Kailash K. Dhaliwal, and the Succession of Manmohan S. Dhaliwal v. Karminderdal S. Dhaliwal and Dhillon Sookham consolidated with Succession of Manmohan Singh Dhaliwal consolidated with Succession of Kailash K. Dhaliwal

Judgment rendered June 15, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,502-CA
No. 54,503-CA
No. 54,504-CA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

No. 54,502-CA No. 54,503-CA

KAILASH K. DHALIWAL AND SUCCESSION OF MANMOHAN
THE SUCCESSION OF SINGH DHALIWAL
MANMOHAN S. DHALLIWAL Plaintiff-Appellee
Plaintiffs-Appellees
versus

KARMINDERAL S. DHALIWAL
AND DHILLON SOOKAM
Defendants-Appellees

No. 54,504-CA

SUCCESSION OF KAILASH K.
DHALIWAL
Plaintiff-Appellee

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 2011-0429, 2010-4412 and 2015-1413

Honorable Alvin R. Sharp, Judge

*****

MAHINDERPAL “PAUL” SINGH In Proper Person,
DHALIWAL Intervenor/Appellant

HUDSON, POTTS & BERNSTEIN, LLP Counsel for Appellees,
By: Jan P. Christiansen, III Succession of
Margaret H. Pruitt Manmohan Singh
Dhaliwal, Kailash K.
Dhaliwal, and Simran
Dhaliwal

DIMOS ERSKINE, LLP Counsel for Appellees,
By: Robert L. Garner Karminderdal S.
Dhaliwal and Dhillon
Sookham Dhaliwal

HAYES, HARKEY, SMITH & CASCIO Counsel for Appellees,
By: Thomas M. Hayes, III Margaret H. Blackwell
John Bibb Saye Pruitt, Jan P.
Thomas M. Hayes, IV Christiansen, and G.
Adam Cossey

*****

Before PITMAN, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

Appellant Mahinderpal Singh Dhaliwal appeals the trial court’s

judgments granting the exceptions of no right of action, no cause of action,

and res judicata filed by defendants Margaret H. Blackwell Pruitt, Jan P.

Christiansen, and G. Adam Cossey. For the following reasons, we affirm

the judgments of the trial court.

FACTS

Prior Appeals

This is the fourth time this matter has been before this court. See

Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, 48,034 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/11/13), 124 So. 3d 470, writ

denied, 13-2931 (La. 2/21/14), 134 So. 3d 1165 (“Dhaliwal I”); Dhaliwal v.

Dhaliwal, 49,973 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/25/15), 184 So. 3d 773, writ

denied, 16-0236 (La. 4/4/16), 190 So. 3d 1204 (“Dhaliwal II”); and

Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, 52,507 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/27/19), 265 So. 3d 1188,

writ denied, 19-00700 (La. 9/6/19), 278 So. 3d 373 (“Dhaliwal III”).

These cases involve members of the Dhaliwal family. Manmohan S.

Dhaliwal (“Manmohan”) and his wife Kailash K. Dhaliwal (“Kailash”) had

two sons, Mahinderpal S. Dhaliwal (“Paul”) and Karminderdal S. Dhaliwal

(“Karl”). Karl is married to Dhillon Sookham Dhaliwal (“Sookham”), and

their daughter is Simran Dhaliwal Emaus (“Simran”). Manmohan died

intestate on June 21, 2010, and Kailash was made the administratrix of his

succession.

On February 9, 2011, Kailash and Manmohan’s succession filed a

petition against Karl and Sookham in which they claimed that Manmohan,

Kailash, and Karl were equal partners in a joint venture that owned multiple

convenience stores. The parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment, and Karl and Sookham also filed a peremptory exception of

prescription or peremption. The trial court sustained the exception, finding

that the suit claiming a share of profits was not timely filed; denied Kailash

and the succession of Manmohan’s motion for summary judgment; sustained

Karl and Sookham’s motion for summary judgment; and dismissed with

prejudice Kailash and the succession’s claims. Kailash and the succession

appealed.

