Joey M. Gray and Carolyn Gray v. State Farm Insurance Company, Patrick W. Johnson, Murray R. Harper, and State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development

Judgment rendered January 13, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 53,554-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

JOEY M. GRAY AND CAROLYN Plaintiffs-Appellants
GRAY

versus

STATE FARM INSURANCE Defendants-Appellees
COMPANY, PATRICK W.
JOHNSON, MURRAY R.
HARPER, AND STATE OF
LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND
DEVELOPMENT

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 20084093

Honorable Alvin R. Sharp, Judge

*****

WALTERS, PAPILLION, THOMAS, Counsel for Appellants
CULLENS, LLC
By: Darrel J. Paplillion
Renee C. Crasto

LAW OFFICES OF JIM NORRIS
By: Alan J. Norris

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Counsel for Appellees
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: Wm. David Coffey
C. Bryan Racer
Phillip J. Ellis

*****

Before PITMAN, COX, and BLEICH (Pro Tempore), JJ.

BLEICH, J. (Pro Tempore)

The plaintiffs, Joey M. Gray and Carolyn Gray, appeal a district court

judgment granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, the Louisiana

Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”). For the

following reasons, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for

further proceedings.

FACTS

This matter arises out of an automobile accident that occurred in

Ouachita Parish on November 12, 2007. The defendant, Patrick Johnson

(“Johnson”), was driving a black Chevrolet Tahoe southbound on Louisiana

Highway 34, a two-lane road. Donna Lawrence, the driver of a red Pontiac,

had activated her left turn signal and was waiting to execute a left turn into

her driveway. Johnson, who testified that he was driving 55-60 miles per

hour, did not notice Lawrence’s vehicle until he was directly behind it.

Johnson swerved onto the right shoulder to avoid colliding with Lawrence’s

vehicle. While swerving, Johnson saw a brick mailbox belonging to the

defendants, Murray Harper, Edmond Harper, and Troy Harper (“the

Harpers”). Johnson attempted to avoid hitting the mailbox by veering back

onto the highway. However, the right rear panel of Johnson’s SUV struck

the mailbox, demolishing it. Thereafter, Johnson continued swerving to the

left and entered the northbound lane. He struck a minivan driven by the

plaintiff, Joey Gray (“Joey”); the plaintiff, Carolyn Gray (“Carolyn”), Joey’s

wife, was a passenger in the vehicle. After the collision, the plaintiffs’

minivan rolled over, and Joey was ejected from the vehicle. Joey sustained

significant and extensive injuries. Carolyn also sustained serious physical

injuries and emotional distress.1

At the center of this dispute is the mailbox the Harpers constructed in

1981. The mailbox was built with bricks and mortar and was placed on a

concrete pad foundation. In 1985, the American Association of State

Highway and Transportation Officials (“AASHTO”) published a 37-page

document entitled “A Guide for Erecting Mailboxes on Highways.”2 The

guidelines referenced fatal accidents that occur in the United States due to

vehicles striking mailboxes when the design and support of the mailbox

contributed to the severity of the accident. The document stated, in pertinent

part:

The typical single mailbox installation is not a serious threat to
motorists. [I]t is the massive structures, such as the masonry
columns, railroad rails and ties, tractor wheels, plow blades,
concrete filled barrels, etc., sometimes used to support
mailboxes, that turn a single mailbox installation into a lethal
roadside obstacle that should be eliminated.

Recently mailboxes of heavy gauge steel or other substantial
materials have been designed and sold as deterrents to
vandalism. These massive boxes . . . are quite resistant to
deformation. However, these boxes are potentially hazardous
to occupants of errant vehicles regardless of the support used[.]

DOTD began implementing the AASHTO guidelines in 1987.

1
Joey’s injuries included a subarachnoid hemorrhage, skull fractures, multiple
facial fractures, pelvic fractures, a fractured left arm, and a ruptured bladder. He was
hospitalized approximately three months. Carolyn suffered multiple bruises and
contusions and was treated for neck and back pain.
2
AASHTO is not a government entity. Rather, it is a private entity that sets
standards and publishes specifications and guidelines used in highway design and
construction throughout the United States.

