State of Louisiana v. Brandon S. Butler

Judgment rendered April 22, 2020.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,360-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

BRANDON S. BUTLER Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 205,973

Honorable Michael Nerren, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ANDREW JACOBS
JOHN MICHAEL LAWRENCE
DOUG STINSON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before MOORE, GARRETT, and THOMPSON, JJ.

GARRETT, J.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Brandon S. Butler, was

convicted as charged of two counts of first degree murder. He received

consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant appealed. We affirm

the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

FACTS

In May 2014, Jacqueline Beadle and Karyl Cox were roommates who

shared a one-story, three-bedroom house in the 3000 block of Bragg Street

in Bossier City. Ms. Beadle, who had a young son, had lived there for about

a year; for seven to eight months of that time, her boyfriend, Shawn

Washington, lived with her until they broke up in early 2014. Ms. Cox had

resided in the Bragg Street house for approximately a month; she had a

young daughter, whose custody she shared with the child’s father.

On Friday, May 9, 2014, Ms. Beadle dropped her son off at the home

of her mother, Joanna Hanson, where he spent the night. On Saturday,

May 10, 2014, Ms. Hanson tried repeatedly and unsuccessfully to contact

Ms. Beadle by phone and text message. According to Ms. Hanson, it was

highly unusual for Ms. Beadle not to call to check on her son and talk to him

when he spent the night with his grandmother. Ms. Hanson called several of

her daughter’s friends, including Mr. Washington, to see if they had heard

from her. On Sunday, May 11, 2014, which was Mother’s Day, Ms. Hanson

went to the Bragg Street house at about 6:30 a. m. because she was worried

about her daughter. When she arrived, she noticed that her daughter’s car

was there, but Ms. Cox’s blue, four-door Chevy Cruze sedan was not. She

entered the locked residence with a key and found the dog confined in its

crate in the kitchen and “going crazy.” After letting the dog go outside, Ms.

Hanson went into her daughter’s bedroom, where she discovered Ms.

Beadle’s body on the floor under a comforter. She had been stabbed several

times and shot in the forehead. Ms. Hanson then went into Ms. Cox’s

bedroom, where she discovered her body in bed under the covers. She too

had been shot in the forehead; she also had several other gunshot wounds.1

Ms. Hanson went outside and called 911.

Law enforcement officers arrived and cordoned off the house with

crime scene tape. At some point that day, the defendant approached an

officer outside the house and asked to speak to a detective. Detective Jeffery

Humphrey of the Bossier City Police Department (“BCPD”) talked to the

defendant, who said that Ms. Cox was his best friend. Thereafter, Detective

Humphrey took the defendant to the police station for an interview in which

he answered general questions about the victims.

By the following day, Monday, May 12, examination of the crime

scene had disclosed the defendant’s fingerprint on the door of Ms. Beadle’s

bedroom in a red substance that appeared to be blood.2 The defendant was

asked to give a second interview. During the first part of this interview, the

defendant spoke to Detective Michael Hardesty for about 33 minutes. He

described Ms. Cox as his best friend, stated that they spoke almost daily, and

said that he was at her house about four days a week. However, he informed

1
The record indicates that Ms. Cox’s child was with her father at the time of the
murders.
2
Jeffery Ross, a BCPD crime scene detective, testified that he observed
fingerprints in a substance that appeared to be blood on Ms. Beadle’s bedroom door.
However, he did not believe a test was done to determine if it was actually blood.
Michelle Vrana, the DNA section supervisor at the North Louisiana Criminalistics
Laboratory (“NLCL”), testified that a sample of suspected blood from the door was
visually negative for blood. However, forensic testing of the sample obtained a partial
DNA profile that was consistent with Ms. Beadle.

2

the detective that he had not been at the Bragg Street house or in Ms. Cox’s

car since Tuesday, May 6. He claimed that he had been with Sekeona

Campbell, a former girlfriend who was visiting family in Shreveport, from

about 11 p.m. Friday night until 7:30 or 8:00 Saturday morning. He stated

that, because he did not have a car, his friend, Terrell Stewart, had given him

a ride to where Sekeona was staying. This portion of the interview ended

shortly after Detective Hardesty confronted the defendant about the bloody

fingerprint. The defendant vehemently denied being in the house on Friday

night and maintained that his fingerprint could not be on the door in blood.

