54,766-CA Precedential Affirmed Processed

Donnie McManus v. Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana, Brittanie Parrott and Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed November 16, 2022

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

  • 304 So. 3d 143 not in our corpus
  • 310 So. 3d 179 not in our corpus
  • 339 So. 3d 508 not in our corpus

Opinion text

Judgment rendered November 16, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,766-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

DONNIE MCMANUS Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

SAFEWAY INSURANCE Defendants-Appellees
COMPANY OF LOUISIANA,
BRITTANIE PARROTT and
SAFECO INSURANCE
COMPANY OF OREGON

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2019-2428

Honorable Robert C. Johnson, Judge

*****

LAW OFFICES OF STREET & STREET Counsel for Appellant
By: Curtis Daniel Street

PIPES | MILES | BECKMAN, LLC Counsel for Appellee,
By: Rachel S. Kellogg Safeco Insurance
H. Minor Pipes, III Company of Oregon

*****

Before PITMAN, STONE, and ROBINSON, JJ.

STONE, J.

This civil appeal arises from the Fourth Judicial District Court,

the Honorable Robert C. Johnson presiding. Donnie McManus (“plaintiff”)

suffered injuries in a vehicular collision. The plaintiff sued the other driver,

Brittanie Parrot (“Parrot”), and her liability insurer, Safeway Insurance

Company of Louisiana (“Safeway”). Parrot’s policy with Safeway was

limited to $15,000 per person for automobile liability insurance coverage.

The plaintiff settled with Safeway and Parrot.

The plaintiff also sued his insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of

Oregon (“Safeco”) to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage

under the policy because Parrot’s liability coverage was insufficient to fully

compensate his damages. Pursuant to a selection of lower limits executed

by the insured’s wife, the Safeco policy’s UM coverage initially had limits

of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, but those limits had been

statutorily increased to $15,000 and $30,000, respectively, by the time of the

accident. It is undisputed that the Safeco policy continuously renewed from

2009 until the date of the accident without any changes to the limits of

liability except for the statutory increase in minimum liability coverage.

Safeco paid $15,000 on the plaintiff’s UM claim, but refused to

pay more based on the aforementioned coverage selection. Thereafter,

the plaintiff and Safeco filed cross motions for summary judgment

regarding the applicable UM coverage limit; the trial court denied the

plaintiff’s MSJ, and granted Safeco’s partial MSJ, which contended that

the plaintiff’s wife’s selection of coverage limits is valid and

enforceable.1 The plaintiff now appeals, urging that: (1) his wife’s

selection of lower coverage limits in obtaining the initial UM policy was

rendered ineffective – regarding the current policy – by the subsequent

change in the law, and therefore, the trial court erred in granting the

defendant’s MSJ; and (2) the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ MSJ

wherein the plaintiff contended that, by default, the coverage limits for the

policy’s liability coverage are also the coverage limits for the UM coverage.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents strictly a question of law. The facts are not in

dispute. The sole question is whether the statutory increase in minimum

required motor vehicle liability coverage – which became effective after the

execution of the coverage selection form – caused the renewal of the policy

to constitute the issuance of a “new policy” within the meaning of that

phrase as used in La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a).

Motion for summary judgment

After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting

documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that

the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966

(A)(3). The only documents that may be filed in support of or in

opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written

1
Katherine McManus, a named insured on the policy, selected UMBI coverage
limit of $10,000 each person, $20,000 each accident, lower than the policy’s liability
limit of $50,000 each person, $100,000 each accident.

2

stipulations, and admissions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). Furthermore, the

court may consider only those documents filed in support of or in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider any

documents to which no objection is made. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2).

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s granting of summary

judgment de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court’s

decision on the motion. McDonald v. PNK (Bossier City), LLC, 53,561 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/23/20), 304 So. 3d 143, writ denied, 20-01416 (La. 2/9/21),

310 So. 3d 179.

Statutory interpretation

“As with the interpretation of any statute, the only question is the

expressed intent of the legislature.” Leisure Recreation & Ent., Inc. v. First

Guar. Bank, 21-00838 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So.3d 508. (emphasis added).

