State of Louisiana v. Keuntrel Rayshun Knight

Judgment rendered March 9, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,236-KA
No. 54,237-KA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

KEUNTREL RAYSHUN KNIGHT Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 222,256 and 222,256-A

Honorable A. Parker Self, Jr., Judge

*****

GILLEY & GILLEY Counsel for Appellant
By: Patricia A. Gilley
Tristan P. Gilley

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JOHN MICHAEL LAWRENCE
ANDREW JACOBS
RICHARD R. RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, COX, and O’CALLAGHAN (Pro Tempore), JJ.

PITMAN, J.

Defendant Keuntrel Rayshun Knight appeals the imposition of his

sentences of 35 years at hard labor after a guilty plea to a charge of

manslaughter and 12 years at hard labor after a guilty plea to a charge of

attempted manslaughter. For the following reasons, we affirm his

convictions, amend his sentences and, as amended, affirm.

FACTS

On July 30, 2017, at 1:00 a.m., Reese Williams, Sr. (“Williams”),

drove with his two children to the home of their mother, Nicorya Chisley, in

Bossier Parish, Louisiana. Williams entered the house, but left the children

in the car parked in Chisley’s driveway. Chisley was home with Defendant,

her boyfriend of two weeks. An altercation occurred, and Defendant, who

was armed, fired his gun five times and shot Williams twice in the torso

while he was in the house. Williams ran outside; Defendant fired one shot

outside of the home. That bullet struck five-year-old Reese Williams, Jr.

(“Reese”), who was sitting in his car seat, and killed him. Williams

survived.

Defendant was charged by bill of information with attempted second

degree murder of Williams, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27 and La.

R.S. 14:30.1, Docket No. 222,256-A, and by indictment with the second

degree murder of Reese, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1), Docket

No. 222,256. On January 22, 2020, a Bossier Parish assistant district

attorney (“ADA”) filed a motion for joinder of causes so that the two cases

could be tried together. The motion was granted.

The trial was set for January 27, 2020, but on that day, discussions

were held and Defendant was offered a plea agreement whereby the ADA

would reduce the charges to attempted manslaughter and manslaughter in

exchange for a guilty plea. Defendant’s attorneys believed that a cap was to

be placed on the amount of time Defendant would be required to serve if he

pled guilty to the charges, but this discussion was never placed on record,

and the ADA claimed that stipulation had never been made.

The transcript of the guilty plea, with both Patricia Gilley and Tristan

Gilley representing Defendant, states as follows:

MR. GILLEY: The State’s tendered an offer in exchange for a guilty
plea. There would be an amended charge of
Manslaughter and Attempted Manslaughter. And those
would be run concurrently. The Judge, we order a PSI
[presentence investigation].

THE COURT: All right. Is Mr. Knight prepared to take that amended.

MR. GILLEY: We’re going to enter a guilty plea.

MS. GILLEY: With the understanding that there would be a PSI and-

THE COURT: And the Court would share that PSI with you and with
the District Attorney and then we would sentence
Mr. Knight in accordance with that.

MS. GILLEY: Your Honor, at this time would you be in a position to
say-put a cap on what you would expect.

THE COURT: I don’t put caps. They put caps on.

MR. RAY: No. The State would object to any cap on this. That’s
not been the offer. That’s never been the offer.

THE COURT: Yeah, they put caps on. We’ve had discussions, but
those discussions, of course, are off the record. And so,
that’s where we are.

MR. GILLEY: And, Your Honor, you would, review any sentencing
memorandum we would file.

THE COURT: A sentencing memorandum? I would be happy for you- -
I’ve had sentencing hearings, so I’m open to those.
You’ve been with me for those-Well, nine of my 17 years
here-
...

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-and know how we proceed in this courtroom.

MR. GILLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, where are we, counselors?

MS. GILLEY: Your Honor, I believe that Mr. Knight has decided to go
ahead and take the plea offer.

...

MR. RAY: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. . . . I guess what we’re going to
do is under docket number 222,256 we will amend
Second Degree Murder to Manslaughter, which the
amended Revised Statute will be 14:31. And then under
222,256A the Attempted Second Degree Murder, I guess,
the attempt is already in it, so that’s 14:27 is the Attempt
and then Manslaughter is, again, 14:31.