When the interview resumed after a brief break, Detective Humphrey

took over questioning the defendant, who admitted being in the house Friday

night. He stated that, after Ms. Cox retired to her bedroom for the night, he

was with Ms. Beadle in her bedroom when her former boyfriend, Shawn

Washington, appeared at her partially open window. He said Ms. Beadle

jumped up, tripped on a cover, fell, and busted her nose on a dresser or

nightstand. The defendant said he helped her get up, and she told him to

leave, which he did. According to the defendant, Mr. Washington, who had

come through the window, was threatening to “fuck up” Ms. Beadle and kill

her. The defendant said he walked to the Orchard Apartments where he was

living, took a shower, and called Mr. Stewart for a ride. He revised his

arrival time at the place where Sekeona Campbell was staying to 1:30 or

2:00 a.m. Saturday morning. However, according to Sekeona, the defendant

did not arrive until about 4 a.m. Saturday morning and he was driving a

dark, four-door car which he said belonged to a female friend. She observed

a picture of a child in the area of the car’s speedometer.

3

After the victims’ bodies were found on Sunday morning, the police

utilized the GPS technology in Ms. Cox’s missing car to locate it in the

driveway of a vacant house in the 4000 block of Sheryl Street, which was

not far from the Orchard Apartments. There appeared to be blood on the

door and the driver’s seat. Forensic examination determined that the

defendant’s fingerprint was on the driver’s door handle and the blood on the

driver’s seat belonged to Ms. Beadle. Photos of the recovered car show

pictures of Ms. Cox’s young daughter prominently displayed on either side

of the speedometer.

During his second statement on Monday, the defendant told the police

that he had given his mother the clothes he was wearing Friday night to be

laundered. Later that day, the police retrieved them from the trunk of her car

and submitted them for testing. Ms. Beadle’s blood and DNA were found

on the defendant’s underwear.

In July 2014, the defendant was indicted on two counts of first degree

murder, and the state gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty. The

matter was set and reset for trial numerous times. In August 2018, the

matter was set for a four-week jury trial on March 11, 2019. The state

eventually withdrew the request for the death penalty in January 2019, at

which time the defense waived a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. The trial

date of March 11, 2019, was maintained.

Trial began March 11, 2019, and concluded on March 18, 2019. On

March 20, 2019, the trial court announced its verdicts in court, finding the

defendant guilty as charged on both counts of first degree murder, and

giving oral reasons for its decision. It also issued a written opinion in which

it extensively discussed the evidence presented at trial and detailed its

4

reasons for finding the defendant guilty. In May 2019, the trial court

imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on each count. It ordered that

the sentences be served consecutively.

The defendant appealed, asserting two assignments of error: (1) the

evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and

(2) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motions for continuance.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the

state presented sufficient evidence to support his convictions for the first

degree murders of Ms. Beadle and Ms. Cox. He argues that the state’s

evidence was insufficient because it did not exclude a reasonable hypothesis

of innocence, i.e., that Mr. Washington murdered the victims. Among the

facts he claimed that the trial court overlooked were the failure to take

fingernail scrapings from the victims, Mr. Washington’s palm print on Ms.

Beadle’s door frame, and matted grass under Ms. Beadle’s window.

Law

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 2001-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905,

124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Williams, 52,519 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 485, writ denied, 19-00718 (La. 10/21/19),

280 So. 3d 1172; State v. Brooks, 49,024 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So.

5

3d 1072, writ denied, 14-1202 (La. 2/13/15), 159 So. 3d 459. This standard,

now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the

appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So. 2d 517; State v. Brooks, supra.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Lambert, 52,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So. 3d 621; State v. Robinson, 50,643 (La. App. 2

Cir. 6/22/16), 197 So. 3d 717, writ denied, 16-1479 (La. 5/19/17), 221 So.

3d 78.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157

So. 3d 1127. For a case resting essentially upon circumstantial evidence,

that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.

R.S. 15:438; State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d

629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064.

6

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442;

State v. Brooks, supra. A reviewing court accords great deference to a trier

of fact’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in

part. State v. Lambert, supra; State v. Sims, 49,682 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/27/15), 162 So. 3d 595, writ denied, 15-0602 (La. 2/5/16), 186 So. 3d

1161. In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with

physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Lambert, supra.

La. R.S. 14:30 defines first degree murder, in relevant part, as follows:

A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
...

(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm upon more than one person.

Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the

circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1);

State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ

denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. As a state of mind, specific

intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the

circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s actions. State v.

Christopher, 50,943 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 255, writ denied,

16-2187 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 985. The discharge of a firearm at close

range and aimed at a person is indicative of a specific intent to kill or inflict

great bodily harm upon that person. State v. Mingo, supra. The

determination of whether the requisite intent is present is a question for the

trier of fact. State v. Walker, supra.

