State of Louisiana v. Christian A. Satterfield

Judgment rendered March 3, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,809-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

CHRISTIAN A. SATTERFIELD Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 361141

Honorable Charles G. Tutt, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

WILLIAM C. GASKINS
ALEX L. PORUBSKY
MALLORY RICHARD
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before MOORE, COX, and BLEICH (Pro Tempore), JJ.

BLEICH, J. (Pro Tempore).

The defendant, Christian Satterfield, was charged with aggravated

battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34. After a jury trial, defendant was found

guilty as charged pursuant to a unanimous verdict. The trial court sentenced

defendant to imprisonment for two years at hard labor. Defendant appeals

his conviction and sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

The record shows that on the evening of September 14, 2018,

Shreveport police officers responded to a 911 call regarding a stabbing at the

Stone Forks restaurant parking lot in Shreveport. The officers were directed

to a nearby Circle K store to contact the victim, Bobby Frasier, who

informed officers that defendant had attacked him with a knife, causing

wounds to his head and arm. Defendant was arrested the next day and

admitted to the investigating officer that he stabbed Frasier with a knife.

Defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated battery.

At trial, Bobby Frasier gave the following testimony: Frasier and

Joseph Cockrell had been dating since December 2017, and had broken up

just before this incident occurred; Frasier did not know defendant and had

not met him before; on September 14, 2018, Frasier texted Cockrell via cell

phone about returning Cockrell’s laptop and PlayStation game console to

him; they agreed that Frasier would bring the items to Cockrell at the Stone

Forks restaurant after work at 10:00 p.m.; Frasier asked Lindsey Parker, his

friend since childhood, to drive him to meet Cockrell; when they arrived in

the restaurant parking lot that night, no one was outside; Frasier texted

Cockrell, but did not get a response; when someone walked outside the

building and approached them, Frasier assumed the person was Cockrell and

stepped out of the car; Frasier then realized it was defendant, who asked

Frasier for Cockrell’s belongings; Frasier refused to hand them over because

he had never met defendant before and was uncomfortable giving him

Cockrell’s belongings. Defendant responded by suddenly, and without

hesitation, striking Frasier in the head; with the falling rain, Frasier was

initially unaware that he was bleeding and simply thought that he had been

punched in the head. Frasier, unarmed but upset, followed his attacker as he

ran to another vehicle in the parking lot; defendant then struck Frasier in the

arm and entered his vehicle; he almost backed over Frasier as he was leaving

the parking lot.

Frasier returned to Parker’s vehicle, where Parker was on the phone

with police; they initially attempted to follow defendant, but then stopped at

a Circle K store down the street and waited for the police and paramedics to

arrive. Frasier was transported to the emergency room and received four

stitches in his arm; the wound in his head was near his eye, so the doctors

used glue instead of stitches; Frasier identified State’s Exhibit 1 as pictures

taken by Parker that showed his injuries; he thought Cockrell worked at

Stone Forks, did not know that defendant worked there and did not call him

there; the police did not ask Frasier to save the text messages from Cockrell

and they were eventually erased from his phone. Frasier followed defendant

to ask why he hit him; Frasier had no intent to harm defendant and had not

threatened him verbally or physically.

Lindsey Parker testified as follows: on September 14, 2018, she

drove Frasier to the Stone Forks restaurant so that he could return items to

his ex-boyfriend, Cockrell; Parker felt that Frasier was upset and hurt about

the breakup; based on what Frasier told her about the agreed meeting, Parker
2

was expecting Cockrell to walk out of the building; Parker was aware that

defendant and Cockrell were dating, but she did not know defendant at that

time; when defendant walked out of the building, he appeared calm; Parker

heard defendant say that he would get Cockrell’s things, and Frasier refused

to give the items to anyone but Cockrell; she did not recall the conversation

being heated and did not recall hearing any negative words, but things

became physical “really quickly and unexpectedly”; Parker watched as

defendant walked up and suddenly stabbed Frasier in the head; Parker never

saw Frasier get physically or verbally aggressive with defendant; she did not

know that defendant had any weapon until she saw the blood coming from

Frasier’s head; Parker saw that defendant ran to his truck and that Frasier ran

after him, but did not see Frasier get struck a second time in the arm.

