Andrew F. Payne v. Gregory Glen Stanley, Mitchell B. Stanley, and Michael Brian Stanley

Judgment rendered March 3, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 53,773-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

ANDREW F. PAYNE Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

GREGORY GLEN STANLEY, Defendants-Appellees
MITCHELL B. STANLEY, and
MICHAEL BRIAN STANLEY

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 201738

Honorable Robert C. Johnson, Judge

*****

BREITHAUPT, DUBOS, & WOLLESON, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: P. Scott Wolleson

LAVALLE B. SALOMON, APLC Counsel for Appellees
By: Lavelle B. Salomon

*****

Before STONE, THOMPSON, and BLEICH (Pro Tempore), JJ.

BLEICH, J. (Pro Tempore).

The plaintiff, Andrew F. Payne, appeals the trial court’s finding that

the defendants, Gregory Glen Stanley, Mitchell B. Stanley, and Michael

Brian Stanley, were not liable, in solido, for the injuries and damages the

plaintiff sustained during the commission of a battery. The plaintiff also

appeals the trial court’s award of damages and its denial of the claim for

vicarious liability on the part of the employer. For the following reasons, we

affirm in part, reverse in part, render, and remand with instructions to

apportion fault.

FACTS

The defendants, Mitchell and Gregory Stanley, who are brothers, were

the owners of Stanley Brothers Livestock, Inc., and Stanley Brothers Farm,

L.L.C., in Bastrop, Louisiana. The defendant, Michael Stanley, the son of

Mitchell Stanley, was employed by the business(es).

Stanley Brothers Livestock, Inc., and Stanley Brothers Farm, L.L.C.,

were known in the local community as the “Bastrop Kill Pen” (“BKP”).

BKP offered select rescue horses for individual sale at its facility. However,

the primary business of the enterprise was the purchase and sale of rescue

horses to export to Mexico for slaughter, processing, and human

consumption.

In August 2016, BKP garnered local and national media attention

following an investigation into allegations of animal cruelty at its facility.

The investigation ensued as a result of a viral video on social media

depicting two men (one of whom was Boots Stanley, the son of Gregory

Stanley) torturing a dog and cutting its throat on the premises of BKP.1

Thereafter, animal rights activists from across the country protested BKP,

many traveling to the town of Bastrop to protest at the Morehouse Parish

Courthouse.

The media publicity gained the attention of the plaintiff, Andrew F.

Payne. The plaintiff, aged 65 and retired, had a history of supporting causes

that advocated for the humane treatment of wild horses that had been

“rescued.” Due to his interest in rescue horses, the plaintiff became

intrigued by practices at BKP. On September 22, 2016, the plaintiff went to

the Morehouse Parish Courthouse to conduct research regarding potential

USDA investigations into BKP’s practices. While there, the plaintiff heard a

rumor that the USDA would be conducting an investigation that day at the

BKP facility. The plaintiff left the courthouse and drove to BKP to attempt

to confirm what he had been told.

Because BKP is located on a dead-end road, the plaintiff drove past

the business, turned around, and drove past the business again to attempt to

leave the area. At this time, the defendants, Mitchell Stanley and Michael

Stanley, along with Boots Stanley, were working on a trailer in BKP’s

parking area. Mitchell noticed the plaintiff’s vehicle driving on the public

roadway. As the plaintiff was trying to leave the area, Mitchell yelled for

the plaintiff to stop. The plaintiff stopped, and he and Mitchell became

embroiled in an argument. Mitchell accused the plaintiff of theft and

trespassing and threatened to call law enforcement. Meanwhile, Gregory,

1
Boots Stanley and the other man depicted in the video were arrested and charged
with multiple accounts of aggravated animal cruelty in relation to that incident. The
defendants involved in the instant lawsuit were not involved in the offense regarding the
dog.