In a September 11, 2013 opinion, this Court found that this matter

involved genuine issues of material fact regarding whether a joint venture

existed between Manmohan, Kailash, and Karl and, therefore, that summary

judgment was inappropriate. See Dhaliwal I. This Court reversed the

judgments of the trial court regarding summary judgment and prescription

and remanded for further proceedings. Id.

On May 13, 2014, Kailash, in her individual capacity, filed a motion

to dismiss her claims against Karl and Sookham, and the trial court granted

this motion. The trial court also denied a motion filed by the former attorney

for Manmohan’s succession to prohibit Kailash from dismissing

Manmohan’s succession’s claims against Karl and Sookham. This Court

affirmed those rulings. See Dhaliwal II.

Kailash died on April 16, 2015. On June 4, 2015, the trial court

appointed Simran as administratrix of Manmohan’s succession.

On September 19, 2016, Manmohan’s succession, through its

administratrix Simran, filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the February

9, 2011 lawsuit filed against Karl and Sookham, arguing there was

insufficient evidence to support a claim that Manmohan was a partner in an
2

oral joint venture with Karl and Sookham that would entitle Manmohan’s

succession to any award and, therefore, that continued prosecution of the

lawsuit would squander the assets of his succession and breach her fiduciary

duty owed to the heirs of his succession.

Paul opposed the motion to dismiss and this Court summarized his

claims as follows:

On March 17, 2017, Paul, in his capacity as an heir to [his
father’s] succession, filed an opposition to the motion to
dismiss. He argued that Simran breached her duty to act as a
prudent administratrix. He alleged that she did not enforce all
of the obligations in favor of the succession; did not preserve,
repair, maintain and protect the property of the succession;
failed to produce and file an accounting; paid the succession’s
attorney without authorization from the trial court; and was in
collusion with the succession’s attorney, Karl, and Sookham.
He also alleged that Simran and the succession’s attorney were
in possession of documents that showed viable claims and that
she and the succession’s attorney had taken no affirmative steps
to pursue these claims against Karl and Sookham.

Dhaliwal III, supra, at 1190.

On November 14, 2017, the trial court filed a ruling granting the

motion to dismiss. It agreed with Simran that there was not enough

evidence to support the succession’s claim that an oral joint venture existed

and that to proceed with the lawsuit would waste the succession’s assets. On

November 29, 2017, it filed an order dismissing the Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal

lawsuit.1 Paul appealed that ruling. On February 27, 2019, this Court

affirmed the trial court’s ruling finding that a joint venture did not exist. See

Dhaliwal III.

Kailash’s Will and Succession Proceedings

1
Any future reference to “Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal,” refers to the suit in which
Kailash and Manomohan’s succession sued Karl and Sookham.
3

As stated, Kailash passed away on April 16, 2015. On May 18, 2015,

the trial court ordered that Kailash’s will be filed and executed. Originally,

Karl was confirmed as executor to his mother’s succession, which Paul

opposed. However, on March 1, 2016, the trial court granted Kailash’s

succession’s motion to nominate Simran as a substitute for Karl as executor.

In her will, Kailash bequeathed immovable property she owned in Clinton,

Mississippi, to Paul and Karl in equal shares. The remainder of her estate

was left to Karl.

On May 23, 2016, Paul filed a document in his mother’s succession

proceedings styled, “Petition to Annul the Last Will and Testament of

Kailash K. Dhaliwal Due to Undue Influence.” In that filing, Paul restated

the joint venture claims made by Kailash and Manmohan’s succession. Paul

stated that Karl unduly influenced his mother to “drop” her interest in the

joint venture suit and to execute a will. Paul stated that Karl’s influence

“destroyed her free agency and caused her volition to be substituted for his.”

Paul asked that his mother’s will be declared null.

On May 15, 2017, Paul filed another document in his mother’s

succession proceedings again titled, “Petition to Annul the Last Will and

Testament of Kailash K. Dhaliwal Due to Undue Influence.” Paul again

asked that his mother’s will be declared null. Paul referenced email

correspondence between the attorneys representing his parents’ successions.

