Larkin Development North, L.L.C. v. City of Shreveport consolidated with Larkin Development at Railsback, L.L.C. v. City of Shreveport

Judgment rendered March 4, 2020.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 53,374-CA
No. 53,375-CA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

No. 53,374-CA No. 53,375-CA

LARKIN DEVELOPMENT LARKIN DEVELOPMENT
NORTH, L.L.C. AT RAILSBACK, L.L.C.
Plaintiff-Appellant Plaintiff-Appellant

versus versus

CITY OF SHREVEPORT CITY OF SHREVEPORT
Defendant-Appellee Defendant-Appellee

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 599393 and 599394

Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge

*****

SINCLAIR LAW FIRM, L.L.C. Counsel for Appellants
By: Scott C. Sinclair

COOK, YANCEY, KING & Counsel for Appellee
GALLOWAY, APLC
By: Elizabeth Mendell Carmody
James Ashby Davis
Jason Blance Nichols

*****

Before STONE, COX, and McCALLUM, JJ.

McCALLUM, J.

Larkin Development North, L.L.C. (“LDNorth”), and Larkin

Development at Railsback, L.L.C. (“LDRailsback”), filed inverse

condemnation actions against the City of Shreveport (“Shreveport”). In

response, Shreveport filed exceptions of no cause of action, lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, and prematurity. The trial court granted the exceptions,

compelling LDNorth and LDRailsback to file the instant appeal before us.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Since the trial court granted the exceptions at issue, it did not consider

the merits of the case. Therefore, we will note the factual highlights of this

case and review its procedural background.

Between July, 2006 and April, 2007, LDRailsback and LDNorth

purchased adjacent property totaling 137 acres of land. In 2016, they filed

applications for approval of plat designations with the Shreveport-Caddo

Metropolitan Planning Commission (“MPC”). In February of 2017, MPC

denied the applications. Upon subsequent review, the Shreveport City

Council affirmed the MPC’s denial of the plat applications.

LDRailsback and LDNorth then filed their inverse condemnation

actions under Louisiana law against Shreveport. They alleged that by

denying their plat applications Shreveport prevented their ability to develop

the property into profitable residential lots. They sought just compensation

for their losses caused by Shreveport’s denial of the applications.

Thereafter, LDRailsback applied for additional plats with MPC. MPC

denied the new applications and the Shreveport City Council affirmed the

decision. LDRailsback then amended its petition to include that most recent

plat application denial.

MPC’s reason for denying the plat applications was that the land in

question was in the pathway of the possible future extension of LA 3132.

No party disputes that LDRailsback and LDNorth did not seek judicial

review of the plat application denials. Alleging that Shreveport’s denials

prevented them from developing the property to its full extent, LDNorth and

LDrailsback filed their inverse condemnation actions, seeking compensation

under Louisiana law.

In response, Shreveport filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of

action, and alternatively, declinatory exceptions of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and dilatory exceptions of prematurity. Shreveport argued that

LDNorth and LDRailsback must first exhaust all administrative and judicial

review options prior to bringing any actions for inverse condemnation. With

the petitioners failing to exhaust such remedies, Shreveport alleged that they

had no cause of action, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction,

and that the actions were premature. LDNorth and LDRailsback countered

that their damages and inverse condemnation actions arose at the time that

MPC and Shreveport denied the plat applications.

The trial court granted the exceptions. Citing Louisiana Court of

Appeal, First Circuit, jurisprudence, it ruled that LDNorth and LDRailsback

must first exhaust their rights to direct appeal of the MPC and city council

decisions. Essentially, before proceeding with their actions for inverse

condemnation, the petitioners must first exhaust all administrative remedies.

Without such remedies sought, the trial court found that the petitioners failed

to show a cause of action and thus failed to show that the district court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, it found that that

the issue of compensation was not ripe for judicial consideration.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is

subject to de novo review. Beasley v. Nezi, LLC, 2016-1080 (La. App. 1 Cir.

