Jarrell E. Godfrey, Jr. v. Go Auto Insurance Company and Craig Dewayne Jones

Judgment rendered September 22, 2021.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,060-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

JARRELL E. GODFREY, JR. Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

GO AUTO INSURANCE Defendants-Appellees
COMPANY AND CRAIG
DEWAYNE JONES

*****

Appealed from the
Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Tensas, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 24397

Honorable Michael E. Lancaster, Judge

*****

JARRELL E. GODFREY, JR. In Proper Person,
Appellant

BRADLEY J. GADEL, APLC Counsel for Appellee,
By: Bradley John Gadel Go Auto Insurance
Company

VOORHIES & LABBÉ Counsel for Appellee,
By: Cyd Sheree Page Craig Dewayne Jones

*****

Before MOORE, STONE, and ROBINSON, JJ.

MOORE, C.J., concurs with written reasons.

STONE, J.

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff-appellant, Jarrell Godfrey, Jr., filed this action seeking to

recover for damage to his 2004 Chevrolet Suburban, which defendant Craig

Jones was using without permission and crashed into a utility pole in a single

vehicle accident. At the time of the crash, Jones had in effect a motor vehicle

liability policy (“MVLP”) issued by the defendant-appellee, Go Auto

Insurance Company (“Go Auto”).

Go Auto filed a motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”) arguing that

Godfrey’s claim is not covered by the MVLP because there is an applicable

exclusion in the policy. The Go Auto policy issued to Jones excludes from

liability coverage “property damage to any property…owned by, being

transported by, used by, or in the care, custody or control of, a covered

person.” (Emphasis added).

Godfrey filed his own MSJ, arguing that the Go Auto MVLP does

provide liability coverage for his claim because the exclusion is

unenforceable. Godfrey introduced his own affidavit (for the purpose of

summary judgment) attesting to the fact that Jones did not have permission

to use the vehicle, and no conflicting evidence was admitted for the purpose

of summary judgment.

After a hearing, the trial court granted Go Auto’s MSJ and dismissed

Godfrey’s claims against Go Auto with prejudice. In so doing, the trial court

rejected Mr. Godfrey’s argument that the Go Auto policy exclusion is

unenforceable.

The trial court ruled that this exclusion: (1) applies to the plaintiff’s

claim; and (2) does not violate the mandate of coverage in La. R.S.

32:900(C) of the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law. The

trial court held that the exclusion is enforceable because it invokes the

exception thereto (provided in La. R.S. 32:900(E)) for damage to property

“in [the] charge of” the insured. As support for the latter holding, the trial

court relied on Lewis v. GEICO Cas. Co., 51,864 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/27/18),

246 So. 3d 815, 817, writ denied, 2018-1024 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 796.

In its written reasons for judgment, the trial court stated that the vehicle is

“in [the] charge of” the driver regardless of whether the driver has the

owner’s permission to use the vehicle.

Godfrey now appeals, and enumerates seven assignments of error.

However, our disposition of Godfrey’s first assignment of error renders all

the others moot: the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law,

which establishes the legal requirement of liability insurance for motor

vehicles operated on Louisiana roads, renders the exclusion on which Go

Auto relies unenforceable. For this reason, we reverse the judgment granting

Go Auto’s MSJ and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

DISCUSSION

La. C.C.P. art. 966(A), in relevant part, states:

(3) After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion
for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,
memorandum, and supporting documents show that there
is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the
mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.1 (Emphasis added).

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The relevant facts are not in dispute. This case presents purely a question of law.
2

Appellate courts review summary judgment de novo under the same

criteria governing the trial court’s consideration of whether summary

judgment is appropriate. Lewis, supra.

An insurance policy is a contract between the parties. Id. In Lewis,

supra, we explained:

Insurance companies may limit coverage in any manner
they desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict
with statutory provisions or public policy. (Emphasis
added).

Id.

Those statutory limitations are embodied, in part, by the Louisiana

Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, La. R.S. 32:851 et seq., which

establishes the legal requirement that motor vehicles operated on Louisiana

roads must be covered by liability insurance. It also defines the scope of that

compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance. If a certain risk or loss is

within that scope, policy exclusions seeking to deny coverage of that risk or

loss are unenforceable.

To that end, La. R.S. 32:900(C) sets forth a general rule mandating

liability coverage “for damages arising out of the use by [the named insured]

of any motor vehicle not owned by him.” However, La. R.S. 32:900(E) sets

forth exceptions to this general rule; the language relevant to this case is as

follows:

E. Such motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any
liability …for damage to property owned by, rented to,
in charge of or transported by the insured.

Thus, liability coverage is not mandated when the insured’s liability is for

damage to property: (1) owned by the insured; (2) rented to the insured; (3)

transported by the insured; or (4) that is “in [the] charge of” the insured. A

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person is “in charge of” property if that person has “the right to exercise

dominion or control” over it. Lewis, supra, at 820. (Emphasis added).

In Lewis, supra, this court held that if the owner of a motor vehicle

gives another person permission to drive the motor vehicle, it is “in [the]

charge of” the other person for purposes of La. R.S. 32:900(E):

Since Johnson was driving the vehicle with Lewis’
permission when the accident occurred, she clearly had the
right to exercise dominion or control over Lewis’ vehicle
when it was damaged. (Emphasis added).

Id. at 820.

The trial court’s holding directly conflicts with our reasoning in

Lewis, supra, wherein we specifically stated that the owner’s permission was

our basis for holding that the driver was “in charge of” the owner’s vehicle.

Lewis at 820. Accordingly, Jones did not have “the right to exercise

dominion or control” over Godfrey’s vehicle because he did not have

Godfrey’s permission to do so. The trial court erred in granting of Go Auto’s

MSJ. Because Jones used Godfrey’s vehicle without permission, the vehicle

was not in Jones’ charge, and application of the Go Auto liability coverage

exclusion would be in violation of La. R.S.32:900(C).

CONCLUSION

The trial court judgment granting Go Auto’s MSJ is REVERSED and

this case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. All costs of this appeal are assigned to Go

Auto.

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MOORE, C.J., concurs.

I concur in reversing the summary judgment and remanding the case

for further proceedings. The district judge, who was on the eve of

retirement, commendably sought to clear his docket and leave no unfinished

business for his successor; however, by scheduling all pending motions to be

heard on one date during his last month in office, he unduly prejudiced

Godfrey’s position and gave short shrift to his arguments. In my view, he

did not give proper consideration to the issues raised by this motion and by

Godfrey’s opposition. I therefore concur in the result.

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