In Re: Revocation of an Alcohol Beverage Permit for Riteway Liquor Store, 1750 Martin Luther King Drive Shreveport, LA 71107

Judgment rendered April 13, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,431-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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IN RE: REVOCATION OF AN ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE PERMIT FOR
RITEWAY LIQUOR STORE, 1750 MARTIN LUTHER KING DRIVE
SHREVEPORT, LA 71107

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 626,167

Honorable Ramon Lafitte, Judge

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WEEMS, SCHIMPF, HAINES, Counsel for Appellants,
SHEMWELL & MOORE, APLC Hasan Awad, Riteway
By: Kenneth Patrick Haines Liquor Store, and
Baydoun Liquor Mart

LAW OFFICES OF J. DHU
THOMPSON, APLC
By: J. Dhu Thompson

MAYER, SMITH & ROBERTS, LLP Counsel for Appellee,
By: Marcus Edwards City of Shreveport

CASTEN & PEARCE, APLC
By: Brian David Smith

*****

Before MOORE, STONE, and THOMPSON, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

After a unanimous vote by its city council, the City of Shreveport

revoked the alcohol beverage permit of a liquor store on the grounds it

presented a consistent, significant danger to the surrounding area from

frequent criminal activity, including but not limited to fights, drug sales,

shootings, and homicides on the premises. The Shreveport Chief of Police

described the location as one of the most dangerous places in Shreveport.

The owner and operator of the business sought judicial review of that

revocation. After a de novo trial, during which several witnesses and police

officers testified to the danger presented by the liquor store, the trial court

affirmed the City Council’s revocation of the permit. The owner again

appealed. For the reasons more fully set forth below, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

FACTS

The City of Shreveport issues alcoholic beverage permits for the sale

of alcoholic beverages within its city limits. To maintain that permit in good

standing, permit holders are required to meet certain minimum standards. In

this matter, on March 3, 2020, the Chief of the Shreveport Police signed a

letter to the City Council recommending the revocation of the alcoholic

beverage permit for Riteway Liquor Store, located at 1750 Martin Luther

King Drive in Shreveport, Louisiana, which is owned and operated by Hasan

Awad (“Awad”) and Baydoun Liquor Mart d/b/a Riteway Liquor

(“Riteway”). With the letter, he included a petition with the signatures of

over 100 residents of the neighborhood. The letter was signed by the police

chief, the mayor, and the city attorney and indicated that in a 14-month

period from 2018-2019, there had been over 100 service calls to the

Shreveport police department for that location, including two homicides and

complaints of open-air drug sales. Prior to the current ownership, there had

been fewer than 20 calls for service in a five-year timeframe. The letter

included the recommendation by the chief that the alcoholic beverage permit

be revoked. The letter also stated that the business had committed

prohibited acts listed in City Ordinance 10-102.

A notice of hearing was mailed on August 17, 2020, and the meeting

was postponed to September 22, 2020 at Riteway’s request. At the City

Council meeting, the council heard testimony from Awad, several police

officers, and residents of the Martin Luther King neighborhood. It also

considered records of service calls submitted by the police department. The

council voted 7 to 0 to accept the recommendation of the Chief of Police and

revoke Riteway’s alcoholic beverage permit. Thereafter, the City of

Shreveport (the “City”) revoked the permit. On September 24, 2020, Awad

and Riteway petitioned for judicial review and injunctive relief from the

City’s revocation.

A de novo trial was held in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo

Parish, Louisiana on April 20, 2021. The court accepted into evidence the

video depositions of Shreveport Police Chief Ben Raymond and Major

Stephanie Thomas. Major Stephanie Thomas (“Major Thomas”) testified

that her cousin, Cortez Woods, was killed at Riteway in 2019. Major

Thomas is the guardian of her cousin’s son and is in favor of the revocation

of Riteway’s permit. Chief Raymond testified that he attended a

neighborhood forum where the citizens of the neighborhood sought to have

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Riteway closed. Chief Raymond stated that although Riteway is in a high-

crime area, a high number of calls for service had been reported at the

Riteway compared to other businesses. Chief Raymond testified that

Riteway is one of the most dangerous places in the City of Shreveport and is

known for open air drug sales. Chief Raymond recommended that

Riteway’s permit be revoked.