Parker was already on the phone with the police when Frasier returned

to her vehicle and wanted to follow defendant; she was shaking too badly to

pursue defendant, so she pulled into a Circle K gas station several blocks

away, and they waited for the police and paramedics; she accompanied

Frasier to the hospital, where they learned that Frasier’s wounds were not as

bad as they thought; Parker did not see that Frasier was armed with anything

and did not see Frasier attack defendant; Parker maintained that defendant

was the aggressor; Frasier was still upset about the breakup as they drove to

meet Cockrell; Frasier told Parker that the attacker’s name was Christian

Satterfield as she was speaking with the police on the phone. Parker

acknowledged prior convictions for possession of Xanax and Lortab, simple

battery, and driving while intoxicated, and that she had charges pending, but

denied being promised any inducements or leniency in exchange for her

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testimony. Parker denied being under the influence of anything at the time

of the incident, and at trial.

Shreveport patrol officers Jemela Freeman and Andre Wilson testified

that they responded to the 911 call of a stabbing at the Stone Forks

restaurant. After arriving at the empty parking lot of the business, they were

redirected to the nearby Circle K gas station, where they found Frasier and

Parker. Officer Freeman observed that Frasier seemed frantic. Both officers

observed the wounds to Frasier’s head and arm, and Officer Freeman noted

that there was blood everywhere. Officer Freeman testified that Frasier said

he had gone to the restaurant to return some belongings to his ex-boyfriend,

but was met by his ex’s new boyfriend, defendant, who wanted to take the

items. Frasier told the officers that he refused to give defendant the items

because he wanted to give them to the owner; Parker told the officers that

defendant pulled out an unknown sharp object and stabbed Frasier twice,

once in the head and once in the arm. Along with this testimony, the jury

viewed the dash cam video from Officer Freeman’s police vehicle that

contained the voices of Frasier and Parker describing the incident.

Shreveport police investigator Marlon Clark testified about his

investigation into the incident as follows: he attempted to record his 15-

minute interview with defendant but the machine failed to properly record;

he used his handwritten notes taken during the interview to prepare his

report and he was still in possession of his notes, which he had not turned

over to the district attorney’s office; defendant said in his statement that he

was working at Stone Forks that day, and he had received several

threatening phone calls from Frazier on the restaurant phone; defendant said

that after closing the restaurant at 10:00 p.m., he went outside and was
4

confronted by Frasier; initially, defendant told the officer that he was

unarmed and that he did not stab Frasier, but that he may have punched

Frasier; defendant later admitted that he had a steak knife from the restaurant

on his person and that when Frasier confronted him, he stabbed Frasier with

it before he fled the scene; defendant said that he brought the steak knife

with him because he was worried that Frasier was going to be there and then

returned the knife to Stone Forks; when asked why he did not call the police

after Frasier made the phone calls and confronted him at the restaurant,

defendant told the officer that he did not have an answer; he (Officer Clark)

did not obtain Frasier’s phone to verify a call to the restaurant and did not

obtain a search warrant, but agreed that if there was evidence that Frasier

was calling Stone Forks, such evidence might indicate that Frasier instigated

the conflict; Officer Clark also confirmed that none of the police officers had

attempted to take pictures of the items that Frasier alleged he was returning

to Cockrell that night and none of the officers took pictures of Frasier’s

injuries; Frasier and Parker stated that Frasier was at the restaurant parking

lot to return items to Cockrell, but defendant was there instead and asked for

the items; the officer acknowledged that he did not record the statement that

he obtained from Parker at the hospital, even though witness statements are

“typically” recorded; and he did not re-interview Cockrell after speaking

with the others because Parker’s account of what happened corroborated

Frasier’s story and defendant had confessed that he stabbed the victim.

Defendant gave the following testimony: at the time of trial, he was

32 years old and employed at Casa Jimador in Shreveport; he was previously

the general manager at Stone Forks, and before that was the event and party

coordinator at another restaurant; he met Cockrell through an internet dating
5

site about one month before the incident and they immediately began dating;

it would be difficult to confuse him with Cockrell because Cockrell was not

as tall as him and had a smaller build than him; as general manager of Stone

Forks at the time of the incident, he could confirm that Cockrell did not

work at Stone Forks; he knew that Cockrell previously dated Frasier, and

had seen Frasier key Cockrell’s vehicle; and he felt that Cockrell was fearful

of Frasier, and observed that Cockrell received daily text messages from

Frasier.