7

Testimony

The defendant’s trial took place over six days and involved the

testimony of 25 live witnesses and the admission of a voluminous number of

exhibits. Other evidence was received in the form of reports by expert

witnesses. In addition to the facts already mentioned, the evidence presented

established the following.

Detective Hardesty was the lead detective investigating the homicides.

After arriving at the crime scene on Sunday morning, he spoke with Ms.

Hanson, who informed him that Ms. Cox’s car was missing. He obtained

the GPS information that led to the discovery of the car on nearby Sheryl

Street. He went to that location and remained there until crime scene

personnel arrived to take charge of the vehicle.3 While there, he observed

that a deep ditch and a trail ran from the dead-end of Sheryl Street to the

Orchard Apartments. Upon returning to the crime scene on Bragg Street, he

went through the house. He noticed that the residence was warm, with a

temperature of 84.7 degrees. He also observed that the door to Ms. Cox’s

bedroom had been forced open. There was an empty safe sitting open on the

floor of Ms. Cox’s bedroom. In Ms. Beadle’s room, the mattress was bare.

A purse was found on the bed, as were its strewn contents.

Members of the BCPD crime scene unit processed the crime scene on

Bragg Street and Ms. Cox’s car. In addition to taking photographs, they

collected numerous pieces of evidence, including shell casings, fingerprints,

and the victims’ cell phones. They also swabbed various locations for DNA.

3
The exterior of the car was photographed at the Sheryl Street location. The
vehicle was then towed to a crime scene facility for processing. As previously noted, the
defendant’s fingerprint was found on the driver’s door handle and Ms. Beadle’s blood
was detected on the driver’s seat.

8

Detective Humphrey was also present at the crime scene. He was told

that someone outside wanted to talk to a detective. He spoke to the

defendant, who informed him that his friends were in the house and asked if

they were dead. Detective Humphrey took the defendant back to the BCPD

station to ask him general questions about the victims. The defendant told

him that Ms. Cox was his best friend and mentioned that she kept weed and

money in a safe.

As part of their investigation, both Detectives Hardesty and

Humphrey participated in a canvass of the neighborhood. Detective

Hardesty spoke to Jennifer Pearson, who lived next door to the victims. She

told him that she had not seen or heard anything unusual. The detectives

also spoke to other individuals who were close to the victims, including

former boyfriends, such as Mr. Washington.

Mr. Washington testified that he and Ms. Beadle broke up in early

2014, but he could not specifically recall when. He stated that he never had

a key to Ms. Beadle’s house and, when he lived there, he would either call or

knock to gain entry. He further stated that he had not been in her house

since their breakup. He admitted talking to Ms. Beadle around May 8 or

May 9, when she called to tell him she had gotten him a present for his

birthday on May 12, if he wanted to come get it. He testified that he never

went to pick it up. Ms. Beadle’s mother called him on Saturday or Sunday

looking for her daughter; he told her that he had not seen Ms. Beadle. He

denied killing Ms. Beadle and Ms. Cox.

At the time of the murders, Mr. Washington was living with his new

girlfriend, Nancy Campbell. By the time of trial, they were no longer

together. Nancy Campbell testified that Mr. Washington would drop her off

9

and pick her up from work. As a CNA supervisor, she worked 12-hour

shifts from 6:45 a.m. to 7:15 p.m. She said they would converse throughout

the day. She did not recall anything out of the ordinary happening on

Saturday. She testified that he took her to work on Sunday. She recalled

him telling her that he knew someone who was killed and that he seemed

sad. However, she could not recall when he told her. She said it could have

been when he was taking her to work, but it also could have been later.

On Monday, May 12, 2014, Detective Hardesty attended the victims’

autopsies. Ms. Beadle’s autopsy was conducted by Dr. James Traylor, Jr.

She had a fatal gunshot wound over her left eyebrow, which Dr. Traylor

characterized as a tight contact wound. Ms. Beadle had stab wounds to the

left side of her neck and her left shoulder. She also had incised wounds to

both hands which Dr. Traylor characterized as defensive wounds.

Additionally, she had suffered a blunt force injury to the left bridge of her

nose, as well as abrasions to various parts of her body, including her right

cheek, left collar bone, left arm, and left lower back. Dr. Lon Jin performed

Ms. Cox’s autopsy. She had sustained four gunshot wounds, including a

fatal contact wound to the forehead. She also had a near contact wound to

the left cheek, as well as gunshot wounds to both forearms or wrists which

were of intermediate range. One of the forearm gunshots had reentered her

right upper arm. Both forensic pathologists testified that no fingernail

scrapings were taken from the victims because the victims’ hands were not

bagged when the bodies arrived for autopsy.4 Dr. Traylor also noted that

4
However, during the testimony of Detective Matthew Childs, he was shown
photos he took at the crime scene depicting bags from the coroner’s office on the hands
of both victims.