2

who had heard Mitchell yelling, exited the barn “to see what was

happening.” According to the plaintiff, while Mitchell confronted him on

the driver’s side of his vehicle, Gregory reached into the passenger window

and “grabbed and held” him. The plaintiff testified that he managed to

escape Gregory’s hold. However, Michael threw a wooden board into the

vehicle and struck the plaintiff in the face.2

The plaintiff drove to the Bastrop Police Department and reported the

incident, and an investigation ensued. The officers obtained a statement

from the plaintiff and took photographs of his injuries. They also retrieved

the wooden board from the plaintiff’s vehicle and logged it into evidence.

Meanwhile, Mitchell called the Bastrop Police Department and

reported that ongoing thefts had occurred at his place of business, and he had

observed a “suspicious white truck” driving on the road leading to the

business. However, Mitchell failed to mention the confrontation/attack

regarding the plaintiff to the police officers. Following an investigation,

Michael Stanley was arrested and charged with aggravated battery, and

Gregory Stanley was arrested and charged with simple battery.

The plaintiff sustained injuries that required medical attention. He

was treated at Morehouse General Hospital for facial lacerations, abrasions

and a nasal fracture, which later required reconstructive surgery. The

injuries to the plaintiff’s face resulted in damage to his olfactory nerve,

causing the permanent loss of taste and smell. The plaintiff was also

diagnosed with anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder.

2
The plaintiff used his cellphone to record the encounter, and the recording was
introduced into evidence at trial. Mitchell was depicted in the plaintiff’s video footage
holding his cellphone as if he was recording the incident. However, a search of
Mitchell’s phone did not yield any video footage of the encounter.

3

Further, according to the plaintiff, in the months following the attack,

the defendants used the BKP Facebook page to accuse him of committing

various criminal acts. He also asserts that the defendants conspired with

others to defame his character.

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendants, Gregory, Mitchell,

and Michael Stanley. He also named Stanley Brothers Livestock, Inc., and

Stanley Brothers Farm, L.L.C., as defendants. The plaintiff alleged claims

of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.

A bench trial was held. The plaintiff testified regarding the day of the

incident and the extent of his injuries. The defendants denied acting in

concert to harm the plaintiff. Mitchell testified that when he was arguing

with the plaintiff, he was unaware that Michael was standing behind him

holding the wooden board. Michael testified that when he saw the plaintiff’s

truck, he assumed that the plaintiff was someone who had been following

and “harassing” his cousin, Boots, after Boots had had been arrested for

cutting the dog’s throat in the prior incident. According to Michael, he did

not intend to throw the board at the plaintiff; he threw it at the plaintiff’s

truck. Michael also testified that he was employed by his father on a part-

time basis. He admitted that he was “helping” on the farm on the day of the

incident, but he was not “working” that day.

At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that Michael was

solely liable for the battery he committed against the plaintiff because the

evidence did not establish that the defendants formed an agreement to attack

the plaintiff. The court found that neither Mitchell nor Gregory was aware

that Michael intended to throw the wooden board at the plaintiff.

4

With regard to the separate battery committed by Gregory (reaching

into the passenger window and grabbing the plaintiff), the trial court

concluded that the evidence established that Gregory committed the battery.

However, the court found that Gregory was not liable for damages because

the plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered any damages as a result of that

separate battery.

In addition, the trial court found that the defendants, Stanley

Brothers Livestock, Inc., and Stanley Brothers Farm, L.L.C., were not

vicariously liable for Michael’s conduct. The trial court noted that

Michael was employed by the businesses and that he had “no specific

work hours or designated workdays.” The court also noted that

Michael received “cash payments as well as paychecks for his work,”

and “the plaintiff did not present any testimony from business

employees or any documentary evidence such as a timesheet or other

payroll records to dispute the defendant’s testimony that he was not

working on the day of the incident.”

The trial court went on to conclude that the plaintiff failed to present

evidence to refute Michael’s claim that his decision to throw the board was

personal in nature, and was unrelated to his employment at BKP. The court

stated, “Surely throwing a wooden board at the plaintiff was not in the ambit

of Michael Stanley’s assigned duties, nor does the court find that it was a

risk fairly attributable to the furtherance of any employment objectives of

Stanley Brothers Livestock under these facts and circumstances.”

