State of Louisiana v. William Patrick Richardson

Judgment rendered September 21, 2022.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,607-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

WILLIAM PATRICK RICHARDSON Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 339,701

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON W. WALTMAN
REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before MOORE, STONE, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of

Caddo, the Honorable Donald Hathaway, Jr., presiding. Defendant, William

Patrick Richardson, pled guilty to second degree rape and was sentenced to

15 years at hard labor without benefits. Defendant now appeals his sentence

as excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant’s conviction

and sentence.

FACTS

The record in this case provides that on March 19, 2016, Richardson

encountered S.W. at Lee’s Bar on Kings Highway, Shreveport, Louisiana.

The two were acquaintances. S.W. had a couple of glasses of wine while

both were at the bar. While there, Richardson offered S.W. a Xanax, which

she declined. Richardson then drove S.W. to a Waffle House. While there,

S.W. went to the bathroom, and it was then that Richardson put pills in her

drink. Richardson admitted that he put something in S.W.’s drink. He was

captured on surveillance video placing something in her drink and

repeatedly trying to get her to drink the mixture before leaving the

restaurant. Richardson acknowledged that S.W. was intoxicated prior to

placing pills in her drink and that she could not tell him where her home

was.

Richardson then drove S.W. to his home, and upon exiting his vehicle,

she vomited in driveway. Richardson took S.W. inside his home to his

bedroom, where he had vaginal sexual intercourse with her. He stated that

she was in and out of consciousness while he had sex with her. S.W. told

police that she woke up while Richardson was having sex with her and

began screaming. Richardson’s roommate then contacted the police. S.W.’s

blood was tested and showed the presence of a controlled dangerous

substance.

On April 18, 2016, Richardson was charged by bill of information

with the second degree rape of S.W., in violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1.

Richardson initially pled not guilty to the offense. On May 3, 2021,

Richardson was charged by amended bill of information with the same

offense. The amended bill stated that S.W. was incapable of resisting due to

Richardson administering to her a controlled dangerous substance without

her knowledge. Also on May 3, 2021, Richardson withdrew his not guilty

plea and pled guilty as charged. The trial court informed Richardson of the

rights he was forgoing by pleading guilty, and Richardson stated that he

understood. The trial court did not order a presentencing investigation

report.

On June 23, 2021, Richardson was brought before the trial court for

sentencing. Richardson stated that he was born in Montgomery, Alabama,

and his father is a retired cardiovascular surgeon. He completed three years

of college studying building science, and he worked as a carpenter.

Richardson testified that he had been addicted to drugs and alcohol from the

age of 13. He had two overdoses before he turned 16, and he went to rehab

where he got sober. He stated that he had a prior arrest due to his addiction

to narcotics and he attended a Teen Challenge program in relation to that

arrest.

He said that he injured his ankle when he was 21, and again “got

hooked” on narcotic pain pills. Richardson stated that on the date of the

offense, he had consumed Xanax and alcohol, which “makes me black out a

lot of times and do things I would not normally do.” Richardson stated that
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he has not done anything like this before. Richardson expressed remorse

about what he had done to S.W. and said that drug addiction had ruined his

life. He stated that he hopes one day S.W. will be able to forgive him.

On cross-examination, Richardson acknowledged that his case was

originally set for trial on December 2, 2019, and he failed to appear.

Richardson affirmed that he remained a fugitive until he was located by a

bail bondsman in St. Louis, Missouri, and returned to Caddo Parish.

Richardson admitted that initially he told police that the sexual encounter

between himself and S.W. was consensual. Richardson said that he did not

recall that S.W. vomited as she tried to exit his car.

The state entered S.W.’s victim impact statement into the record. In it

she described Richardson’s assault and how disoriented and helpless she felt

while it occurred. She stated that she was in and out of consciousness during

the attack. She said that she endured panic attacks while Richardson was a

fugitive, and she asked the trial court to hold him accountable for what he

did.

The trial court then recited the facts of the case and stated:

At the time this offense was committed, the punishment was
found in [La. R.S.] 14:42.1. Whoever commits the crime of
second degree rape shall be imprisoned at hard labor without
benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence for not
less than five nor more than 40 years.

The trial court informed Richardson of his right to an appeal and of

his post-conviction relief time limits. The trial court stated that it considered

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and found paragraphs (A)(1), (2), and (3) applicable

in this case. The trial court stated that it also considered the aggravating and

mitigating factors from La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B), finding them “not

particularly applicable to this case and didn’t move the court very much.”
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The trial court stated that it was disturbed by Richardson’s apparent

familiarity with the administration of narcotics to the victim, and it noted

that he absconded prior to pleading guilty.

Richardson was then sentenced to 15 years at hard labor without

benefits. Richardson was ordered to pay court costs and a $50 fine to the

indigent defender. The trial court stated that this was a sex offense, and

Richardson was given written notification of the sex offender registration

requirements. The following exchange then occurred:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And, Your Honor, there is something
about the statute that has a minimum of two years.

[THE STATE]: Well, he gave him 15 without, so –

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The whole thing is to be without?

THE COURT: Without, correct.