9/8/17), 227 So. 3d 308. The standard of review for an appeal of a no cause

of action ruling is de novo. Acurio v. Cage, 52,309 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/26/18), 257 So. 3d 824, writ denied, 2018-1762 (La. 1/8/19), 260 So. 3d

581. Appellate review of a prematurity exception ruling is typically

manifest error; however, when the ruling involves a question of law, it is

reviewed de novo. Bayou Orthotic & Prosthetics Ctr., L.L.C. v. Morris

Bart, L.L.C., 2017-557 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/28/18), 243 So. 3d 1276.

Therefore, our review standard for all matters regarding this case is de novo.

DISCUSSION

JURISPRUDENTIAL CONFLICT

LDNorth and LDRailsback argue that the trial court erred in requiring

that they first exhaust all administrative remedies. Shreveport counters that

Louisiana law requires that LDNorth and LDRailsback first seek all

administrative remedies before filing for compensation. In essence, one

party argues that the right to compensation arose immediately upon the

alleged taking. The other party argues that the exhaustion doctrine prevents

claims for compensation from arising until all administrative remedies are

pursued. Thus, no cause of action exists until all measures to prevent the

damages from arising are exhausted. The trial court agreed with the latter.

In its decision, the trial court cited two cases for support of its

judgment: Mercan, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 2000-0660 (La. App. 1 Cir.

5/11/2001), 797 So. 2d 722, writ denied, 2001-1685 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.

2d 676; and Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Ins. Rating Comm’n, 1997-
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1043 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So. 2d 1250, writ denied, 1998-2072

(La. 11/6/98), 728 So. 2d 396. Citing the above cases, the trial court ruled

that because LDNorth and LDRailsback failed to directly appeal the plat

application denials, they then had no causes of action for inverse

condemnation. The trial court further found that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction and that any action for compensation was premature.

In Mercan, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, considered

whether a party had a cause of action for damages. The City of Baton

Rouge, through its Subdivision Review Committee, denied a subdivision

application to Mercan, Inc. Mercan, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, supra.

Although it alleged that the denial was arbitrary and capricious, Mercan did

not appeal the city’s decision to the district court. Id. Instead, Mercan sold

the property at issue to the Baton Rouge Recreation and Parks Commission.

Id. Mercan then filed an inverse condemnation action against Baton Rouge,

seeking compensation for the difference between the value of the

subdivision and the amount that Mercan received selling the property. Id.

Citing Liberty Mutual as authority, the court found that Mercan’s

failure to seek judicial review of the subdivision application denial

prevented the courts an opportunity to rectify the alleged arbitrary and

capricious or abusive conduct. Id. Therefore, because Mercan failed to seek

judicial review to rectify the alleged injustice, and prevent damages, it no

longer had a cause of action. Id.

In Liberty Mutual, the First Circuit considered the then novel issue of

a taking and the exhaustion doctrine. Liberty Mutual sued the State of

Louisiana through the Louisiana Department of Insurance, alleging that the

State caused it injury by setting unreasonably low, mandatory insurance
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rates. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Ins. Rating Comm’n, supra.

Alleging a taking had occurred, Liberty Mutual filed an inverse

condemnation action and sought compensation. Id.

The court reviewed the exhaustion doctrine with regard to

administrative review and remedies. It further focused on the statutory

scheme that gives express recourse with respect to insurance rate changes. It

took note that Liberty Mutual had failed to seek any review of the rate

changes and decided the following:

Applying these principles to our consideration of the allegations
of the petition before us, we conclude that because Liberty
Mutual failed to seek administrative and/or judicial review of
the LIRC’s denial of its rate requests, except with regard to the
1989 request, it cannot now assert a cause of action against
LIRC for monetary damages for inverse condemnation based
on those rulings.

Id. at 1254.

We note that the above cases are decisions of the Louisiana Court of

Appeal, First Circuit. In this circuit, we have case law seemingly in conflict

with those opinions, particularly Anderson v. Bossier Parish Police Jury,

45,639 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 56 So. 3d 275.

