Gladstone Area Partnership, Inc., and Swan Apartments, L.L.C., and Ashley M. Atkins v. City of Shreveport, Lakeshore Liquore, Beer & Wine 2, L.L.C., and Chris Casten

Judgment rendered April 13, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,349-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

GLADSTONE AREA Plaintiff-Appellees
PARTNERSHIP, INC., AND
SWAN APARTMENTS, L.L.C.,
AND ASHLEY M. ATKINS

versus

CITY OF SHREVEPORT, Defendant-Appellants
LAKESHORE LIQUORE, BEER
& WINE 2, L.L.C., AND CHRIS
CASTEN

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 605,639

Honorable Michael A. Pitman, Judge

*****

LAW OFFICE OF REGINALD W. Counsel for
ABRAMS, SR., LLC City of Shreveport
By: Reginald W. Abrams

NELSON W. CAMERON Counsel for
Lakeshore
Liquore, Beer &
Wine 2, L.L.C.

CHRIS CASTEN In Proper Person

SEABAUGH & SEPULVADO, LLC Counsel for Appellees
By: Michael C. Melerine Gladstone Area
Partnership, Inc., Swan
Apartments, LLC and
Ashley M. Atkins

NEIL ERWIN LAW, LLC
By: Neil T. Erwin

*****

Before MOORE, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ.

COX, J. concurs with written reasons.

MOORE, C.J.

The City of Shreveport and Lakeshore Liquor Beer & Wine 2, LLC

appeal a judgment that reversed the Shreveport City Council’s decision,

following a recommendation from the City’s Metropolitan Planning

Commission (“MPC”), to grant a special use permit in favor of Lakeshore to

open a retail liquor store on a lot zoned C-2. The district court found that the

MPC’s recommendation, and the Council’s decision to adopt it, was

unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. For the reasons expressed, we

reverse and render.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The lot in question is at 327 Kings Highway (the southeast corner of

Kings at Gilbert Drive), formerly a Circle K convenience store and zoned C-

2 (commercial corridor, authorized to be open 24/7 and to sell beer and

wine). Sometime after the Circle K vacated the building, Bernie Woods Sr.,

the owner of Lakeshore, applied to the MPC to open another Lakeshore store

on the site (his other store is on Lakeshore Drive). Since Lakeshore would

be selling liquor in addition to wine and beer, Mr. Woods applied for a

special use permit (“SUP”).

In November 2017, after about two months of study, including a four-

page staff report, the MPC voted to approve the SUP, but with limited hours

of operation and six stipulations that Lakeshore must meet.1 Unhappy with

1
Hours would be limited to 8 am until midnight; stipulations included (1) closing
the driveway onto Gilbert Dr., (2) extending the sidewalks and landscaping over the
former driveway, (3) irrigating all landscaping, (4) repairing all fences, (5) providing a
new sign, (6) repairing the Dumpster enclosure.

the reduced hours and some of the expensive site revisions, Lakeshore

appealed to the Council, to remove all stipulations.

Meanwhile, Gladstone Area Partnership, a local neighborhood

association, and Swan Apartments LLC, a small complex about one block

east on Kings, also appealed to the Council, to contest the grant of the SUP

under any circumstances. They alleged that granting the SUP, even with the

stipulations, was arbitrary and capricious because Lakeshore did not meet

any of the criteria listed in the City’s Uniform Development Code (“UDC”),

§ 16.3 E.

The Council met on November 28, 2017. Both appeals ended in a tie

vote, 3-3. The City Attorney advised that the tie meant that the appeals were

denied, and the MPC’s recommendation was approved.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Gladstone Area Partnership, Swan Apartments, and one individual

(collectively, “Gladstone”) filed this suit against the City, Lakeshore, and the

owner of the property to reverse the Council’s action and deny the SUP.2

After additional pleading and discovery, Gladstone moved for summary

judgment and the City filed a rule for declaratory judgment. After a hearing

in August 2019, the district court remanded the matter to the Council to take

a definitive vote (not a tie) that would “affirm, modify or overrule/reverse”

the MPC.

