Blake Babcock v. Joseph Blackman and GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company

Judgment rendered May 5, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 53,931-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

BLAKE BABCOCK Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

JOSEPH BLACKMAN AND Defendants-Appellees
GEICO COUNTY MUTUAL
INSURACE COMPANY

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 157643

Honorable Charles A. Smith, Judge

*****

GORDON McKERNAN Counsel for Appellant,
INJURY ATTORNEYS Blake Babcock
By: H. Dean Lucius, Jr.

JOSEPH BLACKMAN In Proper Person,
Appellee

LAW OFFICE OF J. BRAD SMITHERMAN Counsel for Appellee,
By: J. Brad Smitherman GEICO County Mutual
Joshua A. Scott Insurance Company

*****

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and BLEICH (Pro Tempore), JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

Plaintiff, Blake Babcock (“Blake”), has appealed from an adverse

summary judgment ruling dismissing his claim against defendant, GEICO

County Mutual Insurance Company (“GEICO”). Finding that there are

genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment at this time,

we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Blake filed a petition on October 24, 2018, seeking damages for

injuries he sustained as a result of a two-vehicle accident that occurred on

November 14, 2017. Blake alleged that on that date, as he was riding his

motorcycle westbound in the left-hand lane of U.S. Hwy. 80 in Bossier City,

Louisiana, defendant Joseph Blackman (“Joseph”), driving a 1995 Ford

Ranger, abruptly pulled in front of him from the right-hand lane, causing

him to slide and collide with the left rear corner of Joseph’s truck. Blake

further asserted that GEICO was Joseph’s liability insurer and asked that

GEICO file into the record “the original or a certified copy of said insurance

policy.”

GEICO filed a motion for summary judgment on July 24, 2019.

According to GEICO’s motion, there was no genuine issue of material fact

regarding “the cancellation of an insurance policy of GEICO… issued to

Joseph Blackman prior to November 14, 2017.” GEICO further asserted

that it has issued policy number 4476-57-96-04 to Sandra J. Blackman and

Arthur L. Driscoll; a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium had

been issued to Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur L. Driscoll; and, because no

payment was received, “the aforementioned policy was effectively cancelled

on October 18, 2017, at 12:01 a.m.” Attached to the motion for summary

judgment were three exhibits: the notice of cancellation; an affidavit by a

GEICO claims underwriter regarding Ms. Blackman and Mr. Driscoll’s

policy history with GEICO; and proof of the mailing of the notice of

cancellation. GEICO filed a memo in support of summary judgment, and

Blake responded with a memo in opposition to summary judgment.

The trial court heard brief arguments by the parties’ attorneys on

March 16, 2020, noted that it found no issue of material fact, and that,

according to controlling caselaw, the notice of cancellation in GEICO’s

exhibit was not a request for payment but was a notice of cancellation in

unambiguous terms. The court granted GEICO’s motion for summary

judgment and signed a judgment to that effect, dismissing Blake’s claims

against GEICO with prejudice. It is from this judgment that Blake has

appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Bernard v. Ellis, 2011-2377 (La. 7/2/12), 111 So. 3d 995; Cutsinger v.

Redfern, 2008-2607 (La. 5/22/09), 12 So. 3d 945; Bonin v. Westport Ins.

Co., 2005-0886 (La. 5/17/06), 930 So. 2d 906. Under this standard of

review, the appellate court uses the same criteria as the trial court in

determining if summary judgment is appropriate: whether there is a genuine

issue of material fact, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Id.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge’s role is

not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or determine the truth of the

matter, but instead determine whether there is a genuine issue of material

fact. Murphy v. Savannah, 2018-0991 (La. 5/8/19), 282 So. 3d 1034;
2

Samaha v. Rau, 2007-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So. 2d 880. Factual

conclusions drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party

opposing a motion for summary judgment, and all doubt must be resolved in

the opponent’s favor. Yokum v. 615 Bourbon Street, L.L.C., 2007-1785 (La.

2/26/08), 977 So. 2d 859; Willis v. Medders, 2000-2507 (La. 12/8/00), 775

So. 2d 1049; June Medical Services, LLC, v. Louisiana Dept. of Health,

2019-0191 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/4/20), 302 So. 3d 1161. Summary judgment

must be denied if the supporting documents presented by the mover are not

sufficient to resolve all material fact issues. Sanders v. Hercules Sheet

Metal, Inc., 385 So. 2d 772 (La. 1980); Debrun v. Tumbleweeds Gymnastics,

Inc., 39,499 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/6/05), 900 So. 2d 253.

