Sherita Ann Cooks v. The City of Shreveport through its Mayor, Ollie Tyle, The Shreveport Fire Department Chief, Edwin Scott Wolverton, Chief of Communications, Kathy Owens Rushworth, Chief of Communications, Kim LaShun Tolliver

Judgment rendered March 1, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,841-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

SHERITA ANN COOKS Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

THE CITY OF SHREVEPORT Defendants-Appellees
through its MAYOR, OLLIE
TYLE, THE SHREVEPORT FIRE
DEPARTMENT CHIEF, EDWIN
SCOTT WOLVERTON, CHIEF
OF COMMUNICATIONS,
KATHY OWENS RUSHWORTH,
CHIEF OF COMMUNICATIONS,
KIM LASHUN TOLLIVER

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 604705

Honorable Craig Owen Marcotte, Judge

*****

GILLEY & GILLEY Counsel for Appellant
By: Patricia A. Dordan Gilley

CARMOUCHE, BOKENFOHR, Counsel for Appellees,
BUCKLE & DAY, PLLC City of Shreveport, The
By: Nichole M. Buckle Shreveport Fire
Department Chief,
Edwin Scott Wolverton,

Chief of
Communications, Kathy
Owens Rushworth, Chief
of Communications, Kim
LaShun Tolliver

*****

Before STONE, COX, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STONE, J.

This appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, the Honorable

Craig Marcotte presiding. The plaintiff, Sherita Cooks, appeals the trial

court’s dismissal of all her claims with prejudice via grant of the

(“defendant”), City of Shreveport’s motion for summary judgment

(“MSJ”).1 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case stems from the plaintiff’s employment as a financial

accreditation manager with the Shreveport Fire Department, which began in

June 2014. In or around December 2014, the plaintiff’s immediate

supervisor, Chief of Communications, Kathy Rushworth (“Chief

Rushworth”), allegedly ordered the plaintiff to spend her personal money on

official fire department business and indicated that plaintiff would be

reimbursed from an “off the books” bank account known as the International

CAD Consortium fund (“ICC fund”). It contained money that was to fund a

consortium event; the event was later canceled, but the money was not

refunded. The plaintiff alleged that her assistant, Ashley Wiggins

(“Wiggins”), and Chief Rushworth, used the ICC fund as a “slush fund,” and

that Chief Rushworth instructed her to not open the ICC bank statements or

mention the ICC fund to the finance auditor or Violet Anderson, the

Assistant Chief of Communications. Allegedly as a result of the plaintiff’s

calling attention to the slush fund, she experienced a “hostile work

environment” perpetrated by Wiggins and Chief Rushworth. However, as of

March 2016, Chief Rushworth retired and was replaced by Chief Kim

1
Former mayor Ollie Tyler is also a defendant. Her surname is misspelled as “Tyle” in
the petition and on the jacket of the record.

Tolliver (“Chief Tolliver”). On April 4, 2016, due to stress allegedly caused

by the hostile work environment, the plaintiff was transported by ambulance

from work to the hospital with a blood pressure of 190/100. On April 14,

2016, Wiggins was transferred to another position where she would have no

contact with the plaintiff.2

On April 18, 2016, the plaintiff began a sabbatical that lasted until the

end of June 2016. Three days after beginning her sabbatical, the plaintiff

reported the ICC fund and her mistreatment by Wiggins and former Chief

Rushworth to Fire Chief Wolverton, and later to the city attorney office.

