State of Louisiana v. Emily R. Fields

Judgment rendered March 1, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 54,920-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

EMILY R. FIELDS Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 356,567

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Jane L. Beebe

JAMES E. STEWART, JR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON W. WALTMAN
REBECCA A. EDWARDS
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, COX, and STEPHENS, JJ.

COX, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court,

Caddo Parish, Louisiana. Emily Fields was found guilty by a unanimous

jury of obstruction of justice, in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1. She was

sentenced to five years at hard labor. Fields now appeals her conviction.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

According to Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) Officer Diane

Sanchez’s report, on October 4, 2015, at approximately 9:11 p.m., officers

responded to an emergency involving a pedestrian and a vehicle at the

corner of East 76th Street and Fairfield Avenue. The pedestrian, Nathaniel

Nicholson, was having trouble breathing and was transported to University

Health, where he was pronounced dead. The vehicle that struck Mr.

Nicholson fled the scene before emergency responders arrived. Crash

investigators gathered pieces of the vehicle that were left at the scene to

determine the make and model. It was later determined that the passenger

side mirror left at the scene was possibly from a 2003-2007 Honda Accord.

A press release was sent to the media on October 7, 2015, requesting any

information about the accident and/or vehicle.

After the media release, Officer Sanchez was contacted by Blake

Stephenson, the owner of Louisiana Glass in Bossier City. Mr. Stephenson

informed Officer Sanchez that one of his employees, Ronnie Odums,

believed Louisiana Glass replaced the front windshield on a 2003 black

Honda Accord that was described in the SPD media release. Mr.

Stephenson stated that Louisiana Glass received a request from Joseph

Lofton for a front windshield for a 2003 Honda Accord. He stated that Mr.

Lofton brought the vehicle in on October 6, 2015. Mr. Lofton was followed

in a vehicle by Fields, who spoke to Mr. Odums. Mr. Odums stated that

Fields told him the vehicle was hers and asked him how long it was going to

take to repair the windshield. Mr. Odums stated that he observed damage to

the vehicle’s front bumper, fender, A-pillar, and windshield.

Officer Sanchez stated in her report that she reviewed the surveillance

video and was able to positively identify Mr. Lofton and Fields. She also

confirmed that the 2003 black Honda Accord was registered to Fields.

Officer Sanchez met with Mr. Lofton on October 9, 2015, and he agreed to

go to the police station for an interview regarding the accident. Mr. Lofton

was Mirandized prior to questioning at the police station. According to

Officer Sanchez’s report, Mr. Lofton stated that he had been friends with

Fields for four years and described himself as “Mr. Over-reliable.” He

stated that Fields texted him for help at 6:00 a.m. on October 5, 2015. He

said she asked for help because her vehicle was vandalized, but he knew

there must be more to the story after looking at the damage to the vehicle.

Mr. Lofton stated that he did not ask Fields many questions regarding the

vandalism and described the following as being damaged on Fields’ vehicle:

windshield shattered, passenger side dents, the bumper was loose, passenger

headlights cracked, and passenger side mirror parts were hanging off. He

told Officer Sanchez that he ordered new vehicle parts in his name because

Fields said she “couldn’t put the parts in her name.” He stated that he did

not know why she was putting the parts in his name and giving him cash to

pay for it, but he felt that if he helped her out, there might be a way for them

to have a relationship.

2

Mr. Lofton told Officer Sanchez that he drove Fields’ vehicle to

Sherwin-Williams to match the paint color and purchased a half-pint of

touchup paint. The manager at Sherwin-Williams verified this purchase for

officers. Mr. Lofton stated that he picked up the parts that were ordered

from New World International and paid cash. The manager of New World

International verified this purchase for officers. Mr. Lofton stated that

Fields asked him to drive her vehicle to Louisiana Glass because she did not

want to get pulled over for the busted windshield. He stated that he did not

know who repaired the vehicle or where the repairs were made and had not

seen Fields since October 6, 2015, after dropping off the vehicle at

Louisiana Glass.

Fields’ employer at the time of the accident recalled the following for

Officer Sanchez: Fields came to work on October 6, 2015, and stated that

her car had been vandalized over the weekend while she was at a house

party; Fields seemed very nonchalant about what happened to her car but

was more upset about the new headlights being clear instead of smoky;

Fields stated a friend of a friend was replacing the headlights; Fields

received a phone call while at work on October 8, 2015, which visibly upset

her; and, Fields left work on October 8, 2015, around noon, and never

returned.