La. R.S. 22:636.1 provides the procedures for cancellation of

automobile liability insurance, and it mandates strict compliance with

statutory provisions for a valid notice of cancellation of an insurance policy.

Johnson v. Williams, 35,986 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 90.

Notice is required to make the insured aware that his policy is being

terminated and to afford him time to obtain other insurance protection.

Broadway v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 285 So. 2d 536 (La. 1973); Johnson, supra.

It is well settled that an automobile liability insurer has the burden of

proving that the policy has been cancelled prior to the date of the accident

giving rise to a claim under the policy, and the insurer must show facts that

constitute positive and unambiguous proof of understanding of cancellation

of the policy. Lewis v. Coleman, 48,173 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/13), 118 So.

3d 492, writ denied, 2013-1993 (La. 11/13/15), 125 So. 3d 1108; Johnson,

supra. By having to prove a valid cancellation, in essence, the insurer is

tasked with establishing facts that will relieve it of liability. See, Sanchez v.
3

Sigur, 18-680 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/16/19), 264 So. 3d 587; Direct General Ins.

Co. of La. v. Mongrue, 04-358 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/31/04), 882 So. 2d 620;

Accardo v. Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co., 99-398 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/4/00), 751

So. 2d 975, writ denied, 2000-0369 (La. 4/7/00), 759 So. 2d 761.

Blake asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

to GEICO when it found that there were no genuine issues of material fact

regarding whether defendant Joseph Blackman’s insurance policy with

GEICO was validly cancelled effective October 18, 2017.

GEICO argues that because it introduced satisfactory evidence that it

mailed the notice of cancellation to the named insureds over ten days prior

to the indicated cancellation date, and that the language contained in that

notice was clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous, the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in its favor should be affirmed by this Court.

The notice of cancellation was mailed to Sandra J. Blackman and

Arthur J. Driscoll, whose identity, connection, or relation to this case appear

nowhere in the pleadings or properly filed evidence of record. GEICO

does, however, in its appellate brief, mention for the first time, that Ms.

Blackman and Mr. Driscoll are the owners of the truck involved in the

accident on November 14, 2017. There is no evidence of this fact, however,

in the record. Furthermore, in the first paragraph of its appellate brief,

GEICO wrote:

…Defendant-Appellee Geico argues that on October 7, 2017,
GEICO forwarded a “Notice of Cancellation for Nonpayment
of Premium” to Charlotte Ware, which stated, in pertinent
part:

In accordance with the cancellation provisions of your
policy, identified below by number, your insurance is
hereby canceled as of 12:01 a.m. local time Oct-18-17.

4

This cancellation is due to nonpayment of the premium
shown below. (Emphasis in original.)

The notice of cancellation mailed to Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur J.

Driscoll does not actually contain the above-cited language, although it does

contain similar wording.

This Court is fully aware that appellate briefs are not pleadings, and

that any statements made therein do not constitute evidence. See, La. C.C.P.

art. 852; Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Services, Inc., 2007-2413 (La. 5/21/08),

983 So. 2d 84; Coston v. Seo, 2012-0216 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/15/12), 99 So.

3d 83. Nonetheless, it cannot be ignored that GEICO misstated the

defendant/alleged insured’s name in the above paragraph, and the notice of

cancellation mailed to Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur J. Driscoll

(whoever they may be, since neither the pleadings nor properly filed

evidence of record give this Court any indication as to their identity) does

not actually contain the above-cited language (although it does contain

similar wording).1

The motion for summary judgment filed by GEICO on July 24, 2019,

contains the following assertions:

(1) There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the
cancellation of an insurance policy of GEICO County Mutual
Insurance Company issued to Joseph Blackman prior to
November 14, 2017.

(2) GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company issued policy number
4476-57-96-04 to Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur L. Driscoll.

1
These minor mistakes may have been overlooked and not mentioned but
for the fact that they are a continuation of similar errors made throughout
GEICO’s summary judgment pleadings and attachments thereto, which are
concerning for several reasons. First, that they were filed as apparently
acceptable under La. C.C.P. art. 863 standards, and second, that they seemed a
sufficient basis upon which to grant summary judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 966,
et seq.
5

(3) On October 7, 2017, GEICO issued a Notice of Cancellation for
non-payment of premium to Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur L.
Driscoll advising that the policy would be cancelled on October
18, 2017, at12:01 a.m. due to non-payment of their premium.

