Princeton Jumper v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

Judgment rendered March 9, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,184-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

PRINCETON JUMPER Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

STATE FARM MUTUAL Defendant-Appellee
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY

*****

Appealed from the
Bastrop City Court for the
Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 26260-19

Honorable Phillip Murray Lester, Judge

*****

ANTHONY J. BRUSCATO Counsel for Appellant

DAVENPORT, FILES & KELLY Counsel for Appellee
By: Carey Brad Underwood
Stephen P. Dillon
Grant M. Tolbird

*****

Before COX, THOMPSON, and O’CALLAGHAN (Pro Tempore), JJ.

O’CALLAGHAN, J. (Pro Tempore)

In this case involving an insurance claim for medical payments and

uninsured motorist (“UM”) coverage, the plaintiff, Princeton Jumper,

appeals a summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant, State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”). For the reasons

expressed below, we affirm the trial court judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff was injured while traveling as a passenger in a friend’s

car. Neither his mother nor her boyfriend was present for or involved in the

accident. None of the vehicles in the accident were owned by Jumper, his

mother, or her boyfriend. He is now attempting to recover under an

automobile policy which was issued to his mother’s boyfriend and defines a

“resident relative” as someone who lives with the named insured and is

related to the named insured “by blood, marriage, or adoption.” The

undisputed facts below were gleaned from the pleadings and various exhibits

submitted in support of the motions for summary judgment, particularly

Jumper’s June 2019 deposition and the affidavits submitted by his mother

and her boyfriend.

Jumper, who was born in 1993, has lived with his mother, Princess

Murry, his entire life. Since he was approximately 11 years old, his mother

has been in a relationship with Harry Moore. Moore began residing with

Murry and her son in about 2008. However, Moore and Murry have never

married as Murry is married to someone else. In late 2013, Murry

experienced problems with her car. As a result, Moore decided to buy her a

new vehicle as a gift. They selected a Ford Fusion, which Moore bought

and financed in January 2014; the title to the car was in his name. As part of

his gift, Moore decided to pay for insurance on the vehicle. To that end, he

contacted his State Farm agent, Ron Bush. The State Farm application listed

Moore as the registered owner of the Ford Fusion and Murry as its principal

operator.

The policy declarations page on the Fusion for policy period

January 24, 2014, to July 2, 2014, listed only Moore as the named insured. 1

The Definitions section of the policy contains the following relevant

provisions:

Non-Owned Car means a car that is in the lawful possession of
you or any resident relative and that neither:
1. is owned by:
a. you;
b. any resident relative[.]
...

Resident Relative means a person, other than you, who resides
primarily with the first person shown as a named insured on the
Declarations Page and who is:

1. related to that named insured or his or her spouse by blood,
marriage, or adoption[.]
...

You or Your means the named insured or named insureds
shown on the Declarations Page. If a named insured shown on
the Declarations Page is a person, then “you” or “your”
includes the spouse of the first person shown as a named
insured if the spouse resides primarily with that named insured.

Under Medical Payments Coverage, the following additional definition is

found:

Insured means:
1. you and resident relatives:
a. while occupying:

1
The 2014 declarations page is the only one in the record. The certified policy
record statement attached to the copy of the policy stated that “[i]t is State Farm’s
business practice to print a new Declarations Page only when a policy issuance
transaction such as a change of coverage occurs. Therefore, the included Declarations
Page which was in effect at the time of loss will indicate the policy period of the last
policy issuance transaction.” It further states that the policy was in effect on the loss date
of 05/01/2018.

2

(4) a non-owned car[.]

The Insuring Agreement pertaining to medical payments coverage

states as follows:

We will pay:
1. medical expenses incurred because of bodily injury that is
sustained by an insured and caused by a motor vehicle
accident[.]

The Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage section contains the

following relevant provisions:

Additional Definitions

Insured means:
1. you;
2. resident relatives;
3. any other person while occupying:
a. your car;
b. a newly acquired car;
c. a temporary substitute car; or
d. a rental private passenger car rented to you.

Insuring Agreements

1. Under Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage, we will
pay nonpunitive damages for bodily injury an insured is legally
entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an uninsured
motor vehicle. [Emphasis in original.]

In May 2018, Moore paid off the Fusion. On May 31, 2018, he

donated the car to Murry, who then had the title put in her name. However,

on May 1, 2018, while the car title was still in Moore’s name, Jumper was in

an auto accident while a guest passenger in a friend’s vehicle. Jumper

collected an amount from the tortfeasor’s insurer which was allegedly

insufficient to compensate him for his injuries. As a result, he made a claim

for medical payments coverage under the State Farm policy covering his

mother’s vehicle. State Farm denied the claim on the basis that Jumper was

not a “resident relative” of the named insured, Moore.

