State of Louisiana v. Johnathan Guice

Judgment rendered May 25, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,484-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JOHNATHAN GUICE Appellant

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Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Richland, Louisiana
Trial Court No. F-2020-39

Honorable John Clay Hamilton, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward Kelly Bauman

PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

KENNETH DOUGLAS WHEELER
Assistant District Attorney

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Before PITMAN, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

The defendant, Johnathan Guice, was charged by bill of indictment

with second degree murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the amended charges of manslaughter, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:31, and attempted armed robbery, a violation of La.

14:27 and 14:64, in return for a cap of 55 years for the combined sentences,

which would run consecutively. The trial court sentenced the defendant to

serve consecutive sentences of 40 years for the manslaughter conviction and

15 years for the attempted armed robbery conviction. Defendant appeals the

sentence imposed for manslaughter as excessive. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

FACTS

The record shows that in January 2020, deputies of the Richland

Parish Sheriff’s Office responded to a report of a shooting at a residence in

Rayville. At the scene, deputies found the body of Charley Island, who had

been killed by a gunshot wound to his chest. During the investigation,

police learned defendant and Desi Dowles had gone to Island’s residence

planning to rob him with a firearm. In a statement and a letter to police,

defendant claimed Dowles had shot and killed Island during the robbery.

However, Dowles accused defendant of shooting the victim. Defendant was

charged with second degree murder and conspiracy to commit armed

robbery.

At the guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked defendant if he had

ever been examined by a doctor for his mental health and defendant said yes,

but he was able to understand the proceedings and his plea agreement.

Defendant also said he understood the rights stated by the court and that he

was waiving those rights by pleading guilty. After speaking with defendant,

the trial court found him competent to waive his constitutional rights and

plead guilty. Under the plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to the

amended charges of manslaughter and attempted armed robbery in return for

a sentencing cap of 55 years with the sentences to run consecutively. A

presentence investigation (PSI) was ordered and reviewed by the court.

At the sentencing hearing, defendant’s attorney noted the PSI report

did not include defendant’s medical and mental health records. The defense

attorney asserted any mental health issues should be considered as a

mitigating factor. However, defense counsel did not request a continuance

or present any medical records for the trial court’s consideration. The trial

court sentenced defendant to serve 40 years for the manslaughter conviction

and 15 years for attempted armed robbery, with the sentences to run

consecutively. Defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence was denied.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing an excessive

40-year sentence for the manslaughter conviction. He argues a less harsh

sentence is supported by mitigating factors, which the trial court failed to

consider.

An appellate court uses a two-pronged test to determine whether a

sentence is excessive. First, the record must show the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court

is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long

as the record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article.

State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. DeBerry, 50,501 (La.
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App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 2016-0959 (La. 5/1/17),

219 So. 3d 332. Articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of

Article 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. State

v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982). The elements which should be

considered include the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital

status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, the seriousness of

the offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d

1049 (La. 1981).

The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside

as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of this discretion. State v.

Williams, 2003-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7; State v. Diaz, 46,750 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 12/14/11), 81 So. 3d 228. On review, an appellate court does not

determine whether another sentence may have been more appropriate, but

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Williams, supra; State

v. Free, 46,894 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/12), 86 So. 3d 29. When a defendant

has received a reduction in the potential length of incarceration by a plea

agreement, the trial court’s discretion to impose the maximum sentence is

enhanced. State v. Edwards, 2007-1058 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/12/08), 979 So.

2d 623.

Second, this court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence can be constitutionally excessive,

even when it falls within statutory guidelines if: (1) the punishment is so

grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime that, when viewed in

light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice; or (2) it

serves no purpose other than to needlessly inflict pain and suffering. State v.
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Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Weaver, 2001-0467 (La.

1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.

The penalty for the crime of manslaughter is imprisonment for not

more than 40 years. La. R.S. 14:31(B).