2

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Johnson, his automobile insurer,

State Farm Insurance Company, Murray Harper, and DOTD.3 The plaintiffs

alleged, inter alia: Johnson committed various acts of negligence, including

failure to maintain control of his vehicle and failure to follow traffic

ordinances; the Harpers constructed a mailbox that constituted an

unreasonable risk of harm to motorists and failed to comply with standards,

guidelines, rules, and specifications adopted by DOTD and AASHTO; and

DOTD negligently allowed “the large, heavy, brick mailbox to be situated as

constructed on the shoulder and right-of-way of Highway 34.” The

plaintiffs also asserted that DOTD had actual and constructive notice of the

existence of the mailbox “through its inspectors and employees that

periodically would inspect, repair, overlay, and who traveled Highway 34.”4

The plaintiffs settled their claims with Johnson, the Harpers, and their

respective insurers; those parties were dismissed from the lawsuit. The

matter proceeded to trial with DOTD as the sole defendant. Prior to trial, the

parties entered into a “Joint Stipulation of Facts,” which provided as

follows:

***
21. The installation of the mailbox on LA Highway 34 at
milepost 77.1 was brick on a concrete pad foundation. The
installation was made in 1981.

22. The [AASHTO] guidelines for the placement of brick
mailboxes on highway [sic]. DOTD should have been aware by
1985 that mailboxes such as this one were roadside hazards,
and in 1986, DOTD began implementing AASHTO regulations
for newly constructed mailboxes. In 1987, DOTD received

3
The plaintiffs later amended the petition to add as defendants Edmond Harper
and Troy Harper, and American Southern Insurance Company, the Harpers’
homeowners’ insurer.
4
On June 20, 2017, Joey Gray died from injuries he sustained in an automobile
accident unrelated to the accident at issue herein. His wife and children were substituted
as plaintiffs in this matter.
3

notice that federal funds were available for removal of
hazardous mailboxes, and therefore, DOTD could have begun
removal at the time.

23. The Harper mailbox failed to meet standards, guidelines,
rules and specifications adopted by the Louisiana DOTD and
[AASHTO]. AASHTO is a standard-setting body which
publishes specifications, test protocols and guidelines which
were used in highway design and construction throughout the
United States.
***

The defendant, Patrick Johnson, did not testify during the trial.

However, his pretrial deposition was read to the jury in its entirety. Johnson

testified as follows:

***
I was proceeding down the highway, and I realized that there
was someone stopped in front of me. I really – I can’t
remember if it was – it seemed that – seemed that it was a fairly
sudden stop, and that’s fairly common on that highway because
there is no – people just stop and sit and wait for traffic and
turn. As soon as I realized that – that I could not stop or if I – I
couldn’t stop, I would’ve hit the vehicle, I put on my – applied
my brakes and swerved to the right and missed that vehicle,
came in contact with what seemed to be a ten-foot-tall brick
mailbox, you know, in my mind; a very large brick mailbox.
And then after that, it’s all a blur.
***

Johnson further testified as follows: he was traveling at a speed of

approximately 55-60 mph in a 55 mph speed zone; he swerved to avoid rear-

ending the turning vehicle; he believed he was in control of his vehicle

before he encountered the mailbox; he hit the mailbox, which “sent [him]

careening” back onto the roadway; hitting the mailbox caused him to lose

control of his vehicle; and he did not recall the collision with the plaintiffs’

vehicle.

During cross-examination, Johnson testified that he did not recall the

specifics of the accident. Namely, he was unable to recollect the angle at

which his vehicle left the roadway, which part of his vehicle struck the
4

mailbox, or whether he attempted to avoid steering away from the mailbox.

Johnson stated that he “assumed” that he was applying his brakes during the

sequence of events leading up to the accident. Johnson further testified that

he had traveled Highway 34 for many years, and he was aware of the many

residences located along the highway. However, he stated that he had never

taken any particular notice of the mailboxes on the side of the road.