Antoinette Needham (“Needham”) testified that her cousin, Jeremiah

Davenport, was murdered outside of Riteway in 2017 or 2018. Needham

helped organize obtaining signatures on a petition to revoke Riteway’s

alcoholic beverage permit and spoke at the City Council meeting about the

revocation. Needham not only wanted Riteway’s permit revoked, she also

wanted the entire establishment shut down.

Irma Rogers (“Rogers”) testified that she is the president of the Martin

Luther King Development Organization, a neighborhood organization that

runs multiple programs for citizens in the community. She helped Needham

circulate the petition to the members of the community organization. She

spoke to the city council and asked them to revoke Riteway’s permit.

Rogers testified that she had reports from her members of the large number

of people who hang out around Riteway and of the noise they consistently

generate. Rogers testified to her personal knowledge of two people being

murdered on the Riteway premises in the past few years.

Sergeant James Cisco (“Sgt. Cisco”) of the Shreveport Police

department testified that he is Sergeant over the Alcoholic Beverage Control

Office, which regulates all of the sale of alcohol within the city limits. Sgt.

Cisco testified that he assisted Alcohol and Tobacco Control, a state agency,

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with the investigation of the sale of alcohol to an underage person at

Riteway, and he had received complaints of loitering in the Riteway parking

lot. Sgt. Cisco testified that the sale of alcohol to a minor is a violation of

Riteway’s alcoholic beverage permit. Sgt. Cisco testified that there is a

regulation stating that the owner is responsible for his property inside and

outside, including the parking lot. Finally, Sgt. Cisco testified that he was

notified by the homicide department that Awad was not cooperating with

security cameras under city law. Sgt. Cisco testified that even after speaking

to Awad about security cameras, calling the police, and hiring security,

Awad had not done so and a fight had broken out on the premises. He

testified there had been complaints of drug use and confirmed that Riteway

is located in a high-crime area.

Corporal Carlos Glass-Bradley (“Cpl. Glass-Bradley”) testified that he

works in the Alcohol Beverage Ordinance office of the Shreveport police.

He personally coordinated the investigation into Riteway’s alcoholic

beverage permit. He explained that calls for service are calls to 911 or the

police from a certain location or a person or business. The difference

between a service call and an offense call is that a service call does not result

in a report documented and an offense call is a major event that needs to be

well documented. Cpl. Glass-Bradley testified about the report he prepared

for Chief Raymond and the City Council regarding service calls and offense

calls. Cpl. Glass-Bradley testified that he determined that Riteway was a

major public safety concern, based on his investigation. For an 18-month

period, there were 102 service calls. He testified that he looked at another

liquor store in a high crime area, and it received only 4 service calls in as

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many months. In that 18-month time period, Cpl. Glass-Bradley’s

investigation revealed there had been four shootings.

Cpl. Glass-Bradley further testified that he had been a part of an

investigation that determined that Awad had been operating another business

in city limits without a proper permit. Cpl. Glass-Bradley testified that

selling alcohol without a permit or by an employee without an ABO card,

selling alcohol to a minor, allowing crowds to loiter at the business, and

allowing patrons to drink on premises are all violation of the City’s

ordinances. Cpl. Glass-Bradley testified that there was another liquor store

in the area with more service calls but the Riteway calls involved violence,

and thus, Riteway was a more serious public safety concern. He

recommended that Riteway’s alcoholic beverage permit be revoked.

Awad testified that the sale of alcohol to an underage person charge

was dismissed and not prosecuted. Awad stated that he told community

organizers that he would hire a security guard, add security cameras, post

signs and take other measures on weekends when there was an increase in

the volume of his business. Awad testified that he had been making calls for

service for loitering, as instructed by Cpl. Glass-Bradley. Awad testified

that he never aided in the commission of a crime or intentionally allowed

people to loiter on his premises. Awad stated that he signed an affidavit

asserting that he would use security cameras, reduce his hours of operation,

and install a security guard. However, he confirmed that he had not hired a

security guard and, instead, believed all of his employees were security

guards. When asked specifically by his attorney if he had hired a security

guard for the door, Awad answered affirmatively. However, upon

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questioning by the trial court, he testified that the security guard was actually

just an employee.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court summarized the live

testimony taken at trial and stated that it reviewed the DVD of the City

Council meeting, noting that there were 102 service calls to Riteway in an

18-month period. The court also noted that there had been two homicides,

four shootings, two armed robberies, two narcotics arrests, five assaults and

batteries, and two underage sales, based on the testimony at the City Council

meeting. The court noted that the City Council voted to unanimously revoke

Awad and Riteway’s alcoholic beverage permit. The trial court noted that it

was alarming there had been so many service calls and so much criminal

activity at the location. The court noted that:

After telling the City Council that he was willing to hire
security in September, we come to trial in April, seven months
later, he still had not hired any security. He has not made any
efforts to curb the crime at his location. It appears to the Court
that he is not willing to hire security unless ordered to do so. If
I don’t order him to hire security, he will not hire security and
crime will continue. This activity does not show concern for
the MLK area. As such, it is the ruling of the Court that his
license be revoked.

The court later noted that if Awad had hired security, then crime

would have gone down and the court probably would not have revoked the

permit. The trial court affirmed the City’s decision to revoke the alcoholic

beverage permit. Riteway filed a motion and order for appeal, requesting

that the execution of the judgment be stayed pending appeal. A hearing on

the request for stay was held on June 22, 2021, and the stay was denied by

the trial court. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION

On appeal, Awad and Riteway assert three assignments of error:

First Assignment of Error: The district court committed legal error by
allowing the City of Shreveport to proceed on its petition to revoke an
alcohol permit without proper notice.

In their first assignment of error, Awad and Riteway argue that they

were not given proper notice of the meeting of the City Council to consider

rescinding Awad and Riteway’s alcoholic beverage permit, citing La. R.S.

33:4787, which states:

A notice shall be served upon the holder of the permit stating
the time and place of the hearing to be held by the governing
body of the municipality or parish, or a municipal alcoholic
beverage control board which shall be not less than ten calendar
days from the date such notice is given. The notice shall
enumerate the cause or causes for suspending or revoking
the permit, and shall be sent by registered mail to the holder of
the permit at the address of his place of business as given in his
application for the permit, or may be served on him in person
by an officer or employee of the municipality or parish. Any
trade organization consisting of brewers and distributors of
beverages of low alcoholic content, through its authorized
representative, may file with the governing body of any
municipality or parish, or a municipal alcoholic beverage
control board a sworn petition requesting that a permit be
suspended or revoked, and the procedure in such cases shall be
the same as herein set out.

(emphasis added). Awad and Riteway argue that the notice provided to

them was overly broad and did not provide specificity as to which ordinance

violations it should be prepared to defend at the City Council meeting.

The record reflects that written notice was sent to Awad and Riteway

on August 17, 2020 by mail. The letter states that the chief of police has

notified the City Council that Riteway did not meet all of the qualifications

to hold a liquor permit as outlined in Section 10-102 of the Code of

Ordinances of the City of Shreveport. The letter specifically quotes sections

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(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(10), which enumerate potential violations for the sale

of alcohol to underage persons, the sale of alcoholic beverages to an

intoxicated person or allowing any person under the influence to be on the

premises, and permitting the sale or consumption on or about the licensed

premises of any kinds of narcotics or habit-forming drugs.1

Legal findings are reviewed under the de novo standard. City of

Shreveport v. CenturyTel Solutions, LLC, 54,159 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/17/21),

332 So. 3d 229. Appellate review of a question of law, which is de novo, is

simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct or legally

incorrect. Id.