10

they were not requested by law enforcement. Dr. Jin testified that the warm

temperature in the Bragg Street house negatively affected his ability to

determine the time of death. Carla White, a NLCL firearms examiner,

testified that the bullets recovered during the victims’ autopsies had similar

class characteristics, and that the four fired cartridge cases found in both

victims’ bedrooms and the one found in Ms. Cox’s hair during her autopsy

were all fired from the same gun. According to Detective Hardesty’s

testimony, neither the gun nor the knife used in the murders was ever

recovered.

Also on Monday, the detectives learned that the crime scene unit had

found the defendant’s fingerprint in a red substance on Ms. Beadle’s

bedroom door. As discussed supra, they interviewed the defendant a second

time. After he initially denied being at the Bragg Street house on Friday

night, the defendant admitted being there but claimed that Mr. Washington

was also present and angrily making death threats against Ms. Beadle.

While at the BCPD station, the defendant voluntarily gave the police his cell

phone for examination.

On Wednesday, May 14, 2014, after learning that the police wanted to

speak to him, Mr. Stewart voluntarily went to the BCPD station to give a

statement. Mr. Stewart testified that he drove the defendant to Bragg Street

on Sunday after hearing about the murders and that he was aware of the

defendant talking to the police. He further testified that, after speaking to

the police, the defendant asked Mr. Stewart to tell the authorities that he had

picked up the defendant “from the females’ house” on Friday night.

However, Mr. Stewart testified that he did not pick up the defendant or even

see him on Friday night. He also testified that, when he was with the

11

defendant on Sunday, the defendant never mentioned Mr. Washington.

Likewise, Latommorris Clark, the defendant’s best friend, testified that,

when he spent time with the defendant on Saturday afternoon and on

Sunday, he never mentioned Mr. Washington to him. Mr. Clark also stated

that, at the time of the murders, the defendant was “going through a lot,”

namely women problems, financial situations, trying to take care of his

children, and trying to “get [himself] together.”

Also on Wednesday, May 14, the police took a statement from

Sekeona Campbell in which she told them about the defendant’s visit. At

trial, she testified that the defendant came to see her at about 4 a.m. Saturday

morning in a dark, four-door car, which he said belonged to a female friend.

A photo of a child was in the area of the speedometer. Although she had

told the police the car was black, at trial she admitted that, due to “the hour

of the night” when she saw it, she could not be certain of its color. She

testified that the defendant stayed about three hours, during which time they

were intimate. Sekeona Campbell allowed the police to take photos of the

texts she exchanged with the defendant. Shortly after he left, he texted her

as follows: “[M]y mind was somewhere else but I promise to make it up to

u.” She texted him to find out what he meant. He later texted back: “Shit

got real for the first time last night.”

On Friday, May 16, 2014, the police got consent to search a house on

Camellia Lane in Bossier City where Christopher Wilson, a friend of the

defendant’s, lived with his mother. This house was located between the

place where Ms. Cox’s car was abandoned and the Orchard Apartments

where the defendant lived. Detective Childs, an investigator with the crime

scene unit, swabbed two areas of possible blood on the sliding glass back

12

door. According to Detective Childs, the house was less than a mile from

the Orchard Apartments. Ms. Vrana from the crime lab testified that she

obtained a partial DNA profile from one of the samples from the sliding

glass door which was consistent with Ms. Beadle. She estimated that the

probability of finding the same DNA profile from a randomly selected

individual was one in 713 million.

Mr. Wilson testified at trial that, on a night during the Mother’s Day

weekend, he had gone to a nightclub in Shreveport.5 After the club closed at

4 a.m., he went home, arriving between 4:15 and 4:30 a.m. He said he was

drunk and lying on his couch when Brandon entered his house through the

sliding glass door. Mr. Wilson testified that the defendant told him he had

robbed somebody. He told the defendant to leave. Later, Mr. Wilson and

his mother noticed a substance on the sliding glass door that looked like

blood. Mr. Wilson then told his mother about the defendant’s visit, and she

took him to the police station. He subsequently gave a recorded statement to

the police.

Evidence was presented pertaining to the defendant’s and Ms. Cox’s

cell phone usage. Randall Thomas, who worked in the cybercrimes unit of

the Bossier City Marshal’s Office, testified for the state that the defendant’s

cell phone was “pretty active” on Friday night to early Saturday morning.