On July 9, 2021, Richardson filed a motion to reconsider sentence

arguing his sentence was excessive and that the trial court failed to

adequately consider the mitigating factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

The trial court denied the motion the same day. Richardson now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Richardson’s sole assignment of error is that his sentence is excessive.

Richardson argues that, because his crime is a crime of violence and a sex

offense, he cannot earn a good time diminution of sentence, but must serve

his sentence “day for day.” Richardson states that he testified before the

trial court that he would not have committed his crime if he had not been

under the influence of alcohol. Richardson states that his 15-year sentence is

harsh and excessive as he is not the worst offender and his is not the worst

offense.

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Richardson argues that he has no prior felony convictions, some

college education, and a career as a carpenter. He states that he has attended

rehabilitation programs before, but has had trouble maintaining his sobriety.

He maintains that his intoxication was at the root of his offense. Richardson

states that he can be rehabilitated and be a contributing member of society.

Richardson also states that the trial court ordered him to pay court costs and

a fine to the indigent defender and it was inappropriate for the trial court to

burden him with monetary obligations in addition to his 15-year sentence.

He asks that his sentence be vacated and remanded for resentencing.

The state argues that Richardson’s sentence is not excessive and the

trial court properly considered the factors found in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 as

well as his personal history. The state asserts that Richardson received a

sentence on the lower end of the sentencing range and his sentence is neither

disproportionate to the seriousness of his offense against S.W., nor shocks

the sense of justice. The state contends that the trial court has wide

discretion to impose a sentence that is within statutory limits, as is the case

here. The state argues that regardless of what he consumed, Richardson

maintained the presence of mind to drive the victim to the Waffle House, to

drug her drink while she was in the restroom, to drive S.W. to his home

while she was impaired, and to rape her. The state contends that this showed

that “calculated opportunism” was at the root of Richardson’s offense, not

intoxication.

The state argues Richardson’s guilty plea and remorse came after he

initially denied what he did until confronted with the video evidence of his

drugging S.W. The state contends that Richardson absconded while on bond

and was returned to Louisiana months later once located by a bondsman.
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The state maintains his sentence is not excessive, and the imposition of court

costs and indigent defender fee is appropriate given that no jail time was

imposed in lieu of payment. The state asks this court to affirm Richardson’s

conviction and sentence.

An appellate court utilizes a two-pronged test in reviewing a sentence

for excessiveness. First, the record must show that the trial court took

cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The court shall

state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual

basis therefor in imposing sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(C); State v.

Parker, 54,190 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22) 335 So. 3d 519. The trial judge is

not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as

the record reflects that he adequately considered the guidelines of the article.

State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Parker, supra; State v.

DeBerry, 50,501 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So. 3d 657, writ denied, 16-

0959 (La. 5/1/17), 219 So. 3d 332.

The articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions.

Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence

imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full

compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475

(La. 1982); State v. Parker, supra. The important elements which should be

considered are the defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital

status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of the

offense, and the likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049

(La. 1981); State v. Parker, supra. The trial court is not required to assign

any particular weight to any specific matters at sentencing. State v. Parker,
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supra; State v. Parfait, 52,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 278 So. 3d 455,

writ denied, 19-01659 (La. 12/10/19), 285 So. 3d 489.

Second, the court must determine whether the sentence is

constitutionally excessive. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is

grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more

than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v.

Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La.

1980). A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;

State v. Parker, supra; State v. Meadows, 51,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18),

246 So. 3d 639, writ denied, 18-0259 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208.

The trial court has wide discretion to impose a sentence within the

statutory limits, and the sentence imposed will not be set aside as excessive

absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La.

12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7. A trial judge is in the best position to consider the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore,

is given broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Parker, supra. On review,

an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may have

been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Parker, supra; State v. Adams, 53,055 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/19),

285 So. 3d 526, writ denied, 20-00056 (La. 9/8/20), 301 So. 3d 15.

On the date the offense was committed, March 19, 2016, La. R.S.

14:42.1(B) provided:

Whoever commits the crime of second degree rape shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than

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forty years. At least two years of the sentence imposed shall be
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

La. R.S. 14:42.1 was later amended to provide that the entire sentence

for a violation of the statute had to be served without benefits. The trial

court here initially used the incorrect law. However, defense counsel

informed the trial court of the applicable law, and the court affirmed its

intent to deny benefits for the entirety of Richardson’s sentence.

The trial court properly considered the factors found in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1. The trial court discussed Richardson’s age, family, medical,

social, and criminal history with him and said that it was troubled by

Richardson’s apparent familiarity with the administration of narcotics to the

victim. The trial court also observed that he fled prior to pleading guilty and

was apprehended in another state. The state entered S.W.’s victim impact

statement into the record, which details her fear and helplessness during the

attack and the fact that she suffered panic attacks while Richardson was a

fugitive.

The sentence comports with the aggravating and mitigating factors

listed in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and it is not grossly disproportionate to the

gravity of the offense. Richardson fails to show that the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing 15-year hard labor sentence without benefits or that

the trial court was wrong to deny his motion to reconsider sentence.

DECREE

The defendant's conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

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