5

Furthermore, the trial court found that the plaintiff failed to meet his

burden of proving intentional infliction of emotional distress and

defamation. The court awarded damages as follows:

Past Medical Expenses: $21,419.84

Future Medical Expenses: $0

TOTAL: $21,419.84

Physical pain and suffering
(past and present): $75,000

Mental pain and suffering
(past and present): $25,000

Loss of Enjoyment
of Life: $15,000

TOTAL: $115,000

The plaintiff appeals.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff contends the trial court erred in finding that the

defendants, Michael, Mitchell, and Gregory Stanley, were not liable, in

solido, for his injuries. He argues that the evidence established that the three

men participated in the attack, and their actions showed that they entered

into a tacit agreement, and thus conspired to commit an intentional or willful

act. The plaintiff maintains that there was no evidence that he provoked the

defendants or that they acted in self-defense.

An appellate court may not set aside a trial court’s finding of fact in

the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Where two

permissible views of the evidence exist, the factfinder’s choice between

them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Cole v. State Dept.

of Public Safety & Corr., 01-2123 (La. 9/4/02), 825 So. 2d 1134; Stobart v.

6

State through Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 617 So. 2d 880 (La. 1993); Jewitt v.

Alvarez, 50,083 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 179 So. 3d 645.

Our jurisprudence summarizes the appropriate standard of review as

follows:

To reverse a factfinder’s determination, the appellate court must
find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not
exist for the finding of the trial court and that the record
establishes that the finding is clearly wrong. Stobart, supra;
Jewitt, supra.

Even if an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and
inferences are more reasonable than the factfinder’s, reasonable
evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact
should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the
testimony. Cole, supra; Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La.
1989).

Moreover, where the factfinder’s conclusions are based on
determinations regarding credibility of the witnesses,
the manifest error standard demands great deference to the trier
of fact because only the trier of fact can be aware of the
variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on
the listener’s understanding and belief in what is said. Rosell,
supra; Jewitt, supra.

In the instant case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired

to commit a battery. Under La. C.C. art. 2315, a person is liable for acts

which cause damage to another. The intentional tort of battery is a harmful

or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act intended to cause

the plaintiff to suffer such a contact. Griffith v. Young, 46,184 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/13/11), 62 So. 3d 856; Touchet v. Hampton, 08-833 (La. App. 3

Cir.12/11/08), 1 So. 3d 729, writ denied, 09-0076 (La.3/27/09), 5 So. 3d

141.

The Louisiana Civil Code addresses a conspiracy among tortfeasors,

making them answerable, in solido, for the damage caused by their offense.

La. C.C. art. 2324(A). The term “conspiracy” generally means a plan by two

7

or more persons to accomplish some unlawful, immoral, criminal, or evil

purpose. Hall v. Lilly, 29,624 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/18/97), 697 So. 2d 676;

Walker v. American Honda Motor Co., 93-1659 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/1/94),

640 So. 2d 794, writ denied, 94-1741 (La. 10/7/94), 644 So. 2d 644. Once

the conspiracy is sufficiently established, the act done by one in furtherance

of the unlawful design is, in law, the act of all. Curole v. Delcambre, 16-550

(La. App. 3 Cir. 8/21/17), 224 So. 3d 1074, writ denied, 17-1506, 17-1491

(La.1/9/18), 231 So. 3d 652, 653, citing Rush v. Town of Farmerville, 156

La. 857, 101 So. 243 (1924). When a tort is perpetrated through the

instrumentality of a combination or conspiracy, the party wronged and

injured may look beyond the actual participants in committing the injury,

and join with them, as defendants, all who cooperated in, advised, or assisted

in the accomplishment of the common design, for co-trespassers, are bound,

in solido. Id.

La. C.C. art. 2324 does not, by itself, impose liability for a civil

conspiracy. Haygood v. Dies, 49,972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/12/15), 174 So. 3d

1211; Butz v. Lynch, 97-2166 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/8/98), 710 So. 2d 1171.