None of the calls or texts were to or from Ms. Cox. However, there was a

period of an hour and 19 minutes, from 12:01 a.m. to 1:20 a.m., when there

5
Before Mr. Wilson testified, his mother was placed on the stand to give evidence
pertaining to his competency. She stated that her 35-year-old son had had issues since
birth and was considered “mild to moderate mentally handicapped.” He also had some
visual impairment. She said he was unable to live by himself and that he would get
confused sometimes. However, she admitted that he knew the difference between the
truth and a lie. The trial court made a preliminary finding of competency and allowed
Mr. Wilson to testify.

13

was no outgoing activity. A written report from defense expert Ryan

Ferreira concerning an extraction from Ms. Cox’s cell phone was admitted

into evidence by the defense in lieu of his live testimony. Ms. Cox’s cell

phone records revealed she used her cell phone frequently, but all outgoing

communication by her ended between 11:30 p.m. Friday night and 12:30

a.m. Saturday morning.

During its case, the defense presented the testimony of several of the

victims’ neighbors in an effort to show that the victims were alive after

Friday night. Jennifer Pearson testified that on Saturday afternoon she saw

Ms. Beadle arguing with a black man in the front yard and that Ms. Cox

came out the front door to tell them to stop before the police were called.

Ms. Pearson testified that she thought the man was Mr. Washington, but her

boyfriend told her it was the defendant. Ms. Pearson also testified that on

multiple occasions Ms. Beadle and Mr. Washington argued in the yard and

that he drove by and screamed at Ms. Beadle. According to her testimony,

Mr. Washington came to her house on Friday night into Saturday morning

and said he was going to kill Ms. Beadle. However, she admitted telling a

police officer that she did not see or hear anything unusual around the time

of the murders. Detective Hardesty was recalled on rebuttal and testified

that, when he talked to Ms. Pearson on Sunday, she did not mention that, on

Friday night into early Saturday morning, she saw Mr. Washington and

heard him say he was going to kill Ms. Beadle. Instead, she said that she

had not heard or seen anything unusual.

Another neighbor, Gloria Brown, testified that on Saturday she

observed four or five people in the front yard of the victims’ residence.

Only one car was in the driveway and other cars were parked on the street.

14

She also saw a girl on a bicycle who was talking to a guy in the road by the

sidewalk. She admitted that she did not know the victims and what they

looked like. Tammy Evans, whose home was catty-cornered from the

victims’ house, testified that on Saturday evening she saw five or six cars

parked along the road. She also asserted that she saw people going in and

out of the victims’ house but could not say how many.

The neighborhood postman, Jeffery Moosman, testified that, when he

was delivering mail on Saturday morning, he noticed that their dog was not

in the victims’ yard barking at him as it usually was on the weekend. He

also said that on Saturday there was only an unfamiliar rusty brown car at

the house. He testified that he reported this information to a police officer

on Monday. On rebuttal, that officer, Tiffany Brinkman, testified that he

told her about the dog not barking on Saturday. However, he also told her

that there was normally a silver car in the driveway which he did not see

Saturday. As to the two vehicles that were in the driveway Monday, he told

her that Saturday was the first time he had seen them there.

On rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of Josh Woodard, the

general manager of the restaurant where Ms. Cox worked. He said that

during the three years she worked for him, she was a “dream employee” who

was never late and never missed work. On the rare occasion she was late,

she called to let them know. He testified that she worked Friday night and

was scheduled to work on Saturday morning at 10:30 a.m. However, she did

not show up for work or call on Saturday. Additionally, he received no

response to the phone call or text messages he sent her that day.

15

Judge’s Oral and Written Reasons

The trial court gave both oral and written reasons for its verdicts of

guilty of first degree murder. Consequently, we have the benefit of the trial

court’s analysis and credibility determinations.

As to the defense’s argument that the evidence did not support a guilty

verdict because the exact time of death could not be determined, the trial

court found otherwise. While the heat in the house precluded the

pathologists who performed the autopsies from using normal forensic

methods to determine the time of death, the trial court concluded that there

was sufficient other evidence to make the determination that the deaths

occurred late Friday night or early Saturday morning. This included Ms.

Hanson’s inability to contact her daughter by call or text all day Saturday

and Ms. Beadle’s corresponding failure to contact her mother as she usually

did when her mother was babysitting her young son. The trial court also

cited the testimony of Mr. Woodard that Ms. Cox was a highly dependable

employee and that she failed to report for work at 10:30 Saturday morning or

call or respond to his attempts to communicate with her. The trial court

further looked to the data recovered from Ms. Cox’s cell phone which

showed her to be an active cell phone user; all outgoing communication by

Ms. Cox ended abruptly between 11:30 p.m. Friday night and 12:30 a.m.