In the present case, defendant does not challenge his convictions or

the sentence imposed for attempted armed robbery. Defendant asserts in his

brief the 40-year sentence for manslaughter is excessive because the trial

court erroneously believed defendant was the shooter.

We note in the discussion of the facts of the offenses, the trial court

found defendant’s conduct in committing the crimes manifested deliberate

cruelty to the victim, who was shot and killed. Additionally, the trial court

stated defendant “and your co-defendant” used a dangerous weapon during

the offense and defendant knew using a firearm to commit the crime created

a risk of serious injury or death. The transcript shows contrary to

defendant’s assertion, the trial court did not make an express finding

defendant was the shooter but reasonably considered defendant’s

participation in the crime, which involved the use of a handgun, in imposing

the sentence.

In his brief, defendant contends the trial court should have considered

defendant’s mental health history as a mitigating factor. However, the

record contains only brief references to defendant’s mental health at the time

of the guilty plea and at sentencing.

Prior to accepting the guilty plea, the trial court asked defendant if a

doctor had ever examined him for his mental health and defendant said yes.

The trial court followed up and asked defendant “do you fully understand

what we’re doing today by taking your plea?” Defendant answered, “Yes, I
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fully understand that.” Defendant also stated he understood the crimes

charged and the terms of his plea agreement with the state.

At the time of sentencing, the trial court asked defendant’s attorney if

there were any mitigating factors for the court to consider. The defense

attorney stated the PSI report did not contain defendant’s mental health

records concerning issues “which he’s been suffering from [for] a long time

and I think that will work towards mitigating his capacity to commit these

type [of] offenses.” The defense counsel did not specify the nature of

defendant’s alleged mental health issues and did not present any

corroborating medical records for the trial court to consider. The state

responded any such issues regarding defendant were most likely related to

his use of illegal drugs over a considerable time period and should not be

considered as a mitigating factor. When the trial court asked defendant if he

had anything to say about himself, defendant simply replied he “made a

messed up decision” by participating in the crime.

Our review of the record demonstrates there was no showing

defendant’s mental ability was impaired or that he was unable to understand

the consequences of his actions or the legal proceedings against him. The

trial court was able to weigh the statements made regarding defendant’s

condition with its observations of defendant. Additionally, the trial court

was not provided with any specific medical evidence to consider in

determining the sentence. Based on the evidence presented, defendant’s

argument that the trial court should have considered his mental health as a

mitigating factor lacks merit.

Prior to imposing sentence, the trial court reviewed the PSI report

which shows defendant has a juvenile record, a prior felony drug conviction
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in 2019 and a conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor in

2018. The court considered the facts of the offenses in light of the

provisions of Article 894.1 and found defendant planned the crime and there

were no grounds which would excuse defendant’s conduct. Under Article

894.1, the trial court further found there was an undue risk defendant would

commit another crime if not incarcerated because he was on probation when

he committed the current offenses, defendant was in need of correctional

treatment provided by commitment to an institution and a lesser sentence

would deprecate the seriousness of these offenses.

The record demonstrates the trial court adequately considered the

sentencing guidelines of Article 894.1 in determining the sentence. The trial

court was aware of defendant’s age and of his prior offenses committed as a

juvenile. In addition, the trial court noted defendant is a second felony

offender who committed the present offenses while on probation for a prior

conviction. The trial court also considered defendant received a substantial

benefit from the plea agreement by reducing his sentencing exposure from a

mandatory life sentence for a second degree murder conviction. Under the

circumstances of this case, the trial court acted within its discretion in

imposing a sentence of 40 years for the manslaughter conviction.

The sentence imposed is proportionate to defendant’s acts of planning

and taking steps to commit a crime during which the unarmed victim was

shot and killed in his residence. Based upon this record, we cannot say the

trial court abused its discretion in imposing this sentence, which

appropriately reflects the severity of defendant’s crime and does not shock

the sense of justice. Thus, the assignment of error lacks merit.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s convictions and sentences

are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

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