Anderson involves a Bossier Parish proposed and subsequently

enacted ordinance that changed the elevation of a base flood plain zone. The

petitioners alleged that the ordinance’s enactment caused damage to their

property value when their property was rezoned into the flood plain. Id.

Noting that the injury to petitioners occurred at the time that the ordinance

went into effect, this Court stated, “This event changed the status of the

plaintiff’s land and made its development more burdensome, if not

impossible.” Id. Thus, applying La. R.S. 13:15111, this Court held that

prescription began to run from the date of discovery of the taking. Id. The
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date of taking was held to be the date when the Police Jury passed the

ordinance and it became effective. Id.

At issue in the Anderson case was whether the inverse condemnation

cause of action had prescribed. This Court found that both the cause of

action to challenge the ordinance and compensation action had not yet

prescribed. Id. We take particular note that prescription for both actions

began to run at the same time, that time being the date of the passage and

enactment of the ordinance. Id. Thus, the delay for filing suit began to run

on the compensation action at the same time as the action to challenge the

enactment of the ordinance. Id. Aphoristically speaking, this Court decided

that a cause for compensation existed despite the lack of exhaustion of the

administrative remedy to challenge the ordinance. Furthermore, with regard

to the inverse condemnation action, it is axiomatic that a cause of action

cannot begin to prescribe before it comes into existence. Therefore,

Anderson would seem to imply that the trial court, in the case before us,

erred in granting the exception of no cause of action.

Furthermore, a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, Crooks v.

Department of Natural Res., 2019-0160 (La. 1/29/20), 2020 WL 499233,

supports the finding that an action for inverse condemnation arises upon

injury. The Crooks Court considered an action for compensation for alleged

damages caused by federal and state construction projects. At issue was a

project that ultimately caused the flooding and loss of certain properties in

and around the Catahoula Basin. The Court determined that a taking had

occurred and that the three-year prescriptive period found in La. R.S. 13:511

applied. Id. The Court further explained, “Prescription begins to run when

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the claimant is aware of those facts which give rise to a cause of action.” Id.

at 15.

LDNorth and LDRailsback assert that the damage caused by

Shreveport’s inverse condemnation occurred when the plat applications were

denied, before any direct appeal option came into existence. They argue that

Shreveport’s decision to deny their plat application, not the exhaustion of the

administrative direct appeal, gave rise to their action for compensation.

Therefore, they assert that the trial court erred in granting the exceptions.

The statute that provides the prescription delay for compensation

actions further indicates that the action arises at the time of injury. The last

sentence of La. R.S. 13:511(A) states, “Actions for compensation for

property taken by the state, a parish, municipality, or other political

subdivision or any one of their respective agencies shall prescribe three

years from the date of the taking.” (emphasis added). Therefore, both the

statutory framework and the jurisprudence of this Court appear to support

the argument by LDNorth and LDRailsback.

EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE

Shreveport has built its arguments upon an exhaustion doctrine

foundation. Since the trial court cited case law that invoked the doctrine in

order to deny compensation actions, we will review the doctrine and

consider its effects on the case before us.

Article 1, Section 22 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantees the

people of Louisiana access to the courts. Article 5, Section 16(A) grants

original jurisdiction of civil and criminal matters to the district courts of this

state. Exceptions do exist where a constitutional mandate or the legislature

may delegate limited, narrowly construed, judicial authority to
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administrative agencies. For example, and pertinent to the case before us,

La. R.S. 33:101.1 et seq. provides for the administrative authority and

procedure of handling subdivision grants and plat applications. However,

“[a]n administrative agency has only the power and authority expressly

granted by the constitution or statutes.” Haygood v. Dies, 47,765 (La. App.

2 Cir. 5/15/13), 114 So. 3d 1206, 1214; Louisiana Horsemen’s Benev. &

Protective Ass’n 1993 Inc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 1995-1702 (La. App. 1

Cir. 4/4/96), 672 So. 2d 340, writs denied, 1996-1163, 1996-1125 (La.

6/7/96), 674 So. 2d 968, 969.

