State of Louisiana v. Joseph M. Bryant

Judgment rendered March 4, 2020.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,321-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JOSEPH M. BRYANT Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 327055

Honorable Brady D. O’Callaghan, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Holli Ann Herrle-Castillo

JOSEPH BRYANT Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

RICHARD S. FEINBERG
KODIE K. SMITH
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before WILLIAMS, STEPHENS, and McCALLUM, JJ.

McCALLUM, J.

Adjudicated a second-felony habitual offender after being convicted

of armed robbery and attempted aggravated rape, Joseph Bryant appeals his

habitual offender sentences, contending that they are unconstitutionally

excessive. Concluding that the sentences are justified and that the trial judge

did not abuse his discretion when imposing the sentences, we affirm them.

FACTS

The details of Bryant’s current offenses were set forth in a prior

appeal in this matter:

On the morning of August 22, 2014, the victim, SS, was home
alone watching television when her doorbell rang. SS looked
through the peephole, and observed a tall, dark-skinned black
male, wearing a baseball cap, holding a business card. The
man, later identified as the defendant, Joseph M. Bryant,
indicated that he worked for a tree service and inquired if SS
desired service at her home. SS declined, but cracked the door
open just enough to take the business card from Bryant. As she
opened the door, Bryant put his foot in the threshold of the
door. SS noted the perpetrator was much larger than she.
Bryant asked SS if her husband was home. When she said no,
Bryant forced his way into SS’s home.

Once inside the home, SS observed Bryant holding a
pocketknife. Bryant ordered SS not to scream and told her, “I
am going to rape you and kill you,” a threat he repeatedly made
during the assault. SS and Bryant walked from the entryway of
her home, through the dining room, into the kitchen, and
eventually ended up in the den. While in the den, Bryant threw
SS onto the sofa and again informed her that he was going to
rape her. While still armed with the pocketknife, Bryant then
straddled SS, throwing both of his legs on the outside of both of
SS’s legs and untied her robe. SS was wearing only a robe,
nightshirt, and underwear. After untying SS’s robe, Bryant
lifted up SS’s nightshirt and touched her vagina on top of her
underwear. Throughout the incident, SS continually pleaded
for her life and Bryant repeatedly told SS that he planned to
rape and kill her. While pleading for her life, SS offered Bryant
her vehicle, money, and jewelry. Bryant became interested in
the money and got off SS, at which point she wrapped her robe
around herself. Bryant followed her to the master bedroom to
retrieve her purse. The two went back into the den, where
Bryant took $120 cash from SS. Somehow, with his knife still

drawn, the two ended back up in the bedroom. For a second
time, Bryant threw SS onto the bed and told her he would rape
her. Bryant, again, untied SS’s robe and straddled her - she
could not move. SS made every effort to protect herself as she
was being attacked.

Suddenly, Bryant stopped, sat up on the bed, and instructed SS
to fix her robe. He then began to tell SS that she was a nice
person and told her that his daughter had recently been killed.
Bryant became emotional and began to weep. At that point,
Bryant got off the bed and the two went into the sunroom,
through the den, into the entryway, and arrived at SS’s front
door. Bryant asked for a hug, SS relented, and Bryant exited
the home. Having learned SS’s first name at some point during
the incident, Bryant called out to her from the other side of the
door using her name. Bryant asked to reenter the home, and SS
refused. Bryant then asked if SS intended to call the police and
requested reentry a second time. Again, SS refused and
eventually Bryant left. Afraid to call the police, SS called her
husband, who then called police.

Later, Bryant was apprehended in connection with other
incidents and arrested. When SS was shown a six-person
photographic lineup, she identified Bryant as the man who
entered her home on the morning of August 22, 2014. SS
additionally made an in-court identification of Bryant at his
trial.

State v. Bryant, 52,743, pp. 1-3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 874,

876-7, writ denied, 19-01320 (La. 10/08/19), 280 So. 3d 171.

Bryant was charged by bill of information with attempted aggravated

rape (La. R.S. 14:42 and 14:27)1 and armed robbery (La. R.S. 14:64).