“When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to

absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further

interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.” La.

C.C. art. 9. There is an even stronger admonition against judicial rewriting

of legislation in the revised statutes: “[w]hen the wording of a Section is

clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the

pretext of pursuing its spirit.” La. R.S. 1:4. We turn to the controlling

insurance statutes with these precepts in mind.

Controlling insurance statutes

La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a) sets forth, in pertinent part, the following

provisions governing issuance of uninsured motorist coverage:

(i) No automobile liability insurance covering liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any
motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in
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this state…unless [uninsured motorist] coverage is
provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than
the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the
policy…however, the coverage required under this Section
is not applicable when any insured named in the
policy…selects lower limits…in the manner provided in
Item (1)(a)(ii) of this Section. In no event shall the policy
limits of an uninsured motorist policy be less than the
minimum liability limits required under R.S. 32:900...Such
coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a
renewal, reinstatement, or substitute policy when the
named insured has… selected lower limits in connection
with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer
or any of its affiliates…

(ii) Such …selection of lower limits…shall be made only on
a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.
The prescribed form shall be provided by the insurer and
signed by the named insured or his legal representative…The
form signed by the insured or his legal representative which
initially…selects lower limits…shall remain valid for the
life of the policy and shall not require the completion of a
new selection form when a renewal, reinstatement,
substitute, or amended policy is issued to the same named
insured by the same insurer or any of its affiliates. An insured
may change the original uninsured motorist selection or
rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the
policy by submitting a new uninsured motorist selection
form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the
commissioner of insurance. Any changes to an existing
policy…except changes in the limits of liability, do not
create a new policy and do not require the completion of
new uninsured motorist selection forms. For the purpose
of this Section, a new policy shall mean an original contract
of insurance which an insured enters into through the
completion of an application on the form required by the
insurer. (Emphasis added).

In 2009, La. R.S. 32:900 mandated a minimum coverage of

“[$10,000] because of bodily injury to…one person in any one accident.” On

January 1, 2010, La. R.S. 32:900 increased that mandatory minimum

coverage to $15,000.

In Rashall v. Pennington, 08-0001 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/30/08), 982 So.

2d 301, writ denied, 08-1543 (La. 10/10/08), 993 So 2d 1286, the court of

appeal held that an initial valid rejection of UM coverage is also valid for
4

renewal, reinstatement or substitute policies. The court granted summary

judgment for the insurer.

In this case, the plaintiff relies on the sixth sentence of La. R.S.

22:1295 (1)(a)(ii), italicized above, which states that “[a]ny changes to an

existing policy…except changes in the limits of liability, do not create a new

policy and do not require the completion of new uninsured motorist

selection forms.” The plaintiff interprets this language, via negative

implication, to mean that a change in the limit of liability to an existing

policy creates a new policy and requires completion of new uninsured

motorist coverage selection forms.2

The plaintiff’s argument is unequivocally disproved by the very next

sentence in La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii), underlined above, which provides: “For

the purpose of this Section, a new policy shall mean an original contract of

insurance which an insured enters into through the completion of an

application on the form required by the insurer.” (emphasis added). This

language dictates that the statutory increase in minimum liability coverage did

not make the subsequent policy renewal the issuance of a “new policy.” Thus,

the 2009 coverage selection form continued to be effective until the accident in

question.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. All costs of this

appeal are assessed to the plaintiff, Donnie McManus.

AFFIRMED.

2
The plaintiff further argues that the statutory increase in minimum liability
coverage prospectively invalidated the coverage selection, and the UM coverage limits
default to the $50,000 per person limit of the policy’s liability coverage pursuant to La. R.S.
22:1295(1)(a)(i), supra.

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