State of Louisiana v. Jareona Nicole Crosby

Judgment rendered June 29, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,539-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JAREONA NICOLE CROSBY Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 222,271

Honorable Allen Parker Self, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward K. Bauman

JOHN SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

ANDREW JACOBS
RICHARD RUSSELL RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before COX, ROBINSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

ROBINSON, J.

Jareona Crosby (“Crosby”) was indicted on December 10, 2018, for

the second degree murder of Joshua Kidd (“Kidd”), who was shot on

September 25, 2018, while Crosby and another individual were engaged in

an aggravated burglary of Kidd’s vehicle. Crosby was seventeen years old

when the crime was committed. Crosby appeared in court on December 11,

2018, and waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. On

November 10, 2020, Crosby withdrew her former plea of not guilty and

entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder, in exchange for the

dismissal of the other charges of simple burglaries and theft of a firearm.

Crosby was sentenced on December 15, 2020, to life imprisonment at hard

labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Crosby filed her own pro se application for post-conviction relief seeking an

out-of-time appeal on May 24, 2021, alleging that her plea was not

knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made and that trial counsel was

ineffective. The court granted her out-of-time-appeal on September 10,

2021, appointing the Louisiana Appellate Project to represent Crosby on

appeal.

For the reasons expressed herein, this Court AFFIRMS Crosby’s

guilty plea of second degree murder, but AMENDS the sentence of life

imprisonment to be with benefit of parole consideration pursuant to La. R.S.

15:574.4F.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 25, 2018, Crosby, who was seventeen years old at the

time, and Alonzo Wilson (“Wilson”), were in the process of committing

several burglaries in and around Greenacres Place neighborhood in Bossier

City, Louisiana, when Crosby and Wilson came to Kidd’s house. Crosby

and Wilson entered the garage of the dwelling, which was inhabited by

Kidd, his wife, and his young child, with the intent to commit a theft therein,

and with Crosby being armed. Kidd encountered Crosby and Wilson within

the inhabited dwelling (Kidd’s home); and while Kidd was pursuing Crosby

away from the home, Crosby shot him. The gunshot wound ultimately

resulted in Kidd’s death.

Crosby was charged by bill of indictment with second degree murder

while engaged in an aggravated burglary on December 10, 2018. She

appeared in court on December 11, 2018, waived formal arraignment, and

entered a plea of not guilty. On November 10, 2020, Crosby withdrew her

former plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to second degree

murder, in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges of simple

burglaries and theft of a firearm. She was sentenced on December 15, 2020,

to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or

suspension of sentence. Crosby filed her own pro se application for post-

conviction relief seeking an out-of-time appeal on May 24, 2021, alleging

that her plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made and that

trial counsel was ineffective. The court granted her out-of-time-appeal on

September 10, 2021, appointing the Louisiana Appellate Project to represent

Crosby on appeal.

DISCUSSION

Free and Voluntary Guilty Plea

Crosby argues that the trial court erred in failing to inform her of the

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without benefits if she pled guilty,

in accordance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1, She claims that the court relied
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solely on her affirmation that her attorney explained to her “the nature of the

charge … the range for sentencing on that charge and the fact that the

sentence would be up to the Court.” Crosby further argues that this falsely

led her to believe that there was a sentencing range for the crime charged.

She claims that she was required to be informed in open court of the

maximum sentence required to be imposed for her crime before entering her

guilty plea and that the trial court failed to do so. She referenced the

following portion of the trial court’s colloquy:

THE COURT: Okay. Now, you have the right to be
represented by an attorney, previously have been represented by
Mr. Fish now represented by Ms. Waltman. They’ve explained
this proceeding to you, … they’ve also explained to you the …
nature of this charge, what’s the, uh, range for sentencing on that
charge and the fact that the sentence would be up to the Court.
Do you understand that?

MISS CROSBY: Yes, sir.

Crosby urges that a guilty plea must be the free and voluntary choice

of a defendant. State v. Garth, 622 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1993). As

noted by this court in State v. Lewis, 32,892 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/30/99), 749

So. 2d 914:

In order for a guilty plea to be voluntarily and knowingly entered,
the trial court must apprise a defendant of any mandatory
minimum penalty and the maximum possible penalty for the
offense to which he pled guilty. La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1; State v.
Anderson, 30,901 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/19/98), 720 So. 2d 355;
State v. Clay, 30,770 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/13/98), 714 So. 2d 123;
State v. Garth, supra. The requirement of such advice includes
the defendant’s understanding of both the maximum and
minimum sentence he faces by pleading guilty and any other
direct sentencing consequences resulting from his plea. State ex
rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly, 416 So. 2d 82 (La. 1982); State v.
Cassels, 27,227 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/96), 669 So. 2d 715, 717
and cases cited therein.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1 provides, in pertinent part:

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A. In any criminal case, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, without first addressing the defendant
personally in open court and informing him of, and determining
that he understands, all of the following:

1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law.