The actionable element in a claim under this article is not the conspiracy

itself, but rather the tort which the conspirators agreed to perpetrate and

which they actually commit in whole or in part. Id. However, to recover

under a theory of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that an agreement

existed among the defendants to commit the tortious act which caused the

plaintiff’s injury. Id. A conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial

evidence. Haygood, supra; Hall, supra.

8

The conspiracy action is for damages caused by acts committed

pursuant to a formed conspiracy, and all of the conspirators will be regarded

as having assisted or encouraged the performance of those acts. Thomas v.

N. 40 Land Dev., Inc., 04-0610 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/26/05), 894 So. 2d 1160,

citing Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 51 F. 3d 553 (5th Cir.

1995). Proof of a conspiracy can be by actual knowledge of both parties or

overt actions with another, or can be inferred from the knowledge of the

alleged co-conspirator of the impropriety of the actions taken by the other

co-conspirator. Stephens v. Bail Enforcement of La., 96-0809 (La. App. 1

Cir. 2/14/97), 690 So. 2d 124, writ denied, 97-0585 (La. 4/18/97), 692 So.

2d 454; Curole; supra. The plaintiff must therefore prove an unlawful act

and assistance or encouragement that amounts to a conspiracy. The

assistance or encouragement must be of such quality and character that a

jury would be permitted to infer from it an underlying agreement and act that

is the essence of the conspiracy. Thomas, supra; Chrysler Credit, supra.

After a thorough examination of this record, we find the evidence in

the record is sufficient to establish the elements of a conspiracy. Although

there is no direct evidence that the defendants “pre-devised” a plan to attack

the plaintiff, the defendants’ actions showed that they acted in concert,

assisting one another during the attack. During the trial, Mitchell testified

that he saw the plaintiff driving a white truck on the road near BKP, and he

believed the plaintiff may have been the person who had stolen items from

his business. Mitchell stated that he yelled for the plaintiff to stop the

vehicle, and the plaintiff complied. As Mitchell ran to confront the plaintiff,

Michael also approached the vehicle. Gregory, who testified that he heard

9

Mitchell yelling, also arrived on the scene. While Mitchell engaged the

plaintiff in a verbal confrontation on the driver’s side of the vehicle, Gregory

approached the passenger side. Gregory then reached into the vehicle and

grabbed the plaintiff as Mitchell attempted to record the interaction by

video. When the plaintiff managed to escape Gregory’s hold on him,

Michael threw a board into the vehicle, striking the plaintiff in his face. The

attack, which resulted in the plaintiff’s injuries, did not begin when Michael

threw the board at the plaintiff. It began when Mitchell observed the “white

truck” and began running toward it with Michael and Gregory in tow.

Although the defendants denied knowing that Michael was going to throw

the board, they were all aware that Mitchell and the plaintiff were engaged

in a heated verbal confrontation and that Gregory had reached into the

plaintiff’s truck. Under the facts of this case, we find that the defendants’

tacit agreement to detain, confront, and batter the plaintiff resulted in the

plaintiff’s injuries. Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in finding

that the defendants were not liable, in solido, for the plaintiff’s injuries. This

portion is reversed, and judgment is rendered finding that Mitchell Stanley,

Gregory Stanley, and Michael Stanley are liable, in solido, for the damages

incurred by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff also contends the trial court erred in denying his claim

for vicarious liability on the part of the defendants, Stanley Brothers

Livestock, Inc., and Stanley Brothers Farm, L.L.C. According to the

plaintiff, he met his burden of proving that he was injured during the course

and scope of the defendants’ employment.