We find no legal error in the trial court allowing the City to proceed

on its petition to revoke this alcoholic beverage permit. The notice sent by

the City provided Riteway with three specific alleged violations of Section

10-102(a) of the Code of Ordinances, including the sale of alcohol to

minors, allowing intoxicated people on the premises, and permitting the sale

or consumption of illegal drugs on or about the premises. This notice is

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Sec. 10-102(a): No person holding a retail dealer’s permit and no agent, associate,
employee, representative, or servant of any such person shall do or permit any of the
following acts to be done on or about the licensed premises:
(1) Sell or serve alcoholic beverages to any person under the age of 21 years, unless such
person submits a driver’s license, selective service card or other lawful identification
which, on its face, establishes the age of the person as 21 years or older. No form of
identification mentioned above shall be accepted as proof of age if it is expired, defaced,
mutilated or altered. If the driver’s license, state identification card or lawful
identification submitted is a duplicate, the person shall submit additional identification
which contains the name, date of birth and photograph of the person. In addition, an
educational institution identification card, check cashing identification card, or employee
identification card shall not be considered as lawful identification for the purposes of this
paragraph.
(2) Sell or serve alcoholic beverages to any intoxicated person or, if the retail dealer’s
permit is for consumption off the premises only, allow any person under the influence of
alcohol or any illegal drug to be on the premises.
(10) Illegally sell, offer for sale, possess or permit the sale and/or consumption on or
about the licensed premises of any kind or type of narcotics or habit-forming drugs. If
notified of illegal activity on the premises, it is the owner/manager’s responsibility to
ensure the activity ceases.

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sufficient to put the permit holder on notice as to the allegations against it

and to prepare its defense thereto. This assignment of error is without merit.

Second Assignment of Error: The district court committed legal error
by failing to require the City of Shreveport to prove that the “bad acts”
alleged to have been committed on the Riteway Liquor premises were
attributable to the alcohol permit holder.

Awad and Riteway argue that that none of the evidence presented by

the City established its burden of proof linking the alleged problems of

Riteway’s premises to Awad or a representative of Riteway. Awad and

Riteway cite Section 10-102(a) of the city ordinances and contend that the

City failed to establish a causal link between the prohibited acts and

Riteway. As such, Awad and Riteway argue the evidence was insufficient to

support the revocation of Awad and Riteway’s alcoholic beverage permit.

While the trial court reviewed the decision of the City Council de

novo, appellate courts utilize the manifest error or clearly wrong standard to

review the trial court’s findings. Bibbins v. City of New Orleans, 02-1510

(La. App. 4 Cir. 5/21/03), 848 So. 2d 686. If two permissible views of the

evidence exist, the factfinder cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly

wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989).

As noted above, at the trial on this matter, the City presented evidence

from various witnesses. The Shreveport police chief testified that Riteway is

one of the most dangerous places in Shreveport, and he recommended that the

alcohol beverage permit be revoked. Major Thomas testified that her cousin

was killed on the Riteway premises in 2019. Needham also testified that her

cousin was murdered outside of the Riteway. Rogers testified that numerous

residents of the MLK community wanted Riteway’s permit revoked, as

evidenced by the signed petition presented.

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Sgt. Cisco testified that he had firsthand knowledge of complaints of

loitering in the Riteway parking lot and the sale of alcohol to a minor at the

Riteway. Sgt. Cisco testified that he had spoken to Awad about security

cameras, calling the police, and hiring professional security. Sgt. Cisco

testified that Awad did not make these changes to protect his customers and

a fight occurred on the Riteway premises. He was also aware of complaints

of drug use on the premises.

Cpl. Glass-Bradley testified that he determined Riteway was a major

public safety concern, based on the results of his investigation into service

and offense calls to the location. Cpl. Glass-Bradley determined that there

had been 102 service calls in an 18-month period and that four of them were

for shootings. Cpl. Glass-Bradley testified that he had personally been

involved in an investigation that determined Awad had been operating

another business without a proper alcohol permit.

In its reasons for judgment, the trial court noted the above testimony,

which describes several specific violations of Section 10-102 of the Code of

Ordinances that could result in the revocation of an alcoholic beverage

permit. The trial court took particular notice of the fact that Awad testified

that he had hired security but upon further questioning by the court, revealed

that he had not hired professional security personnel, several months after

signing an affidavit stating that he would do so. The testimony at the trial on

this matter described consistent serious, violent crimes that took place on

Riteway’s premises, the sale of alcohol to a minor at the Riteway drive-

through, complaints to police of fights and loitering at the premises. This

evidence could certainly be deemed to be in violation of Section 10-102(a),

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and we cannot say that the trial court’s ruling revoking Awad’s alcoholic

beverage permit was manifestly erroneous. This assignment of error is

without merit.

Third Assignment of Error: The decision of the district court violates
Riteway’s due process rights as a matter of law because inadmissible
evidence was admitted at the trial de novo and considered by the trial
court.