“The function of the exhaustion doctrine is to give the body whose

decision is under attack an opportunity to review, supplement, and, if

necessary, correct its decision.” Haygood v. Dies, supra; Jones v. Crow, 633

So. 2d 247 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993). However, “[i]n order to require a

petitioner to first exhaust his administrative remedies, the remedies must be

adequate.” Haygood v. Dies, supra. Thus, we must determine if the

agencies, the MPC and Shreveport City Council, can provide the adequate

remedies pursued in the inverse condemnation petitions filed by LDNorth

and LDRailsback.

The lack of direct appeal of the plat decisions to the district court

forms the crux of the exhaustion doctrine argument propounded by

Shreveport. However, we note that only the same, narrow remedies

authorized to the agencies, would be available on direct appellate review of

those decisions. In other words, if the agencies lack authority to provide a

remedy of compensation, then on direct appeal of their decision to deny the

plat applications, the district court would also be precluded from awarding

compensation.
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“The exhaustion doctrine applies only when exclusive jurisdiction

exists in an administrative agency and the courts have only appellate

jurisdiction as opposed to original jurisdiction to review the agency

determination.” Haygood v. Dies, supra; Capital House Preservation Co.,

L.L.C. v. Perryman Consultants, Inc., 2001-2524 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/31/02),

836 So. 2d 680, writs denied, 2003-0323, 2003-0324 (La. 4/21/03), 841 So.

2d 794, 795. However, “[a]ctions for money damages are within the original

exclusive jurisdiction of Louisiana’s district courts.” Haygood v. Dies,

supra, Louisiana Horsemen’s Benev. & Protective Ass’n 1993 Inc. v. Fair

Grounds Corp., supra; Capital House Preservation Co., L.L.C. v. Perryman

Consultants, Inc., supra.

La. R.S. 33:101.1 et seq. do not provide authority or jurisdiction for

the administrative agencies to determine and award compensation for

damages due to inverse condemnation. Furthermore, the exhaustion doctrine

cannot apply to the case at hand because LDNorth and LDRailsback seek

only damages and compensation for the inverse condemnation of their

property. They do not seek any relief from or ask that the district court

overturn the denials of their plat applications. Therefore, it would seem that

the exclusive jurisdiction of the inverse condemnation actions in this case lie

with the district court.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

“Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a

tribunal to adjudicate a particular matter involving the legal relations of the

parties and to grant the relief to which the parties are entitled.” See La. C.

C. P. arts. 1 and 2; Capital House Preservation Co., L.L.C. v. Perryman

Consultants, Inc., supra. As cited above, the Louisiana Constitution vests
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district courts with original jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters,

unless other jurisdictional authorization can be found through constitutional

or legislative mandate. Furthermore, as stated above, money damages and

inverse condemnation actions are within the original, exclusive jurisdiction

of the district courts of the state.

LDNorth and LDRailsback have filed actions for inverse

condemnation, seeking only compensation for damages to their property

caused by MPC’s and the Shreveport City Council’s denials of their plat

applications. They do not challenge the denials of their plat applications as

such. Therefore, their actions are ones that are within the judicative

authority of the district courts. Since the district court does have subject

matter jurisdiction of the inverse condemnation actions, it erred in granting

the exception of subject matter jurisdiction.

NO CAUSE OF ACTION

“A peremptory exception of no cause of action questions whether the

law extends a remedy to anyone under the factual allegations of the

petition.” Villareal v. 6494 Homes, L.L.C., 48,302 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/7/13),

121 So. 3d 1246; Rangel v. Denny, 47,381 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/8/12), 104 So.

3d 68. “The purpose of the peremptory exception of no cause of action is to

determine the sufficiency in law of the petition. The burden of showing that

the plaintiff has stated no cause of action is upon the exceptor. The public

policy behind the burden is to afford the party his day in court to present his

evidence.” Villareal v. 6494 Homes, L.L.C, supra; City of New Orleans v.

Board of Dir. of La. State Museum, 1998-1170 (La. 3/2/99), 739 So. 2d 748.