According to Johnson, he did not notice the brick mailbox until he swerved

to avoid hitting the turning vehicle. During redirect examination, Johnson

testified that he believed that the presence of the brick mailbox, which he

described as a “considerable structure,” was a substantial factor in his

vehicle entering the oncoming lane of traffic and colliding with the

plaintiffs’ vehicle.

Donna Lawrence, the driver of the red Pontiac (the left-turning

vehicle), also testified during the trial. She stated as follows: she had

activated her turn signal and was waiting for traffic to pass so she could

execute a left turn from the highway into her driveway; she suddenly heard

“squealing” tires; she looked into her rearview mirror and saw a “big black

truck” approaching from behind her; the driver of the black truck went

around her and hit her neighbors’ brick mailbox; she saw bricks “flying all

up in the air”; and she watched as the truck swerved onto her neighbors’

property, reentered the roadway into oncoming traffic, and struck the

plaintiffs’ van.

Kevin Cummings, another eyewitness to the automobile accident,

testified as follows: he was traveling behind the plaintiffs’ minivan; he saw

a car “stopped [i]n the southbound lane evidently trying to turn into a

driveway and a black SUV was coming behind it”; he was accustomed to
5

seeing drivers maneuver onto the shoulder of Highway 34 to avoid waiting

behind left-turning vehicles; the driver of the black SUV was “going to

cream the car in front of him. So he hit the shoulder of the road to go around

him . . . then hit a big brick mailbox”; after hitting the mailbox, the driver

reentered the roadway “right across the lane of traffic and hit the van and

flipped it”; he knew “something bad was going to happen when [Johnson]

hit that mailbox [and] he just evidently lost it, lost control of it”; and

Johnson crossed “the lane of traffic and hit [the] van” after he hit the

mailbox.

During cross-examination, Cummings testified that he did not know

how fast Johnson was driving, but he did not believe Johnson would have

been able to stop in time to avoid hitting the red Pontiac. After Johnson

struck the mailbox, it looked as if the mailbox “exploded” because “debris

went everywhere.”5

Troy Harper, one of the owners of the brick mailbox, testified. He

testified he and his father constructed the brick mailbox in 1981. Harper

stated that the mailbox remained next to the highway from the time of its

construction until the day of the accident in question. Harper also stated that

at the time the mailbox was constructed, he was unaware that he needed a

permit from the State of Louisiana to construct a brick mailbox along the

highway. He testified that DOTD did not inform him that the mailbox did

not comply with standards and regulations. According to Harper, he would

5
The deposition of Dr. Louie Crook, an emergency room physician, was read
aloud in the presence of the jury. The video deposition of Dr. David Kim, an oral
maxillofacial surgeon, was also played for the jury. Both physicians testified with regard
to Joey’s injuries and treatment.
6

have removed the structure had he known it did not comply because he

“didn’t want nothing that wasn’t in compliance.”

During cross-examination, Harper testified that he and his father used

a preconstructed “three-inch thick” pad of concrete and erected the brick

mailbox on top of it. He stated that he placed the mailbox approximately 18

inches from the shoulder of the roadway to give vehicles enough space to

utilize the shoulder of the road without colliding with the mailbox. Harper

testified that he would have obtained a permit and followed regulations if

DOTD had informed him that he needed to do so.

Professor Andrew Jefferson McPhate, Sr. was accepted by the trial

court as an “expert in mechanical engineering with particular expertise in

vehicle dynamics and the effect of forces that interact with vehicles.”

Professor McPhate described the mailbox at issue as a hollow structure made

from bricks and held together with mortar. He testified that the mailbox was

located in a “clear zone,” and Johnson did not have much time to react to its

presence. Professor McPhate described a “clear zone” as an “area free of

objects that would stop a vehicle if a driver runs into it.” He stated that a

motorist’s actions would be affected if he or she leaves the roadway and

perceives a hazard to navigation in a clear zone. Professor McPhate further

testified:

The reason that a clear zone is of concern, clear zone means
that there [are] no objects that would actually stop a vehicle if
you ran into it. And a vehicle is going to – I refer to it as real
estate. If a vehicle gets an errant trajectory, is going
somewhere where you don’t want it to go for whatever reason,
you will need some real estate in order to recover, to be able to
gain control of your vehicle. And so whenever you have an
errant trajectory, you would like to have some real estate that
you can recover in and get the vehicle back under control. And
you don’t want objects in that clear zone to stop or suddenly
stop your vehicle.
7

Professor McPhate stated that a clear zone is nonexistent if a “forty some

odd inch brick mailbox” is located there.