10

Employers are answerable for the damage caused by their employees

in the exercise of the functions in which the worker is employed. La. C.C.

art. 2320. An employer’s vicarious liability for conduct not his own extends

only to the employee’s tortious conduct which occurs within the course and

scope of the employment. Orgeron v. McDonald, 93-1353 (La. 7/5/94), 639

So. 2d 224; Candler v. Henderson, 48,441 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/13), 128

So. 3d 587, 590, writ denied, 13-2980 (La. 2/28/14), 134 So. 3d 1179. In

general, an employee is acting within the course and scope of his

employment when the conduct is the type he is employed to perform, occurs

substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is activated

at least in part by a purpose to serve the employer. Timmons v. Silman, 99-

3264 (La. 5/16/00), 761 So.2d 507; Candler, supra.

An employer is responsible for the negligent acts of its employee

when the conduct is so closely connected in time, place and causation to the

employee’s job duties as to constitute a risk of harm attributable to

the employer’s business. Orgeron, supra; Candler, supra. Such a

connection is established when the employer has reason to expect the

employee to undertake the mission and the employee reasonably expected to

be compensated for the task. Candler, supra; Young v. Mooney, 01-1592

(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/1/02), 815 So. 2d 1107. In determining whether the

employee’s conduct is employment-related, the court assesses several

factors, including the payment of wages by the employer, the employer’s

power of control, the employee’s duty to perform the act in question, the

time, place and purpose of the act in relation to serving the employer, the

relationship between the employee’s act and the employer’s business, the

11

employee’s motivation for performing the act and the employer’s reasonable

expectation that the employee would perform the act. Orgeron, supra;

Candler, supra.

In the present case, the plaintiff presented evidence indicating that

defendants committed the intentional torts on the road in front of the

business(es) during business hours. However, the business(es) would not

be vicariously liable absent evidence that the defendants’ tortious acts were

primarily employment rooted or reasonably incidental to the performance of

their job duties. Thus, to recover against the employer, the plaintiff bore the

burden of proving that the Stanleys’ tortious conduct was so closely

connected to their employment duties that the risk of harm was fairly

attributable to the business(es).

Our review of the record reveals that neither the plaintiff’s testimony

nor the exhibits that were entered into evidence addressed the Stanleys’

particular job duties, and the record does not support a finding that

defendants’ torts were employment rooted. To the contrary, the paltry

evidence presented demonstrated that the Stanleys’ tortious conduct was

based upon their own personal considerations or emotions, rather than a

desire to further the interests of the business(es). The plaintiff testified that

he went to BKP to ascertain whether the USDA was conducting an

investigation of the business. However, there is no evidence that the

defendants knew the plaintiff’s identity, his reasons for being on the

premises, or that the attack was related to the defendants’ employment. The

evidence established that Mitchell confronted the plaintiff, an argument

ensued, tempers flared, and the situation escalated. Based on the record

12

before us, we find that the plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of proving

that physical attack furthered the objectives of BPK or was primarily rooted

in the Stanleys’ employment with and/or ownership of Stanley Brothers

Livestock, Stanley Brothers Farms, or BKP. This assignment lacks merit.

The plaintiff further contends that the trial court abused its discretion

in awarding damages that were insufficient to compensate him for the extent

of his injuries. The plaintiff maintains that he underwent reconstructive

surgery of his nose, and he suffered permanent damage to his olfactory nerve

and can no longer smell or taste. According to the plaintiff, with no sense of

smell or taste, he will suffer the effects of the attack for the rest of his life.

One damaged through the fault of another is entitled to full

indemnification for the damages caused thereby. La. C.C. art. 2315;

Wainwright v. Fontenot, 00-0492 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So. 2d 70; Jones v.

Fin. Indem. Co., 52,421 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/19), 264 So. 3d 660. General

damages are those which may not be fixed with pecuniary exactitude;

instead, they involve mental or physical pain or suffering, inconvenience, the

loss of intellectual gratification or physical enjoyment, or other losses of

lifestyle which cannot be definitely measured in monetary terms. Bellard v.

American Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08), 980 So. 2d 654; Jones,

supra. The trier of fact has much discretion in the assessment of general

damages. La. C.C. art. 2324.1. The role of the appellate court in reviewing

general damage awards is not to decide what is an appropriate award, but to

review the exercise of discretion by the trial court. Wainwright, supra;

Jones, supra.