The city attorney office investigated and determined that the plaintiff had

indeed been subjected to a hostile work environment.3

Also, in April 2016, because of the stress that the hostile work

environment and the slush fund matter allegedly caused her, the plaintiff

voluntarily began counseling or psychiatry sessions pursuant to the city’s

employee assistance program (“EAP”). However, with only one exception,

she was not allowed to use her sick leave to attend these sessions during the

workday.4 Furthermore, as previously stated, the plaintiff took a two-month

sabbatical beginning in April 2016. It bears repeating that when the plaintiff

2
In her brief to this court and her opposition to the defendant’s MSJ, the plaintiff
argues that the actions of Chief Rushworth and Ashley Wiggins were part of the grounds
for the plaintiff’s “constructive termination.”
3
Additionally, the city attorney instructed the plaintiff to stop pursuing the slush
fund issue because it had been referred to the city’s internal audit department.
4
The entirety of the evidence that the plaintiff cites in support of her constructive
termination claim consists of an April 2016 email exchange between her and Chief
Tolliver wherein the plaintiff requested an explanation as to why she could not attend an
EAP session during her lunch hour, even though it would take more than one hour when
including travel time. The plaintiff offered to compensate the City for the time the
session required in excess of the allotted one-hour lunch by taking sick leave. In
response, Chief Tolliver granted the plaintiff permission to attend one session during her
lunch hour, but stated that, thereafter, the plaintiff would have to adhere to the fire
department’s policy of requiring that EAP sessions take place after work hours.

2

returned to work in June 2016, both Chief Rushworth and Wiggins were no

longer employed with the Shreveport Fire Department. The plaintiff did not

quit her job until November 2016.

The City filed an MSJ asserting that the plaintiff cannot carry her

burden of proving constructive termination (or other discipline or reprisal by

the employer). The plaintiff asserts that the MSJ was erroneously granted

because: (1) her evidence submitted for the purpose of the MSJ constituted

prima facie proof of her claim; and (2) there was discovery regarding the

secret account that remained outstanding, and a hearing pursuant to La.

C.C.P. art. 1467(B) regarding that discovery was set but never took place.

DISCUSSION

Motion for summary judgment

After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary

judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting

documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the

mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3).

A fact is “material” when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to

plaintiff’s cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery.

Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-2292 (La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791, 814.

A genuine issue is one regarding which reasonable persons could disagree;

if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a

trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Hines v. Garrett,

04-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) allocates the burden of proof on a motion for

summary judgment as follows:

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The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if
the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the
issue that is before the court on the motion for summary
judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not
require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse
party’s claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to
the court the absence of factual support for one or more
elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense. The burden is on the adverse party to produce
factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to

the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and

admissions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). Furthermore, the court may consider

only those documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment and shall consider any documents to which no objection

is made. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2). Appellate “review of a grant or denial of

a motion for summary judgment is de novo.” Jones v. Est. of Santiago, 03-

1424 (La. 4/14/04), 870 So. 2d 1002, 1006.

Whistleblower statutes

La. R.S. 42:1169, in relevant part, provides:

Any public employee who reports…information which he
reasonably believes indicates a violation of any law or of
any order, rule, or regulation …or any other alleged acts
of impropriety related to the scope or duties of public
employment or public office within any branch of state
government or any political subdivision shall be free from
discipline, reprisal, or threats of discipline or reprisal by
the public employer for reporting such acts of alleged
impropriety. No employee with authority to hire, fire, or
discipline employees, supervisor, agency head, nor any
elected official shall subject to reprisal or threaten to
subject to reprisal any such public employee because of
the employee’s efforts to disclose such acts of alleged
impropriety. (Emphasis supplied).

The plaintiff also cites La. R.S. 23:967, which in relevant part, states:
4

A. An employer shall not take reprisal against an
employee who in good faith, and after advising the
employer of the violation of law:
(1) Discloses or threatens to disclose a workplace act or
practice that is in violation of state law.
(2) Provides information to or testifies before any public
body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry into
any violation of law.
(3) Objects to or refuses to participate in an employment
act or practice that is in violation of law.
…
C. For the purposes of this Section, the following terms
shall have the definitions ascribed below:
(1) “Reprisal” includes firing, layoff, loss of benefits, or
any discriminatory action the court finds was taken as a
result of an action by the employee that is protected under
Subsection A of this Section; however, nothing in this
Section shall prohibit an employer from enforcing an
established employment policy, procedure, or practice or
exempt an employee from compliance with such.