Officer Sanchez stated in her report that she was contacted by

Attorney Stephen Glassell on October 12, 2015. Glassell told Officer

Sanchez that he was representing Fields, Fields would not be giving a

statement, and the vehicle could be located at her residence. After

impounding the vehicle, Officer Sanchez made the following observations:

the vehicle smelled of fresh paint; the passenger side mirror was different
3

than the driver side mirror; the headlights were offset; there was a green

substance under the passenger fender, which they thought to be used to fill

in holes that were drilled to pull out the dent in the fender; and small pieces

of glass (presumably from the windshield) were found on the front and rear

passenger floorboards.

Officer Sanchez removed the driver side mirror of the vehicle and sent

it to the lab to compare it to the side mirror left at the scene of the accident.

The lab results included the following, “The paint samples tested in item 5

were similar in color, layer structure, solubility and infra-red absorbance

spectra to the paint samples tested in item 6.” Office Sanchez noted in her

report that the lab could not say that both mirrors came from the same car.

SPD Corporal Dirk Morris stated in his report that he was called to the

scene of the accident to investigate. He noted in the narrative of his report

that a concerned citizen who was passing by called for help after checking

on the victim, who was lying face down on the sidewalk. He stated that the

victim had obvious head trauma with blood coming from his ear. Cpl.

Morris stated that while preparing to photograph the scene, he received a call

that the victim had passed away. According to the citizen who found the

victim, the victim was lying with his legs in the street and his head was face

down on the sidewalk. He stated that the victim’s shoes were knocked off

his feet; one shoe was next to the victim and the other a few feet away. Cpl.

Morris noted that the victim appeared to be carrying groceries in a brown

paper bag, which was located in the street next to him. He stated in his

report that multiple pieces of side mirror were located next to the victim.

Cpl. Morris’ initial involvement with the case ended at this point, but he was

4

reassigned to the case on June 21, 2017, after Officer Sanchez was promoted

and moved to another unit.

Cpl. Morris searched Fields’ phone but was unable to find anything

prior to October 19, 2015. He attempted to search Mr. Lofton’s phone but

was unable to complete the download of the data due to technical

difficulties. Cpl. Morris was able to obtain Fields’ phone records from

Metro PCS. The phone records showed that the phone was in continuous

use before and after the crash. According to location data, Fields’ phone

was at her residence until approximately 8:56 p.m., when the phone moves

to the vicinity of the crash from 9:00 p.m. until 9:07 p.m. The phone then

travels back to Fields’ residence, approximately 8 miles from the scene of

the accident.

Cpl. Morris obtained an arrest warrant for Fields on March 13, 2018,

charging her with felony hit and run and obstruction of justice.

On May 15, 2018, the State filed its bill of information against Fields

for violating La. R.S. 14:130.1 (obstruction of justice) and La. R.S. 14:100

(hit and run driving).

On June 12, 2019, the State filed its notice that it intended to use

evidence of Fields’ other crimes, wrongs, and/or acts during the trial. The

State listed a previous offense from 2007 in which Fields struck another

vehicle and fled the scene in a careless or reckless fashion. The State

submitted that this previous offense would be offered to show proof of

intent, knowledge, identity, notice, absence of mistake or accident, and

modus operandi, or for any other purposes for which it may be deemed

relevant and admissible.

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On June 23, 2020, in open court, the trial court ruled that the previous

offense was admissible if the State could prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the previous offense was committed by Fields. It stated the

purpose of the evidence would be to prove motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or

other reasonable purposes. The trial court noted Fields’ objection for the

record.

On October 4, 2021, Fields filed a motion in limine to exclude the

evidence of her previous hit-and-run citation. She asserted that the evidence

was prejudicial, shameful, and irrelevant. On October 11, 2021, in open

court, the trial court denied the motion in limine. It ruled that it would allow

the officer who wrote the previous citation to testify as long as it did not

involve hearsay.

The six-member jury was chosen and the trial began on October 12,

2021. The State’s first witness was Alice West, Nathaniel Nicholson’s

sister. She stated that she last saw her brother on the morning of the

accident before he left for church. She stated that she received a phone call

that evening from a doctor who told her she needed to get to the hospital

because her brother had been hit and he was not looking good. She stated

that when she arrived at the hospital, her brother was deceased.

Lashonda Tilmon testified that as she was leaving work the night of

the accident, she saw someone lying on the side of the road, between the

road and the sidewalk. She stated that she went to check on him and when

she saw all the blood, she called 911. She testified that one of his shoes was

in the middle of the street and it looked as if he had a bag with him.

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Cpl. Morris testified that when he arrived on the scene, he took

pictures of the vehicle debris, the victim’s shoes and bag, and the blood on

the sidewalk. Those pictures were introduced as evidence. He stated that

after photographing the scene, he went to the hospital to photograph the

victim’s injuries, which were also introduced into evidence. He testified that

his initial involvement in the case ended after taking the pictures, but he was

later reassigned to the case after the previous investigator was promoted.