3

On January 7, 2019, Jumper filed suit against State Farm, asserting

that its denial of his claim for medical payments was arbitrary, capricious,

without probable cause, and lacking in good faith. He requested penalties

and attorney fees. On March 11, 2019, State Farm filed an answer in which

it asserted that it issued an auto policy to Moore covering a Dodge Ram

truck and a Ford Fusion. It further alleged that its policy defined “resident

relative” as a person related to Moore “or his or her spouse by blood,

marriage or adoption.” Because Jumper was occupying a non-owned car

and was not related to Moore by blood, marriage, or adoption, State Farm

alleged that its policy did not provide coverage for medical payments to him.

On April 16, 2019, Jumper filed an amended petition in which he

additionally alleged that the State Farm policy included UM coverage. State

Farm answered this petition on April 24, 2019.

On October 18, 2019, Jumper filed a motion for partial summary

judgment on the issue of insurance coverage. He asserted that, due to a

clerical error, Murry was not put on the policy as a named insured and that

the policy should be reformed. In support of his motion, he attached the

following exhibits: the affidavits of Moore and Murry, the State Farm

policy, the vehicle title history, and the insurance application. In their

affidavits, Moore and Murry stated that they had been in a relationship for

many years and considered themselves to be engaged. They recounted

Moore’s 2014 purchase of the Fusion, which they asserted was intended to

be Murry’s personal vehicle. Moore stated that he called his insurance agent

and told him that he was buying a car for Murry and he wanted her to have

“full coverage” on the car, “the same coverage I had on my own vehicle.”

Murry stated in her affidavit that the agent had her come in to his office with

4

her driver’s license. According to Murry, the agent took the application and

put on it that Moore was the record owner and she was the principal driver.

Her understanding was that she would have “full insurance coverage” on the

car, the “exact same coverage” for her on her vehicle as Moore had for

himself on his. Both stated that Moore made all the payments on the car and

its insurance until it was paid off in May 2018. On May 31, 2018, he signed

an act of donation so that Murry could have the title changed.

On January 22, 2020, State Farm filed its own motion for summary

judgment. It contended that, since Jumper was not related to Moore by

blood, marriage, or adoption, its policy did not provide coverage for the

injuries Jumper sustained in the accident while occupying a non-owned

vehicle. In support of its motion, State Farm attached its policy, the petition,

the amended petition, and Jumper’s deposition.

A hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment was held on

February 4, 2020. Jumper’s counsel conceded that, since Jumper was not

related to Moore, there could be no UM coverage. He then contended that

the policy should be reformed due to a clerical error by State Farm in not

listing Murry as an additional named insured. Although Moore was the title

holder, he asserted that Murry could be the true owner of the car. State Farm

argued that the lack of coverage was clear under the terms of its policy and

the facts. In support of its position, State Farm cited the factually similar

cases of Lemoine v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co., 38,237 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/12/04),

868 So. 2d 304, writ denied, 04-0926 (La. 6/4/04), 876 So. 2d 86, and writ

denied, 04-0904 (La. 6/4/04), 876 So. 2d 87, and Munson v. Dupre, 497 So.

2d 320 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986). As to reforming the policy, State Farm

further pointed out that the plaintiff had not alleged any clerical error in his

5

petitions. State Farm asserted that, even if Murry had been included as a

second named insured, Jumper would not quality under the policy definition

of a “resident relative” because Moore would have been the first named

insured since the title was in his name. The trial court observed that there

was no deposition of the insurance agent asking whether there was a

mistake. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied both

motions.

On January 4, 2021, State Farm filed a second motion for summary

judgment. In addition to the exhibits submitted with the first motion, it

included an affidavit from State Farm agent Ron Bush. In his affidavit,

Bush stated that he wrote the policy for Moore; neither Murry nor Jumper

were listed as named insureds under the policy on May 1, 2018; and no

request was ever received to add Murry or Jumper as a named insured to the

policy prior to May 1, 2018. On February 22, 2021, Jumper filed a

memorandum in opposition to the motion in which he again blamed the

failure to add his mother as a named insured upon a clerical error by State

Farm’s representatives. 2 He asserted that Bush’s “narrowly drafted”

affidavit was “couched in conclusory terms.” He also contended that he had

tried unsuccessfully to depose Bush and attached copies of a July 2019

subpoena for State Farm documents and emails in which taking Bush’s

deposition was discussed.3 As a result of these factors, he argued that the

2
In conjunction with his opposition, Jumper submitted several exhibits he used to
support his own motion for summary judgment, such as the affidavits of Moore and
Murry and the policy declarations page.
3
We note that the emails are not competent summary judgment evidence as they
are not attached to an affidavit and are thus unsworn. Consequently, we cannot consider
them. Asi Fed. Credit Union v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Syndicate
1414 Subscribing to Pol’y FINFR1503374, 18-164 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/7/18), 259 So. 3d
552.