Defendant also provided the following testimony: while working on

September 14, 2018, he received a call at 7:30 p.m. from Frasier on the

Stone Forks restaurant phone; Frasier asked for Cockrell, and he told him

that Cockrell was not there; Frasier said that he wanted to return Cockrell’s

belongings to him; he told Frasier that was a matter between Cockrell and

Frasier, and that he did not like Frasier calling him where he worked; Frasier

became angry and began yelling at him; he told Frasier that he was not

welcome on the premises because of his hostility and hung up the phone;

when closing the restaurant at 10:00 p.m., he noticed a vehicle parked in the

lot and went outside to let the people inside the vehicle know the restaurant

was closed and to ask if they needed anything; he had never met Frasier

before, but he had seen a picture of him; Frasier told him that he had come to

return Cockrell’s things; he told Frasier that was between him and Cockrell

and that Frasier was not permitted on the property because he had been

hostile on the phone; Frasier yelled at him that he wanted to give Cockrell

his belongings, and defendant replied that he would take the items to

Cockrell because Cockrell was fearful of Frasier, who began pacing, yelling

obscenities, and flailing his arms; he never saw the items that Frasier said he
6

wanted to return to Cockrell; defendant turned to get into his truck; as he put

his hand in his pocket to get his keys, Frasier came around the car door

toward him; he had silverware and a knife in his work apron, and he pulled

the knife out with his keys; he felt threatened because Frasier was chasing

him; when he started to open his vehicle door, Frasier came from behind and

tried to grab him, so he spun around with the knife in his hand and that is

how Frasier ended up with the cut on his temple and the wound to his arm;

after he got inside his truck and locked the door, Frasier beat on the vehicle

and yelled at him; he drove away and went home; and he did not call the

police because he felt that his defensive actions would not have “looked

good on him,” and he was concerned that he might lose his job.

Defendant acknowledged that he stabbed Frasier with a knife, but

only to defend himself. Defendant admitted that he initially was not

“forthcoming” to officers about having the knife and stabbing Frasier.

Defendant also insisted that Frasier instigated the incident when he showed

up at defendant’s place of employment, confronted him, and then chased

him when he tried to leave, causing defendant to defend himself.

After the close of evidence, the six-person jury returned a unanimous

verdict finding defendant guilty of aggravated battery. Defendant filed

motions for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and for new trial alleging that

the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction of aggravated battery

because the state’s witnesses gave inconsistent testimony showing they were

not credible and the state failed to negate his claim of self-defense.

Defendant also argued that a new trial was required because the state had

failed to share with the defense the handwritten notes of Officer Clark from

his unrecorded interview with defendant. The trial court denied the motions
7

and sentenced defendant to serve two years at hard labor. Defendant’s

motion to reconsider the sentence was denied. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to support the conviction. Defendant argues that the state failed

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed aggravated battery

because the state’s witnesses were not credible and defendant proved he

acted in self-defense.

Defendant asserts that under the circumstances shown at trial, he

reasonably acted in self-defense after being confronted at his workplace by

Frasier, who then chased and grabbed defendant in a dark parking lot. The

state argues that defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that he acted in self-defense, because his actions were neither

reasonable nor necessary under the circumstances.

A battery is the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of

another. La. R.S. 14:33. An aggravated battery is a battery committed with

a dangerous weapon. La. R.S. 14:34. “Dangerous weapon” includes any

instrumentality, which in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce

death or great bodily harm. La. R.S. 14:2.

In considering the issue of sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing

court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560

(1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied,

8

541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Frost,

53,312 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So. 3d 708.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence and accords great deference to the trier of fact’s decisions

to accept or reject witness testimony in whole or in part. State v. Frost,

supra. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Jackson, 53,497 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1156.

The Jackson standard of review is applicable in cases involving both

direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Frost, supra. The facts

established by the direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances

established by that evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every

essential element of the crime. State v. Jackson, supra.