During the district attorney’s (“DA”) statement of the facts of the

case, Defendant admitted that there were fewer than seven shots fired and

that at least one shot fired outside the house resulted in the death of the

minor child. After the guilty plea colloquy, Defendant pled guilty to both

charges and did not reserve any nonjurisdictional errors or objections for

appeal.

On June 27, 2020, after the PSI was provided to the trial court, a

sentencing hearing was held at which Defendant’s attorney called many

people to the stand, including Defendant, in an attempt to show mitigating

factors for the court to consider in sentencing. After Defendant’s attorney

presented over an hour of statements, the state presented Williams and his

mother, Patricia Williams, to make victim impact statements. Defendant was

not allowed to ask these witnesses any questions. The victims asked the

court to impose the maximum sentence of 40 years. The state also argued

that the trial court should impose maximum sentences.

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The trial court stated that it had reviewed the PSI and considered

factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. It considered mitigating and

aggravating factors associated with Defendant, including his young age at

the time of the commission of the crime and that it was his first felony

offense. It also discussed his home life and his attempts to engage in a

professional career. It further noted that Defendant was the father of three

children of his own. It considered that the crime involved the use of a

handgun and that very serious consequences resulted from the poor decision

Defendant made in using that gun.

Having considered all of the pertinent facts, the trial court sentenced

Defendant to 35 years for the manslaughter of Reese and 12 years for the

attempted manslaughter of Williams, to be served concurrently. It failed to

state that the sentences were without benefit of probation or suspension of

sentence.

On July 22, 2020, Defendant’s attorney filed a motion to reconsider

sentence pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1 in Docket No. 222,256-A, the

case concerning attempted manslaughter, but did not file a separate motion

in Docket No. 222,256. Defendant alleged that the DA and/or his ADA

were directly or indirectly guilty of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in

due process violations, which affected not only the sentence imposed, but

the overall fairness of the judgment in the case, including the sentence.

Defendant also alleged that the DA and ADA threatened Chisley, a key

witness in the murder case, by telling her that she would end up in prison

with her boyfriend if she did not change her story as to the facts of the fatal

incident. He further alleged that the DA and ADA conspired with Williams

and his mother, Patricia Williams, to threaten Chisley to change her version
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of the facts. He also alleged that the trial court had entered into an

agreement with him that it would not impose a sentence of more than

20 years, that it did not keep its word and denied having entered into the

agreement and that it violated other rights of Defendant by not allowing him

to rebut adverse information in the PSI and letters written by members of the

Williams family. Further, he alleged that the trial court prevented him from

asking Chisley any questions at the sentencing hearing, which violated his

right to due process. He also claimed that the sentences imposed were

constitutionally excessive.

On July 30, 2020, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration

of sentence. A motion for appeal was filed in Docket No. 222,256-A, but

the order was granted in Docket No. 222,256. The motion for appeal in

Docket No. 222,256-A raised issues pertaining only to the sentences

imposed. Because the sentences for both crimes were imposed at the same

time, this court will review the sentences imposed for both manslaughter and

attempted manslaughter.

On August 11, 2020, the DA filed a rule to show cause why

Defendant’s attorney should not be held in contempt for filing the motion to

reconsider sentence that contained insulting, abusive, discourteous or false

language constituting direct contempt accusing the DA, ADA and even the

trial judge of engaging in serious breaches of professional conduct.

Defendant’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss the rule to show cause, and a

hearing was held on September 23, 2020, at which the trial court denied the

motion to dismiss the rule. However, it also recused itself from any further

proceedings since a portion of the motion to reconsider sentence, upon

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which the rule for contempt was based, concerned allegations related to the

trial judge.

A hearing was held on September 30, 2020, according to the minutes

of the record, which are the only evidence that a second hearing was held on

the matter by a different judge. The minutes of that hearing state that

Defendant’s attorney was found to be in direct contempt and was ordered to

pay sanctions of penalty in the amount of $100 within seven days. She

refused to pay and was booked into the parish jail, where she remained for a

short period of time until someone else paid the $100. No appeal was taken

from the contempt ruling, and there is no evidence of the contempt hearing

except in the minutes of the record of the appeal currently before this court.

