three

lots of land and they were made final over thirty years ago. Therefore, res

judicata precludes Clark from litigating again those matters.

Furthermore, res judicata attaches and bars the petitions for nullity on

their face because several other appellate courts have already found and

decided such. Based on those previous decisions alone, res judicata attaches

and precludes the petitions. Therefore, res judicata not only attached to

preclude Clark from further litigation based on the stipulated agreements, it

also attached when the other state and federal appellate courts resolved the

issue earlier.

Additionally, the federal rights issues asserted by Clark and L&M

have no merit and are further barred by res judicata. It is clear that the

previous federal district and appellate court decisions have completely

resolved those issues, precluding Clark from further litigation of them.

Finally, we observe that the record unequivocally shows that Clark

and L&M are again attempting to retry that which has already been

adjudicated and which has already been dismissed through previous, nearly

identical res judicata opinions. Clark has, on multiple occasions, in front of

multiple courts, stated that he simply dislikes the previous outcomes and
11

wishes to retry the exact same issues. Clark and L&M, without any doubt,

have clearly had their day in court and have no meritorious grievance left

with the issues at hand.

We hold that res judicata applies to preclude Clark’s petition for

nullification. We further find no merits to reverse the trial court’s denial of

Clark’s motion for retrial. Clark presented neither new law or evidence nor

any compelling reason for a new trial. We also find that Clark’s ex parte

motion for relief, wherein Clark sought an order to force the State to amend

and file afresh all expropriation suits and deposit money into the court’s

registry, has no merit. The trial court was correct in denying all relief as to

that motion. Therefore, we affirm the trial court in whole, on all issues

presented.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. All costs of this appeal

are assigned to the appellant.

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