The Council considered the matter on remand at its meeting on

October 8, 2019, and it was a real spectacle. Gladstone brought in some 21

witnesses to testify against letting anybody open a retail liquor store so close

2
In the caption of the original petition, the applicant’s name is misspelled as
“Lakeshore Liquore, Beer & Wine 2, LLC.”
2

to a residential area and schools (Centenary College, Byrd High School, and

Creswell Elementary); an undated report called “How Alcohol Outlets

Affect Neighborhood Violence,” taken from the website of an entity called

the Prevention Research Center, Pacific Institute for Research & Evaluation;

and a sheaf of over 1,300 signatures to a petition to “Oppose Liquor Store at

corner of Gilbert & Kings Hwy.” Lakeshore called three witnesses,

including Mr. Woods and his son, and the Council accepted the MPC’s

original staff report. After about three hours of testimony and discussion,

two members moved to grant the SUP, subject to additional stipulations.3

With the additional stipulations, the motion passed, 6-1, and the SUP was

granted.

Gladstone then moved to continue its appeal. In response to a

scheduling order, the City introduced the complete MPC case file,

transcripts of the Council’s administrative and regular meetings, October 7

and 8, 2019, various correspondence, and 113 pages of petitions,

oppositions, and support letters.

At a hearing limited to argument in September 2020, Gladstone

argued that under UDC § 16.3 E, the MPC and Council were required to

consider a list of elements that pertain to health, welfare, and safety, but

there was “no evidence” that either body did so. It also argued that in early

2020, the Council amended the UDC to eliminate liquor sales on any

property zoned C-2 if it abuts a residence; by that standard, Lakeshore would

not qualify for the SUP. Gladstone also argued that six days before it

3
The business would have to close at 9 pm; in addition to the original six
stipulations, Lakeshore would have to “enhance the façade and revise the site plan” by
restoring a glass storefront, installing a “raised gabled parapet” and canopies, and adding
siding, pilasters, brick columns, a front sidewalk, and ornamental planters.
3

granted Lakeshore’s SUP, the Council denied a similar SUP for a retail

liquor store only about 11 blocks away, resulting in inconsistent rulings.

Finally, it argued that in voting to approve the SUP, certain councilmembers

explicitly stated their high regard for Mr. Woods, who is African American,

a leader in the Black community, a benefactor to youth programs, a USAF

combat veteran, and a good businessman. This, Gladstone felt, negated the

objectivity of the proceedings.

The City argued that Council’s action could be reversed only if it was

“arbitrary and capricious,” which meant that there was no evidence to

support it, and, in fact, there was ample evidence to support this grant of the

SUP. The City also argued that the Council was not required to make an

individual finding as to every item in UDC § 16.3 E, but only to consider

them. The City denied that the Council ignored the concerns of the 1,300

signatures opposing the SUP, but submitted that by seriously limiting the

hours of operation and imposing detailed stipulations, the Council had

addressed most of those objections.

Lakeshore argued that its application had been pending for three years

now, it had spent a lot of money, it had complied with all requirements, the

Council had approved it 6-1, and courts should not disturb legislative

actions. It also argued that unlike other SUPs that the Council had denied, in

residential areas, 327 Kings Highway was an “eclectic” neighborhood, with

tattoo parlors, restaurants that sell alcohol, and a wide array of small

businesses. Lakeshore concluded that acting on an application is not just a

matter of “counting witnesses,” and that the Council’s careful action was by

no means arbitrary and capricious.