Cpl. Morris detailed the steps he took in the investigation, which coincides

with his police report narrative detailed above. He testified that based on

Fields’ cell phone data, her internet activity included “searching legal,

looking for the wreck on the internet, things like that.”

On cross-examination, Cpl. Morris testified that he did not believe the

victim was walking on the sidewalk at the time of the accident; the area was

not well-lit; and, the victim was wearing blue jeans, a black shirt, a black or

blue hat, and no reflective material. He stated that there were no

eyewitnesses to the accident and he does not know 100 percent that Fields

was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

Jarvis Armington testified that he was friends with Fields at the time

of the accident, he formerly coached her son in football, and they previously

dated for a few months. He testified that Fields contacted him and stated she

hit something in the road and asked if he knew anyone who does car repairs.

He stated that he never saw the vehicle and she never told him that she hit

someone.

Lieutenant Shannon Mack of the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office

testified that she assisted in retrieving the cell phone information for SPD.

She described the process of mapping a phone’s location from the data
7

received from the carrier. Through Lt. Mack, the State introduced maps

showing that Fields moved from her house to the accident site and back to

her house on the night of the accident.

Bobby Rothenberger, the parts manager at a Honda dealership,

testified that he assisted SPD in identifying the make and model of the

vehicle to which the passenger side mirror belonged. Mr. Stephenson, the

owner of Louisiana Glass, testified that he called SPD to notify them that a

vehicle they worked on matched the description of a vehicle described in the

SPD media release. The surveillance video from Louisiana Glass was

introduced and played for the jury during Mr. Stephenson’s testimony.

Ronnie Odums, an employee with Louisiana Glass, testified that he

heard on the news that police were looking for a vehicle that had damage on

the right side, windshield, mirror, and possibly the headlights. He stated that

the description resembled a vehicle that he had worked on, which had a

bashed-in windshield on the passenger side, damage to the passenger side

mirror, and a new mirror in the back seat of the vehicle. Mr. Odums

testified that the damage to the car did not look consistent with damage

caused by a baseball or baseball bat, but it looked like a large object hit the

windshield, like an animal or deer. Mr. Odums stated that he told his boss,

Mr. Stephenson, about the vehicle, and Mr. Stephenson contacted the police.

Joseph Lofton testified that Fields texted him the night of the accident

and he went to help her with her car the next morning. He stated that he

helped her pay to have her windshield fixed and drove her car to Louisiana

Glass. He testified that Fields asked him to pick up some paint from

Sherwin-Williams and parts from New World International. He stated that

he did not ask Fields questions regarding the car and described himself as
8

“Mr. Old Reliable.” Mr. Lofton testified that when questioned by the police,

he told them everything about the windshield, paint, and car parts. He stated

that he was not involved in the accident and only drove the vehicle to get it

repaired.

Sgt. Sanchez testified that she was assigned the case the morning after

the accident and she received all of the photos and evidence collected from

the scene. She described the comparison of the paint chips on the side

mirrors, as detailed in her report above. She further described her process of

identifying the type of vehicle to which the mirror belonged. Photos taken

of evidence were introduced during Sgt. Sanchez’s testimony. She testified

that after the media release seeking information about the accident, she

received a call from the owner of Louisiana Glass and spoke with employees

about a vehicle matching the description.

Sgt. Sanchez testified that she interviewed Mr. Lofton and was able to

verify his statements regarding purchases with all the stores he visited. She

stated that when they impounded Fields’ vehicle, she could smell a strong

paint odor on the vehicle.

Dr. James Traylor testified that he performed the autopsy on

Nathaniel Nicholson. He was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology.

Dr. Traylor’s autopsy report was introduced into evidence. He stated that

Mr. Nicholson had blunt force injuries to his head, which were fatal. He

stated that Mr. Nicholson also had abrasions, a large contusion on the left

side of his head, fractures on his skull, right side rib fractures, which

punctured his lung, and a laceration to his liver. He testified that the only

thing found in his system was caffeine. Dr. Traylor concluded that

9

Nicholson was not lying in the road and run over, rather he was upright

when he was hit.

SPD Sgt. John Jackson testified regarding Fields’ previous hit-and-run

citation in 2007. He referred to his report and stated that he met up with

Fields after a minor accident with another vehicle. He testified that he

issued her a citation for hit and run. The State rested after the testimony of

Sgt. Jackson.