Paul stated that after reviewing that correspondence, he reserved the right to

amend his petition in order to include “more particular details” of “undue

influence and conspiracy” resulting in the judgment dismissing his mother’s

joint venture claim. On June 2, 2017, the trial court ordered that the two

successions be consolidated.
4

Paul’s Re-Stated Petition

On August 4, 2020, Paul filed a “Re-Stated Petition” in his parents’

succession proceedings and in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal. Paul named as

defendants: the attorneys of the succession representative, Margaret

Blackwell Pruitt, G. Adam Cossey, and J.P. Christiansen (collectively, “the

Attorneys”), Simran, Karl, Sookham, and ABC Insurance Company, the

professional liability insurer of attorneys Pruitt and Cossey.

Paul organized his Re-Stated Petition into sections.2 The first section

is titled, “Re: Father’s Intestate Succession.” In that section, Paul reiterated

the joint venture claims that were dismissed in Dhaliwal III. He also

claimed the Attorneys: 1) possessed records showing and had knowledge of

Karl converting cash from their parents’ accounts after Manmohan’s death,

which was not accounted for in the succession accounting; 2) were silent

about the undue influence Karl exerted over their mother; 3) did not include

the attorneys’ fees in the succession accounting; 4) secretly represented

Karl; 5) never disclosed to Paul any succession accountings; 6) violated their

fiduciary duty to enforce succession claims against Karl; 7) represented Karl

in an unrelated suit; and 8) concealed that Karl rented their parents’ home

and kept the paid rent.

The second section is titled, “Re: My Mother’s Testate Succession.”

In that section, Paul claimed that: 1) the Attorneys tried to install Karl as the

executor of their mother’s will; 2) he was not “placed in legal possession of

unencumbered succession property” from his mother’s succession; 3) he was

2
The claims Paul raised against the Attorneys, he also raised against Simran, as
succession representative. Because Paul has only appealed the judgments sustaining the
Attorneys’ exceptions, only those claims he brought against the Attorneys in the Re-
Stated Petition will be discussed in depth.
5

denied resources to contest the appointment of Simran as executor; and 4)

the Attorneys “enjoyed absolute and complete power and authority over all

succession assets.”

The third section is titled, “Re: Both My Parents’ Successions.” In

that section, Paul claimed that 1) the Attorneys failed their statutory

accounting duties, because only four annual accountings were filed in his

father’s succession after Manmohan died intestate in 2010, and only two

annual accountings were filed in his mother’s succession, after her

succession was opened in 2015; 2) the Attorneys committed negligence and

legal malpractice in advising Simran, who mismanaged the successions; 3)

the Attorneys colluded with Simran to conceal evidence in order to get

Paul’s fiduciary claim against Karl dismissed; 4) the succession suffers “loss

of return on investment and needless monthly expenses for maintenance,

insurance, utilities, and taxes on property which should have been sold years

ago”; and 5) Simran and the Attorneys breached their statutory duties to

close both successions as soon as possible;

Paul pursued the following relief:

1. A declaration that Kailash’s will is invalid;

2. Nullity of the November 14, 2017 judgment which dismissed
the succession of Manmohan’s claims against Karl regarding
the joint venture. See Dhaliwal III;

3. Damages from Karl;

4. Damages from Simram for alleged breach of duties owed to
him as the successions’ representative; and

5. Damages from the Attorneys for their negligent and
intentional breaches of fiduciary duties owed to him, and their
failure to safeguard his interests by pursuing claims against
Karl that would have benefitted Paul.

6

The Attorneys’ Exceptions3

On October 19, 2020, the Attorneys filed in each case the following

documents: 1) “Exceptions of Improper Cumulation of Actions,

Unauthorized Use of Summary Proceedings, and No Cause of Action,”

which was captioned Succession of Kailash Dhaliwal; and 2) a filing titled

“Exceptions,” which contained exceptions of no right of action, res judicata,

and no cause of action, and was captioned Kailash Dhaliwal v. Karl

Dhaliwal.4 The Attorneys asked that Paul’s claims against them be

dismissed with prejudice. The Attorneys argued in those exceptions that:

1. Paul cannot seek an annulment of the trial court’s November
29, 2017 judgment dismissing the Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal suit,
because he has no right of action to do so. The Attorneys stated
that Paul’s interest in his father’s succession is the property of
the bankruptcy trustee for his bankruptcy proceedings. The
Attorneys also asserted that Paul’s attempt to annul the
judgment in this case constitutes a “collateral attack” on that
judgment of dismissal which is prohibited by jurisprudence.