Defendant appeals his sentences.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court breached its

agreement to sentence him to no more than 20 years for the crimes to which

he pled guilty; and, thus, his guilty pleas are constitutionally infirm, and he

should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. He also

argues that the DA and ADA violated his constitutional and statutory rights,

as well as their own prosecutor’s code of professional conduct, and that the

sentences must be revoked. He further argues that the sentences imposed of

35 years and 12 years, to be served concurrently, are constitutionally

excessive.

Violation of a Plea Agreement

Defendant argues that the trial court breached a plea agreement to

sentence him to no more than 20 years and that this breach rendered his

guilty pleas constitutionally infirm and subject to withdrawal.
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The state argues that the record clearly contradicts the claim that the

trial court breached any plea agreement. It points out that nowhere in the

extensive record of the proceedings, which included numerous pretrial and

post-trial hearings, is there any confirmation of a cap on sentencing of

20 years and that it would never agree to a cap in this situation. It argues

that Defendant received a considerable benefit from the plea bargain

agreement when the charges were reduced from second degree murder of the

juvenile and attempted murder of Williams to manslaughter and attempted

manslaughter, respectively. It also argues that the sentences were left to the

discretion of the trial court, that the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, that

the trial court gave reasons for the sentences imposed and that the sentences

were within the sentencing range of the pled offenses.

A guilty plea is invalid when the defendant is induced to plead guilty

by a plea agreement or by what the defendant reasonably believes is a plea

agreement and the terms of the bargain are not satisfied. State v. Hall,

637 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994), writ denied, 94-1373 (La. 9/30/94),

642 So. 2d 868.

Where a defendant’s misunderstanding is not induced by or attributed

to representations made by the district attorney or the trial court, there are no

grounds for withdrawal of the plea. State v. Hall, supra. In the absence of

fraud, intimidation or incompetence of counsel, a guilty plea is not made less

voluntary or less informed by the considered advice of counsel. Id.

A misunderstanding between counsel and defendant does not have the same

implication as a breached plea bargain and does not render the guilty plea

not “free and voluntary”; nor is dissatisfaction with the sentence or expected

sentence after sentencing sufficient to invalidate a guilty plea if the plea was
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entered into on advice of competent counsel and there is no indication that a

plea agreement had been broken. State v. Banks, 49,767 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/15/15), 163 So. 3d 895, citing State v. Senterfitt, 00-415 (La. App. 3 Cir.

9/27/00), 771 So. 2d 198, writ denied, 00-2980 (La. 9/28/01), 798 So. 2d

107.

The transcript of the guilty plea hearing shows that no one other than

perhaps Defendant’s counsel was under the impression that a plea bargain

agreement limiting his sentence to 20 years had been made, and the record

does not explain how counsel remained confused. When the attorney

broached the subject with the trial court, it clearly stated that there would be

no cap placed on the sentences. The trial court stated that it did not take that

action, and the ADA protested that he would never enter into such an

agreement under the circumstances of this case. Even though these

assertions that no such 20-year cap existed were made in open court,

Defendant pled guilty to the reduced charges of manslaughter and attempted

manslaughter while knowing that a PSI had been ordered and that the trial

court would consider the PSI and any sentencing memoranda filed by his

attorney when determining his sentences.

Defendant’s misunderstanding was not induced by or attributed to

representations made by the ADA or the trial court. There was no fraud or

intimidation which induced him to plead guilty. There are no grounds for

withdrawal of the guilty pleas, which were freely and voluntarily given.

For these reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.

Alleged Misconduct of the DA and ADA

Defendant argues that the DA and ADA violated his constitutional

and statutory rights, as well as the prosecutor’s code of conduct. He bases
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this assertion on two separate arguments, the first of which is that the DA’s

office intimidated or threatened Chisley, the mother of the deceased child.

The state responds to Defendant’s argument by asserting that there is

no evidence, inside or outside the record, that indicates there was a violation

of Code of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8, concerning special

responsibilities of a prosecutor. Further, it contends that the same

allegations were adjudicated at the contempt hearing and were found to be

without merit. That judgment was not appealed and is now final.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.2 concerns review of sentence and states in

pertinent part as follows:

A. (1) The defendant may appeal or seek review of a sentence
based on any ground asserted in a motion to reconsider
sentence. The defendant also may seek review of a sentence
which exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by the
statute under which the defendant was convicted and any
applicable statutory enhancement provisions.