4

ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT

The district court wrote a four-page opinion. After summarizing the

facts, it found that under UDC § 16.3, the Council was “required * * * to

consider the public health, safety and/or welfare,” but, “in spite of

overwhelming public opposition,” there was “no explicit evidence in the

record” that the Council actually considered these matters. The court also

observed that public opposition is “an important factor that elected officials

must consider” in SUP applications, citing Papa v. City of Shreveport,

27,045 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/29/95), 661 So. 2d 110, writ denied, 95-2544 (La.

1/5/96), 666 So. 2d 295.

The court then noted that the Council had denied similar applications,

one at the former Don’s Restaurant location, Kings Highway at Highland

Avenue at Line, and the other, on Centenary Boulevard at Olive Street, both

very close to Lakeshore’s site. The court concluded that these actions “may

constitute non-uniform application of zoning ordinances that is arbitrary and

capricious,” citing Papa, supra.

Finally, the court cited the subsequent, January 2020 ordinance that

prohibited sales of alcohol on any C-2 site “which abuts a residential zoning

district.” The fact that all six councilmembers who voted to grant

Lakeshore’s SUP in October 2019, also voted to ban such a result in January

2020, proved a nonuniform application of zoning rules that was

unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. The court, therefore, reversed the

Council’s grant of the SUP to Lakeshore.

The City, and then Lakeshore, each appealed suspensively.4

4
Gladstone moved to convert the appeal to devolutive, on grounds that the City
never paid the $15,000 appeal bond. According to the minutes, the court “passed” this
5

APPLICABLE LAW

Zoning is a legislative function, the authority for which flows from the

police power of governmental bodies. King v. Caddo Parish Com’n, 97-

1873 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So. 2d 410; Racetrac Petroleum Inc. v. City of

Shreveport, 45,120 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/21/10), 44 So. 3d 800. Courts do not

interfere with this legislative prerogative unless the zoning decision is

palpably erroneous and bears no substantial relation to the public health,

safety, or general welfare. Toups v. City of Shreveport, 10-1559 (La.

3/15/11), 60 So. 3d 1215; Racetrac Petroleum v. City of Shreveport, supra.

When there is room for two opinions, an action cannot be arbitrary and

capricious when exercised honestly and on due consideration, even though it

may be believed an erroneous conclusion was reached. Toups v. City of

Shreveport, supra; Carter v. City of Shreveport, 51,589 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 659.

A special use permit is a dispensation whereby a landowner may vary

from the strict terms of a zoning ordinance. King v. Caddo Parish Com’n,

supra. The standards for granting an SUP must ensure equal treatment for

all applicants to prevent the governing authority from exercising its power

arbitrarily. Id.

A challenge to a zoning decision is a de novo proceeding on the issue

of whether the result of the legislative action is arbitrary and capricious, and

therefore a taking of property without due process of law. Toups v. City of

Shreveport, supra.

motion on June 14, 2021, and there is no further ruling. As a result, Lakeshore is open
and selling liquor at this time.
6

In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws

apply prospectively only. La. C.C. art. 6. Retroactive application of new

legislation is constitutionally permissible only if it does not result in

impairment of the obligations of contracts or in divestiture of vested rights.

Born v. City of Slidell, 15-0136 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So. 3d 1227; M.J. Farms

Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So. 2d 16.

THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

The City and Lakeshore both assign as error that the district court

erred in reversing the grant of the SUP. The City urges that the court could

not have found the Council’s action unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.

In support, it argues that the court should not have “counted witnesses”;

could not have found, on an incomplete record, that the denial of SUPs at

other locations was inconsistent with the grant of an SUP for Lakeshore; and

should not have found that the subsequent amendment to UDC § 16.3 had

any bearing on this action. Finally, it asserts the court was plainly wrong to

find “no explicit evidence” that the Council considered the elements of

health, safety, or general welfare listed in UDC § 16.3; in fact, the record

shows that the MPC and Council carefully considered these elements, and

actually exceeded them by requiring a new sign and various aesthetic

improvements.