La. R.S. 14:18 provides that the fact that an offender’s conduct is

justifiable, although otherwise criminal, shall constitute a defense to

prosecution for any crime based on that conduct. La. R.S. 14:18(7) provides

that this defense of justification can be claimed when the offender’s conduct

is in defense of persons or of property under any of the circumstances

described in R.S. 14:19 through 14:22.

The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable

when committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the

person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person’s lawful

possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and

apparently necessary to prevent such offense. La. R.S. 14:19(A)(1)(a). In a
9

non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense is subject to a two-part

inquiry. State v. Barron, 51,491 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/9/17), 243 So. 3d 1178,

writ denied, 17-1529 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1063. First, there is an

objective inquiry into whether the force used was reasonable under the

circumstances. Second, there is a subjective inquiry into whether the force

used was apparently necessary. State v. Williams, 50,004 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/30/15), 178 So. 3d 1051.

A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot

claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good

faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows, or should know, that he

desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14:21; State v.

Williams, supra. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the

possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person

who used force or violence in defense of his person or property had a

reasonable belief that force or violence was reasonable and apparently

necessary to prevent a forcible offense or to prevent the unlawful entry. La.

R.S. 14:19(D).

The statutes do not clearly define or allocate the burden of proving

self-defense in a non-homicide case. State v. Williams, supra. This Court

has repeatedly held that the burden of proving self-defense in a non-

homicide case rests with the defendant to prove the defense by a

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Barron, supra. In State v. Jackson,

51,841 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 646, this Court noted that while

the burden of proof was the defendant’s by a preponderance of the evidence,

the Court in some cases also required that the state must then prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. This Court
10

has also noted, however, that the Louisiana Supreme Court has not clearly

approved of this additional burden. Id.

In State v. Jackson, supra, the jury was instructed that the defense has

the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his actions

were in self-defense and that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant did not act in self-defense. This Court held that the

defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in

self-defense. Id. This Court also held that the state met its burden of

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s attempted homicide

was not perpetrated in self-defense. Id.

To convict defendant of aggravated battery in this case, the state was

required to prove that he committed an intentional battery on Frasier with a

dangerous weapon. At trial, the victim, Frasier, and the eyewitness, Parker,

both testified, and defendant admitted, that he intentionally used a knife and

inflicted injury on the victim. Frasier’s testimony that he suffered wounds to

his head and arm was corroborated by the testimony of Parker and Officers

Freeman, Wilson, and Clark. La. R.S. 14:34 does not include serious bodily

injury as an element of the offense, so whether Frasier’s wounds were

superficial or serious is irrelevant. Thus, the state proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant committed aggravated battery in using a

dangerous weapon, a knife, to intentionally commit a battery on Frasier.

In this case, as in State v. Jackson, supra, the jury was advised as

follows:

The burden of proof is on the State to prove the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. The defendant must prove a claim of self-
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance
of the evidence means more probable than not. If a
preponderance of the evidence shows that the defendant acted
11

in self-defense, then the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.

Defendant was thus required to prove that his use of force and

violence, though otherwise criminal, was justified because he acted in

defense of his person, to prevent a forcible offense against him, and that the

force used was reasonable under the circumstances and apparently

necessary.

Even taking defendant’s assertions as true, that Frasier repeatedly

called the restaurant that day and that Frasier was upset and “manic” because

he could not return the items directly to Cockrell, the jury could have

determined, based upon the evidence presented at trial, that defendant was

not in danger of a forcible offense that justified his use of a knife against an

unarmed person. Furthermore, defendant’s testimony that Frasier keyed

Cockrell’s vehicle and was sending daily “harassing” text messages to

Cockrell described actions made toward Cockrell, not defendant. The only

evidence presented at trial regarding Frasier’s behavior, prior to being

stabbed in the head by defendant, was testimony by Parker that Frasier was

still upset about the breakup with Cockrell and defendant’s statement that

Frasier had tried to grab him.