(2) The defendant cannot appeal or seek review of a
sentence imposed in conformity with a plea agreement
which was set forth in the record at the time of the plea.

The issue of alleged intimidation by the DA and ADA of the deceased

child’s mother was raised by Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of

sentence and cannot be reviewed in the context of this appeal currently

before our court. In response to the motion to reconsider sentence in the trial

court, the DA filed a rule to show cause why Defendant’s attorney should

not be held in contempt because the motion contained insulting, abusive,

discourteous or false language constituting direct contempt. The contempt

hearing was held after the notice of appeal was filed. There is no transcript

of the hearing or a signed order. The only reference to the contempt hearing

in the record is found in the minutes. Apparently, the trial court, which

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heard the contempt matter, agreed that the allegations against the DA and

ADA were insulting, abusive, discourteous or false since Defendant’s

attorney was found to be in contempt. No appeal was taken from the

decision to hold her in contempt; therefore, this issue is not currently before

this court for review.

The second argument of this assignment of error is that the DA’s

office interfered with Defendant’s ability to call witnesses at his sentencing

hearing. He asserts that he was not allowed to confront his accusers when

the victims made their impact statements to the trial court regarding the

sentences to be imposed. He also argues that the trial court denied him the

right to confront the witnesses against him when it did not allow him to

question Williams or his mother, the grandmother of the deceased child,

when they gave their impact statements.

Defendant argues that by denying him the right to confront witnesses

against him in the sentencing phase and refusing to allow him to develop the

mitigating circumstances important to his sentencing, the DA and ADA

violated Rule 3.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled “Special

Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” which provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

(d) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows,
or reasonably should know, either tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all
unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor,
except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by
a protective order of the tribunal[.]

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La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.3 concerning the record on review of the

sentence states as follows:

In reviewing a sentence, the appellate court may consider the
record of the case which shall include any evidence or relevant
information introduced at preliminary hearings, hearings on
motions, arraignments, or sentencing proceedings, and any
relevant information included in a presentence investigation
report filed into the record at sentencing. In order to preserve
confidentiality, in appropriate cases, the court may order that
the presentence report, or any portion thereof, be held under
seal.

The sentencing hearing transcript shows that Defendant was allowed

to present many witnesses who testified to his good character and nature.

Further, Defendant’s mother was called to testify that she and the deceased

child’s mother had a good relationship after the incident. Defendant was

allowed to make a statement to the trial court expressing his remorse for

what had occurred and the result of his actions. He presented a statement

indicating that he was acting in self-defense.

The U.S. Constitution requires that a guilty plea be recorded showing

that the defendant was informed of and waived his constitutional right

against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury and the

right to confront one’s accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct.

1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Russell, 46,426 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/17/11), 73 So. 3d 991, writ denied, 11-2020 (La. 2/10/12), 82 So. 3d 270.

In a felony case, a court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first

addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and

determining that he understands, inter alia, the right to confront and cross-

examine the witnesses against him. La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1(A)(3).

In this case, the trial court informed Defendant of his constitutional

right to confront his accusers before his decision to plead guilty. The trial
11

court specifically told him that by pleading guilty he waived the rights

provided by Boykin, supra. The safeguards provided by the Boykin colloquy

protect defendants during the guilty phase of trial and do not apply to

situations when victims are making their impact statements at sentencing.

Defendants are not allowed to confront their victims when they have already

pled guilty to the crimes against them.

Defendant pled guilty to the charges of manslaughter and attempted

manslaughter. The testimony presented by Defendant at the sentencing

hearing raised no substantial issues regarding the free and voluntary nature

of the guilty plea. There is no proof in the record that the actions of the DA

and ADA violated Defendant’s statutory or constitutional rights or the Rules

of Professional Conduct by withholding exculpatory evidence at the guilty

phase of the trial or at sentencing.

For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

Defendant claims his sentences of 35 years and 12 years, to be served

concurrently, are excessive and that the trial court failed to take into

consideration the mitigating circumstances he attempted to develop at the

sentencing hearing, but was prevented from doing.