The defense called its only witness, Terrell Myles, a former

prosecutor in Shreveport City Court. He testified that the City did not

proceed with prosecuting Fields’ 2007 hit-and-run citation. He stated that

the citation was ultimately dismissed.

After closing arguments and jury instructions, the jury was sent back

for deliberations. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty for

obstruction of justice and not guilty for hit-and-run driving. The State

requested that the jury be polled.

On October 19, 2021, Fields filed a motion for new trial arguing that

the trial court’s rulings made during the trial show prejudicial error. She

argued the trial court erred in denying her motion in limine to exclude

404(B) evidence. Fields filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on the

same day arguing the weight of the evidence did not support a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime of obstruction of justice. She

also argued in this motion that the trial court erred in denying her motion in

limine to exclude 404(B) evidence. Both of these motions were denied in

open court prior to sentencing. Defense then waived all sentencing delays.

At sentencing, the trial court received multiple letters and statements

on Fields’ behalf. The trial court stated that it found paragraph three of La.
10

C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(A) to be applicable—a lesser sentence would deprecate

the seriousness of the offense. It stated that it had considered all factors in

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B). It stated that the only aggravating circumstance

was that she committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the

commission of another offense. The trial court found no mitigating

circumstances to apply. The trial court then sentenced Fields to five years at

hard labor. Fields now appeals her conviction.

DISCUSSION

Insufficient Evidence

Fields argues the trial court erred when it denied her motion for new

trial and motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal because there was no

evidence that she attempted to conceal that her car was in an accident. She

argues that Mr. Lofton’s self-serving testimony was the only evidence

presented that she was involved in the post-accident clean-up. She asserts

the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

The State asserts that Fields’ argument is nothing more than an attack

on the jury’s acceptance of Mr. Lofton’s testimony and its credibility

determination, which is entitled to great deference on appeal. The State

asserts that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer from the

circumstances that Fields had the requisite specific intent to tamper with

evidence of her car being involved in a hit-and-run.

Fields argued before the trial court and on appeal that there was

insufficient evidence to convict her of obstruction of justice. The standard

of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
11

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.

Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851

So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248

(2004); State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224,

writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797. This standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the

appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So. 2d 517; State v. Nabors, 52,163 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/19/18), 251 So.

3d 1214, writ denied, 18-1477 (La. 9/21/18), 252 So. 3d 496.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.

State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Nabors, supra.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So. 3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243

So. 3d 1064. If a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.
12

15:438; Id. The appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution and determines whether an alternative

hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306

(La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v. Mathis, 52,500 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/16/19), 263 So. 3d 613.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442;

State v. Mathis, supra. A reviewing court accords great deference to the

jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in

part. State v. Mathis, supra.

Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Cooley, 51,895 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/23/18), 247 So. 3d 1159, writ

denied, 18-1160 (La. 3/6/19), 266 So. 3d 899. In the absence of internal

contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness’s

testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite

factual conclusion. State v. Jones, 52,672 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So.

3d 585, writ denied, 19-01075 (La. 10/1/19), 280 So. 3d 160; State v.

Cooley, supra.

La. R.S. 14:130.1 states the following, in pertinent part:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following
when committed with the knowledge that such act has,
reasonably may, or will affect an actual or potential present,
past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this Section:
(1) Tampering with evidence with the specific intent of
distorting the results of any criminal investigation or
proceeding which may reasonably prove relevant to a criminal
13

investigation or proceeding. Tampering with evidence shall
include the intentional alteration, movement, removal, or
addition of any object or substance either:
(a) At the location of any incident which the perpetrator knows
or has good reason to believe will be the subject of any
investigation by state, local, or United States law enforcement
officers; or
(b) At the location of storage, transfer, or place of review of any
such evidence.

The knowledge requirement in paragraph (A) is met if the perpetrator

merely knows that an act reasonably may affect a potential or future criminal

proceeding. State v. Jones, 07-1052 (La. 6/3/08), 983 So. 2d 95; State v.

Matthews, 50,838 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So. 3d 895, writ denied, 16-

1678 (La. 6/5/17), 220 So. 3d 752. The defendant must also have tampered

with evidence with the specific intent of distorting the results of a criminal

investigation. La. R.S. 14:130.1(A)(1). Nothing beyond movement of the

evidence is required by the statute if accompanied by the requisite intent and

knowledge. Id.

After review under the Jackson standard, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to support Fields’ conviction for obstruction of

justice. The jury, as finder of fact, accepted the following testimony from

Mr. Lofton: Fields contacted him the day after the accident for help repairing

her car; he only drove the car for repairs; he had not driven the car prior to

that day; and, Fields told him where to go for parts and paint. The stores

where Mr. Lofton purchased the parts and paint corroborated his story of

what he purchased and that he paid with cash.