6

affidavit should be stricken and the motion denied. State Farm filed a reply

to the opposition in which it asserted that Bush appeared for his deposition,

but the plaintiff failed to attend it. As a result, Bush’s affidavit was executed

on the date when his deposition was scheduled to be taken.

On March 2, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on State Farm’s

second motion for summary judgment. State Farm reminded the court of its

previously expressed wish for an affidavit or testimony from the agent,

which had been supplied with its second motion. As to Jumper’s assertion

of a clerical error, State Farm cited an insured’s duty to read his policy and

request the appropriate coverage, as well as Moore’s failure to amend the

policy to include Murry as an insured for four years. On the other hand,

Jumper insisted that Moore wanted “full coverage” of Murry’s vehicle and,

as a result, she should have been made a named insured. He asserted that

there was a dispute of material fact as to the understanding of the parties

when coverage was requested. Counsel for Jumper reiterated his claim that

he had tried to take Bush’s deposition. In response, State Farm’s counsel

maintained that Bush appeared for his deposition and, when the plaintiff

failed to show up, Bush executed his affidavit, which was not conclusory.4

The trial court concluded that it could not get around the insured’s obligation

to read his policy and ask questions, particularly for a period of four years.

It granted State Farm’s second motion for summary judgment. Judgment

granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing Jumper’s claims

4
Jumper’s attorney told the trial judge that he sent a letter saying he would take
the agent’s deposition if the agent brought his file. However, because he did not receive
a reply that the agent would be bringing the file, he chose not to attend the deposition.
The deposition was not rescheduled, and State Farm proceeded with its second motion for
summary judgment.

7

against State Farm was signed on March 24, 2021. Jumper appeals from this

judgment.

LAW

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,

using the same criteria that govern the district court’s consideration of

whether summary judgment is appropriate. Larson v. XYZ Ins. Co., 16-0745

(La. 5/3/17), 226 So. 3d 412; Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-2292 (La.

6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791. The summary judgment procedure is favored and

designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

actions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). After an opportunity for adequate

discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion,

memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue

as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover

will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court

on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion

does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s

claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of

factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s

claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce

factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).

The interpretation of an insurance policy ordinarily involves a legal

question that can be properly resolved on motion for summary judgment.

8

Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Wood Energy Grp., Inc., 53,096 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/15/20), 289 So. 3d 671; McGee v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52,299 (La. App. 2

Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So. 3d 1161, writ denied, 18-2057 (La. 2/18/19), 265 So.

3d 773. The starting point in analyzing insurance policies is the principle

that the policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed

using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the

Louisiana Civil Code. Sensebe v. Canal Indem. Co., 10-0703 (La. 1/28/11),

58 So. 3d 441; McGee v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra.

When determining whether or not a policy affords coverage for an

incident, it is the burden of the insured to prove the incident falls within the

policy’s terms. On the other hand, the insurer bears the burden of proving

the applicability of an exclusionary clause within a policy. Chretien v.

Thomas, 45,762 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/10), 56 So. 3d 298.

Summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance

policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the

policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence

supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded. Elliott v.

Continental Cas. Co., 06-1505 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So. 2d 1247; Reynolds v.

Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So. 2d 1180; Kansas City

S. Ry. Co. v. Wood Energy Grp., Inc., supra.

As other written agreements, insurance policies may be reformed if,

through mutual error or fraud, the policy as issued does not express the

agreement of the parties. Samuels v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 06-

0034 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So. 2d 1235. See Tillman v. USAgencies Cas. Ins.

Co., 46,173 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11), 58 So. 3d 1009, writ denied, 11-0665

(La. 5/6/11), 62 So. 3d 127. In the absence of fraud, the party seeking

9

reformation has the burden of proving a mutual error in the written policy.

Samuels, supra.

It is the insured’s responsibility to request the type of insurance

coverage, and the amount of coverage needed. It is also well settled that it is

the insured’s obligation to read the policy when received, since the insured is

deemed to know the policy contents. Isidore Newman Sch. v. J. Everett

Eaves, Inc., 09-2161 (La. 7/6/10), 42 So. 3d 352. It is the client who has the

duty and responsibility to determine the coverage needed, advise the agent

of those needs, and then to review the policy to determine whether it meets

his or her needs. Sitaram, Inc. v. Bryan Ins. Agency, Inc., 47,337 (La. App.

2 Cir. 9/19/12), 104 So. 3d 524, writ denied, 12-2283 (La. 11/30/12), 103

So. 3d 375.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, we address Jumper’s arguments pertaining to Bush’s

affidavit. We find no merit to Jumper’s contention that Bush’s affidavit

should be stricken. While Jumper argues that he was not allowed to depose

Bush, he admitted at the hearing on the second motion for summary

judgment that he chose not to attend the scheduled deposition. As a result,

in lieu of being deposed, Bush signed the affidavit which was submitted with

State Farm’s second motion for summary judgment. The affidavit concisely

sets forth the relevant information known by Bush about the instant matter.