2. Paul cannot seek annulment of the judgment dated May 13,
2014, which dismissed Kailash’s personal claims against Karl
and Sookham, because he has no right of action to do so. Paul
is not the succession representative of his mother’s estate,
which remains under administration, and his mother’s will,
which has not been declared invalid, bequeaths to him only an
interest in immovable property in Mississippi.

3. Paul is barred from bringing claims against the Attorneys,
because on November 10, 2015, he sued the Attorneys, their
law firm, Karl, and Simran in suit No. 2015-3432, claiming that
the Attorneys had breached their fiduciary duty owed to him as
an heir of his father’s succession and a legatee of his mother’s
succession. In that suit, Paul asserted that the Attorneys
conspired with Simran and Karl to cause him intentional harm
and to deny him his rightful inheritance. The Attorneys stated
that on July 20, 2016, that suit was dismissed with prejudice,

3
Simran, as succession representative, and Karl and Sookham filed similar
exceptions to Paul’s Re-Stated Petition. Paul has not appealed any rulings on those
exceptions.
4
The Attorneys also raised additional exceptions in the two filings on which the
trial court did not rule.

7

after the trial court sustained their exceptions of no right of
action, res judicata, and no cause of action. The Attorneys
stated that Paul did not appeal that judgment, which is now
final, barring the claims against him in his Re-Stated Petition.

4. The Attorneys stated that in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, Paul
opposed the motion by Simran to dismiss the succession’s
claims against Karl and Sookham, and that opposition included
claims against Simran that she and the Attorneys possessed
documents establishing misconduct by Karl and Sookham. The
Attorneys stated that those claims were rejected by the trial
court and this Court. See Dhaliwall III. The Attorneys stated
that those claims in Paul’s Re-Stated Petition are barred by res
judicata, and that his claims against the Attorneys, “which
derive from and are based solely upon the claims against
Simran,” are also barred by res judicata.

5. The Attorneys argued that Paul has no cause of action against
them, because he has not established that the November 29,
2017 judgment was dismissed,

6. The Attorneys argued that Paul has no cause of action against
them, because a non-client cannot hold his adversary’s attorney
personally liable for malpractice or negligent breach of a
professional obligation, he failed to plead facts establishing
specific malice or an intent to harm, and he has no cause of
action for alleged breach of fiduciary duty.

The Attorneys attached to their exceptions:

1. A document titled, “Motion to Allow Trustee to Close Case
Without Abandoning Asset,” filed in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Louisiana on or about April 13,
2016. The motion contains the case caption, In re Mahinderpal
Singh Dhaliwal, Tisa Denise Dhaliwal, Debtors, and states that
it was filed by attorney John Clifton Conine (“Atty. Conine”),
the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee in the matter. The motion
states that the assets of the bankruptcy estate include Paul’s
claim in his father’s succession, which, in turn, includes any of
his potential claims in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal. The motion states
that Atty. Conine desired to close the case, but intends to re-
open the case “should a meaningful judgment be rendered in the
bankruptcy estate’s favor,” and he asked the bankruptcy court
for authorization to do so.

2. A May 2, 2016, order from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Louisiana, which states:

[T]he bankruptcy estate’s interest in the claim of the
debtor…Paul…in his late father’s…succession, including
but not limited to the litigation now pending in the
8

[Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal], entitled
[Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal] and the Succession of
Manmohan…not be abandoned under the provisions of
11 U.S.C. § 554(c); and

It is ordered that the Trustee be and is authorized to re-
open the case, should a meaningful judgment be rendered
in the bankruptcy estate’s favor, or to have this court
approve any settlement reached in the future.