In addition to Mr. Lofton’s testimony, the jury heard from

investigators who stated that they found internet searches on Fields’ phone

for legal information and news of the accident. These internet searches,

coupled with the other witnesses’ testimonies about Fields’ behavior after

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the accident, are sufficient for the jury to find the requisite intent and

knowledge that any vehicle repairs may affect a future investigation. Our

law only requires the movement of evidence if the requisite intent or

knowledge is established. Therefore, Fields’ replacement of her windshield

and side mirror and repainting of her vehicle, coupled with her

intent/knowledge, are sufficient to establish that she violated La. R.S.

14:130.1, obstruction of justice. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Other Crimes Evidence- La. C.E. art. 404(B)

Fields argues that the trial court erred when it granted the State’s

motion to admit other crimes evidence of a minor traffic accident in 2007,

which was 14 years before the trial was held in this matter. Fields asserts

that the State failed to state under which 404(B) factor it sought to admit the

prior accident—plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or accident.

She asserts that allowing the admission of the evidence was not harmless

error because it was extremely prejudicial and the jury’s verdict cannot be

considered “unattributable” to this error. She requests that her conviction

and sentence be reversed.

The State argues that Fields has failed to show any error by the trial

court in admitting the evidence of the previous hit-and-run citation. The

State argues that even if it was an error to admit the other crimes evidence,

which it disputes, the harmless error review applies. It asserts that Fields

was not convicted of the hit-and-run so the evidence had no effect on

influencing the jury to find her guilty of that charge.

Code of Evidence article 404(B)(1) embodies the settled principle that

evidence of other crimes may be admissible if the state establishes an

independent and relevant reason for its admission. State v. Taylor, 16-1124
15

(La. 12/1/16), 217 So. 3d 283. This evidence must have substantial

relevance independent from showing defendant’s general criminal character

in that it tends to prove a material fact genuinely at issue. State v. Jones, 17-

00658 (La. 10/22/19), 285 So. 3d 1074; State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08),

976 So. 2d 109.

It is the duty of the district court in its gatekeeping function to

determine the independent relevancy of this evidence. State v. Miner, 17-

1586 (La. 1/4/18), 232 So. 3d 551; State v. Altenberger, 13-2518 (La.

4/11/14), 139 So. 3d 510. The district court must also balance the probative

value of the other crimes, wrongs or acts evidence against its prejudicial

effects before the evidence can be admitted. State v. Miner, supra; State v.

Henderson, 12-2422 (La. 1/4/13), 107 So. 3d 566.

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence

will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 18-

01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So. 3d 199, cert. denied, 212 L. Ed. 2d 596, 142 S.

Ct. 1702 (2022); State v. Allen, 54,153 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/21), 331 So.

3d 1101. The erroneous introduction of other crimes evidence is subject to

harmless error review. State v. Gatti, 39,833 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/13/05), 914

So. 2d 74, writ denied, 05-2394 (La. 4/17/06), 926 So. 2d 511. Trial error is

harmless where the verdict rendered is “surely unattributable to the error.”

State v. Jones, 50,270 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/10/16), 188 So. 3d 268, writ denied,

16-0858 (La. 5/1/17), 220 So. 3d 742.

Given the trial court’s vast discretion in this regard, the trial court did

not abuse that discretion in finding the prior hit-and-run charge was relevant

to establish Fields’ motive, knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident.

Even if the trial court erred in admitting the prior charge, the error is
16

harmless. In the case before us, the jury found Fields not guilty of the hit-

and-run charge and guilty of obstruction of justice. The prior charge, which

the jury heard was dismissed, was not for obstruction of justice. Therefore,

the guilty verdict was unattributable to any error. As previously stated, the

evidence of obstruction of justice was sufficient to render this error

harmless. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Error Patent

Our error patent review indicates that Fields’ sentence is illegally

lenient as the trial court did not impose a fine of not more than $10,000, as

required by La. R.S. 14:130.1(B)(3). Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A),

an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time by the court that imposed

the sentence or by an appellate court on review. However, as this Court has

recognized, we are not required to take such action. State v. Bell, 51,312

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 79; State v. Pena, 43,321 (La. App. 2

Cir. 7/30/08), 988 So. 2d 841.

The State did not object to the error and Fields was not prejudiced in

any way by the failure to impose the mandatory fine. Thus, we decline to

remand the case for correction of the sentence to include a fine. See also

State v. Murray, 42,655 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/24/07), 968 So. 2d 916, writ

denied, 08-0468 (La. 11/14/08), 996 So. 2d 1083.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Fields’ conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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