The state argues that the sentences imposed by the trial court are fair

and are not excessive and withstand constitutional review.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial judge

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long

as the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the
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article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Meadows, 51,843

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ denied, 18-0259 (La.

10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208. The articulation of the factual basis for a

sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical

compliance with its provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate

factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where

there has not been full compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v.

Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982); State v. Meadows, supra. The

important elements which should be considered are the defendant’s personal

history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior

criminal record, seriousness of the offense and the likelihood of

rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981); State v.

Meadows, supra. There is no requirement that specific matters be given any

particular weight at sentencing. State v. Meadows, supra; State v. Shumaker,

41,547 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So. 2d 277, writ denied, 07-0144 (La.

9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 351.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.

1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d

166; State v. Meadows, supra.

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As a general rule, maximum or near maximum sentences are reserved

for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Woods, 41,420 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 11/1/06), 942 So. 2d 658, writs denied, 06-2768, 06-2781 (La.

6/22/07), 959 So. 2d 494. However, in cases where the defendant has pled

guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct, the

general rule does not apply and the trial court has great discretion in

imposing the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense. This is

particularly true in cases where a significant reduction in potential exposure

to confinement has been obtained through a plea bargain and the offense

involves violence upon a victim. State v. Meadows, supra; State v.

McKinney, 43,061 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 976 So. 2d 802.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 14:31(B) provides that a person found guilty of

manslaughter:

[s]hall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty
years. However, if the victim killed was under the age of ten
years, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor without
benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, for not less than
ten years nor more than forty years.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 14:27(D)(3), which provides the penalties when a

person is found guilty of attempted crimes, states that he:

[s]hall be fined or imprisoned or both, in the same manner as
for the offense attempted; such fine or imprisonment shall not
exceed one-half of the largest fine, or one-half of the longest
term of imprisonment prescribed for the offense so attempted,
or both.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court took notice of the

information provided in the PSI, as well as other documentation which had

been submitted to it for sentencing purposes. It stated that pursuant to the

plea bargain agreement, it had the task of determining the length of the

sentences. It also stated that it had reread the statutes related to conviction
14

and reread La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, setting forth the factors to be considered

in sentencing. It noted that this was a very serious crime that resulted in the

death of a young child and that the offender created a risk of death or great

bodily harm to more than one person. Defendant utilized a dangerous

weapon in the commission of the offense, and any reasonable person could

have anticipated the consequences of these actions.

The trial court cited the PSI and stated that there were mitigating

factors to be considered, including Defendant’s young age and that this was

his first felony offense. It considered Defendant’s social history by stating

that although Defendant’s father was a convicted felon, his mother provided

him with a good and stable home and encouraged him to do well in school.

Defendant was a church member and worked in the medical community

rendering assistance. He is the father of three children, one of whom he

supports. Defendant expressed his remorse for his actions, which resulted in

the death of the child.

After considering and discussing the factors found in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court

sentenced Defendant to 35 years for manslaughter and 12 years for

attempted manslaughter, to be served concurrently. It failed to include that

the sentences were to be served without benefit of probation or suspension

of sentence.

According to La. R.S. 14:31, the maximum sentence for manslaughter

is 40 years in prison; and the maximum sentence for attempted manslaughter

is 20 years in prison. In sentencing Defendant to 35 and 12 years, the trial

court greatly reduced the number of years to which Defendant could have

been sentenced had he not agreed to accept the plea bargain agreement.
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The sentences are not grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of

the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of

pain and suffering. They do not shock or offend the sense of justice.

For the foregoing reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.

Error Patent

We note that there is an error patent in the record. The trial court

failed to state that Defendant’s sentences are to be served without benefit of

probation or suspension of sentence as provided in La. R.S. 14:31(B). That

statute is self-activating and makes the denial of benefits self-operative.

State v. Williams, 00-1725 (La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790; State v. Neely,

35,993 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/8/02), 818 So. 2d 829.

Defendant’s sentences are amended to reflect that they are to be

served without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and, as

amended, are affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The convictions of Defendant Keuntrel Rayshun Knight are affirmed.

The sentences of Defendant are amended to include that they are imposed

without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence and, as amended, are

affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AMENDED AND,

AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.

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