During cross-examination, Professor McPhate testified that he was

retained by plaintiffs’ counsel to “evaluate the noticeability and conspicuity

of the mailbox,” and he did not reconstruct the automobile accident. He

stated that the mailbox constituted a hazard because of its location and its

potential impact on objects. According to Professor McPhate, hazards are

quantifiable; therefore, the size of an object affects the degree of its hazard.

He opined that the more substantial the object, the greater the hazard it

presents. Professor McPhate also stated that he reviewed photographs from

the accident, and photographs of the yaw markings on the highway left by

Johnson’s vehicle indicated that Johnson was veering to the left, and the path

of the vehicle was not significantly changed after Johnson hit the mailbox.

During redirect examination, Professor McPhate testified that the

paved shoulder of Highway 34 was approximately 10 feet-wide. He stated

that the purpose of the paved shoulder of a highway is to provide motorists

with a place to recover and reenter the travel portion of the highway. He

stated, “The only thing that’s a significant hazard is the stack of bricks that is

the mailbox support system.” Further, Professor McPhate testified that the

evidence did not indicate that Johnson careened into the mailbox and was

forced back onto the roadway. Professor McPhate reiterated that the yaw

markings indicated that Johnson was already steering left when he

encountered the mailbox. According to Professor McPhate, the most likely

reason that Johnson was steering to the left was that he was attempting to

8

avoid hitting the mailbox. Professor McPhate opined that the accident

would not have occurred if the brick mailbox had not been in that location.

Following the plaintiffs’ presentation of evidence, DOTD moved for a

directed verdict pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1810. DOTD argued the

plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving causation. Counsel for

DOTD stated:

Mr. McPhate even agrees that that mailbox that was struck did
not change the trajectory, it wouldn’t have mattered one way or
the other in terms of the path that this vehicle took. The second
portion is he testified that no matter what the object is on the
side of the road everybody is going to try and avoid it. So it
doesn’t matter what it’s made of, what it was constructed of,
that was his testimony as well, what is the medium that’s
involved. If you see something plastic, if you see something
metal, you see something brick if you have control of your
vehicle and if you have the ability you’re going to turn away
from it. So, to the extent that the whole complaint here is that
there is a – it’s unreasonably dangerous to have a brick
mailbox, not a mailbox, the medium is irrelevant. The medium
did not cause or contribute in any way to changing the
trajectory or potentially causing Mr. Johnson to turn back. He
was going to turn back irrespective according to Professor
McPhate’s testimony.
***
The second argument is the legal cause argument. Where this
works – looks at is you have to look at what is the nature of the
rule that we alleged – that has been allegedly been violated. In
this case, the alleged rule that’s been violated is allowing or
permitting a brick mailbox that shouldn’t have been there to be
on the side of the road. Now, what is the purpose of that rule?
The undisputed testimony is that the purpose of the rule is to
prevent vehicle intrusion. You don’t want a brick coming
through into the compartment of the vehicle and decapitating . .
.. It’s not to prevent trajectory, bounce off, et cetera. Right.
It’s not to prevent drivers from steering away from it. Right.
Because that’s going to happen anyway not matter what it’s
made of. The sole purpose that you want non-brick mailboxes
according to Mr. McPhate is to prevent vehicle intrusion.
There’s not vehicle intrusion here.
***

At the conclusion of the parties’ arguments, the trial court granted the

motion, stating that it “[found] merit to [DOTD’s] motion[.]”

9

The plaintiffs appeal.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting DOTD’s motion

for directed verdict. The plaintiffs argue that they met their burden of

proving that the presence of the mailbox was a cause-in-fact or legal cause

of the accident.