Awad and Riteway argue that the trial court correctly ruled that the

police reports attached to Cpl. Glass-Bradley’s report were inadmissible

hearsay but contends that the ruling was undone by allowing the evidence

into the record via a transcript of the City Council’s meeting. Awad and

Riteway argue that the trial court relied on this hearsay evidence that was

presented at the council meeting to make its ruling. Awad and Riteway

contend that the conclusion that Riteway was a dangerous location was

based on unsubstantiated hearsay, and thus, there was insufficient evidence

to support the revocation of its permit.

In support of this argument, Awad and Riteway cite Brossette v.

Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 611 So. 2d 1391 (La. 1993), wherein the

Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the police officers’ testimony repeating

other parties’ complaints at an earlier council meeting to prove a night club

was the site of criminal activity was hearsay and should have excluded from

the trial court’s de novo review. After excluding that evidence, the court

noted that the club was located in a high-crime area and there had been one

murder and one serious fight. It also found that the club’s owner cooperated

with the police, employed police protection for the club, and suffered from

its location in a high-crime area. Brossette, supra.

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Awad and Riteway also refer this court to Bibbins, supra, wherein the

court found that two officers’ testimony regarding printouts from a computer

database concerning criminal incidents at a nightclub was hearsay and

should have been excluded. The printouts were not a part of the record, and

the court ruled that all testimony not based on firsthand knowledge was

hearsay. The court ultimately found that a physical argument outside of the

club did not constitute adequate competent evidence that the club was a

public nuisance. Testimony revealed that the club’s owner employed five

security workers and the club had taken precautions to ensure the safety of

the its patrons. Bibbins, supra.

We believe that the above cases are distinguishable from the present

matter. Here, the trial court did not allow the police reports attached to Cpl.

Glass-Bradley’s report into evidence because they were hearsay. While the

trial court did allow the transcript of the City Council’s meeting into

evidence, we do not believe that it is clear that the trial court relied on the

transcript when making its ruling.

Unlike Brossette, supra, and Bibbins, supra, there is an abundance of

evidence of violations of the city ordinances that would qualify Riteway for

the revocation of its alcoholic beverage permit. As described above, the trial

court heard testimony from multiple police officers, a community leader,

and two women whose family members had been murdered at Riteway. The

record reflects firsthand testimony regarding two murders, loitering, and the

sale of alcohol to an underage person on the premises. Moreover, there is

abundant evidence that Awad, unlike the owners of the establishments in

Brossette, supra, and Bibbins, supra, failed to take any meaningful

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precautions to ensure the safety of its patrons. The record reflects that the

trial court commented that if Awad had hired professional security, then

crime would have gone down and the court probably would not have

revoked Riteway’s permit.

The trial court is granted broad discretion in its evidentiary rulings,

which will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Fields v. Walpole Tire Serv., LLC, 45,206 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 37 So.

3d 549, writ denied, 10-1430 (La. 10/1/10), 45 So. 3d 1097. At trial, a party

must make a timely objection to evidence that party considers to be

inadmissible and must state the specific ground for the objection. La. C.E.

art. 103(A)(1); La. C.C.P. art. 1635. On appeal, this court must consider

whether the complained of ruling was erroneous and whether the error

affected a substantial right of the party. Fields, supra. The determination is

whether the error, when compared to the record in its entirety, has a

substantial effect on the outcome of the case, and it is the complainant’s

burden to so prove. If there is no substantial effect on the outcome, then a

reversal is not warranted. Fields, supra; Crisler v. Paige One, Inc., 42,563

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/9/08), 974 So. 2d 125.

The trial court assessed the entirety of the testimony and evidence

presented to it when rendering its ruling. Insofar as the City Council

transcript may have included hearsay evidence, we find that any potential

error in allowing that evidence to be included had no substantial effect on

the outcome of the case, when compared to the record in its entirety. Unlike

Bibbins, supra, and Brossette, supra, even without the City Council

transcript, there is an abundance of evidence of violations by Riteway that

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the trial court could have determined justified the revocation of its alcoholic

beverage permit. See Point Proven, LLC v. City of Monroe, 51,074 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 1/13/17), 214 So. 3d 912, writ denied, 17-0292 (La. 4/17/17),

218 So. 3d 111; Rhythm City Ent. Corp. v. City of New Orleans, 09-1001,

2010 WL 8971105 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/13/10). We find no manifest error in

the trial court’s ruling, and this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

Costs assessed to Hasan Awad and Baydoun Liquor Mart d/b/a Riteway

Liquor.

AFFIRMED.

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