State of Louisiana v. Marquise Jamal Jones

Judgment rendered March 9, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,264-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

MARQUISE JAMAL JONES Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 345,115

Honorable Ramona L. Emanuel, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ALEXANDRA L. PORUBSKY
SAMUEL S. CRICHTON
NANCY F. BERGER-SCHNEIDER
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and HUNTER, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

The defendant, Marquise Jones, was charged by amended bill of

information with molestation of a juvenile under age 13, a violation of La.

R.S. 14:81.2. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged by

unanimous verdict. Defendant was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment

with the first 25 years to be served without benefit of parole, probation or

suspension of sentence. Defendant was notified in writing of the sex

offender registration requirements and his motion to reconsider sentence was

denied. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence. For the following

reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS

The record shows that in August 2016, T.C., who was five years old,

complained of vaginal pain to her grandmother, M.J., while taking a bath.

T.C. said defendant was her abuser. The next day, T.C. was examined by a

pediatrician, Dr. Sheyenne Carper, who found that the child had contracted

the sexually transmitted disease of chlamydia.

In September 2016, T.C. was interviewed at the Gingerbread House

by Alex Person. Using an anatomical drawing, T.C. was able to identify

different parts of the body and referred to her vaginal area as her “noonie.”

During the conversation, T.C. indicated she had been touched on her vagina

and when asked who had touched her there, T.C. replied “Marquise did.”

T.C. then told the interviewer defendant put his “thing” in her noonie. Using

another drawing, T.C. identified defendant’s thing as his penis. T.C. stated

defendant committed this act at “Hotdog’s house.” Subsequently, defendant

was questioned by police and charged with molestation of a juvenile.

At trial, Shreveport Police Detective Gilbert Monereau testified that

he questioned defendant, who admitted to getting treatment for chlamydia

and to bringing the children to Hotdog’s house when they were in his care.

Defendant testified he had not been treated for chlamydia and denied

sexually abusing T.C. After hearing the evidence, the jury unanimously

found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to

serve 40 years at hard labor with the first 25 years to be served without

benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence and denied

defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The defendant contends the evidence presented was insufficient to

support a conviction of molestation of a juvenile under age 13. Defendant

argues the state failed to prove defendant’s guilt because the victim’s

testimony was unreliable and there was no corroboration of his alleged

statement to the police.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must

consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Leger, 2017-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609; State v. Frost, 53,312 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So. 3d 708, writ denied, 2020-00628 (La. 11/18/20),

304 So. 3d 416. The appellate court does not assess the credibility of

witnesses or reweigh evidence, and accords great deference to the trier of

fact’s decision to accept or reject witness testimony in whole or in part. State

v. Frost, supra. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters,
2

the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of

the witnesses, the issue is the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. In

the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Gullette, 43,032

(La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So. 2d 753. This principle is equally

applicable to victims of sexual assault; such testimony alone is sufficient

even when the state offers no medical, scientific or physical evidence to

prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State ex rel. P.R.R.,

Jr., 45,405 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 36 So. 3d 1138.

Molestation of a juvenile is the commission of a lewd or lascivious act

by anyone over age 17 upon the person of a child under age 17, where there

is an age difference greater than two years between the persons, with the

intention of arousing the sexual desire of either person by the use of

influence gained from a position of control or supervision over the juvenile.

La. R.S. 14:81.2.

In this case, M.J. testified her adult daughter, also with the initials

T.C., is the mother of two children, the victim and her brother. M.J. stated

when the child, T.C., complained of vaginal discomfort in August 2016, she

asked T.C. if anyone had been “tampering” with her private area and the

child named defendant, the former boyfriend of the child’s mother. M.J.

testified she took T.C. to the doctor for a medical exam the next day.

Dr. Sheyenne Carper, a pediatrician, testified she saw T.C. on August

11, 2016, with a complaint of vaginal irritation. Dr. Carper stated after

being examined the child said defendant “put his thing” in her private area.

3

Dr. Carper testified T.C. tested positive for chlamydia, a sexually

transmitted disease (“STD”), which confirmed her report of abuse.

T.C. testified she is the mother of a daughter, T.C., and a son, who

were currently in the custody of their grandmother. T.C. stated she was

incarcerated at the time of trial for an unrelated offense. T.C. testified

defendant was her former boyfriend and he lived with her and the children

for approximately two years. T.C. stated the children were often left in

defendant’s supervision when she was working. T.C. testified she

contracted chlamydia during her relationship with defendant when he was

her only sexual partner.

Gilbert Monereau, a detective with the Shreveport Police, testified

that in August 2016, he received a report of sexual abuse of a 5-year-old girl,

T.C., who had contracted an STD. Det. Monereau stated he scheduled an

interview for the child at Gingerbread House on September 13, 2016, and

observed the interview via closed-circuit television. Det. Monereau testified

he contacted defendant for questioning in November 2016. Det. Monereau

stated after being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant waived his rights

and agreed to answer questions. Det. Monereau testified defendant said he

lived with T.C., the mother of the victim, and her children from 2012 to

2014. Det. Monereau stated defendant said when babysitting he sometimes

took the children with him on visits to the house of his friend, Torey

Ferguson, who was called “Hotdog.” Det. Monereau testified defendant

acknowledged previously being treated for chlamydia. Det. Monereau stated

his interview with defendant was not recorded because of a machine

malfunction.