A motion for directed verdict is a procedural device available in jury

trials to promote judicial efficiency. Fields v. Walpole Tire Serv., L.L.C.,

45,206 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 37 So. 3d 549, 556, writ denied sub

nom. Fields v. Walpople Tire Servs., L.L.C., 10-1430 (La. 10/1/10), 45 So.

3d 1097; Tanner v. Cooksey, 42,010 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/4/07, 954 So. 2d

335), writ denied, 07-0961 (La. 6/22/07), 959 So. 2d 508. The motion is

appropriately made at the close of the evidence offered by the opposing

party and should be granted when, after considering all evidentiary

inferences in the light most favorable to the movant’s opponent, it is clear

that the facts and inferences so overwhelmingly favor a verdict for the

movant, that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a contrary

conclusion. Id.; See also La. C.C.P. art. 1810 and Clifton v.

Coleman, 32,612 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/23/99), 748 So. 2d 1263, writ

denied, 00-0201 (La. 3/24/00), 758 So. 2d 151. If there is substantial

evidence opposed to the motion, i.e., evidence of such quality and weight

that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment

might reach different conclusions, the motion should be denied and the case

submitted to the jury.

While credibility evaluations should not enter the process, the trial

court has much discretion in deciding to grant or deny the motion. The
10

standard of review of a trial judge’s granting of a directed verdict is whether,

viewing the evidence submitted, reasonable men could not reach a contrary

verdict. Watson v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 47,295 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/20/12), 93 So. 3d 855; Dowles v. Conagra, Inc., 43,074 (La. App. 2 Cir.

3/26/08), 980 So. 2d 180. In addition, the appellate court must evaluate the

propriety of a directed verdict in light of the substantive law related to the

claims. Id.

In order for the DOTD to be found liable for negligence, the plaintiffs

must prove that (1) DOTD had custody of the thing which caused plaintiffs’

damages; (2) the thing was defective because it had a condition which

created an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) DOTD had actual or constructive

notice of the defect and failed to take corrective measures within a

reasonable time; and (4) the defect was a cause-in-fact of plaintiffs’

injuries. Boothe v. Dep’t of Transportation & Dev. & Par. of E. Baton

Rouge, 18-1746 (La. 6/26/19), 285 So. 3d 451; Cormier v. Comeaux, 98-

2378 (La. 7/7/99), 748 So.2d 1123.

In the instant case, the plaintiffs argue that they clearly established all

four requirements in this case. Specifically, they contend the parties

stipulated that (1) DOTD had custody of the roadway, (2) brick mailbox

presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and (3) DOTD should have known

of the dangerous condition caused by the brick mailbox. The plaintiffs also

argue that the evidence presented at trial proved that the presence of the

brick mailbox was a cause-in-fact and legal cause of the accident.

Contrarily, DOTD maintains that Professor McPhate testified that the

AASHTO standards were designed solely to protect motorists from bricks

intruding into vehicles whenever a brick mailbox was struck by a vehicle.
11

According to DOTD, the accident in this case was not the type of accident

the guidelines were designed to protect against. Therefore, DOTD asserts

that the brick mailbox was not a legal cause of the accident because no

bricks intruded into Johnson’s vehicle.

Cause in fact is generally a “but for” inquiry; if the plaintiff probably

would have not sustained the injuries but for the defendant’s substandard

conduct, such conduct is a cause in fact. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032

(La. 1991), on reh’g (5/28/1992). Stated differently, the inquiry is “[d]id the

defendant contribute to the plaintiff’s harm or is the defendant a cause of the

plaintiff’s harm?” Id., at 1042. An alternative method for determining cause

in fact, which is generally used when multiple causes are present, is the

“substantial factor” test. Roberts, supra. Under this test, cause in fact is

found to exist when the defendant’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in

bringing about plaintiff’s harm. Id.

Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty,

the scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether

the particular risk falls within the scope of the duty. Rando v. Anco

Insulations Inc., 08-1163 (La. 5/22/09), 16 So. 3d 1065; Roberts, supra.

The scope of protection inquiry asks whether the enunciated rule or principle

of law extends to or is intended to protect this plaintiff from this type of

harm arising in this manner. Rando, supra; Faucheaux v. Terrebonne

Consol. Gov’t, 615 So. 2d 289 (La. 1993).