Bryant’s mental status became an issue leading up to trial. On September

14, 2015, the trial judge ordered Bryant’s commitment upon finding that he

lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to

assist in his defense. The Eastern Louisiana Mental Health System Forensic

Division (“state hospital”) discharged Bryant in March of 2016 on the basis

that he had the mental capacity to proceed. Following a hearing on May 31,

1
Aggravated rape is now designated as first degree rape. La. R.S. 14:42.
2

2016, the trial judge determined that Bryant had not regained competency

and ordered his return to the state hospital.

Another sanity hearing was held on January 10, 2017, during which

the trial judge heard testimony from treating providers that Bryant presented

one affect when he was being evaluated and a different affect at other times.

The providers also asserted that Bryant was competent to stand trial. The

trial judge ruled that Bryant had been restored to competency.

On November 8, 2017, Bryant was convicted as charged of armed

robbery and attempted aggravated rape. Bryant filed a motion for new trial

as well as a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. Both motions

were denied.

On December 13, 2017, the State filed a habitual offender bill against

Bryant charging him as a third-felony habitual offender. Bryant had been

convicted of the two predicate felonies, robbery and sexual assault, in Dallas

County, Texas, on October 31, 1994. He had received a sentence of 10

years for the sexual assault, and a sentence of 20 years for the robbery. The

predicate felonies had been committed on different dates. The robbery

occurred on June 19, 1992, while the sexual assault occurred on April 9,

1994. According to testimony at that habitual offender proceeding, records

from Texas indicated that Bryant’s departure date from the Texas

Department of Corrections was February 7, 2014.

On January 4, 2018, Bryant was adjudicated a third-felony habitual

offender and sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. The trial judge concluded that the

mandatory sentence of life without parole, probation, or suspension, as

dictated by La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b), was appropriate considering not only
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the violent nature of the current offenses, but also the brief time between

Bryant’s release from incarceration and the commission of the current

offenses.

A motion to reconsider sentence was filed on January 18, 2018.

Bryant’s counsel contended that Bryant was 18 years old when previously

convicted and that he suffered from mental health issues.2 The court denied

the motion.

Bryant appealed his convictions and sentence. The first assignment of

error asserted that the trial court erred in finding Bryant competent to

proceed to trial. In the second assignment of error, Bryant’s counsel argued

that the trial court erred in adjudicating Bryant a third-felony offender. This

Court found no merit to the first assignment of error and affirmed Bryant’s

convictions. However, this Court vacated Bryant’s habitual offender

adjudication and remanded for resentencing. Pursuant to La. R.S.

15:529.1(B) and State v. Shaw, 06-2467 (La. 11/27/07), 969 So. 2d 1233, the

predicate convictions were to be counted as one conviction because they

were obtained on the same date and prior to October 19, 2004. State v.

Bryant, supra.

Upon remand, Bryant was adjudicated a second-felony habitual

offender on July 24, 2019, and sentenced on each count to 65 years at hard

labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The

sentences were to be served concurrently. Defense counsel objected to the

sentences. The trial judge noted the objection and stated that the sentences

were actually lower than the midrange sentences requested by the defense.

2
A presentence investigation report prepared on December 27, 2017, reflected
that Bryant’s birthdate was February 24, 1975.
4

Bryant was advised by the trial judge that he had 30 days to appeal his

sentences and 2 years to seek post-conviction relief.

Bryant filed a motion to reconsider sentence on July 26, 2019. He

asked the court to reconsider the sentences imposed because of his young

age at the time of the predicate offenses and because he suffered from

mental health issues. The trial judge denied the motion, noting in a written

ruling that he had carefully considered the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances and concluded that the sentences were appropriate. The trial

judge added that after reviewing the motion and the reasons stated in court,

his opinion remained that the sentences were reasonable. Bryant has

appealed his sentences.