4

The victim, T.C., testified she was 10 years old at the time of trial and

she knew the difference between telling the truth and a lie. T.C. stated she

was 5 years old when she spoke with a lady at the Gingerbread House about

her problem with defendant. The video recording of the interview in which

the child described defendant’s act of sexual abuse was played for the jury

and admitted into evidence. T.C. testified she told the interviewer the truth

about the abuse committed by defendant.

The defendant, Marquise Jones, testified he did not molest T.C. and

did not give her chlamydia. Defendant stated he was 38 years old at the time

of trial, he was the father of a teenage daughter, he had finished twelfth

grade and worked in a landscaping business. Defendant testified he told

Det. Monereau about being previously treated for an STD, but it was

gonorrhea. Defendant stated he lived with the victim’s mother from 2012 to

2014 and he supervised the children while their mother was working.

Defendant testified he did not tell the police he took the children to Hotdog’s

house while babysitting and did not say he had tested positive for chlamydia.

Defendant acknowledged he had been previously convicted of simple

burglary, domestic abuse battery and the federal crime of felon in possession

of a firearm.

On rebuttal, M.J. testified she was sure she had once picked up T.C.

and her brother from Hotdog’s house on Woodrow Street. Det. Monereau

testified defendant said in the interview he had taken T.C. and her brother to

the house of his friend, Hotdog, while babysitting and he had tested positive

for chlamydia. Det. Monereau stated the child, T.C., was the first person to

identify defendant as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse and she never

named any other potential perpetrator during the investigation of the crime.
5

After reviewing this record, we find the state presented sufficient

evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the

offense of molestation of a juvenile. The state established the child was 5

years old when she told her grandmother and investigators defendant had

sexually abused her and the defendant was over 30 years old at the time of

the offense. From the circumstances shown, the jury could find defendant

intended to obtain sexual arousal from performing the sex act. In addition,

the evidence shows defendant committed the crime while babysitting T.C.,

placing him in a position of supervision over the child. The record further

demonstrates although T.C. was only 5 years old at the time of the crime,

she consistently named defendant as the person who sexually abused her.

The jury viewed the child’s Gingerbread House interview, heard the

witnesses and reasonably accepted the testimony of T.C. and Det. Monereau

as more credible than defendant’s version of events. Based upon this record,

the state presented ample evidence to support defendant’s conviction of

molestation of a juvenile under age 13. Thus, the assignment of error lacks

merit.

Sentencing

In two assignments, defendant contends the trial court erred in

imposing an excessive sentence. He argues the trial court failed to give an

adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed and the record supports a

less harsh sentence.

An appellate court uses a two-pronged test to determine whether a

sentence is excessive. First, the record must show the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The trial court is

not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as
6

the record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article.

State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 2016-0959 (La. 5/1/17),

219 So. 3d 332. Articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of

Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions.

Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence

imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full

compliance with the article. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982).

The elements which should be considered include the defendant’s personal

history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior

criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, and the likelihood of

rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981).

The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside

as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of this discretion. State v.

Williams, 2003-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Diaz, 46,750 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 12/14/11), 81 So. 3d 228. On review, an appellate court does not

determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, supra; State

v. Free, 46,894 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So. 3d 29.

Second, this court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence can be constitutionally excessive,

even when it falls within statutory guidelines if: (1) the punishment is so

grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime that, when viewed in

light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice; or (2) it

serves no purpose other than to needlessly inflict pain and suffering. State v.
7

Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La.

1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.

The penalty for the crime of molestation of a juvenile when the victim

is under the age of 13 is imprisonment for not less than 25 years nor more

than 99 years. At least 25 years of the sentence shall be served without

benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:81.2(D).

In the present case, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve 40

years at hard labor with 25 years to be served without benefit of parole,

probation or suspension of sentence and ordered him to complete a sex

offender program during his incarceration. The trial court noted its review

of defendant’s sentencing statement prior to imposing sentence.

Additionally, the trial court stated the sentence was based upon the

gravity of the offense, the young age of the minor victim and defendant’s

criminal history. This statement reflects the trial court’s consideration of the

Article 894.1 factors concerning defendant’s knowledge of the child’s

particular vulnerability and the significant harm inflicted on the child.

Further, the trial court found a lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of defendant’s crime. This record reflects the trial court

adequately considered the guidelines of Article 894.1.

The defendant’s criminal record demonstrates he has prior felony

convictions, which would have increased his sentencing exposure if the state

had filed a multiple offender bill of information. In addition, defendant

benefitted from the trial court’s decision to impose only the mandatory

minimum requirement that 25 years of the sentence be served without

parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

8

Although the trial court did not expressly reference defendant’s

personal history at the time of sentencing, we note the court was made aware

of his age, his child and his work history from the defendant’s trial

testimony. Considering the circumstances of this case, in which defendant

abused his role of care giver to commit the offense, the 40-year sentence

does not shock the sense of justice.

The sentence imposed is proportionate to the egregious nature of

defendant’s crime of sexually abusing a 5-year-old child who was entrusted

to his care. Based upon this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing this midrange sentence, which appropriately reflects

the severity of defendant’s crime. Thus, the assignments of error lack merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

9