Regarding the sequence of events – whether defendant stabbed Frasier

first and then Frasier chased him, or whether Frasier first chased defendant,

who then stabbed Frasier in defense – we have only the testimony of

defendant, Frasier, and Parker. The determination of who did what first,

based on the limited evidence presented at trial, required a credibility

determination by the jurors, whose verdict indicates that they found Frasier

and Parker’s testimony more credible than that of defendant.

12

As noted above, if defendant was the aggressor, he would be

precluded from raising a self-defense claim unless he could show that he

withdrew from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that Frasier

knew, or should have known, that he desired to withdraw and discontinue

the conflict. Defendant argues that if the police had obtained Frasier’s

phone records, then that evidence would have established that Frasier called

defendant at Stone Forks that day, but such evidence would not, by itself,

establish Frasier as the aggressor as defendant claims. Defendant also

asserts that Frasier’s phone, with text messages, could have been used to

determine the veracity of Frasier’s statement that he appeared at Stone Forks

that night to return Cockrell’s belongings, and not just to confront Cockrell’s

new boyfriend, defendant. Even assuming that Frasier was not being

truthful, and Cockrell’s belongings were just an excuse for him to talk to

Cockrell or defendant, such evidence would only impact Frasier’s

credibility, and would not, by itself, establish Frasier as the aggressor, even

if none of what followed would have happened had he not appeared at the

restaurant.

The only evidence before the jury was that Frasier told defendant that

he had items to return to Cockrell and that he would give them only to him.

Frasier testified that defendant then stabbed him; defendant testified that

Frasier chased him and then he stabbed Frasier as he was running to flee in

his vehicle. Again, this is a credibility determination for the jury, and the

jury found that Frasier’s version of the incident, regarding who was the

aggressor, was more credible.

When considered in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the

evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that defendant
13

failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that he was acting in self-

defense, and that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

was guilty of aggravated battery. This assignment is without merit.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motions for

post-verdict judgment of acquittal and for new trial. All assignments of

error and issues for review must be briefed. The court may consider as

abandoned any assignment of error and issue for review which has not been

briefed. U.R.C.A. 2-12.4(B)(4).

Defendant’s appellate attorney combined this assignment of error with

the first assignment in her brief. The combined argument addresses the

errors raised in the motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal regarding

the inconsistent testimony of the state’s witnesses and the self-defense claim,

but does not address the argument raised in the motion for new trial

regarding the absence of the investigator’s notes from his interview with

defendant. Assignments of error which are neither briefed nor argued are

considered abandoned. U.R.C.A. Rule 2-12.4; State v. Jones, 48,458 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/20/13), 128 So. 3d 593, writ denied, 13-2926 (La. 5/30/14),

140 So. 3d 1173. Accordingly, that argument is considered abandoned.

Defendant also contends the trial court erred in requiring him to meet

an affirmative burden of proof that he acted in self-defense. Defendant

argues that the burden of proving guilt rests upon the state because the

Louisiana Constitution provides that every person charged with a crime is

innocent until proven guilty.

A party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give a jury

charge unless an objection thereto is made before the jury retires or within

such time as the court may reasonably cure the alleged error. The nature of
14

the objection and the grounds therefor shall be stated at the time of the

objection. La. C. Cr. P. art. 801.

As noted above, La. R.S. 14:18 allows for the use of affirmative

defenses, such as justification, and La. R.S. 14:19 provides the statutory

standard by which the use of force or violence in a non-homicide case is

deemed justifiable – the action must be reasonable and apparently necessary.

Failure to raise an objection to these statutes, or to a jury instruction

explaining these statutes, in the trial court precludes the defendant from

raising such objections on appeal. State v. Barron, supra.

In Barron, the defendant was also charged with aggravated battery.

This Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in

instructing the jury that he had the burden of proving self-defense in a non-

homicide case and held that there was no error in the instructions given.

This Court also noted that in State v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1983),

the supreme court observed that the defendant in a non-homicide case may

have the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence,

since a subjective inquiry is involved. This Court also noted Martin v. Ohio,

480 U.S. 228, 235, 107 S. Ct. 1098, 94 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1987), in which the

United States Supreme Court held that placing the burden on the defendant

to prove by a preponderance that she acted in self-defense in a murder did

not violate due process because the state must still prove every element of

the offense. State v. Barron, supra.

