State of Louisiana v. Cedric Charles O'Neal

Judgment rendered June 29, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,581-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

CEDRIC CHARLES O’NEAL Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 198,597

Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge

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LOUISANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

CEDRIC CHARLES O’NEAL Pro Se

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

LAURA O. WINGATE FULCO
ALEX L. PORUBSKY
NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Cedric Charles O’Neal was sentenced as a third felony habitual

offender to life in prison in 1999 for vehicular homicide. In 2001, the

Louisiana legislature enacted more lenient sentencing guidelines for habitual

offenders. Subsequently, pursuant to the 2006 action by the Louisiana

legislature relative to La. R.S. 15:308 and jurisprudence from the Louisiana

Supreme Court in 2018, the more lenient considerations for sentencing were

held to apply retroactively to habitual offenders sentenced prior to 2001. In

2018, O’Neal filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, citing entitlement

to the retroactive application of the more lenient sentencing guidelines.

Finding error by the trial court in determination of O’Neal’s level of

classification as a habitual offender, as well as error as to the applicable

sentencing range for the crime of which he was convicted, we vacate his

sentence and remand to the trial court with instructions.

FACTS

On October 17, 1998, Cedric Charles O’Neal (“O’Neal”) was

tailgating outside a football game at the Fairgrounds Stadium in Shreveport,

Louisiana. He was drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana before getting

into a friend’s car to leave the tailgate to get something to eat. While he was

driving, the car in front of him stopped to let pedestrians from the game

cross Greenwood Road, and O’Neal swerved around the car at a high rate of

speed. O’Neal drove into the crowd of pedestrians and clipped Sandra

Lewis, knocking her back toward the curb. She survived. O’Neal hit Robin

Barrett (“Barrett”) with the vehicle head-on, and she was tragically killed as

a result. O’Neal was arrested and registered .112% on a Breathalyzer

administered at the time, which was above the legal limit. A

later blood test revealed a blood alcohol content of .11%, and a urine test

also revealed the presence of marijuana in his body. A more detailed factual

recitation of the events that evening can be found in this court’s prior

opinion at State v. O’Neal, 34,814 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/12/01), 795 So. 2d

1292, writ denied, 01-3207 (La. 11/1/02), 828 So. 2d 564, which also

analyzed the underlying facts of O’Neal’s conviction and resulting sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

O’Neal was charged by bill of information on December 14, 1998,

with the vehicular homicide of Robin Barrett in violation of La. R.S.

14:32.1. After a jury trial, O’Neal was found guilty and sentenced to life

imprisonment at hard labor after being adjudicated as a third felony

offender. On appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and his adjudication

as a third felony offender but vacated his sentence and remanded the matter

to the trial court for resentencing as a result of constitutional issues raised in

that appeal. O’Neal, supra. O’Neal’s convictions in his late teens of simple

burglary and possession of cocaine were the two underlying felony

convictions that elevated him to a third felony habitual offender when he

was sentenced for the vehicular homicide charge. On remand, he was again

sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment as a third felony offender,

which O’Neal appealed. The life imprisonment sentence was later affirmed

by this court. State v. O’Neal, 36,431 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/23/02), 830 So. 2d

408.

In 2001, the Louisiana legislature modified the severity of the

sentencing ranges for habitual offenders via Act 403 of the 2001 Regular

Session of the Legislature. In 2006, the Louisiana legislature enacted La.

R.S. 15:308, which provides for retroactive application of the more lenient
2

penalty provisions under La. R.S. 15:529.1. The Louisiana Supreme Court,

in State ex rel. Esteen v. State, 16-0949 (La. 1/30/18), 239 So. 3d 233, held

that La. R.S. 15:308 permits defendants to seek reduced sentences through a

motion to correct illegal sentence.

On May 18, 2018, O’Neal filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in

relation to his latest resentencing, citing entitlement to more lenient

sentencing considerations as directed by Esteen, supra. This court granted a

writ of mandamus on May 29, 2019, ordering the trial court to inform

O’Neal whether there was a pending filing, whether the filing had been acted

upon, and to enter a dispositive order within 30 days. O’Neal filed another

motion to correct illegal sentence on May 30, 2019. This court later granted

O’Neal’s motion to enforce the May 29, 2019 order.

In an August 22, 2019 ruling, the trial court granted O’Neal’s motion

to correct an illegal sentence, asserting that O’Neal should have been

sentenced as a second felony offender, because the cocaine possession

charge against him had been dismissed by the prosecution on February 4,

1993. The trial court stated that it attached the court minutes evidencing the

dismissal to the ruling, but the record does not include those referenced

minutes. It stated that O’Neal should have been sentenced pursuant to La.