Lakeshore also contends that the Council fully considered the public’s

views, by imposing nine stringent stipulations. It concedes that Gladstone

presented an overwhelming number of witnesses to oppose the SUP, but

submits that most of these wanted to ban all alcohol sales, period.

Lakeshore also urges that race relations are an integral part of public

welfare, so the Council acted reasonably in considering Mr. Woods’s role in
7

the Black community. It further contends that UDC § 16.3, as it provided in

October 2019, did not require an “explicit statement” as to each factor, only

a consideration of them. Finally, it urges that the court’s retroactive

application of the 2020 amendment is a denial of due process and vested

rights, Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 00-1132 (La. 4/3/01), 785 So. 2d 1;

Moretco v. Plaquemines Parish Council, 12-0430 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/6/13),

112 So. 3d 287, writ denied, 13-0724 (La. 5/17/13), 118 So. 3d 376.

Gladstone maintains that the court committed no error. It first argues

that the City and Lakeshore “failed to present any evidence that the Council

properly granted” the SUP. Next, it contends that UDC § 16.3 “includes a

mandatory requirement for specific findings of fact”; the Council’s failure to

make such findings resulted in unequal treatment for all applicants, a result

prohibited by law. Jenkins v. St. Tammany Police Jury, 98-2627 (La.

7/22/99), 736 So. 2d 1287; WRW Props. Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 47,756

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/13), 112 So. 3d 279. It submits that the evidence is

“overwhelming and uncontradicted” against the SUP, citing the online report

from the Pacific Institute for Research & Evaluation, the testimony of four

of its own witnesses, and the earlier denial of a similar request for SUP.

Finally, it criticizes the remarks of two councilmembers, who held Mr.

Woods in esteem, as “granting their friend a monopoly” and conclusive

proof of an arbitrary and capricious decision.

DISCUSSION

Compliance with Approval Standards

As noted, the burden is on the opponent of a zoning decision to prove

that the decision had no substantial relationship to public health, safety,

morals, or general welfare. Toups v. City of Shreveport, supra. The review
8

of the governmental action is de novo. Id. Gladstone’s argument has

misstated the burden of proof. It was not the City’s (or Lakeshore’s) burden

to prove the propriety of the Council’s decision to grant the SUP; rather, it

was Gladstone’s burden to disprove it. On de novo review, we have

analyzed the record to see if Gladstone met its burden.

Gladstone first contends that the City failed to make specific findings

in compliance with approval standards, UDC § 16.3. When the Council first

heard this matter, in November 2018, § 16.3 did indeed require the MPC (or,

on appeal, the Council) to “make findings to support their decision

regarding” an SUP, based on four criteria. However, the district court

vacated the results of that meeting, in an effort to clarify the ambiguity of the

tie vote, and remanded the matter to the Council. Meanwhile, effective

February 19, 2019, the Council had amended the UDC.5 At the time of the

instant hearing, October 8, 2019, § 16.3 E provided, in pertinent part:

The Metropolitan Planning Commission or, on appeal, the City
Council, must consider the following development standards
and design specifications. The approval of a special use permit
is based on a balancing of these development standards and
design specifications [now increased to 12 criteria].

In short, there is no basis to negate the MPC’s action or the Council’s

vote simply because they failed to enumerate findings keyed to the approval

standards. The proper question is whether these entities considered them.

The standards are as follows:

1. The design, location, and operating plans must be such that
the public health, safety and/or welfare is protected.
2. The proposed special use is compatible with the general land
use of adjacent properties and other property within 300
feet.