Thus, to prevail under either statute, an employee must prove – among other

things – she suffered discipline, reprisal, or threats thereof by the public

employer. Termination of employment would certainly constitute discipline

or reprisal.

Constructive termination (or discharge) occurs when the employer

intentionally and deliberately creates such severely intolerable working

conditions that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would feel

compelled to resign. Ray v. City of Bossier City, 37, 708 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10/24/03), 859 So.2d 264. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove

constructive discharge. Id.

Constructive termination

The plaintiff’s summary judgment evidence falls far short of prima

facie proof of constructive termination. The entirety of the evidence that she

cites in support of that claim consists of an April 2016 email exchange

between her and Chief Tolliver wherein the plaintiff requested an
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explanation as to why she could not attend an EAP session during her lunch

hour, even though it would take more than one hour when including travel

time. The plaintiff offered to compensate the City for the time the session

required in excess of the allotted one-hour lunch by taking sick leave.5 In

response, Chief Tolliver granted the plaintiff permission to attend one

session during her lunch hour, but stated that, thereafter, the plaintiff would

have to adhere to the fire department’s policy of requiring that EAP sessions

take place after work hours.

The plaintiff began roughly a two-month sabbatical later in April

2016. She returned to work in June 2016 and claimed that her constructive

termination occurred in November 2016 – i.e., almost 7 months after

Wiggins had been removed from her position with the fire department, and

roughly 8 months after Chief Rushworth had retired. After her return, Fire

Chief Wolverton instructed the plaintiff to stop pursuing the ICC fund matter

and stated that it was being handled by the city’s internal audit department.

As a matter of law, this does not and cannot establish a prima facie case for

constructive termination. Therefore, the plaintiff – as the party who would

5
The email exchange regarding EAP is the only evidence cited specifically in
support of constructive termination. However, the plaintiff also asserts her ultimate
conclusion that she is entitled to recovery under the whistleblower statute, which would
include the constructive termination element; in support, she cites: (1) the Fire
Department predisciplinary document created because of plaintiff’s refusal to return to
work; and (2) a document entitled Fire Employee’s Rights which lists those rights and
bears the plaintiff’s signature. These items do not and cannot support the plaintiff’s
constructive termination claim. Beyond that, plaintiff merely makes in globo references
to the 530 to 570 pages of “evidence” she filed with her opposition as supporting her
whistleblower claim. This is an egregious violation of La. Unif. R. Ct. App. 2-12.4(A)(7)
& (9), which require citations to specific page numbers of the record for support of a
party’s allegations and argument. Accordingly, this court may disregard the plaintiff’s in
globo references to her 530 to 570 pages of “evidence.” La. Unif. R. Ct. App. 2-
12.4(B)(3). Furthermore, we reiterate that even if all the factual allegations in the
plaintiff’s brief were adequately supported by properly cited summary judgment
evidence, they still would not support her claim of constructive termination.

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bear the burden of proof at trial – has failed to carry her burden of proving

discipline or reprisal or threat thereof. La. R.S. 42:1169; La. C.C.P. art.

966(D)(1).

Adequate discovery

The plaintiff’s second argument is that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment because the plaintiff did not have an opportunity for

adequate discovery in that her discovery requests (requests for admission)

relating to the details of the ICC fund were unsatisfied. This is a non

sequitur: even if it is assumed that the details of the ICC fund that should

have been – but were not – produced were most favorable to the plaintiff’s

case, the plaintiff nonetheless failed to support her claim of constructive

termination. The details of the ICC fund are immaterial to the issue raised in

the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, i.e., plaintiff’s inability to

prove that she was constructively terminated or otherwise disciplined,

subjected to reprisal, or threat thereof (as required for relief under La. R.S.

42:1169 and 23:967). The trial court was correct in granting summary

judgment.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. All costs of this

appeal are assessed to the plaintiff.

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