As noted by defendant, La. R.S. 14:18 and La. R.S. 14:19 do not

expressly change the state’s burden to prove the defendant guilty of the

offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. However, neither do the

statutes assign the state a greater burden of proof regarding a defendant’s
15

claim of an affirmative defense and the jurisprudence has found there is no

due process violation by requiring the defendant in a non-homicide case to

bear the burden of proof to show that he was defending himself against a

forcible offense. Defendant had the opportunity to justify his actions and

show that, under the circumstances at the time of the offense, his actions

were reasonable and apparently necessary. The verdict shows that the jury

found that he failed to do so. To the extent that defendant would argue that

the jury received an improper instruction, he failed to raise his objections

before the trial court and preserve the issue for appeal. This assignment of

error lacks merit.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing an excessive

sentence and in denying his motion to reconsider sentence. Defendant

argues that the two-year sentence is harsh considering that he had no prior

felony convictions, he had been gainfully employed for years, and the trial

court failed to consider these mitigating factors.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1, and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Wing, 51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711. A review of the

sentencing guidelines does not require a listing of every aggravating or

mitigating circumstance. State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/17),

217 So. 3d 596. When the defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence raises

only a claim that the sentence imposed was constitutionally excessive,

review of the sentence on appeal is restricted to that claim. La. C. Cr. P. art.

881.1; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 245 So. 3d 131.

16

Pursuant to La. Const. art. I, § 20, the reviewing court considers

whether the sentence is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the

offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain

and suffering. State v. Boehm, supra. A sentence is considered grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Wing, supra.

The court must state for the record the considerations taken into

account and the factual basis for the sentence imposed. La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1(C). The court must consider the defendant’s personal history, the

defendant’s criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, and the

likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Boehm, supra. There is no requirement

that specific matters be given any particular weight at sentencing. Id. All

convictions and all prior criminal activity may be considered, as well as

other evidence normally excluded from the trial. State v. Platt, 43,708 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 12/3/08), 998 So. 2d 864.

A trial court has wide discretion in imposing a sentence within the

statutory limits, and a sentence should not be set aside absent a showing of

abuse of discretion. State v. Vanhorn, 52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268

So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La. 11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065; State v.

Weston, 52,312 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 722. Absent specific

authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for

that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.

Id.

The statutory sentencing range in this case states whoever commits an

aggravated battery shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned with or

without hard labor for not more than 10 years, or both. La. R.S. 14:34(B).
17

Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court noted that it had considered

the sentencing guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and found that there was

an undue risk that defendant would commit another crime if given a

suspended sentence, that defendant was in need of a custodial environment,

and that a lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense.

Finding that defendant’s crime was a “needless violent act,” the trial court

sentenced defendant to serve two years at hard labor.

The record shows that the trial court was informed at sentencing that

defendant attempted to make restitution to Frasier. The trial court did not

articulate mitigating factors, but having presided over the trial, the court was

aware that defendant had been gainfully employed for several years and the

extent of his criminal history.

In this case, an emotional argument escalated into an aggravated

battery when one person suddenly stabbed the other person in the head and

arm with a knife. The relatively minor nature of Frasier’s injuries does not

diminish the fact that defendant struck an unarmed man in the head with a

knife, creating the risk that the victim might have been blinded or worse. In

addition, the evidence produced at trial did not show that defendant faced a

threat of forcible offense from the victim.

Under the circumstances of this case, the imposition of a two-year

sentence, which is at the lower end of the sentencing range for this offense,

does not shock the sense of justice. There is no showing that the sentence is

constitutionally excessive or that the trial court abused its discretion in

imposing sentence. This assignment of error lacks merit.

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Error Patent

La. C. Cr. P. art. 930.8(C) requires the trial court to inform the

defendant of the limitations period for filing an application for post-

conviction relief at sentencing. If a trial court fails to properly advise the

defendant of the time period limitations for filing, the appellate court may

correct this error by informing the defendant of the applicable prescriptive

period for post-conviction relief by means of its opinion.

The trial court here inadvertently informed the defendant that he had

two years from the date that his sentence was final to seek post-conviction

relief. By way of this opinion, this Court hereby advises defendant that no

application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more

than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become

final under the provisions of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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