5
Gladstone has quoted only the earlier, superseded version in its brief to this
court.
9

3. The special use conforms to the regulations of the zoning
district where it will be located.
4. The location and dimensions of all public rights-of-way on
or abutting the proposed special use.
5. Existing and proposed vehicular and pedestrian circulation
systems; including streets, alleys, walkways, service areas
and loading areas, the location and arrangement of off-street
parking areas and all points of vehicular entrance and exit.
6. The outdoor surfacing and paving for all parking and
loading areas.
7. The proposed perimeter treatment of the property, with
indication of screening materials to be used, including
fences, walls, and plants, together with a description of uses,
setbacks and the relationship to surrounding areas.
8. A landscape plan showing proposed treatment of the areas
designated as either buffers or open space.
9. The location and dimensions of all existing and proposed
easements and public improvements on the site.
10.The location and size of all structures, distances between
buildings, and distances from structures to property lines.
11.The location and description of all signage, including façade
signs on buildings.
12.The proposed use of all structures and their dimensions, i.e.,
height, floor areas, entrances, and loading areas.

The MPC staff report described this stretch of Kings Highway as “a

commercial corridor within a mostly residential area.” It noted that nearby

grocery stores and gas stations sold beer and wine, but the closest liquor

retailer was a Walmart Supercenter, on Shreveport-Barksdale Highway, 2.2

miles away; thus, “it is difficult to provide a compelling reason, from a land

use perspective, to recommend denial of this request.” A recent request to

open a gas station and convenience store one block away “was met with

considerable opposition”; hence, “It is clear that, in general, there is little

public support of new high alcoholic content retailers in this section of

Kings Highway.” However, to “protect the health, safety and welfare of the

public,” the staff recommended limiting the hours of operation to 8 am to

midnight. It also recommended extensive pavement changes “to direct

10

pedestrian and vehicular traffic * * * as far away from the residences as

possible,” and various aesthetic revisions.

As noted, the Council devoted about three hours to this matter,

receiving testimony from 21 live witnesses who were opposed, three in

favor. We will not attempt to summarize the entirety of this transcript, much

of which digressed into general malaise about falling property values and the

likely clientele of a store like Lakeshore. The chief of police of Centenary

College and the principal of Byrd High School both feared that students

would be exposed to risks from the additional foot traffic to and from a

liquor store; two nearby residents described their negative experiences with

other liquor stores. Most felt that crime was sure to follow a retail liquor

outlet.6 However, a retired Shreveport Police Department lieutenant testified

that even a liquor store is better than a vacant building, under the “broken

window” theory of policing. Another witness stated that Mr. Woods had a

“squeaky clean” record of business dealings and had created hundreds of

jobs for the community.

In response to the concerns about crime, and the perception of when it

is likely to occur, a councilmember proposed limiting Lakeshore’s hours to

“eight to eight.” After extensive discussion, a resolution to grant the SUP,

with hours from 8 am to 9 pm and the aesthetic revisions described earlier,

passed 6-1.

This synopsis of the proceedings makes it clear that the Council

closely considered the approval standards. Amending the requested closing

6
This court also observes that a large number of the signatures on the “Petition to
Oppose Liquor store at Corner of Gilbert & Kings Hwy.” listed addresses from out of
town, even out of state.
11

time of midnight to 9 pm shows consideration of the perceived risk of

criminal activity (public health, safety, and/or welfare); the closure of the

Gilbert Drive entrance is an obvious response to traffic safety; the fact that

Kings Highway is mainly commercial satisfies compatibility (general land

use of adjacent and other property within 300 feet); and the numerous

aesthetic revisions echo, almost verbatim, the remaining standards.

Gladstone’s contention that the City failed to present any evidence to support

the Council’s action is disingenuous and unconvincing.

Gladstone further contends that the evidence was “overwhelming and

uncontradicted” against granting the SUP. Gladstone’s brief, however,

conveniently omits any mention of the MPC’s staff report, the witnesses

who testified in favor of the SUP, the closure of a driveway, the severe

limitation of business hours, and the numerous aesthetic revisions to the

property; any suggestion that evidence against granting the SUP was

“uncontradicted” borders on the frivolous.

