State of Louisiana v. Frank Jauron Stringfellow

Judgment rendered June 30, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,966-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

FRANK JAURON Appellant
STRINGFELLOW

*****

Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 72771

Honorable Bruce E. Hampton, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Paula C. Marx

FRANK JAURON STRINGFELLOW Pro Se

JOHN F. K. BELTON Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

LEWIS ALLEN JONES
KYWONNA DRAKE
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, GARRETT, and COX, JJ.

GARRETT, J.

The defendant, Frank Jauron Stringfellow, was convicted of second

degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and illegal use of weapons

or dangerous instrumentalities. He was sentenced to, respectively, life

imprisonment at hard labor, 50 years at hard labor, and two years at hard

labor. All sentences were to be served consecutively and without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. As to the attempted second

degree murder conviction, the defendant has raised on appeal a claim

pursuant to Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 206 L. Ed. 2d

583 (2020), which we find has merit. Accordingly, the defendant’s

conviction and sentence for attempted second degree murder are vacated,

and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a new trial. The defendant’s

convictions and sentences for second degree murder and illegal use of

weapons or dangerous instrumentalities are affirmed.

FACTS

Shakena Hampton and her five children lived in a house in Ruston

with her mother, Doris Hampton. The defendant was the father of three of

Shakena’s children. However, her 13-year-old daughter, Destiney, and one-

year-old son, Isaiah, were not the defendant’s children.

On August 22, 2017, the defendant argued with Shakena at her home.

He shot her six times; she died at the scene. Isaiah, who was in his mother’s

arms when she was shot, was struck in the back by a bullet but survived.

The defendant shot Doris in the right arm three times; she recovered from

her injuries. According to the testimony of Destiney and her 16-year-old

half-brother, Frank Hampton, the defendant pointed the gun at Destiney and

tried to shoot her also. However, they testified that the gun did not fire but

made clicking sounds. The defendant fled the house.

The defendant was charged by bill of indictment with second degree

murder in Shakena’s death and two counts of attempted second degree

murder as to Doris and Destiney. He was also charged with illegal use of

weapons or dangerous instrumentalities.

The matter came up for trial in October 2019. During jury selection,

counsel for the defendant began questioning potential jurors about the issue

of intoxication. However, the defense had not given the state notice of its

intent to use a defense of intoxication. The state objected to this line of

questioning. The trial court ruled that the defendant was precluded from

asserting the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication and that no jury

instruction would be given as to that defense. The defendant filed an

emergency writ with this court. On the showing made, we denied the writ,

as well as the defendant’s request for a stay.

The jury unanimously convicted the defendant on the charges of

second degree murder and illegal use of weapons or dangerous

instrumentalities. He was convicted of the attempted second degree murder

of Doris by a vote of 11 to 1. As to the charge of attempted second degree

murder pertaining to Destiney, the jury voted not guilty.

On appeal, the defendant asserts that, pursuant to the Ramos ruling, he

is entitled to have his conviction and sentence for attempted second degree

murder vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. In

a pro se brief, in addition to the Ramos issue, the defendant further contends

that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to present an intoxication

defense.

2

RAMOS ISSUE

The only issue raised in the brief filed by the defendant’s appellate

counsel is whether the defendant is entitled to have his conviction for

attempted second degree murder vacated pursuant to Ramos, supra. The

state requests that this court rule in accordance with the controlling law and

jurisprudence.

In the Ramos decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the

right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,

incorporated against the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a

serious offense. The Ramos court further indicated that its ruling may

require retrial of those defendants convicted of felonies by non-unanimous

verdicts whose cases are still pending on direct appeal. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at

1406. 1 The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently determined that the

holding of Ramos applied to cases pending on direct review when Ramos

was decided. State v. Richardson, 2020-00175 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So. 3d

1050. If the non-unanimous jury claim was not preserved for review in the

trial court or was abandoned during any stage of the proceedings, the court

of appeal should, nonetheless, consider the issue as part of its error patent

review. State v. Corn, 2019-01892 (La. 6/3/20), 296 So. 3d 1043. Thus, the

State of Louisiana will have to retry defendants who were convicted of

serious offenses by non-unanimous juries and whose cases were still

1
On May 17, 2021, after the conclusion of briefing in the instant case, the United
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547
(2021), wherein it held that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively
on federal collateral review. However, states remain free, if they choose, to retroactively
apply the jury-unanimity rule as a matter of state law in state post-conviction
proceedings. 141 S. Ct. at 1559.