R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1),1 and therefore, his sentencing range would be

1
A. Any person who, after having been convicted within this state of a felony, or
who, after having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United
States, or any foreign government of a crime which, if committed in this state would be a
felony, thereafter commits any subsequent felony within this state, upon conviction of
said felony, shall be punished as follows:
(1) If the second felony is such that upon a first conviction the offender would be
punishable by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life, then the sentence to
imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less than one-third the longest term and
not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a first conviction.

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imprisonment from 20 to 60 years. That assertion was inconsistent with

applicable law.

As a result of the trial court’s granting of the motion to correct illegal

sentence, a new sentencing hearing was held on January 22, 2021, and

O’Neal was resentenced by the trial court and ordered to serve 30 years’

imprisonment, with one year to be served at hard labor without the benefit of

parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. In response to his most recent

sentencing, O’Neal filed a motion to reconsider that sentence on February

10, 2021. That motion was denied by the trial court. The trial court, in its

ruling, again stated that the sentencing range for O’Neal was 20 to 60 years’

imprisonment and that O’Neal had been sentenced at the lower end of the

range.

This court granted a writ filed by O’Neal, treating his application as a

motion for out-of-time appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for

perfection of the appeal. The trial court perfected the record on appeal by

order filed July 9, 2021. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

O’Neal enumerates several assignments of error, one of which is that

the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider sentence.2 In light

2
O’Neal’s assignments of error are as follows:
1. The sentence imposed in this case was constitutionally excessive
considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the
background of Cedric O’Neal.
2. Considering the excessive nature of the sentence in this case the trial
court erred in denying the Motion to Reconsider Sentence in this
case.
3. The sentence imposed in this case is not the more lenient sentence
entitled under Esteen and La. R.S. 15:308(B).
4. The trial court was not in compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1
and violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1 § 20.
5. The sentence in this case is still constitutionally illegal under La.
R.S. 15:529.1(G).
4

of the fact that O’Neal’s sentence must be vacated on this assignment of

error, we find that the discussion of all other assignments of error is

pretermitted.

Our review of the record reflects that the trial court found that O’Neal

had been improperly adjudicated as a third felony offender due to a

dismissed drug charge from 1993. However, this court determined that he

had been properly adjudicated as a third felony offender and that the prior

conviction for possession of cocaine could be used to support the habitual

offender adjudication in O’Neal, supra. Additionally, the court minutes

referenced by the trial court in support of the second felony offender status

were not included in the record. Although the trial court determined that

O’Neal should be considered a second-offender, it did not vacate his third-

offender adjudication and sentence. The mutually exclusive simultaneous

classifications for sentencing enhancement as both a second felony offender

and a third felony offender must be conclusively resolved on the record by

the trial court, and O’Neal should be subject to the corresponding

appropriate sentencing range.

Additionally, in both the ruling granting O’Neal’s motion to correct

illegal sentence and the ruling denying his motion to reconsider sentence, the

trial court stated that in reaching its conclusion, it recognized the sentencing

range was 20 to 60 years, and as such, the 30-year sentence was on the low

end of the range. That description of and consideration by the trial court of

an applicable sentencing range of 20 to 60 years for the crime for which

O’Neal was convicted was in error. In 1998, La. R.S. 14:32.1 provided that

6. Petitioner should not have been considered a habitual offender due to
the change in La. R.S. 15:529.1 in Act 282 of 2017.

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a person convicted of vehicular homicide shall be imprisoned with or

without hard labor for not less than two years, nor more than 15 years, with

at least one year to be served without benefits. That sentencing range is

without enhancements for habitual offender status. The minimum and

maximum sentencing range is enhanced for habitual offenders.

Therefore, if O’Neal is determined to be a second felony habitual

offender, his sentencing range will be 7 ½ years to 30 years.3 If O’Neal is

determined to be a third felony habitual offender, his sentencing range will

be 10 to 30 years.4 In either situation, a 30-year sentence is the maximum

possible sentence. It appears that the trial court was working under the

assumption the 30-year sentence it imposed was at the lower end of the

potential range of 20 to 60 years, which was error.

Considering the above, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the

motion for reconsideration and vacate O’Neal’s sentence of 30 years’

imprisonment at hard labor, with one year without benefits. We remand this

matter to the trial court for resentencing within the applicable sentencing

range and resolution of O’Neal’s correct classification as a habitual offender.

We note that when O’Neal is resentenced the trial court should articulate the

considerations taken into account in imposing the sentence as set forth in La.

C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and as stated by the court in Esteen, supra.

3
The 2001 version of the habitual offender law states that for a second felony
offender “the sentence to imprisonment shall be sentenced for a determinate term not less
than one-half the longest term and not more than twice the longest term prescribed for a
first conviction.” La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).
4
The 2001 version of La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(i) states that a third felony offender
will be sentenced “for a determinate term not less than two-thirds of the longest possible
sentence for conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed
for a first conviction.”
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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Cedric

Charles O’Neal’s motion to reconsider sentence, vacate his sentence, and

remand with instructions consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED; VACATED; REMANDED.

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