State of Louisiana v. Elliot Cornelius Jackson

Judgment rendered November 17, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,118-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

ELLIOT CORNELIUS JACKSON Appellant

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Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 16F3051

Honorable Marcus L. Hunter, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Chad Ikerd

ROBERT STEPHEN TEW Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

CARL DOUGLAS WALKER
MARK KEITH WHITE
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and ROBINSON, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Elliot Cornelius Jackson appeals his conviction by a Ouachita Parish

jury of attempted manslaughter. He was also convicted of attempted armed

robbery and felon in possession of a firearm, but he has not appealed those

convictions. The trial court originally sentenced him to concurrent sentences

of 30 years on the attempted robbery and 15 years on the attempted

manslaughter, with a consecutive sentence of 15 years on the felon in

possession of a firearm charge. In response to a motion to reconsider the

sentence, the trial court maintained the length of each sentence but amended

them all to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals only his conviction

for attempted manslaughter, arguing that the State failed to sufficiently

prove that he had the intent necessary for an attempted manslaughter

conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

FACTS

On November 18, 2016, Dustin Haynes (“Haynes”) was at work at

College Town Import, changing out the cables in his vehicle, when he heard

the sound of someone putting a round in a chamber of a weapon or “racking

a slide,” as he described it. Haynes was familiar with that recognizable

sound from growing up around weapons and from his military experience in

the Louisiana National Guard. Haynes instinctively raised his head to locate

the source of the concerning sound and saw a man, later identified as the

defendant, Elliot Cornelius Jackson (“Jackson”), pointing a pistol at his face.

Jackson fired the weapon just a few feet from Haynes and in a direct line at

his head. The bullet hit the “B-pillar” of the vehicle, barely missing Haynes,

and ricocheted off the windshield. Haynes testified that it was sheer luck

that the bullet did not hit him, as he instinctively flinched. Jackson

moved to get another shot at Haynes while Haynes was still in the vehicle.

Haynes testified he was caught off guard and thought that the shot may have

been a blank. He testified that he thought Jackson may have been trying to

scare him. However, Haynes also testified that when Jackson continued to

put the gun in his face, he believed Jackson was attempting to line up

another shot.

Haynes decided for his own safety that he needed to take the weapon

away from Jackson, so he grabbed the pistol, pushed them both out of the

vehicle, and then disarmed Jackson. The two men continued to fight for

several minutes. Haynes was able to gain control of the pistol, remove the

magazine, and eject the active round from its chamber. Much to the surprise

and disappointment of Jackson, Haynes had training in close quarters

combat in the Louisiana National Guard, and he used those skills to save his

own life and subdue Jackson. Haynes wrestled Jackson from the vehicle,

across the garage, and, after several minutes, into his office, where Haynes

called the police while restraining Jackson. Haynes testified that Jackson

fought him and attempted to get the pistol back the entire time. Significant

portions of the altercation were recorded by the business’s surveillance

camera. Haynes’s testimony is supported by the video surveillance, and that

Jackson wore a latex glove on the hand he was using to hold the pistol.

When the police arrived, they relieved Haynes and took control of

Jackson, placed him under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights. Jackson

waived his right to remain silent and confessed that he went to the garage to

rob Haynes. He also admitted that he was not permitted to possess weapons

because of a prior felony drug conviction. At the time of the arrest, the

police discovered a mask hidden in Jackson’s pants.
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On January 18, 2017, Jackson was charged with a four-count bill of

information, charging him with: (1) attempted armed robbery, (2) attempted

second degree murder, (3) possession of a firearm by a felon, and (4) illegal

possession of a stolen firearm. The illegal possession of a stolen firearm

charge was dropped in an amended bill of information on June 17, 2019.

After trial by jury on June 19, 2019, Jackson was found guilty of attempted

armed robbery, attempted manslaughter, and possession of a firearm by a

felon. He was sentenced to serve 30 years for the attempted armed robbery,

15 years for the attempted manslaughter, and 15 years and a fine of $1,500

for the possession of a firearm charge, all without the benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence. The attempted armed robbery and

attempted manslaughter sentences were ordered to be run concurrently with

each other but consecutively with the sentence for the possession of a

firearm by a felon charge. The trial court also ordered Jackson to pay

restitution to Haynes in the amount of $1,665 for the damage to the vehicle.

On December 9, 2019, Jackson filed a motion to reconsider sentence,

and a hearing was held on the motion. The trial court granted the motion

and maintained the length of each sentence, but amended them all to run

concurrently. Jackson now appeals, arguing that the State failed to

sufficiently prove that he was guilty of attempted manslaughter.