This court agrees that in terms of numerosity and passion, the

witnesses opposing the SUP preponderated, and nearly overwhelmed, the

hearing. However, the standard for overturning the zoning decision is a

showing that it is “palpably erroneous and bears no substantial relation to the

public health, safety, or general welfare.” Toups v. City of Shreveport,

supra; Racetrac Petroleum v. City of Shreveport, supra. When there is room

for two opinions, an action cannot be arbitrary and capricious when

exercised honestly and on due consideration. Toups v. City of Shreveport,

supra; Carter v. City of Shreveport, supra. On de novo review of this

record, we cannot say that the Council’s action was palpably erroneous and

bore no substantial relation to public health, safety, or general welfare.
12

Gladstone also argues that because two councilmembers held Mr.

Woods in esteem, they granted “their friend a monopoly” and thus took an

arbitrary, capricious action. Lakeshore responds that as a Black American,

Mr. Woods can offer equal opportunity in business and employment, a fact

that the Council was entitled to consider.

Section 16.3 does not mention esteem or personal acquaintance as a

factor in approving or denying an SUP. In other contexts, courts define

“arbitrary” as “based on random choice or personal whim, rather than reason

or system,” and “capricious” as “given to sudden and unaccountable changes

in behavior.” La. Bag Co. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 08-0453 (La. 12/2/08),

999 So. 2d 1104; Black v. Lofland Co., 37,862 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/26/04),

869 So. 2d 264, writ denied, 04-0787 (La. 6/4/04), 876 So. 2d 94. Voting in

favor of an applicant who is a successful businessman, combat veteran, and

community leader strikes us as the opposite of random choice, personal

whim, or unaccountable change. Voting in favor of someone who lacked

these qualities might be arbitrary and capricious. The instant record falls far

short of proving an arbitrary, capricious action on the part of the Council.

Gladstone’s contention is unpersuasive.

Gladstone’s arguments concerning lack of compliance with or

consideration of the approval standards lack merit.

Other Arguments

Gladstone has raised other issues without specifically designating

them as errors.

First, Gladstone argues granting Lakeshore’s SUP was arbitrary and

capricious because six days earlier, the MPC denied a virtually identical

SUP. Specifically, Gladstone attached the MPC staff report for a request to
13

expand an existing convenience store at the corner of Centenary Blvd. and

Olive Street into a liquor retail outlet; the staff report recommended denying

this. Gladstone shows that where permits are granted in similar situations

and refused in others, the refusal to grant a permit may constitute

nonuniform application of zoning ordinances that is arbitrary and capricious.

King v. Caddo Parish Comm’n, supra; Clark v. City of Shreveport, 26,638

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95), 655 So. 2d 617.

The similarities between the Centenary and Lakeshore SUPs fade on

closer examination. Both tracts are zoned C-2 and back onto residential lots.

However, the staff report described this part of Centenary as a “short

commercial corridor,” “very small and narrow, * * * essentially a residential

area”; nearby properties had various uses, including residential and several

vacant lots; notably, the owners had previously lodged eight requests to

upgrade this property to retail liquor sales, a lounge, or a restaurant selling

alcohol; all had been denied. By contrast, Lakeshore’s Kings Highway site

is on a long corridor densely populated with businesses; it had been

approved for upgrades from residential to business, and then to commercial,

in 1968 and 1980; while other requests for retail liquor sales in the vicinity

“had not been well received by residents,” the proposed stipulations would

mitigate the effects. The staff reports, fairly reviewed, show an adequate

basis to deny the Centenary SUP and grant the Lakeshore SUP.

At trial, there was also discussion of the denial of SUP for retail liquor

sales at the former Don’s Restaurant, only a block away from Lakeshore, as

proof that the Council was granting SUPs inequitably. However, aside from

the argument of counsel, the record contains no evidence regarding that

application. As Gladstone itself has ably shown, rank speculation, without
14

the assistance of evidence, will not suffice to meet the burden of proof.