Paul’s Opposition

On November 9, 2020, Paul filed in the succession proceedings and

Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal identical oppositions to the exceptions filed by: 1) the

Attorneys; 2) Simran; and 3) Karl and Sookham. Paul argued that he is an

“uncontested heir” to his father’s succession and an “uncontested legatee” to

his mother’s succession, and that Simran and the Attorneys owe him a

fiduciary duty as an heir and legatee. Paul asserted that Simran and the

Attorneys breached that duty and that the bankruptcy trustee did not have an

interest in the fiduciary duty owed to him. Paul also claimed that the

Attorneys violated the professional rules which gives him a right of action

and cause of action against them. Paul stated that La. C.C.P. art. 934 allows

him to “remove by amendment my claims to annul my mother’s will…such

that particularly pled fraud, conspiracy, collusion and violation of

professional rules having the effect of substantive law may proceed to trial.”

Paul argued that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply here,

because the parties in the prior case between himself and the Attorneys, their

law firm, Simran, Karl, and Sookham is not the same as the instant case.

Paul acknowledges that there is a judgment dismissing his earlier suit. Paul

asserted that this is the exceptional case for which the doctrine of res

judicata should not apply, because there are concealed attorneys’ fees paid

by Karl to the attorneys prosecuting his fiduciary claim against Karl,
9

“violation of conflict of laws having the effect of substantive law,” and

“secret, ‘privileged’ communications” between Karl and the attorney

“prosecuting” his fiduciary claim. Paul stated that the “fraudulent scheme”

to harm him is “on-going, without interruption.”5

Action by the Trial Court

On December 1, 2020, a hearing was held on the exceptions. The trial

court admitted into the record the “Motion to Allow Trustee to Close Case

Without Abandoning Asset” filed by Atty. Conine, and the bankruptcy

court’s order which authorized the bankruptcy trustee to re-open the case in

the event of a favorable ruling in Manmohan’s succession and/or Dhaliwal

v. Dhaliwal. At the hearing, the trial court sustained the Attorneys’

exceptions of no right of action, res judicata, and no cause of action in the

three suits. On December 31, 2020, the trial court issued its written reasons

for judgment which state:

This court finds (among other things) that Paul Dhaliwal filed
for bankruptcy after his father died and all of his asserted rights
in, to, and arising from the succession of his father constitute
the property owned by the Chapter Seven Trustee. Too, this
court finds (among other things) that only the succession
representative has a right to assert a claim belonging to the
succession.

The trial court concluded that Paul does not have a right of action or

cause of action, and his claims are barred by res judicata. On January 1,

2021, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining the Attorneys’ exceptions

of no right of action, res judicata, and no cause of action and dismissed with

prejudice Paul’s claims made against the Attorneys in the succession suits.

On that same date, the trial court signed a judgment sustaining the same

5
The Attorneys then filed a reply in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, re-urging arguments
similar to those found in their exceptions.
10

exceptions, and again dismissed with prejudice Paul’s claims against the

Attorneys in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal. Paul now appeals.6

DISCUSSION

In his assignment of errors, Paul contends that the trial court erred

when it granted “blanket exceptions” to defendants when his claims against

defendants arose post-bankruptcy, during the administration of his mother’s

succession, and are unrelated to his father’s succession; certain damages and

causes of action were not known or have not been brought by the bankruptcy

trustee during his father’s succession; and the order of the bankruptcy court

reserves his right to receive one-half of the damages caused by defendants’

conduct related to the Dhaliwal v Dhaliwal suit.

Paul argues that the trial court’s judgment focuses solely on his

father’s succession, but is silent on the wrongdoings he alleges occurred

with his mother’s succession, which he asserts occurred after the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied review of Dhaliwal III. Paul states that exceptional

circumstances justify relief in his case, because the “conspired wrongful

conduct alleged in Manmohan’s succession was purposely concealed.”

Paul argues that his Re-Stated Petition sets forth new causes of action

for the “conspired breach of fiduciary duty” of Simran and the Attorneys

with Karl. He asserts that he has a right to demand that his parents’

successions be administered according to law and that the administratrix

owes an heir certain fiduciary duties. Paul states that the trial court erred in

6
Paul states in his brief that his appeals derive from a final judgment dated
December 11, 2020. However, Paul’s motions for an appeal state that he is appealing the
two judgments signed by the trial court on January 1, 2021. Those judgments sustain
only the Attorneys’ exceptions and dismiss with prejudice solely Paul’s claims against
them. Therefore, review of any other judgment is not properly before this Court.
11

ignoring his allegations of conspired breach of fiduciary duty in his mother’s

succession and his right to enforce the same.