DISCUSSION

Assignment of Error: The state failed to sufficiently prove that Elliot
Jackson was guilty of attempted manslaughter.

Jackson argues that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to kill Haynes when he

shot at him and then attempted to fire another round at him, and as such, the

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state failed to prove an essential element of the attempted manslaughter

charge. The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence

in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact

could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004), State v. Holder, 50,171 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/9/15), 181 So. 3d 918, 929, writ denied, 16-0092 (La. 12/16/16), 211

So. 3d 1166. This standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art.

821, does not provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own

appreciation of the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Steines,

51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La.

10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d

442; State v. Dale, 50,195 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 180 So. 3d 528, writ

denied, 15-2291 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d 1203. A reviewing court affords

great deference to a trial court’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of

a witness in whole or in part. State v. Steines, supra. Thus, this court is

charged with examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and determining whether any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id.

The offense of manslaughter is defined as a homicide that would be

first- or second-degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden

passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to
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deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. La. R.S.

14:31(A)(1). Although a specific intent to kill is not required for a

conviction of manslaughter, it is necessary to sustain a conviction for

attempted manslaughter. State v. Cortez, 48,319 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/7/13),

122 So. 3d 588. To support a conviction for attempted manslaughter, the

state must prove that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim

and committed an overt act in furtherance of that goal. State v. Glover,

47,311 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/10/12), 106 So. 3d 129, writ denied, 12-2667 (La.

5/24/13), 116 So. 3d 659.

Specific intent is the state of mind that exists when the circumstances

indicate the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences

to follow his act or failure to act. La. R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Glover, supra.

Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Minor, 52,091 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/26/18), 254 So. 3d 1278; State v. Murray, 49,418 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/14/15), 161 So. 3d 918, writ denied, 15-0379 (La. 4/8/16), 191 So. 3d

582.

Specific intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding

the offense and the conduct of the defendant. State v. Bishop, 01-2548 (La.

1/14/03), 835 So. 2d 434. Specific intent to kill may also be inferred from

the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries, and the defendant’s use of a

deadly weapon to produce those injuries, which involved serious risk of

death. State v. Washington, 50,424 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/16/16), 188 So. 3d

350, writ denied, 16-0718 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So. 3d 119. The Louisiana

Supreme Court has held on more than one occasion that specific intent to kill

may be inferred from a defendant’s act of pointing a gun and firing at a

person. State v. Seals, 95-0305 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So. 2d 368, cert. denied,
5

520 U.S. 1199, 117 S. Ct. 1558, 137 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1997). The

determination of whether the requisite intent is present is a question for the

trier of fact. State v. Lewis, 46,513 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/28/11), 74 So. 3d 254,

writ denied, 11-2317 (La. 4/9/12), 84 So. 3d 551.

In this case, Jackson argues that the evidence presented does not prove

that he intended to kill Haynes. Jackson notes that Haynes testified that he

believed Jackson’s first shot was intended to scare him. Jackson contends

that he had the opportunity to shoot Haynes before Haynes disarmed him,

and the fact that he did not take the shot is evidence that he lacked the intent

to kill Haynes. In support of this argument, Jackson notes that there is

evidence in the record that he “panicked” when he took the shot at Haynes.

Jackson further argues that if he had wanted to sneak up on Haynes to kill

him, he would not have racked the slide inside the garage, alerting Haynes to

his presence.

We find these arguments unpersuasive. Jackson’s specific intent to

kill can be determined by the circumstances of the situation and his actions.

In direct conflict with Jackson’s self-serving testimony at trial and his

arguments to this court is the video surveillance of the incident. The two

photos below depict the location the bullet, fired from a pistol and directly

aimed at Haynes’s head, impacted the vehicle.

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Enlargement of a portion of State Exhibit 3b
Enlargement of a portion of State Exhibit 3a
(emphasis added)

A review of the record reflects that Jackson entered Haynes’s garage

with a deadly weapon, which he then fired at Haynes. Haynes testified that

he believed that if the bullet had not ricocheted, the shot would have hit him

directly in the head. Although Jackson did not shoot again, it was not due to

a decision by Jackson. Haynes testified that Jackson was lining up to take

another shot, and he was able to disarm him. Any testimony from Jackson

regarding the shot at Haynes or his subsequent actions is completely

contradicted by the video surveillance of this incident. State Exhibit 3c

clearly depicts Jackson attempting to point the gun at Haynes after his first

shot missed.

Testimony indicates that Jackson

fought to get the gun back the entire time

he and Haynes struggled. Haynes

testified that Jackson wore a latex glove

on his firing hand. The entire conflict

was captured on surveillance video and

played for the jury. The events depicted

on the video surveillance described by
Enlarged Portion of State Exhibit 3c

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Haynes clearly established Jackson intended to kill Haynes and continued

for several minutes to act on that intent.