Saturday morning. As to the defense testimony put forth by Ms. Pearson

that she saw the victims on Saturday afternoon, the trial court noted that this

was inconsistent with her statement to Detective Hardesty on Sunday that

she had seen nothing unusual, and, furthermore, she also failed to tell the

detective anything about Mr. Washington allegedly being at her home and

threatening Ms. Beadle in the early hours of Saturday morning.

16

The trial court concisely enumerated the direct and circumstantial

evidence tying the defendant to the murders. It included: the defendant’s

statement placing him at the crime scene on Friday night into early Saturday;

his fingerprint in a substance containing Ms. Beadle’s DNA which may or

may not have been blood; his fingerprint in Ms. Cox’s car, which was found

abandoned near his apartment, along with Ms. Beadle’s blood on the driver’s

seat; Ms. Beadle’s DNA at Mr. Wilson’s house where the defendant

appeared early Saturday morning; Ms. Beadle’s blood on the underwear

worn by the defendant on Friday night; Sekeona Campbell’s testimony that

placed him in Ms. Cox’s car at about 4 a.m. Saturday; and Mr. Stewart’s

testimony that the defendant asked him to give him a false alibi.

As to witness credibility, the trial court found all evidence presented

by law enforcement personnel and all expert witnesses to be credible. The

trial court specifically found Sekeona Campbell and Mr. Woodard to be

“extremely credible.” Also deemed credible were the defendant’s friends,

Mr. Stewart and Mr. Clark. While the court stated that Mr. Wilson appeared

credible, his testimony was “significantly discounted due to his

intoxication.” However, the court stated it believed that Mr. Wilson saw the

defendant at his house sometime on Saturday morning and that this specific

part of his testimony was corroborated by the discovery of Ms. Beadle’s

DNA at his home. All other lay witnesses presented by the state were

deemed credible; however, the court found their testimony provided little

information pertinent to the determination of the defendant’s guilt or

innocence.

As to the lay witnesses presented by the defense, the trial court found

Ms. Pearson “less than credible” and discounted her testimony in its entirety,

17

noting that it differed completely from her statement to the police in 2014.

In its oral reasons, the trial court additionally stated that her testimony

appeared to be “fabricated” and that it made “absolutely no sense” that she

would not have told the police about Mr. Washington’s presence at her

house and his alleged threats against Ms. Beadle when the victims were

found dead about 24 to 36 hours later.

Although not mentioned in the written reasons, the trial court

discussed Mr. Moosman’s testimony in its oral reasons. It observed that,

while his testimony about the cars at the house was confusing, the unusual

absence of the dog from the yard on Saturday was corroborated by Ms.

Hansen’s testimony about finding the dog inside the house in its kennel on

Sunday.6

The court expressed concern with the testimony of Ms. Evans, whom

it described as “agitated and defensive while being questioned.” However, it

noted that some of her testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Brown,

who was found to be a credible witness. Nonetheless, the court found

neither woman presented any evidence connecting the people they saw in

front of the victims’ house with the house or the murders, although Ms.

Evans believed she saw someone going in and out of the house. Most

importantly, the court observed that neither of these witness or Mr.

Moosman testified that they saw the victims on Saturday or any day

thereafter.

6
Although not specifically mentioned by the trial court, the dog’s absence from
the yard on Saturday was additional support for the trial court’s conclusion that the
murders occurred Friday night or early Saturday.

18

In concluding its oral review of the evidence, the trial court stated that

it believed there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of the

defendant’s guilt. However, it held that, even if there was solely

circumstantial evidence, the totality of that circumstantial evidence excluded

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The trial court stated that Ms.

Beadle, through her DNA, followed the defendant around in his movements

from her house throughout the locations he appeared early Saturday

morning.

The final question resolved by the trial court was whether the

defendant had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon

more than one person as required by La. R.S. 14:30(A)(3). Given the

grievous wounds inflicted upon the victims and the fact that each sustained a

fatal gunshot wound to the forehead from the same gun, the trial court

concluded that the defendant had the specific intent to kill both women.

Based upon its conclusion that both the direct and circumstantial evidence

overwhelmingly indicated that the defendant murdered the victims, while all

evidence offered to prove otherwise was either not credible or inconsistent,

the trial court found the defendant guilty of two counts of first degree

murder.