For guilty pleas entered after Aug. 15, 1997, La. C. Cr. P. art.
556.1 requires the trial court, prior to accepting a guilty plea, to
inform the defendant of the mandatory minimum penalty
provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law.

Crosby recognizes that a guilty plea may be upheld despite a trial

court’s failure to inform defendants of the minimum and maximum

penalties, but argues that her case is distinguishable. A defendant must be

personally, in open court, informed of the mandatory minimum sentence and

the maximum possible penalty under La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1. Any variance

from the procedures required that does not affect substantial rights of the

accused shall not invalidate the plea. La. C. Cr. P. art. 556.1E. As stated by

the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Halsell, 403 So. 2d 688, 690 (La.

1981), “while it is preferable for the trial judge to conduct a colloquy with

the defendant to ascertain the validity of the plea, such a colloquy may not

be indispensable, as long as the record contains some other affirmative

showing to support the plea.”

Crosby points out that, unlike in Halsell where the defendant signed a

waiver of rights form and admitted he had gone over the form paragraph by

paragraph with his attorney, she never reviewed or executed any guilty plea

forms or waiver of rights forms.

Crosby also claims that her case is distinguishable from State v.

Warren, 42,699 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So. 2d 909, writ denied, 07-

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2485 (La. 8/14/20), 300 So. 3d 872, in which the court concluded that the

failure of the trial court to inform the defendant of the minimum and

maximum penalties, to be served without benefits, was not a material factor

in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, as the defendant had consulted

with his attorney about the nature and consequences of his plea, and he

avoided additional sentencing exposure through the dismissal of the most

serious charge, aggravated kidnapping, which carries a mandatory life

sentence without benefits.

Crosby argues that she pled to the most serious charge, and although

she had several simple burglaries and a theft of a firearm dismissed, she still

received a sentence of life without benefits as apparently agreed upon, which

would have been the case had the other charges not been dropped. She

claims that under these circumstances, a direct colloquy with her, her

attorney, or even her mother was warranted.

Crosby also acknowledges this Court’s recent decision in State v.

Robertson, 53,970 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/30/21), 322 So. 3d 937, 942, which

stated in part:

Even though “advice with respect to the defendant’s sentencing
exposure may facilitate the taking of a voluntary guilty plea, [it]
does not form part of the core Boykin requirements for the entry
of a presumptively valid guilty plea.” State v. Anderson, 98-2977
(La. 3/19/99), 732 So. 2d 517; State v. Burford, 39,610 (La. App.
2 Cir. 5/11/05), 902 So. 2d 1190, writ denied, 05-1573 (La.
1/27/06), 922 So. 2d 545.

In State v. Demease, 33,047 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/00), 756 So. 2d
1264, writ denied, 00-1488 (La. 5/25/01), 792 So. 2d 750, this
Court determined that the trial court’s failure to inform the
defendant of the sentencing consequences or exposure before he
pled guilty to the predicate offense did not result in constitutional
infirmity. This Court stated that while advice as to a defendant’s
sentencing exposure may facilitate the taking of a voluntary
guilty plea, it never formed part of the court’s core Boykin
requirements for the entry of a presumptively valid guilty plea.
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Thus, there was no constitutional infirmity as to the failure to
inform the defendant of sentencing consequences or exposure.
Id., citing Anderson, supra.

The record in the case sub judice shows that prior to accepting
the guilty plea, the trial court advised Defendant of his
substantive rights under Boykin. Defendant told the court that he
understood his rights and understood he was waiving those rights
by pleading guilty.

Although the 20-year sentence imposed may have been a longer
term of imprisonment than Defendant expected, he confirmed to
the trial court at the time of the plea that he had been advised by
his attorney of the potential sentencing range for the offense. At
his Boykin exam, Defendant was offered an open-ended plea
deal, whereby his two other charges were dismissed, and he was
to receive a sentence within the sentencing range provided by
law. His guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly given, and
the trial court’s failure to state his potential sentencing exposure
on the record was harmless error.