Considering these facts in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could conclude that Jackson had specific intent to

kill Haynes. As such, the elements for conviction of attempted manslaughter

are satisfied, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

ERRORS PATENT

A review of the record indicates that there is a discrepancy between

the minutes and the transcript of the sentencing hearing held on November

14, 2019. La. C. Cr. P. art. 871(A) provides that a “[s]entence shall be

pronounced orally in open court and recorded in the minutes of the court.”

When there is a discrepancy between the minutes and the transcript,

the transcript prevails. State v. Burns, 53,250 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/20), 290

So. 3d 721; State v. Lynch, 441 So. 2d 732 (La. 1983).

The transcript indicates that the sentences imposed for attempted

armed robbery,1 attempted manslaughter,2 and possession of a firearm by a

felon3 failed to state that they were imposed with hard labor. A defendant in

1
La. R.S. 14:27 states, in pertinent part: “D. Whoever attempts to commit any
crime shall be punished as follows: (3) In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned
or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall
not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment
prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Further, La. R.S. 14:64(B) provides:
“Whoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not
less than ten years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence.”
2
La. R.S. 14:27 states, in pertinent part: “D. Whoever attempts to commit any
crime shall be punished as follows: (3) In all other cases he shall be fined or imprisoned
or both, in the same manner as for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall
not exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment
prescribed for the offense so attempted, or both.” Further, La. R.S. 14:31(B) provides:
“Whoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than
forty years.”

3 La. R.S. 14:95.1(B) provides, in pertinent part: “Whoever is found guilty of
violating the provisions of this Section shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than
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a criminal case does not have a constitutional right or a statutory right to

an illegally lenient sentence. State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800

So. 2d 790. An illegally lenient sentence may be corrected at any time by

the court that imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review. La.

C. Cr. P. art. 882(A). This correction may be made despite the failure of

either party to raise the issue. State v. Williams, supra; State v. Leday, 05-

1641 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/3/06), 930 So. 2d 286.

The failure to impose hard labor is harmless and self-correcting when

there is a mandatory felony requiring any sentence to be served at hard

labor. State v. Burns, supra; State v. Thomas, 52,617 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/22/19), 272 So. 3d 999, writ denied, 19-01045 (La. 2/10/20) 292 So. 3d

61; State v. Foster, 50,535 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 674.

Because La. R.S. 14:27, 14:64, 14:31, and 14:95.1 are mandatory felonies

requiring any sentence to be served at hard labor, the error is harmless and

self-correcting.

Further, an examination of the transcript and minutes indicates that

the trial court erred in sentencing Jackson with regard to his conviction for

attempted manslaughter, as the record reflects that Jackson was sentenced to

15 years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Although this sentence is within the range prescribed by La. R.S. 14:31 and

14:27, those statutes do not reflect that a defendant may be sentenced to

attempted manslaughter with a restriction of benefits. Accordingly, under

La. C. Cr. P. art. 882, we amend Jackson’s attempted manslaughter sentence

five nor more than twenty years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence and be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand
dollars.”
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to remove the restriction on benefits. We remand with instruction to the trial

court to make an entry in the minutes reflecting this change.

Our review of the transcript reveals that Jackson was not given credit

for time served. Failure to give credit for time served, which is mandated by

La. C. Cr. P. art. 880, is error patent and may be corrected by an appellate

court under La. C. Cr. P. art. 882 without remanding for resentencing. State

v. Samuels, 37,099 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/14/03), 847 So. 2d 93. Accordingly,

we amend Jackson’s sentence without remanding for resentencing to allow

him credit for time served.

Finally, the record indicates the trial court failed to advise Jackson of

his right to appeal or of the time limitations for post-conviction relief. La. C.

Cr. P. art. 930.8(C) provides that at the time of sentencing, the trial court

shall inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for post-conviction

relief either verbally or in writing. Accordingly, we advise Jackson that no

application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more

than two years after the judgment of convictions and sentences have become

final under the provisions of La. C. Cr. P. arts. 914 or 922.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jackson’s conviction for

attempted manslaughter. This matter is further remanded to the trial court to

correct the minutes. Jackson’s sentences are amended to reflect credit for

time served. Jackson’s attempted manslaughter sentence is amended to

delete the denial of benefits eligibility and remanded with instructions to the

trial court to make an entry in the minutes reflecting this change. In all other

respects, Jackson’s sentences are affirmed. Finally, the defendant is notified

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that he has two years to file for post-conviction relief, commencing from the

finality of this conviction and sentence.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED, AS
AMENDED; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

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