State of Louisiana v. Daron Dejuan Adams

Judgment rendered March 4, 2020.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,409-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

DARON DEJUAN ADAMS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Webster, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 93787

Honorable Michael Nerren, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Sherry Watters

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

HUGO A. HOLLAND, JR.
JOHN M. LAWRENCE
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before MOORE, PITMAN, and STONE, JJ.

PITMAN, J.

Defendant Daron Dejuan Adams pled guilty to aggravated second

degree battery and was sentenced to nine years at hard labor. He now

appeals, arguing that his sentence is excessive. For the following reasons,

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

FACTS

On April 20, 2018, Defendant shot the victim, Sharman Shehee, in the

head with a handgun. He was originally charged by bill of information with

attempted second-degree murder. However, on April 8, 2019, the state

amended the bill; and he pled guilty to the reduced charge of aggravated

second-degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.7. There was no

agreement as to sentencing.

On June 28, 2019, after reviewing a presentencing investigation

(“PSI”) report, the trial court sentenced Defendant to nine years at hard

labor. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, noting that he was

only 20 years old at the time of the offense and had no criminal history. The

trial court denied the motion without a hearing. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing an upper-range sentence on him, a youthful, first

offender. He claims that his impulsive act in shooting the victim was

partially the product of his youth and resulted from circumstances that are

unlikely to recur. He argues that this was a private incident which did not

cause a threat or risk to the general public. He notes that he has accepted

responsibility and is remorseful and argues that based on sentences in similar

cases, a sentence of five to seven years is the highest sentence supported by

the facts of this case. See State v. Johnson, 45,111 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/14/10),

34 So. 3d 1124 (affirming a five-year sentence for a defendant who stabbed

victim multiple times in the face, upper chest and hands after an altercation;

defendant, who was originally charged with attempted second degree

murder, was 22 years old, employed and had no criminal history); State v.

Shabazz, 14-0431 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/14), 167 So. 3d 725 (affirming a

seven-year sentence for a defendant who stabbed victim in the neck with a

cheese knife; defendant was a fourth-felony offender, was in the process of

obtaining an associate’s degree, employed, a parent and served as a Mason).

In response, the state argues that Defendant’s sentence is not

excessive and that the trial court, in imposing sentence, provided reasons and

balanced the circumstances of this case, his background and the need for

public safety.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long

as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the

article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. DeBerry, 50,501

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17),

219 So. 3d 332. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the

goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its

provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the

sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full

compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475

(La. 1982); State v. DeBerry, supra. The important elements which should
2

be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital

status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the

offense and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049

(La. 1981); State v. DeBerry, supra. There is no requirement that specific

matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. State v. DeBerry,

supra; State v. Shumaker, 41,547 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277,

writ denied, 07-0144 (La. 9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 351.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.

1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;

State v. DeBerry, supra.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7. A trial judge is in the best

position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a

particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. State

v. Allen, 49,642 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162 So.3d 519, writ denied,

15-0608 (La. 1/25/16), 184 So. 3d 1289. On review, an appellate court does

not determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate,

3

but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Jackson, 48,534

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 130 So. 3d 993.

A substantial advantage obtained by means of a plea bargain is a

legitimate consideration in sentencing. State v. Mendenhall, 48,028 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 5/15/13), 115 So.3d 727. Accordingly, where a defendant has

pled guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct or

has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement

through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even

the maximum sentence for the pled offense. State v. Givens, 45,354 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/23/10), 42 So. 3d 451, writ denied, 10-1584 (La. 1/14/11),

52 So. 3d 902.

La. R.S. 14:34.7(C) provides that whoever commits the crime of

aggravated second-degree battery shall be fined not more than $10,000 or

imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than 15 years, or both.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to

nine years at hard labor. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court

considered the PSI report and provided detailed reasons for the sentence

imposed. It stated that Defendant had received a substantial benefit in

sentencing as a result of the plea agreement, and noted that he had originally

been charged with attempted second-degree murder. It also noted

Defendant’s remorse and found that he had taken responsibility for his

actions. The victim was not present at the sentencing hearing, but provided

a statement for the PSI report. The victim has significant medical issues as a

result of the offense and asked the trial court to impose a maximum

sentence. Although Defendant has no prior criminal history, the trial court

4

noted the serious nature of the instant charge and stated that Defendant was

fortunate he was not facing a murder charge.

In reviewing Defendant’s personal history, the trial court noted that he

was 20 years old, has never been married and has two children—a three-

year-old son and a one-year-old daughter. He was born in Minden, but both

of his parents died when he was young, so he was raised by his paternal

grandmother in Bossier City. At some point, he moved back to Minden to

live with his cousins. He was expelled from school in ninth grade for

fighting. He never returned to school and did not obtain a GED. He has

held one job, but lost it due to difficulty finding transportation. The trial

court also noted that he admitted he started using marijuana at the age of 15.

Although the trial court did not specifically articulate the La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 factors it considered in imposing Defendant’s sentence, the

reasons stated by the trial court, the record and the PSI report provide an

adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed. The trial court balanced the

serious facts of this case and the damage to the victim against his relatively

young age and lack of criminal history. Further, the midrange sentence is

not constitutionally excessive. Defendant, who was “clearly the aggressor”

in the altercation, shot the victim in the head. Considering the facts of this

case and the benefit he received from the plea agreement and reduced

sentencing exposure, the sentence imposed by the trial court does not shock

the sense of justice, nor is it grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

offense. This assignment of error is without merit.

5

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Daron

Dejuan Adams are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

6