The exception is triable on the face of the petition; the well-pleaded facts in

the petition and any annexed documents must be accepted as true; and all
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reasonable inferences are made in favor of the nonmoving party. Villareal v.

6494 Homes, L.L.C., supra.

In their petition, LDNorth and LDRailsback allege that damages

began to accrue when MPC and the Shreveport City Council denied the plat

applications. We have already found that at the time that the city denied the

applications, the taking occurred. Furthermore, we have already discussed

that at the time the taking occurred, prescription began to run on the actions

for compensation. Again, it is axiomatic that a cause of action cannot begin

to prescribe before it comes into existence. Therefore, under the facts as

pleaded, we find that a cause of action does exist. Thus, the trial court erred

in granting the exception of no cause of action.

PREMATURITY

La. C.C.P. art. 926 provides the dilatory exception of prematurity.

“The exception of prematurity questions whether the cause of action has

matured to the point where it is ripe for judicial determination.” Haygood v.

Dies, supra; Williamson v. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson, 2004-

0451 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So. 2d 782; Mineo v. Underwriters at Lloyds,

London, 2007-0514 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/22/08), 997 So. 2d 187. “An action

will be deemed premature when it is brought before the right to enforce it

has accrued.” Haygood v. Dies, supra; LaCoste v. Pendleton Methodist

Hosp., L.L.C., 2007-0008, 2007-0016 (La. 9/5/07), 966 So. 2d 519.

“The exception of prematurity may be utilized in cases where the

applicable law has provided a procedure for a claimant to seek

administrative relief before resorting to judicial action.” Haygood v. Dies,

supra. “However, the pendency of a proceeding before an administrative

agency is not determinative of whether an action filed in court is premature.”
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Id.; ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax Comm’n, 2002-1479 (La. 7/2/03),

851 So. 2d 1145. The excepting party bears the burden of proving

prematurity and, as discussed above, in order to require a petitioner to

exhaust administrative remedies, the remedies must be adequate. Haygood

v. Dies, supra.

No adequate remedies lie within the authority of Shreveport.

LDNorth and LDRailsback seek compensation for damages caused by the

city’s inverse condemnation of their property. They do not seek a review of

the denial of the plat applications. As discussed above, the statutes that give

authority to Shreveport to grant or deny plat applications, do not grant

Shreveport jurisdiction to decide and award the compensation for a taking.

Thus, judicial review of MPC’s and the Shreveport City Council’s decisions,

alleged as a requirement by Shreveport, would be narrowly restrained to a

review of the plat denials.

Furthermore, the damages alleged by LDNorth and LDRailsback

began to accrue at the time of the plat denials. We have already determined

that the taking occurred at the time that the city denied the applications.

Furthermore, we have already found that prescription began to run on the

actions for compensation at that time as well. Therefore, the actions are

ripe. The trial court erred in granting the exception of prematurity.

THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION AND TAKINGS

Our state constitution requires that the state pay just compensation, to

the full extent of the loss, when it takes property. As discussed below, this

mandate is required both when the state takes land through court

proceedings (expropriation) or damages land (inverse condemnation).

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“In its most basic aspect, eminent domain is the power of a

government to compel its subjects to give up property interests in land or

things.” State Through Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., Inc.,

595 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 3/2/92) (citing W. Stoebuck, Nontrespassory

Takings in Eminent Domain 4 (1977)).

There can be little doubt that one aim of Article I, § 4, of our
state constitution in requiring that the owner shall be
compensated for property “taken or damaged … to the full
extent of his loss” was to assure that the State and its
subdivisions compensate owners for any taking or damaging of
their rights with respect to things as well as for any taking or
damaging of the objects of those rights.

State Through Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., Inc., supra at

602.

Many differences exist between an expropriation proceeding and an

inverse condemnation proceeding. One stark difference is that the

legislature has expressly created and enacted statutes settling multiple issues

involved with a government entity’s ability to expropriate land. In contrast,

a long jurisprudential record has defined and resolved many issues with

regard to an inverse condemnation action. One thing that both actions do

have in common, however, is our state constitution. As noted above, both

actions derive their existence from Article I, Section 4 as follows:

(A) Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use,
enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is
subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable
exercise of the police power.