In Rogers v. Daigle, 93-1523 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/3/94), 643 So. 2d 758,

on reh’g (10/27/94), the plaintiffs’ son was killed when the vehicle in which

he was riding as a passenger struck a large brick mailbox. The plaintiffs

filed a lawsuit alleging, inter alia, the mailbox failed to comply with
12

AASHTO guidelines, and the owners of the mailbox and DOTD were

negligent in failing to remove it. The trial court found that the driver of the

vehicle was solely at fault and dismissed the plaintiff’s claims against the

remaining defendants. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial

court erred in failing to assess fault to the owners of the mailbox and DOTD.

The Court stated, in pertinent part:

Although the driver was impaired and was speeding, the
mailbox was a substantial cause of the plaintiffs’ son’s
death. Because of the AASHTO guidelines, DOTD was aware
or should have been aware as early as 1985 that mailboxes such
as this one were lethal roadside hazards; in fact, in 1986, it
began implementing AASHTO regulations regarding mailboxes
in new construction. The letter DOTD received in 1987 shows
that federal funds were available for removal of such hazardous
mailboxes, and therefore, DOTD should have begun removal of
them at the time. However, DOTD overlaid Highway 316 in
1990 and 1991 without having the mailbox removed. We
conclude that DOTD’s failure to remove the mailbox while
overlaying the highway in question, armed with knowledge of
the hazardous nature of the mailbox, was a breach of a duty
DOTD owed to the driving public to maintain a reasonably safe
roadway and shoulder. DOTD enjoys no immunity from
liability for its operational decision not to remove the mailbox.

Id., at 762 (Internal citations omitted).

After reviewing this record, we find that DOTD failed to prove that

the facts and inferences so overwhelmingly favor a verdict in its favor, that

reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a contrary conclusion. During

the trial, Johnson testified that he swerved to his right to avoid colliding with

the left-turning vehicle. At that point, he noticed the large brick mailbox,

and he immediately reacted by swerving to the left to attempt to avoid

striking it. Johnson unequivocally testified that he believed the presence of

the mailbox was a substantial factor in causing his vehicle to enter the

plaintiff’s lane of travel.

13

Professor McPhate testified that any roadside object can be a hazard

because it has the potential to be struck by a vehicle and drivers will attempt

to avoid hitting it. He also stated that the larger and more substantial an

object is, the more of a hazard it becomes. With regard to the brick mailbox,

Professor McPhate opined that it was a navigational hazard because drivers

would “take action” to avoid hitting it. Further, Professor McPhate provided

his uncontroverted opinion that the accident would not have occurred had

the brick mailbox not been in that location.

As DOTD points out, Professor McPhate testified that the yaw marks

on the pavement indicated that striking the mailbox did not change trajectory

of Johnson’s vehicle. However, it appears that the vehicle’s trajectory was

not altered because when Johnson noticed the presence of the mailbox, he

began veering to the left to avoid striking it.

Further, we are unpersuaded by DOTD’s contention that the sole

purpose of the AASHTO regulations with regard to brick mailboxes was to

prevent bricks from intruding into vehicles. Our reading of the AASHTO

standards convinces us that the standards/guidelines/regulations were

implemented in an attempt to curtail fatal accidents caused by “massive

structures” on the side of the state and federal highways.

We find that the plaintiffs presented evidence of such quality and

weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors, in the exercise of impartial

judgment, might reach different conclusions. The evidence submitted by the

plaintiffs demonstrated that reasonable jurors could have concluded that

DOTD’s failure to remove the mailbox (or failure to notify the owners that

the mailbox did not comply with AASHTO guidelines) was a cause of the

14

accident. Consequently, the motion for a directed verdict should be denied

and the case submitted to the jury.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s grant of directed

verdict in favor of the defendant, DOTD, is hereby reversed. The case is

remanded for further proceedings. Costs of the appeal, in the amount of

$6,618.50, are assessed to the State of Louisiana, Department of

Transportation and Development, in accordance with La. R.S. 13:4521.

REVERSED; REMANDED.

15