DISCUSSION

Bryant’s sole assignment of error on appeal is that his sentences are

unjustified and unconstitutionally excessive. He maintains that the trial

judge did not properly consider the long history or magnitude of his mental

illness and the effect it had on his behavior. In support of this argument,

Bryant’s appellate counsel refers to a competency evaluation report as well

as testimony given by physicians at the competency hearings.

A competency evaluation was conducted by Dr. George Seiden on

July 17, 2015. During the evaluation, Bryant informed Dr. Seiden that he

heard voices that told him to do bad things. Dr. Seiden also noted that

Bryant appeared to be responding to voices during the evaluation. Bryant

reported having hallucinations, including some where he ate bloody bodies.

Bryant also told Dr. Seiden that he had attempted suicide several times. Dr.

Seiden’s diagnosis was schizophrenia.

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Drs. Marc Colon and Ashleigh Fleming examined Bryant on August

25, 2015. Bryant told them about a history of psychiatric treatment dating

back to when he first saw a psychiatrist at the age of 9 or 10 after he set his

stepfather’s bed afire. He also reported delusions of control and paranoia, as

well as hallucinations.

Bryant was ordered committed on September 14, 2015. However, he

was discharged from the state hospital and sent back to the Caddo

Correctional Center (“CCC”) in March of 2016.

Dr. Dennis Kelly, a staff psychiatrist at the state hospital, testified at

an April 27, 2016, hearing that Bryant had been diagnosed with

schizoaffective disorder of a bipolar type and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Dr. Kelly also testified that Bryant had been subjected to an aggressive

treatment regimen at the state hospital. Bryant continued to report

hallucinations and suicidal thoughts. Dr. Kelly agreed that Bryant had a

significant history of mental illness.

Dr. Colon, who treated Bryant at CCC, testified at a hearing

conducted on May 31, 2016. Dr. Colon stated that Bryant had been

withdrawn and psychotic since his return to CCC. Bryant also refused to

accept medical and psychiatric treatment there. Bryant, who had attempted

suicide by overdose twice, was placed on suicide watch. Bryant had also

complained of hallucinations, and in one instance, had punched a wall. Dr.

Colon did not think that Bryant was malingering in order to avoid going to

trial, but thought that his condition was related to chronic mental illness. Dr.

Colon recommended a specific medication and electroconvulsive therapy if

Bryant returned to the state hospital.

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Drs. Laura Brown and John Roberts testified at a sanity hearing on

January 10, 2017. Dr. Brown, accepted as an expert in the field of forensic

psychiatry, had assessed Bryant at the state hospital. She thought Bryant

probably suffered from a depressive type of mental illness, and possibly a

personality disorder.

Dr. Roberts, who was accepted as an expert in the field of psychiatry,

treated Bryant when he was at the state hospital in 2016. He testified that

Bryant had been diagnosed with a depressive disorder and an unspecified

personality disorder, and he possibly had some psychosis as well. Bryant

also reported hearing voices with command hallucinations. Dr. Roberts

acknowledged that Bryant’s records showed that he had a long psychiatric

history. Bryant had been prescribed medicines for mood stabilization and

for the treatment of psychosis.

While Dr. Roberts was testifying about one of Bryant’s suicide

attempts, Bryant disrupted the proceedings by shouting, “Liar, liar, liar,

liar.” Dr. Roberts thought the outburst could be indicative of mental illness

or possibly frustration over his situation. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the trial judge described Bryant’s conduct in court for the record. Bryant,

who was handcuffed to a wheelchair, had leapt forward and tried to leave the

courtroom through the inmate entrance while dragging the wheelchair

behind him.

Bryant’s appellate counsel also refers to a mental health evaluation

report in the Texas Department of Corrections records which showed that

Bryant had been diagnosed with impulse control, kleptomania, pyromania,

and intermittent explosive disorder. Finally, counsel asserts that Bryant’s

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actions during the current offenses were bizarre and indicative of someone

with mental health issues.