Paul argues that he alleges “conspired violations of specific codal

duties of a succession representative, negligence, and intentional tort,” under

La. C.C.P. arts. 2315 and 1953, including allegations of fraud. He asks that

the trial court’s ruling be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The Attorneys argue that Paul has no interest in his father’s

succession, because the judgment in Dhaliwal III dismissing the joint

venture suit by his father’s succession terminated the bankruptcy trustee’s

claims and barred claims by anyone else claiming to be a successor to

Manmohan. The Attorneys state that in 2014, in the case that was the

subject of Dhaliwal II, Paul made a judicial admission that the trustee owned

his interest in his father’s succession. The Attorneys also argue that Paul’s

bankruptcy was closed without abandoning the bankruptcy estate’s interest

in Manmahon’s succession.

The Attorneys argue that his only interest in his mother’s succession

is a bequest giving him an interest in immovable property in Mississippi.

The Attorneys contend that only the succession representative may bring an

action on behalf of Kailash’s estate, because it is still under administration.

The Attorneys also argue that Paul has no cause of action against his

adversary’s attorneys for their alleged negligence or malpractice when acting

on their client’s behalf, and he also failed to state a cause of action against

them for intentional injury. The Attorneys state that Paul’s 2015 suit against

them, which raised the same issues as his Re-State Petition and was

ultimately dismissed with prejudice, bars this suit. The Attorneys state that

Paul failed to appeal that judgment.
12

Manmohan’s Succession

The exception of no right of action challenges whether the plaintiff

has an actual interest in bringing the action. La. C.C.P. art. 927(A)(6);

Carter v. First S. Farm Credit, ACA, 49,531 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/14/15), 161

So. 3d 928, writ denied, 15-1166 (La. 9/18/15), 178 So. 3d 151; Dance v.

Louisiana State Univ. Med. Ctr. at Shreveport, 32,592 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/10/99), 749 So. 2d 870, writ denied, 00-0532 (La. 3/31/00), 759 So. 2d

76. The essential function of this exception is to provide a threshold device

which terminates suits brought by one who has no interest in enforcing

judicially the right asserted. In re Ewing, 34,413 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/01),

781 So. 2d 885.

Whether a plaintiff has a right of action depends on whether the

plaintiff belongs to a particular class of persons to whom the law grants a

remedy for the alleged grievance, or whether the plaintiff has an interest in

judicially enforcing the right asserted. Carter v. First S. Farm Credit, ACA,

supra. The determination of whether a plaintiff has a right of action is a

question of law and is reviewed de novo on appeal. In re Interdiction of

Lalehparvaran, 48,655 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/15/14), 132 So. 3d 439.

In Carter v. First S. Farm Credit, ACA, supra, this Court explained:

Upon filing a bankruptcy petition, an estate is created which
includes all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of commencement of the case. The interests of the debtor in
property includes causes of action possessed by the debtor.
Even where the debtor fails to list a cause of action as an asset,
the cause of action becomes property of the bankruptcy estate
upon filing of the bankruptcy petition.

Louisiana jurisprudence has held that once a bankruptcy case
commences, only the trustee has the legal capacity to sue upon
a cause of action included as property of the estate. (internal
citations omitted.)

13

Carter v. First S. Farm Credit, ACA, supra at 936, citing Dance v. Louisiana

State Univ. Med. Ctr. at Shreveport, supra.

Here, any right to bring a claim in Manmohan’s succession or related

to his succession belongs to the bankruptcy trustee, as detailed in the order

from the bankruptcy court. While Paul’s bankruptcy case was closed, the

bankruptcy trustee requested, and was granted, the right to re-open the case

in the event of a judgment in favor of Paul in his father’s succession.

Therefore, Paul has no right of action to bring claims related to his father’s

succession.

Kailash’s Succession

A succession representative is a fiduciary with respect to the

succession, and shall have the duty of collecting, preserving, and managing

the property of the succession in accordance with law. She shall act at all

times as a prudent administrator, and shall be personally responsible for all

damages resulting from his failure so to act. La. C.C.P. art. 3191(A).