Crosby again claims her case is clearly distinguishable from

Robertson. The simple burglaries and a theft of a firearm charges were

dismissed in exchange for her guilty plea in which she received life

imprisonment without benefits, but she would have received the sentence

even if the underlying charges had not been dismissed. Further, Crosby’s

merely responding “yes” when asked by the court if her current attorney,

who enrolled the day of the hearing, or one of her former attorneys had

explained the “range for sentencing on that charge and the fact that the

sentence would be up to the Court” indicates that she could be sentenced to a

term less than life at the discretion of the court. She asserts that the

instructions by the court were incorrect and insufficient to comply with La.

C. Cr. P. art 556.1. Crosby argues that, especially given that she was a

juvenile at the time of the crime, she was not sufficiently apprised of the

penalty of the crime; therefore, her guilty plea was not entered knowingly

and willingly.

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The State asserts that Crosby was informed of the maximum and

minimum sentence and that the trial court properly advised Crosby of her

rights pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L.

Ed. 2d 274 (1969). It further contends that the sentence imposed is not

excessive and not constitutionally infirm.

During the guilty plea colloquy, defense counsel stated that she had

discussed with Crosby the sentencing range and Crosby confirmed that both

her current counsel as well as her prior counsel had explained the sentencing

range to her. Defense counsel also stated during the colloquy that she

believed that Crosby understood her rights and freely and voluntarily waived

those rights. The record indicates that Crosby understood her Boykin rights

during her guilty plea colloquy and received a benefit from the plea

agreement.

The State refers to Robertson, supra, noting that, while the trial court

may not have directly informed Crosby of the maximum sentence, it was

confirmed that her counsel had informed her of the maximum sentence. It is

not considered reversible error for a trial court to allow defense counsel to

assume the trial court’s role in informing the defendant of the minimum and

maximum sentences the defendant would face at sentencing after a guilty

plea. The State argues that the facts of Robertson are similar to the instant

matter, in that the trial court did not state on the record the minimum and

maximum sentence but rather confirmed on the record during the Boykin

colloquy that defense counsel had informed Crosby of the sentencing range.

This Court agrees with the State’s argument. Both Crosby and her

counsel confirmed in open court that Crosby’s attorney had explained and

Crosby understood the nature of the charges and sentence. The judge’s
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reference to a sentencing “range” in the colloquy versus a specific

explanation that there was a mandatory sentence is irrelevant. Referring to a

“range” can reasonably be interpreted to include a set penalty, as is the case

in second degree murder convictions. In addition, given the recent changes

in juvenile sentencing at issue here, it would suffice to say that referring to a

sentencing “range” was the safer form of reference to the mandatory

sentencing. Crosby also had the opportunity to ask questions of her counsel

and of the court throughout the plea and sentencing process if she needed

any clarification of what she admits was explained by her counsel.

Further, the fact that she had more than one defense attorney over the

course of three years is irrelevant. There is nothing in the record to show

that her counsel failed to explain the nature of the charges and sentencing or

that she was otherwise inadequately represented, and there is nothing to

show that Crosby did not receive any benefit from the plea agreement.

La. R.S. 15:574.4 F

Crosby argues that the trial court erred in imposing her sentence

without benefit of parole because she was seventeen years old when she

committed the offense and she was indicted on December 10, 2018, since

La. R.S. 15:574.4F provides for automatic parole eligibility for juvenile

offenders indicted for second degree murder on or after August 1, 2017.

La. R.S. 15:574.4 F provides, in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except
as provided in Subsection G of this Section, any person serving
a sentence of life imprisonment for a conviction of second degree
murder (R.S. 14:30.1) who was under the age of eighteen years
at the time of the commission of the offense and whose
indictment for the offense is on or after August 1, 2017, shall be
eligible for parole consideration if [certain] conditions have been
met…

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Crosby argues that because she meets the requirements of La. R.S.

15:574.4F, she should be automatically eligible for parole consideration

under its terms. Accordingly, she claims that her sentence should be vacated

and remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

The State urges that a trial court has broad discretion to sentence

within the statutory limits. Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense

which does not adequately describe his conduct or has received a significant

reduction in potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the

trial court has great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence

possible for the pled offense. State v. Germany, 43,239 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/30/08), 981 So. 2d 792; State v. Black, 28,100 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/96),

669 So. 2d 667, writ denied 96-0836 (La. 9/20/96), 679 So. 2d 430. It

claims that the trial court carefully considered the provisions of La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 in its determination to sentence Crosby to life in prison without

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

For those offenders convicted of second degree murder in Louisiana,

La. R.S. 14:30.1 mandates a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor

without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. However,

the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.

Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) held that a State’s sentencing scheme

that mandates life imprisonment without parole for those offenders under the

age of eighteen at the time they committed a homicide offense, violates the

Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. State

v. Stewart, 13-639 (La. App. 5 Cir. 01/31/14), 134 So. 3d 636, 639, writ

denied, 14-0420 (La. 09/26/14), 149 So. 3d 260.

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The State argues that Miller did not establish a categorical prohibition

against life imprisonment without parole for juveniles, but rather required

that a sentencing court consider an offender’s youth and attendant

characteristics as mitigating circumstances before deciding whether to

impose the harshest penalty for juveniles who have committed a homicide

offense. State v. Williams, 12-1766 (La. 03/08/13), 108 So. 3d 1169; See

also State v. Fletcher, 49,303 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/01/14), 149 So. 3d 934,

943, writ denied, 14-2205 (La. 06/05/15), 171 So. 3d 945, cert. denied, 577

U.S. 904, 136 S. Ct. 254, 193 L. Ed. 2d 189 (2015).

The State claims that the trial court adequately considered the

aggravating and mitigating factors of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 when

sentencing Crosby to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and

it has broad discretion. The State further argues that the sentence ordering

Crosby to serve life in prison without benefit of parole was not grossly

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense and was not so

disproportionate as to shock the court’s sense of justice, and it does not

impose needless and purposeless pain and suffering. It notes that the trial

court found Crosby’s actions to be especially egregious, the judge placing

specific emphasis on the home invasion and the impact on the victim’s

family, including his young child.

The State urges that the life sentence imposed without benefit of

parole was not excessive and should not be disturbed. However, it argues

that, should this Court determine that the trial court erred in imposing a life

sentence on a juvenile offender without benefit of parole, Crosby should

nevertheless not be entitled to a full sentencing hearing with introduction of

evidence because this Court has the ability to modify the sentence to include
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the possibility of parole if and when all the conditions of La. R.S. 15:574.4

are met. State v. Wise, 52,937 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 281 So. 3d 809,

writ denied 19-01955 (La. 7/17/20), 298 So. 3d 174.

We find that the trial court erred in imposing Crosby’s sentence of life

imprisonment without benefit of parole because this case clearly falls within

the scope of La. R.S. 15:574.4F which mandates that juveniles convicted of

second degree murder after August 1, 2017, be eligible for parole

consideration upon meeting the criteria enumerated in the statute. Crosby

was seventeen years old when she committed the offense of second degree

murder. She was indicted for the crime after August 1, 2017. Accordingly,

Crosby is automatically eligible for parole consideration pursuant to the

terms of La. R.S. 15:574.4F.

The Louisiana legislature specifically amended La. C. Cr. P. art. 878.1

and La. R.S. 15:574.4 to codify the holding in Miller that mandatory life

without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment except in cases when a juvenile

offender exhibits such irretrievable depravity that rehabilitation is

impossible and life without parole is justified. Miller, supra. In dictating

parole eligibility for the juvenile offender, La. R.S. 15:574.4 first

distinguishes the type of offense, whether homicide or nonhomicide, and

whether first or second degree murder. Nonhomicide juvenile offenders are

automatically eligible for parole consideration no matter when they are

indicted for the offense. Juveniles convicted of first or second degree

murder indicted before August 1, 2017, are eligible for parole consideration

only if a separate hearing has been conducted on the issue and a judicial

determination made granting eligibility. Juveniles convicted of first degree
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murder whose indictments are on or after August 1, 2017, are eligible for

parole consideration only if a hearing is conducted and a judicial

determination made granting eligibility. Juveniles convicted of second

degree murder whose indictments are on or after August 1, 2017 – as is the

case here – are automatically eligible for parole consideration with no

hearing requirement.

However, we find that Crosby is not entitled to have her sentence

vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing. Crosby’s sentence of life

imprisonment without benefit of parole is an illegal sentence as it is in clear

violation of the requirements La. R.S. 15:574.4F and Crosby’s Eighth

Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment as provided in

Miller. An illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that

imposed the sentence or by an appellate court on review. La. C. Cr. P. art.

882.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS Crosby’s guilty plea

of second degree murder but AMENDS the sentence of life imprisonment to

be with benefit of parole consideration pursuant to La. R.S. 15:574.4F.

Further, the Department of Corrections is ordered to revise Crosby’s prison

master to reflect that her sentence is no longer without benefit of parole and,

in accordance with the criteria in La. R.S. 15:574.4, to reflect an eligibility

date for consideration by the Board of Parole once the conditions of La. R.S.

15:574.4 are met.

GUILTY PLEA AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED AS

AMENDED.

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