The State argues in opposition that Bryant was found competent to

stand trial following numerous competency hearings during which his

mental health issues were thoroughly discussed and several doctors testified

that Bryant was a malingerer. The State notes that Bryant’s convictions are

of the same nature as his two prior felony convictions, and that the

concurrent 65-year sentences are well within the applicable ranges and are

not the maximum sentences available. The State points out that because the

trial judge observed Bryant during his multiple competency hearings, at trial,

and at sentencing, he was in the best position to consider Bryant’s age and

mental health issues and weigh those factors against the trauma that Bryant

caused the victim and his prior convictions of the same nature. The State

maintains that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and that the

sentences imposed are not constitutionally excessive.

A reviewing court imposes a two-prong test to determine whether a

sentence is excessive. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long

as the record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article.

State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App.

2 Cir. 4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 596. The court shall state for the record the

considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing

sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(C). The articulation of the factual basis

for the sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or

mechanical compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows
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an adequate factual basis for the sentence, resentencing is unnecessary even

where there has not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State

v. Fontenot, 49,835 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/27/15), 166 So. 3d 1215.

The defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status,

health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the

offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation are important elements to

consider. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v. Boehm, supra.

There is no requirement that specific matters be given any particular weight

at sentencing. State v. Boehm, supra.

Second, a sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out

of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Dorthey,

623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993). A sentence is considered grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-

0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.

A trial court has wide discretion to sentence within the statutory

limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse of that discretion, a sentence

will not be set aside as excessive. On review, an appellate court does not

determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Boehm, supra.

At resentencing, the trial judge reviewed the applicable sentencing

ranges for both convictions under the habitual offender law as written at the

time the instant offenses were committed on August 22, 2014. For

attempted aggravated rape, the sentencing range was 10 to 50 years at hard

labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La.
9

R.S. 14:42; 14:27. As a second-felony habitual offender under La. R.S.

15:529.1(A)(2)(a), Bryant faced a potential sentence of two-thirds to three

times the longest sentence, or 33 to 150 years, because he had a prior

conviction for sexual assault.

For armed robbery, the sentencing range was 10 to 99 years at hard

labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. La.

R.S. 14:64. Under La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1), Bryant faced a potential

sentence of one-half the longest sentence to two times the longest sentence,

or 49.5 to 198 years.

At resentencing, the trial judge stated that he had previously

considered all of the relevant factors under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. In

particular, he considered Bryant’s criminal history and mental health issues,

which the trial judge was familiar with from having considered Bryant’s

competency to stand trial. The trial judge noted that Bryant had a prior

conviction for sexual assault of a minor and now had a conviction for sexual

assault of an adult, and that his prior conviction for robbery had elevated to a

new conviction for armed robbery. The trial judge found that the similarity

and nature of the instant offenses as compared to the prior offenses indicated

that a serious sentence was both appropriate and necessary. The trial judge

also remarked that while Bryant’s mental health problems were a mitigating

factor, that factor was grossly outweighed by the trauma to the victim and

Bryant’s criminal history.

The sentences imposed were particularized to Bryant. Despite having

already served considerable time for two similar crimes, Bryant engaged in

serious criminal activity not long after being released in Texas. The fact and

severity of Bryant’s ongoing mental health issues were thoroughly addressed
10

in the competency hearings. Moreover, those mental health issues were

clearly considered by the trial judge when fashioning a punishment that was

well below half the maximum allowed for each offense under the habitual

offender statute.

The State argued at resentencing that sentences at the higher end of

the ranges were warranted. Defense counsel countered that in light of

Bryant’s mental health issues, mid-range sentences were more appropriate.

The 65-year sentences imposed fall within the statutory range, are far from

the maximum available sentences of 150 and 198 years, and were ordered to

be served concurrently. Notably, the sentences imposed are actually less

than the midrange sentences sought by Bryant’s counsel at resentencing.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, and in consideration of

the harm done to society, the sentences imposed on Bryant are not

disproportionate and do not shock the sense of justice. The sentences were

absolutely justified. There is no showing that the trial judge abused his

discretion in the sentences imposed. These sentences are not

unconstitutionally excessive.

CONCLUSION

Bryant’s habitual offender sentences are AFFIRMED.

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