13

The physical injuries sustained by the plaintiff are undisputed. As

stated above, the plaintiff suffered a fractured nose, for which he underwent

surgery to repair it. The plaintiff also suffered damage to his olfactory

nerve, resulting in the permanent loss of smell and taste. The trial court

awarded to the plaintiff $75,000 for past and present physical pain and

suffering, $25,000 for past and present mental anguish, and $15,000 for loss

of enjoyment of life.

During the trial, the plaintiff testified regarding the pain and trauma he

experienced as a result of the attack. Dr. Lawrence Danna also testified with

regard to the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries, and the plaintiff’s medical

records detail that the plaintiff sustained a nasal fracture, which required

reconstructive surgery, and his olfactory nerve was permanently damaged.

Dr. William McCown, a clinical psychologist, testified that the plaintiff

suffered from depression, anxiety, and PTSD as a result of the attack. Dr.

John D. Edwards, a licensed professional counselor, testified that the

plaintiff presented with complaints of anxiety, difficulty sleeping,

nervousness, extreme caution, and hypervigilance.

Based on the evidence presented, we cannot say the trial court’s award

of $75,000 for past and present physical pain and suffering, $25,000 for past

and present mental pain and suffering, and $10,000 for loss of enjoyment of

life constituted an abuse of the wide discretion afforded the trier of fact in

the assessment of such damages. Thus, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Further, the plaintiff contends the trial court erred in failing to award

any amount for future medical expenses. He argues that he presented

14

uncontroverted evidence that he will require counseling for PTSD; therefore,

he should have been awarded damages for future medical expenses.

To recover the cost of future medical expenses, a tort victim must

establish the probability of such expenses with supporting medical testimony

and estimations of their probable cost. Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 09-

1869 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So. 3d 996. The proper standard for determining

whether a plaintiff is entitled to future medical expenses is proof by

a preponderance of the evidence that those expenses will be medically

necessary. Menard, supra; Terry v. Simmons, 51,200 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/15/17), 215 So. 3d 410.

In the instant case, Dr. McCown evaluated the plaintiff on October 20,

2016. Dr. McCown stated plaintiff “might” benefit from future

psychological treatment and opined that the plaintiff would need 18-30

counseling sessions to see an improvement in his condition. However,

during his testimony on cross-examination, Dr. McCown stated that his

findings were “tentative” and his evaluation of the plaintiff was only meant

to ascertain the “severity of [the plaintiff’s] symptoms.” The record reveals

that in the three years between the incident and the trial, the plaintiff put

forth little effort to attend the sessions Dr. McCown opined were necessary.

The plaintiff attended three sessions with Dr. Edwards in 2016, one session

in 2017, and one session in 2019. Dr. Edwards noted that the plaintiff’s

hearing impairment, which was unrelated to the incident in dispute, was a

“strong detriment” to mental health counseling and that the plaintiff would

become frustrated during the sessions. However, the record does not contain

any evidence that the plaintiff attempted to address his hearing deficit.

15

Based on the record before us, we find that the medical testimony

indicating the plaintiff’s need for future medical treatment for PTSD was

speculative at best. Dr. McCown indicated that the plaintiff could

“potentially” benefit from future mental health treatment. Therefore, in light

of the record as a whole, we find that the trial court’s conclusion that the

plaintiff was not entitled to an award for future medical expenses was

reasonable. This assignment lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, that portion of the judgment, finding that

the defendants, Michael Stanley, Mitchell Stanley, and Gregory Stanley

were not liable, in solido, and dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against

Mitchell Stanley and Gregory Stanley, is reversed. Judgment is hereby

rendered against Michael Stanley, Mitchell Stanley, and Gregory Stanley, in

solido. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The case is remanded to the

trial court to apportion fault. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the

appellees, Gregory Stanley, Mitchell Stanley, and Michael Stanley.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; RENDERED;
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

16