(B)(1) Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just
compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.

In expropriation proceedings, the government entity wishing to take

land can look to specific statuary framework for authority and procedure.

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For example, La. R.S. 48:441 gives the Department of Transportation and

Development authority to acquire land by expropriation. That statute falls

within Title 48, Chapter 1, Part XVIII, under the unambiguous heading of

“Expropriation by a Declaration of Taking.” From the statutory framework

of this Chapter alone, one can glean the reasons as to why expropriation

proceedings are required prior to a government taking. The legislature and

the people, through their state Constitution, wish to protect the fundamental

right of citizens to own and exploit property. It is clear then that before a

government entity can take land from a citizen, we, as a state, mandate a

judicial review of the matter. If a court confirms the expropriation, our state

constitution then mandates that just compensation be paid to the landowner.

Many benefits are derived from the judicial review of such actions.

First, the landowner is assured a due process right to have judicial review

prior to losing property to the state. Second, if the land is taken, it ensures

that a judicial hand fairly considers and justly compensates the landowner.

Third, in the event that a court denies the expropriation, it hopefully prevents

damage or injury to the landowner.

In contrast, an inverse condemnation action is a judicial creation that

ensures citizens have an action for compensation when the state damages

their property prior to or without a pending expropriation proceeding.

[O]ur constitution requires compensation even though the State
has not initiated expropriation proceedings in accordance with
the statutory scheme set up for that purpose. If there has been
any taking or damaging, the expropriating entity is bound to
make reparations according to Article I, § 4. Although the
legislature has not provided a procedure whereby an owner can
seek damages for an uncompensated taking or damaging, this
court has recognized the action for inverse condemnation arises
out of the self-executing nature of the constitutional command
to pay just compensation.

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State Through Dept. of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., Inc., supra at

602.

Aside from the clear mandate by our state constitution that citizens be

compensated for takings, the legislature of this state, in at least some cases,

has clearly provided that compensation not be thwarted by a requirement to

exhaust all administrative remedies. For example, just as the legislature

authorizes the Department of Transportation and Development to

expropriate property, the same statutory framework further mandates that

compensation is not waived by a lack of administrative remedy. La. R.S.

48:447 provides that if a defendant wishes to contest the expropriation, he

may and must file a motion to contest its validity. However, it also states the

following: “Failure to file the motion within the time provided constitutes a

waiver of all defenses to the suit except claims for compensation.”

(Emphasis added).

The most striking difference between expropriation proceedings and

inverse condemnation is the time at which the damage occurs. Under typical

expropriation procedure, the injury (the taking) only occurs after court order.

In an inverse condemnation proceeding, the injury has already occurred prior

to court proceedings. Our state constitution mandates a right to

compensation at the time of the taking. As cited above, our legislature, in

expropriation proceedings, provides that a defendant’s failure to exhaust all

administrative remedies does not waive his right to compensation.

In light of that example, finding in favor of Shreveport would create

an incongruous outcome. Essentially, we would be deciding that one could

be proscribed his constitutionally mandated compensation in a case where

the damage to his property has already occurred because he failed to exhaust
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all administrative remedies. Yet, a defendant, in a case where the damage

has yet to occur, would have statutory protections from waiving his same

constitutional right to compensation where he also failed to exhaust all

administrative remedies. Again, we note that the courts of this state have

held that both expropriation and inverse condemnation actions arise from the

same constitutional mandate of just compensation. Thus, both actions

should enjoy and inherit the same constitutional protections and rights

associated with such.

Furthermore, we have already cited that our constitution mandates that

actions for compensation arise at the time of the taking. With no

constitutional mandate to the contrary, we cannot find adequate authority

that the exhaustion doctrine can be employed to override or destroy the

constitutional right to compensation for a taking by the government.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED. Pursuant to La. R.S.

13:5112, all costs of this appeal are assigned to the appellees in the amount

of $12,034.02.

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