State of Louisiana v. Joshua J. Ward

Judgment rendered June 30, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 53,968-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JOSHUA J. WARD Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Franklin, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2019447F

Honorable John Clay Hamilton, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Paula Corley Marx

PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

CAROLINE HEMPHILL
AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before GARRETT, STONE, and STEPHENS, JJ.

STONE, J.

This criminal appeal arises from the Fifth Judicial District Court,

Franklin Parish, the Honorable Clay Hamilton presiding. The defendant,

Joshua J. Ward (“Ward”), pled guilty to aggravated flight from an officer

and was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor. On the same day, Ward pled

guilty to possession of methamphetamine (over 2 grams but less than 28

grams) and was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor. See No. 53,969-KA.

The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with one another. The

defendant now appeals. For the following reasons, Ward’s conviction and

sentence is affirmed.

FACTS

On June 15, 2019, officers of the Winnsboro Police Department

responded to a shooting at the Westwood Apartments in Winnsboro,

Louisiana. As they arrived, officers observed Ward driving away at a high

rate of speed. The officers attempted to stop Ward’s vehicle; however,

Ward refused to comply. After traveling at speeds in excess of 100 mph,

crossing the center line, and traveling into oncoming traffic on Highway 4,

Ward finally stopped. Following the stop, officers searched the vehicle and

found a plastic Glock pistol case and four magazines (two of which

contained .40 caliber ammunition). On the driver’s side floorboard, officers

also found a plastic bag of several multi-colored tablets, which were later

determined to contain methamphetamine. Ward was charged in separate

bills of information with attempted second-degree murder, aggravated flight

from an officer where human life is endangered, and possession of a

Schedule II CDS, methamphetamine (more than 2 grams but less than 28

grams) (No. 53,969-KA).

On January 8, 2020, pursuant to a plea agreement, Ward pled guilty to

aggravated flight from an officer and possession of methamphetamine (more

than 2 grams but less than 28 grams). In exchange, the state dismissed the

attempted second-degree murder charge, as well as another unspecified

charge. There was no sentencing agreement, but the parties agreed that

Ward would be sentenced by the trial court after a pre-sentence investigation

(“PSI”) report.

On March 11, 2020, after reviewing the PSI report, the trial court

sentenced Ward to 5 years at hard labor for the aggravated flight from an

officer conviction.1 Defense counsel made a generic, oral objection to the

sentences, and subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, which set forth no

specific complaints. The motion was denied. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Ward argues that his aggravated flight from an officer sentence is

unconstitutionally harsh and excessive. He contends that a maximum

sentence is not warranted, as he caused no physical injuries or property

damage during his two-minute flight from officers. Ward further argues that

he is a 28-year-old, second felony offender and is not the worst offender. He

has strong family support to aid in his rehabilitation, has always maintained

employment, attends church regularly, and consistently sees and supports his

two six-year-old children.

The state argues that Ward has failed to establish that the trial court

abused its discretion in its sentence. The state notes that Ward received a

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The trial court imposed an enhanced sentence of 10 years at hard labor, for the
possession of methamphetamine conviction, after determining this was Ward’s second
drug offense conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.
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tremendous benefit when the state dismissed the attempted murder charge

and when the trial judge ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long

as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the

article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. DeBerry, 50,501

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-0959 (La. 5/1/17),

219 So. 3d 332. The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the

goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its

provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the

sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full

compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475

(La. 1982); State v. DeBerry, supra. The important elements which should

be considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital

status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the

offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049

(La. 1981); State v. DeBerry, supra. The trial court is not required to assign

any particular weight to any specific matters at sentencing. State v. Parfait,

52,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 455, writ denied, 19-01659 (La.

12/10/19), 285 So. 3d 489.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.
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Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.

1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;

State v. Meadows, 51,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ

denied, 18-0259 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208.

The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits and such sentences should not be set aside as

excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v.

Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Allen, 49,642 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 2/26/15), 162 So. 3d 519, writ denied, 15-0608 (La. 1/25/16),

184 So. 3d 1289. A trial judge is in the best position to consider the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore,

is given broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Allen, supra. On review, an

appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have been

more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.

Adams, 53,055 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19), 285 So. 3d 526.

As a general rule, maximum or near-maximum sentences are reserved

for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Cozzetto, 07-2031

La. 2/15/08), 974 So. 2d 665; State v. Hogan, 47,993 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/10/13), 113 So. 3d 1195, writ denied, 13-0977 (La. 11/8/13), 125 So. 3d

445.

The defendant’s receipt of a substantial advantage via plea bargain is

an appropriate consideration in sentencing. Accordingly, where the

defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe

his conduct or has received a significant reduction in sentencing exposure
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through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even

the maximum sentence for the pled offense. State v. Washington, 52,518

(La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 266 So. 3d 430, writ denied, 19-00776 (La.

10/21/19), 280 So. 3d 1174.

La. R.S. 14:108.1(E) provides that a person convicted of aggravated

flight from an officer shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than

five years and may be fined not more than $2,000.00.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed the PSI report, the

facts of this case, and the applicable sentencing factors set forth in La. C. Cr.

P. art. 894.1. The trial court gave sufficient weight to each of the applicable

aggravating and mitigating factors and the record adequately supports the

sentence imposed.

The trial court reviewed Ward’s criminal history as follows: In 2008,

Ward was arrested for discharging firearms where prohibited, disturbing the

peace, and aggravated second degree battery; he pled guilty to aggravated

second degree battery and was sentenced to six years at hard labor, with five

years and three months suspended, and five years of probation. While Ward

was on probation, in 2012, he was arrested for possession of marijuana,

simple battery, and aggravated assault; he pled guilty to possession of

marijuana and simple battery, and was sentenced to 90 days on each charge.

At that time, his probation was revoked and he was remanded to serve the

original six-year sentence. Ward was released on parole in May 2017, and

was arrested for the instant offenses in June 2019, while still on parole. The

trial court stated that Ward has been unable to successfully complete any

significant period of probation or parole, that his prior criminal activity was

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not abated or tempered by his previous entitlement to probation or parole,

and that his prior offenses involved firearms and crimes against the person.

The trial court noted that Ward’s conduct threatened, caused, or could

have caused serious harm, that Ward was again involved in conduct which

involved harm to a person and firearms, that the victims did not induce or

facilitate the commission of the crimes, and that there was no indication that

Ward’s imprisonment would entail any excessive hardship to himself or his

dependents. The trial court found that Ward was unwilling to accept

responsibility for his actions, and referencing Ward’s statement, found that

Ward’s history of criminal conduct indicates that he will continue to be in

the wrong place at the wrong time in the future. Further, the trial court

stated that Ward substantially benefitted from the plea agreement and

reduced sentence exposure, as he was charged with attempted second-degree

murder, which, carries up to 50 years imprisonment. In essence, Ward

avoided a potential lengthy sentence.

Ward’s sentence is not constitutionally excessive, nor does it shock

the sense of justice, or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

offense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Ward to 5

years at hard labor for aggravated flight from an officer. The trial court

appropriately considered Ward’s criminal history and the benefit he received

from the plea agreement.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Joshua Ward’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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