Discussion

Based upon our extensive review of the appellate record, we affirm

the trial court’s guilty verdicts in the instant case. We agree with the trial

court’s excellent and meticulously detailed written reasons, as well as its

equally thorough and compelling oral reasons, wherein the court concisely

set forth the basis for its decision after this lengthy and exhaustively litigated

bench trial. The trial court, which had the benefit of observing the witnesses

19

and their demeanors, made multiple credibility determinations which

informed its resolution of conflicting testimony.

In addition to the persuasive forensic evidence linking the defendant

to the crime scene and Ms. Cox’s car, his own statements to the police

incriminated him in the murders. The defendant initially told the police that

he had not been at the Bragg Street house or in Ms. Cox’s car since Tuesday,

May 6. He further stated that he had gotten a ride from Mr. Stewart on

Friday night to go see Sekeona Campbell, arriving at about 11 p.m. After he

was confronted with the fact that his fingerprint had been found in the house

in a red substance that appeared to be blood, he changed his story and

admitted being in the house on Friday, May 9. He then proceeded to narrate

a fanciful account in which a raging Mr. Washington appeared outside Ms.

Beadle’s bedroom window and then climbed through the window, making

threats against her. The defendant claimed that he fled the house so Mr.

Washington would not know that he was the man in Ms. Beadle’s bedroom,

leaving her and Ms. Cox, a person he described as his best friend, alone with

an enraged Mr. Washington.7 Yet, even after the victims’ bodies were

found, the defendant did not confide Mr. Washington’s alleged presence to

anyone, including his close friends, Mr. Stewart and Mr. Clark.

Furthermore, in his revised account, he again asserted that he had gotten a

ride to go see Sekeona Campbell from Mr. Stewart, but altered his arrival

time to 1:30 a.m. or 2:00 a.m. This was refuted by both Mr. Stewart and

7
In his recorded statement to Detective Humphrey, the defendant stated that Mr.
Washington said to him, “Oh, B, you with this bitch.” Moments later, he told the
detective that he was trying to leave before Mr. Washington recognized him. When
Detective Humphrey reminded him that he had just said that Mr. Washington called him
“B” and knew he was there, the defendant emphatically denied making the earlier
statement.

20

Sekeona Campbell. Mr. Stewart testified that he did not see the defendant

that night, much less give him a ride. And, in one of the most devastating

indicators of the defendant’s guilt, Sekeona Campbell testified that, when he

arrived around 4 a.m., he was driving what was obviously Ms. Cox’s car, a

vehicle later found abandoned near the defendant’s apartment.

The defendant contends that the evidence did not exclude every

reasonable hypothesis of innocence.8 We disagree. A reasonable alternative

hypothesis is not one “which could explain the events in an exculpatory

fashion,” but one that “is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could

not ‘have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v.

Captville, 448 So. 2d 676 (La. 1984); State v. Wooten, 51,738 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/13/18), 244 So. 3d 1216. The strong evidence, both direct and

circumstantial, presented by the state of the defendant’s guilt, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to prove the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

8
In support of this argument, the defendant cited several factors, many of which
he claimed could point to Mr. Washington as the killer. They included the failure to take
fingernail scrapings from the victims for DNA testing; the lack of scratches and cuts on
the defendant when he was interviewed by the police; failure to process Ms. Beadle’s car,
which was parked outside the crime scene, for fingerprints or DNA; the presence of
matted grass under Ms. Beadle’s window; the discovery of a palm print on Ms. Beadle’s
door frame which matched that of Mr. Washington, who had recently lived there; the loss
at the laboratory of a hair recovered from Ms. Beadle’s hand, when all the other hairs
from which DNA profiles could be obtained were consistent with Ms. Beadle’s own hair;
and the presence of unknown DNA on Ms. Beadle’s pants leg.

21

MOTIONS FOR CONTINUANCE

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his

motions to continue the trial date on the basis of late disclosure of evidence.

Law

Upon a written motion at any time and after a contradictory hearing,

the trial court may grant a continuance, but only upon a showing that such a

motion is in the interest of justice. La. C. Cr. P. art. 707; State v. Roth,

52,359 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 1230, writ denied, 18-2059

(La. 6/17/19), 273 So. 3d 1210. Additionally, a trial court has discretion to

grant a timely filed motion for a continuance “in any case if there is good

ground therefor.” La. C. Cr. P. art. 712.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 709(A) provides that a motion for a continuance

based upon the absence of a witness shall state all of the following:

(1) Facts to which the absent witness is expected to testify,
showing the materiality of the testimony and the necessity for
the presence of the witness at the trial.