D’Argent Props. LLC v. City of Shreveport, 44,457 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/24/09), 15 So. 3d 334, writ denied, 09-1726 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 308.

On this record, the denial of other SUPs does not prove that the grant of

Lakeshore’s SUP was arbitrary and capricious.

Finally, Gladstone cites the fact that three months after approving

Lakeshore’s SUP, the Council unanimously approved an ordinance (Ord.

No. 191) prohibiting retail liquor sales on any C-2 property “which abuts a

residential zoning district.” Gladstone shows that every councilmember who

voted to grant Lakeshore’s SUP also voted for Ord. 191, which would have

denied Lakeshore’s SUP. One councilmember admitted telling Mr. Woods,

“I did not want to vote for another liquor store close to a neighborhood. His

would be the last.” Gladstone submits that the enactment of Ord. 191, an

apparent change of heart, proves that granting Lakeshore’s SUP was

arbitrary and capricious.

In the absence of contrary legislative expression, substantive laws

apply prospectively only. La. C.C. art. 6. The law may not be applied

retroactively if it would impair contractual obligations or disturb vested

rights. Born v. City of Slidell, supra; M.J. Farms Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil,

supra; Yates v. Marston, 48,009 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/13), 121 So. 3d 673,

183 Oil & Gas Rep. 32. To apply Ord. 191 retroactively to a matter that was

decided three months before its passage would plainly violate Art. 6’s

principle of prospective operation. To find, as Gladstone suggests, that the

Council’s subsequent amendment of the UDC proves arbitrary and

capricious conduct, and thereby invalidates the grant of Lakeshore’s SUP,

15

would be to reach the same result prohibited by Art. 6. We decline to accept

that proposal.

Gladstone’s arguments alleging unequal treatment and a subsequent

amendment to the UDC lack merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, the judgment of the district court is

reversed. Judgment is rendered herein confirming the action of the

Shreveport City Council of October 8, 2019, which granted a special use

permit to Lakeshore Liquor, Beer & Wine 2, LLC. All costs are to be paid

by the appellees, Gladstone Area Partnership Inc., Swan Apartments LLC,

and Ashley M. Atkins.

REVERSED AND RENDERED.

16

COX, J., concurs with written reasons.

I am sympathetic to the neighbors and neighborhoods represented in

this matter. I understand that they do not want or condone a liquor store

entering their community. However, in our role as the judiciary, we are

constrained to follow the law as written. As stated in the opinion written by

Chief Judge Moore, we review the zoning decision by determining whether

it is “palpably erroneous and bears no substantial relation to the public

health, safety, or general welfare.” The majority opinion lists the standards

Lakeshore was required to meet in order to get approval for their SUP,

including the limited hours of operation, closure of the Gilbert Drive

entrance, and aesthetic requirements. I agree that, based on the

consideration of the standards by the Council, we cannot say that the

decision was “palpably erroneous and bore no substantial relation to public

health, safety, or general welfare.”

The neighborhoods previously argued before the trial court that

Lakeshore is “incompatible” with the existing family residences and future

improvement of the adjacent neighborhoods. They stated that this liquor

store abuts “the stable, family-oriented, and walkable Gladstone

neighborhood and is across Kings Highway from the historic Highland

neighborhood whose walkability and redevelopment efforts (as well as any

halfway houses and addiction treatment facilities) will be hampered by

liquor store operations.” Although Lakeshore also sells liquor, there are

several businesses within one block of Lakeshore that already sell beer and

wine, including Brookshire’s and Circle K. This is not a case of liquor being

introduced into a dry area, as alcohol was already being sold in neighboring

businesses. Because alcohol is already sold in the area, persons who live in
1

the halfway houses, addiction treatment facilities, or are in alcohol recovery

in the area already have access to alcoholic beverages in close proximity of

their residences. As such, even though I am sympathetic to the public

sentiment against this store, I am constrained by the laws as passed by the

legislative branch and must concur in the majority opinion.

2