Except as otherwise provided by law, the succession representative

appointed by a court of this state is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a

right of the deceased or of his succession, while the latter is under

administration. The heirs or legatees of the deceased, whether present or

represented in the state or not, need not be joined as parties, whether the

action is personal, real, or mixed. La. C.C.P. art. 685. A succession

representative shall be deemed to have possession of all property of the

succession and shall enforce all obligations in its favor. La. C.C.P. art.

3211.

14

In Anderson v. Collins, 26,142 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/6/95), 648 So. 2d

1371, writs denied, 95-0629, 95-0783 (La. 4/21/95), 653 So. 2d 576, this

Court observed that under the provisions of La. R.S. 9:5621, actions against

any person who has served as a curator of a vacant succession or as

administrator, testamentary executor, or dative testamentary executor of a

succession in this state, or against the surety on his bond, arising out of any

act the representative, as such, may have done or have failed to do, are

subject to a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from the day of the

judgment homologating the final account. This Court found that the fact that

the prescriptive period does not begin to run until the day of the judgment

homologating the final account is evidence of our lawmakers’ intent that

only the succession representative may institute an action to enforce the right

of the succession while it is under administration. Anderson v. Collins,

supra.

Because Kailash’s succession is under administration, Paul cannot

bring claims against the succession attorneys. It is the succession

representative that is the proper plaintiff while a succession is under

administration. We find that Paul has no right of action against the

succession attorneys for claims related to his mother’s succession, which is

still under administration.

Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal

Paul filed his Re-Stated Petition in Dhaliwal v. Dhaliwal, in which

there is a final judgment which determined that his mother and his father did

not have joint venture claims against Karl. Paul asserts that the Attorneys

colluded with Karl and Simran in that case to have his mother and father’s

claims related to the joint venture dismissed. A final judgment obtained by
15

fraud or ill practices may be annulled. La. C.C.P. art. 2004(A). However, as

discussed, Paul has no right of action in his father’s succession.

Furthermore, Kailash’s will states that she bequeathed to Paul only an

interest in immovable property in Mississippi, and the remainder of her

estate she left to Karl. Therefore, any interest that Kailash may have had in

the alleged joint venture belongs to Karl. Paul must first establish that he

has an interest in Kailash’s succession, beyond his interest in the immovable

property that was bequeathed to him, by annulling her will, before he may

seek nullity of the November 14, 2017 final judgment in Dhaliwal v.

Dhaliwal. He, therefore, does not have the right to pursue that claim. The

trial court was correct in sustaining the exceptions of no right of action and

dismissing his claims.

For these reasons we affirm the judgments, dismissing Paul’s claims

without leave to amend. The claims Paul brought against the Attorneys, he

also brought against Simran, the succession representative, in his Re-Stated

Petition. Thus, leave to amend, as allowed by La. C.C.P. art. 934, is not

required. As noted, the exception of no right of action is a threshold device

which terminates suits brought by a person with no legal interest in

judicially enforcing the right. In re Ewing, supra. Upon finding no right of

action, the court must dismiss the suit. Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp., 562 So.

2d 888 (La. 1990). If the exception of no right of action is sustained pretrial,

there are no substantive rights to determine on the merits. In re Ewing,

supra; Lindsay, Marcel, Harris & Pugh, L.L.C. v. Harris, 98-2677 (La. App.

1 Cir. 2/18/00), 752 So. 2d 335. Therefore, it is unnecessary for this Court

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to consider the trial court’s rulings on the other exceptions.7 For this reason,

the trial court’s rulings are affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgments sustaining the

exceptions of no right of action, thereby dismissing Mahinderpal Singh

Dhaliwal’s claims against defendants Margaret H. Blackwell Pruitt, Jan P.

Christiansen, and G. Adam Cossey, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

7
We further note that we cannot address the merits of the exceptions of res
judicata in this case because no evidence pertaining to the Attorneys’ exceptions of res
judicata was introduced into the record at the hearing on the exceptions. The petition and
judgment upon which the exceptions of res judicata were based are not a part of the
appellate records. As an appellate court, we are a court of record and may not review
evidence that is not in the appellate record or receive new evidence. Denoux v. Vessel
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So. 2d 84.
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