(2) Facts and circumstances showing a probability that the
witness will be available at the time to which the trial is
deferred.

(3) Facts showing due diligence used in an effort to procure
attendance of the witness.

Because the decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court, a reviewing court will not

disturb the trial court’s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Brown, 52,501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 264 So. 3d 697, writ

denied, 19-0297 (La. 6/3/19), 272 So. 3d 892; State v. Free, 48,260 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/20/13), 127 So. 3d 956, writ denied, 13-2978 (La. 5/30/14),

140 So. 3d 1174. Generally, a reviewing court will not reverse a conviction

22

even on a showing of an improper denial of a motion for a continuance,

absent a showing of specific prejudice. State v. Manning, 03-1982 (La.

10/19/04), 885 So. 2d 1044, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 967, 125 S. Ct. 1745, 161

L. Ed. 2d 612 (2005); State v. Saulsberry, 52,031 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18),

247 So. 3d 1137, writ denied, 18-1067 (La. 11/5/18), 255 So. 3d 1053; State

v. Free, supra.

The reasonableness of discretion issue turns primarily upon the

circumstances of the particular case. State v. Simpson, 403 So. 2d 1214 (La.

1981); State v. Cannon, 26,906 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95), 658 So. 2d 728.

Trial Court Ruling

On March 4, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on a defense

motion to continue the trial, which was scheduled to commence on

March 11, 2019. The motion concerned information gleaned from a forensic

examination of Ms. Cox’s iPhone, particularly the identity of the individual

with whom she last communicated.9 The trial court denied the motion to

continue but granted the defense’s request for a NCIC report on that

individual. On March 6, 2019, the state filed a supplemental discovery

response. Among other things, it provided the defense with information on

the individual which included his AFIS prints, NCIC report, and local police

reports.

9
In denying the motion, the trial court stated that it was under the impression that
the cell phone issue had been handled in December 2018. Our review of the record
revealed that, in November 2018, the defense filed a motion for expert testing of the three
cell phones (belonging to the victims and the defendant) collected by the police during
their investigation. The minutes showed that on November 7, 2018, the trial court
directed the defense to file an order granting the request with information about the
expert by November 16, 2018; if the parties could not agree, the matter would be heard at
a contradictory hearing on December 19, 2018. The minutes for that date show that the
matter “has resolved.” On January 7, 2019, the trial court signed an order directing that
the cell phones be examined by the Bossier City Marshal’s Office and then shipped to the
defendant’s expert. On January 11, 2019, a status conference was passed off the docket
because there were no outstanding issues for the court to rule on.

23

On the first day of trial, the defendant filed a renewed motion to

continue the trial. The allegations in the prior motion to continue were

incorporated by reference. The defendant further asserted that on March 6,

2019, the state had disclosed what the defendant characterized as an

agreement for leniency for Terrell Stewart. Additionally, he alleged that Mr.

Stewart had told the state that two individuals had told him that Shawn

Washington had admitted killing the victims. The defense sought additional

time to find, interview, and subpoena those persons. The defendant also

alleged that on March 7, 2019, the state had disclosed that, in an interview in

February 2019, Mr. Washington’s girlfriend had told the police that he might

have told her about the murders on her way to work on May 11, 2014, at

about 6:30 a.m., before the bodies were found. The defense requested

additional time to find, interview and subpoena her.

Once again, the trial court denied the motion to continue. As to the

person who last communicated with Ms. Cox, the trial court noted his name

had been known in the case for years and that Ms. Cox’s phone had been in

law enforcement custody for years and, consequently, the defendant could

have sought the information pertaining to it at an earlier date. The trial court

pointed out that Mr. Stewart was a prosecution witness and had also been

known in the case for years. The trial court stated it was unaware of any

agreement of leniency but assumed that it merely concerned bench warrants

being recalled because he showed up in court. As to Mr. Washington’s

girlfriend, Nancy Campbell, the trial court emphasized that she was a

witness subpoenaed by the state who had likewise been known in the case

for years.

24

Discussion

The decision to deny the motions for continuance rested within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Based upon our review of the facts of this

particular case, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Furthermore,

we find that the defendant has failed to show how the denial of his motions

to continue prejudiced him.

Both Mr. Stewart and Nancy Campbell were trial witnesses who

testified and were subject to cross-examination, as was Mr. Washington. As

noted by the trial court, they had been identified as potential witnesses in the

case for years. The same was true of the last person to communicate with

Ms. Cox. Moreover, the facts above in the sufficiency discussion show that

there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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