While brief, we do not find the language to be conclusory.

10

As previously noted, State Farm cited the cases of Lemoine5 and

Munson 6 to support its position that Jumper was not entitled to coverage

under its policy as a “resident relative.” The undisputed evidence submitted

in support of State Farm’s second motion for summary judgment

demonstrates that Jumper is not covered under the clear terms of the policy,

as he is not related to Moore, the only named insured, “by blood, marriage,

or adoption.” On appeal, Jumper does not seriously contest this position.

Instead, Jumper’s primary contention on appeal is that Bush made a

clerical error in not adding Murry as a named insured in the policy. As a

result, he contends that the contract should be reformed to add Murry as a

named insured in order to provide coverage for Jumper as Murry’s relative.

5
In Lemoine, supra, a named insured bought a car for the use of his fiancée, who
lived with him, and instructed his insurance agency to add the car to his policy “with full
coverage” and add the fiancée as the main driver of the car. At the agency, she presented
her driver’s license to be copied. The car was added as a covered vehicle and the fiancée
was added as a driver. The insurance agent testified that there was no indication of a
request to add the fiancée as a named insured and that she would not have been added as
a named insured because she was not the owner of the car. The car was later sold and
removed from the policy, but the fiancée remained on the policy as a driver. Thereafter,
the fiancée was involved in an accident while driving a noncovered auto, and the
insurance company denied that it provided any coverage. While the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the named insured and the fiancée, this court reversed. We found
that the policy provided coverage for any “insured,” which was defined as “you or any
‘family member.’” It further defined “you” and “your” as referring to the “named
insured” and the “spouse if a resident of the same household,” while “family member”
meant “a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your
household.” Finding that these provisions were clear and unambiguous, we then
concluded that the fiancée did not fall within any of these terms.
6
In Munson, supra, the plaintiff’s daughter was killed in a collision while a
passenger in another person’s vehicle. The mother made a UM claim for her daughter’s
death under a policy on a car owned by a man with whom the mother was living.
Although the daughter apparently lived with the unmarried couple, the man was not her
father. The policy, upon which the man was the only named insured, defined “insured”
as “the named insured and, while residents of the same household, his spouse and the
relatives of either.” The mother argued that, when the policy was purchased, it was
understood with the agent’s office that both she and the man were to be insured and that
her name also appeared on the application for the policy. Thus, she maintained that her
daughter, as her relative, was an insured under the policy. The trial court rejected her
claim, and the appellate court affirmed. It was not convinced that there was any
agreement for the mother to be a named insured. Furthermore, the record did not contain
any written application for insurance, which would not have been part of the policy
anyway.

11

We find no merit to this argument. A similar issue was addressed by this

court in the Lemoine case, wherein reformation of the insurance policy was

sought. We held that reformation of the contract was not required on the

basis that it failed to express the parties’ true intent. Additionally, the policy

was not ambiguous because it did not define the term “driver” or explain its

significance regarding coverage. The named insured received what he

requested – that the car be added with “full coverage” and the fiancée be

added as its main driver. The same is true in the instant case. Moore, the

named insured, requested “full coverage” and that his agent provide the

same coverage on the Fusion as on his own vehicle. He did not request that

Murry be added as a named insured. The declarations page of the issued

policy showed one named insured, Moore. As in Lemoine, no mutual

mistake was established, and reformation of the policy is not appropriate.7

Based upon our de novo review, we find that summary judgment in

favor of State Farm was properly granted.

CONCLUSION

The trial court judgment which granted State Farm’s second motion

for summary judgment and dismissed all claims against State Farm is

7
Jumper made several arguments pertaining to delivery of the policy for the first
time on appeal. As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider issues that were not
raised in the pleadings, were not addressed by the trial court, or are raised for the first
time on appeal. Mendoza v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP., 46,438 (La. App. 2 Cir.
6/22/11), 77 So. 3d 18, writ denied, 11-1918 (La. 11/14/11), 75 So. 3d 943. See and
compare Grant v. Sneed, 49,511 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 155 So. 3d 61, which
considered an issue on appeal of a summary judgment because it was mentioned in the
trial court in the opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the record contained all
information needed to evaluate the argument, and the standard of review was de novo.
However, in the instant case, Jumper made no reference to delivery of the policy below.
Furthermore, nothing in the record (including Moore’s and Murry’s affidavits) even
suggests a failure to receive the policy. In fact, we note that the address given by Jumper
in his deposition as his lifelong address (where he lived with Murry and Moore) was the
same one found for Moore on the declarations page of the policy.

12

affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, Princeton

Jumper.

AFFIRMED.

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