3

pending on direct appeal when Ramos was decided. State v. Ardison, 52,739

(La. App. 2 Cir. 3/31/21), — So. 3d —, 2021 WL 1201808.

The verdict on the attempted second degree murder charge pertaining

to Doris Hampton was not unanimous, and the matter was on direct appeal

when Ramos was decided. Even if the issue was not preserved by the

defendant for appellate review, this error is patent on the face of the record.

State v. Sullivan, 53,797 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/5/21), — So. 3d —, 2021 WL

1773703. Consequently, we hereby vacate the defendant’s conviction and

sentence for attempted second degree murder. The case is remanded to the

trial court for further proceedings.2

INTOXICATION DEFENSE

In his pro se brief, the defendant once again raised the issue of the

intoxication defense. Because it potentially affects the defendant’s

conviction for second degree murder, we will address it.

Where the circumstances indicate that an intoxicated or drugged

condition has precluded the presence of a specific criminal intent or of

special knowledge required in a particular crime, this fact constitutes a

defense to a prosecution for that crime. La. R.S. 14:15(2). Second degree

murder can be a specific intent crime or a felony-murder crime under La.

2
In his pro se brief, the defendant appears to make a more expansive argument
that all of his convictions should be vacated. First, he contends that, while the record
states that the jury votes on two of his convictions (second degree murder and illegal use
of weapons) were “unanimous,” it might not mean the count was 12-0 because the jury
instructions allowed a verdict of only 10 jurors in agreement. However, our review of the
polling slips, which were included in the appellate record as exhibits, reveals that all of
the jurors agreed with the verdicts on those two offenses.

Second, the defendant appears to argue that the use of a jury instruction allowing
for non-unanimous verdicts at his trial was structural error requiring a new trial on all of
the offenses, a concern raised in Justice Alito’s Ramos dissent, 140 S. Ct. at 1436.
However, this argument, which was mentioned in the amicus curiae brief submitted by
the State of Oregon in Ramos, is not currently supported by the jurisprudence, including
Ramos. See State v. Anthony, 17-372 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/30/20), 309 So. 3d 912.

4

R.S. 14:30.1. State v. Gay, 36,357 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/23/02), 830 So. 2d

356; State v. Davies, 35,783 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/02), 813 So. 2d 1262, writ

denied, 2002-1564 (La. 5/9/03), 843 So. 2d 389. Here, the state argued that

it was a specific intent crime because Shakena was shot six times.

If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a mental

disease, defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had

the mental state required for the offense charged, he shall not later than ten

days prior to trial or such reasonable time as the court may permit, notify the

district attorney in writing of such intention, and file a copy of such notice

with the clerk. The court may for cause shown allow late filing of the notice

or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for trial or make such other

orders as may be appropriate. La. C. Cr. P. art. 726(A). Upon a failure to

provide the required notice, the court may exclude the testimony of any

witness offered by the defendant on the issue of mental condition. La.

C. Cr. P. art. 726(B). For purposes of La. C. Cr. P. art. 726, intoxication is

an “other condition” bearing on the issue of whether the defendant had the

mental state for the offense charged. See State v. Trahan, 576 So. 2d 1 (La.

1990).3

During voir dire, defense counsel began asking prospective jurors

whether they drank and about the effects of drinking. The prosecutor

3
In Trahan, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
decision to exclude the results of a blood alcohol test on the defendant which were
contained in the state’s crime lab report. The supreme court found that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion under La. C. Cr. P. art. 726 and excluded the evidence
from the defendant’s second degree murder trial. It explained that the defendant’s failure
to give the state the required notice under La. C. Cr. P. art. 726 prevented the state from
preparing expert testimony to explain the blood alcohol levels and place them into proper
perspective. The supreme court held that the defendant’s constitutional right to present
relevant evidence was not impaired by this ruling because there was ample evidence in
the record to support his claim that he had been drinking.