(4) No payment was received and the aforementioned policy was
effectively cancelled on October 18, 2017, at 12:01 a.m.

In its Statement of Uncontested Facts, GEICO listed only the

following facts:

(1) Joseph Blackman had auto coverage with GEICO from 9/2/17
through 3/2/18. However, since he failed to pay his premium, his
policy number 4476-57-96-04 expired by its own terms on
October 18, 2017.

(2) On November 14, 2017, the accident that forms the basis of this
suit occurred.

Throughout GEICO’s memorandum in support of summary judgment,

the insured(s) under the policy is/are referred to as “Joseph Blackman” five

times; “Charlotte Ware” one time; and “Sandra Jo Blackman and Arthur Lee

Driscoll, Jr.” two times. Since there is no copy of the actual insurance

policy (or policies) in the record, the identity of the actual insured(s) and the

vehicle(s) covered by the policy (or policies) issued by GEICO has not been

established.

GEICO attached three exhibits to its motion for summary judgment.

Exhibit A is a “Notice of Cancellation for Nonpayment of Premium” sent by

GEICO to Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur L. Driscoll regarding policy

number 4476-57-96-04. Exhibit B is an affidavit executed by claims

coverage underwriter Stephen W. Bailey attesting that:

(1) …

(2) At the time of the accident of November 14, 2017, there was no
automobile policy of insurance issued by GEICO in the name of
Sandra Jo Blackman and/or Arthur Lee Driscoll Jr. providing
coverage.

6

(3) Policy number 4476-57-9604 issued to Sandra Jo Blackman and
Arthur Lee Driscoll Jr. had coverage effective dates of February
9, 2017, through May 26, 2017, and September 2, 2017, through
October 18, 2017, and March 10, 2018, through April 27, 2018.

(4) Said policy cancelled for non-payment on October 18, 2018.

Exhibit C is a certificate of mailing showing that the cancellation notice to

Ms. Blackman and Mr. Driscoll was mailed on October 7, 2017.

The trial court erred in granting GEICO’s motion for summary

judgment in this case. GEICO had the burden to prove that there are no

genuine issues of fact, and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We find that there are a number of genuine issues of material fact in this

case, some of which were created by the discrepancies in the motion for

summary judgment and supporting documentation. These issues include:

(1) in its motion for summary judgment, GEICO alleged that there was
no genuine issue of material fact regarding the cancellation of the
policy issued to the driver, Joseph Blackman, then referred only to
policy number 4476-57-96-04, issued to Sandra Jo Blackman and
Arthur Lee Driscoll;

(2) whether policy number 4476-57-96-04 covered the truck that Joseph
Blackman was allegedly driving at the time of the accident;

(3) whether, as alleged by GEICO in its “Statement of Uncontested
Facts,” Joseph Blackman had auto coverage with GEICO from
9/2/17 through 3/2/18, since that appears to include the date of the
accident;

(4) whether it was Joseph Blackman’s failure to pay the premium that
caused policy number 4475-57-96-04 to expire, as alleged by
GEICO, since the record also shows that this policy was issued to
Sandra J. Blackman and Arthur L. Driscoll, not to Joseph
Blackman; and,

(5) whether a policy issued to Joseph Blackman had been cancelled
(since the affidavit issued by the claims underwriter only stated that
the policy issued to Sandra Blackman and Arthur Blackman had
been cancelled).

Based on the above unresolved issues of material fact, GEICO was not

entitled to summary judgment.
7

We hereby reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, and

remand the matter for further proceedings. We note, however, that the

denial of summary judgment on this issue does not preclude GEICO from

refiling a subsequent motion at some future time, with supporting documents

it feels are sufficient to resolve all material factual issues and show its

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.2

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court

granting summary judgment in favor of defendant, GEICO County Mutual

Insurance Company, is hereby reversed, and the matter is remanded for

further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed against defendant,

GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

2
See, Chanler v. Jamestown Ins. Co., 51,320 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17),
223 So. 3d 614, writ denied, 2017-01251 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So. 3d 1230; Rogers
v. Horseshoe Entertainment, 32,800 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/1/00), 766 So. 2d 595,
writs denied, 2000-2894, 2000-2905 (La. 12/8/00), 776 So. 2d 463, 464;
Alexander v. Parish of St. John the Baptist, 12-173 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/12),
102 So. 3d 904; Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. Landry, 2002-891 (La. App. 3 Cir.
2/19/03), 846 So. 2d 798.
8