5

interrupted and asked to approach the bench. The trial judge called a recess,

informing the prospective jurors that a legal matter needed to be resolved.

After adjourning to another courtroom, the judge heard arguments from both

sides outside the presence of any potential jurors. The prosecutor recited the

requirement under La. C. Cr. P. art. 726 that notice be given to the state no

later than ten days prior to trial if intoxication was going to be used as a

defense. In support of its position, the state cited the Trahan case and State

v. Sullivan, 49,183 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/14), 146 So. 3d 952. 4 Defense

counsel agreed that notice was not filed but asserted that the state was placed

on notice that the defendant was intoxicated on the night of the incident by

the statements of Shakena’s children and Doris to the police. However,

defense counsel stated he had no expert witness or lab reports to provide to

the state; he indicated that he merely intended to cross-examine the state’s

witnesses about the defendant’s intoxication. He further maintained that

taking away the intoxication defense would take away the defendant’s right

to defend himself.

The trial court ruled in favor of the state. It cited the Trahan and

Sullivan cases in support of its decision to preclude the defendant from

asserting the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication and not

entertain a request for a jury instruction as to that defense. However, the

4
In Sullivan, supra, the defendant was charged with aggravated second degree
battery, a specific intent crime. Because the defendant failed to give the state adequate
notice, the trial court ruled that he would be prohibited from asserting the defense of
intoxication or requesting a jury instruction regarding intoxication. The trial court noted
that the defendant’s intoxicated condition would come out in testimony, but the defense
could not argue that intoxication precluded the specific intent required for the crime.
During voir dire, the trial court allowed defense counsel to question prospective jurors
regarding their feelings about those who become intoxicated. The appellate court found
that the trial court properly refused to (1) allow defendant to assert the defense of
voluntary intoxication and (2) give jury instructions on that defense.

6

trial court stated that it would not exclude all questions regarding

intoxication. It stated that it was not ruling against the defense asking

prospective jurors if hearing something about the defendant drinking would

prejudice them against him. Also, the trial court stated that, if the state’s

witnesses indicated anything regarding intoxication, defense counsel would

be able to question them about the defendant’s actions and appearance and

“even smell.”

The defendant sought supervisory review of the trial court’s ruling.

On the showing made, this court denied the writ, citing the Trahan and

Sullivan cases, and denied the defendant’s request for a stay. State v.

Stringfellow, 53,404 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/29/19). On appeal, the defendant

claims in his pro se brief that the trial court’s ruling violated his right to

present a defense.

Based upon our review, we find that the trial court’s reliance on the

jurisprudence discussed supra, particularly the Sullivan case, was well

founded. Similar to Sullivan, the failure of the defendant in the instant case

to provide advance notice of the intent to assert the affirmative defense of

voluntary intoxication would have been prejudicial to the state, which would

have been prevented from preparing the evidence tending to prove that the

defendant’s level of intoxication did not preclude the presence of the specific

intent necessary to commit second degree murder. As a result, the trial court

properly refused to allow the defendant to assert the defense of voluntary

7

intoxication or give jury instructions on that defense.5 Accordingly, we find

that this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

The defendant’s conviction and sentence for attempted second degree

murder are vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for a new

trial pursuant to Ramos, supra. The defendant’s convictions and sentences

for second degree murder and illegal use of weapons or dangerous

instrumentalities are affirmed.

ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION
AND SENTENCE VACATED, AND MATTER REMANDED FOR
NEW TRIAL; CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES FOR SECOND
DEGREE MURDER AND ILLEGAL USE OF WEAPONS OR
DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITIES AFFIRMED.

5
The defendant also claims that the trial court “failed to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter.” This claim is baseless. Our review of the
record reveals that the jury was, in fact, instructed on manslaughter.

8