Kenya Cotton v. Walmart, Inc. d/b/a Walmart and Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC d/b/a Walmart

Judgment rendered April 5, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,983-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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KENYA COTTON Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

WALMART, INC. D/B/A Defendant-Appellee
WALMART AND WAL-MART
LOUISIANA, LLC D/B/A
WALMART

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 623419

Honorable Ramon Lafitte, Judge

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LAW OFFICE OF ALLEN COOPER, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: James Allen Cooper, Jr.

BLANCHARD, WALKER, O’QUIN Counsel for Appellee
& ROBERTS
By: Stacey D. Williams

*****

Before STONE, STEPHENS, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STONE, J.

This civil appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, the

Honorable Ramon Lafitte, presiding. The plaintiff, Kenya Cotton (“Ms.

Cotton”), appeals the motion for summary judgment (“MSJ”) granted in

favor of defendant, Wal-Mart Louisiana, LLC and Walmart Inc.

(“Walmart”). The trial court found that Walmart did not have actual or

constructive knowledge of an unreasonably dangerous condition before Ms.

Cotton slipped and fell on Walmart’s premises. For the following reasons,

we reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 20, 2019, Ms. Cotton and her mother were shopping at the

Walmart SuperCenter store on Mansfield Road in Shreveport, Louisiana.

Ms. Cotton was shopping in the produce area. As she approached the bag

dispenser, she slipped and fell in an unknown substance on the floor. She

suffered bodily injuries and medical expenses as a result of the fall.

On April 20, 2020, Ms. Cotton filed a petition for damages against

Walmart alleging negligence. She claimed Walmart knew or should have

known of the unreasonably dangerous condition and that, despite this

knowledge, Walmart did not take timely action to remedy or warn Ms.

Cotton of the dangerous condition.

On September 29, 2021, Walmart filed a MSJ on the grounds that Ms.

Cotton could not prove the essential elements of her claim, specifically: (1)

that Walmart had actual or constructive notice of the floor condition prior to

the slip, (2) that Walmart failed to exercise reasonable care as required by

the Merchant Liability Statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6; and (3) that Walmart

caused the substance to be on the floor. In support of the motion, Walmart

attached the petition, and Ms. Cotton’s and her mother’s deposition

testimony. Both women testified that they did not know how the substance

got on the floor and they did not know if any Walmart employee knew of its

existence on the floor.

Ms. Cotton opposed the MSJ asserting that there are factual issues

relative to Walmart’s constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition.

Ms. Cotton submitted her deposition testimony and that of Chad Thomas

(“Mr. Thomas”), the Walmart store representative and asset protection

manager. In her deposition, Ms. Cotton testified that she did not see the

substance on the floor or any wet floor signs prior to her fall. Ms. Cotton

described the substance as a clear, slimy puddle. The video recording of the

incident was played during the deposition, and Ms. Cotton identified herself

and her mother on the video. She identified the pictures taken from the date

of the incident, and verified that one of the pictures depicted the skid mark

from her shoe as she fell. Also, Ms. Cotton testified that she completed an

incident report the day of the fall and it was presented during the deposition

testimony. After her fall, the Walmart maintenance man cleaned the

substance and placed warning signs in that area.

In his deposition, Mr. Thomas confirmed that he saved the video

footage from the incident and testified that it is Walmart’s standard

operating procedure to preserve an hour of video surveillance and to take

five pictures of every accident. When presented with those pictures, Mr.

Thomas admitted that there were brown stains at the base of the produce

weight stand that appeared to have dried. He further stated that “it is

possible” that stains can come from fruit and vegetables that are being

handled, weighed, and bagged. He also testified that Walmart knows that
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fruits and vegetables can leak while being weighed, handled, and bagged and

despite this knowledge there was no mat located in that area where Ms.

Cotton fell.

He testified that putting a mat in the vicinity where the produce is

weighed and bagged should not cost much, but Walmart corporate

representatives make those decisions. After viewing the surveillance

footage and pictures taken from the day of the incident, Mr. Thomas testified

that Ms. Cotton fell approximately 1 foot from the produce stand, and the

brown stains near it appeared to have been there for a while. Mr. Thomas

did not dispute that Ms. Cotton slipped on a substance on Walmart premises.

He further testified that a customer with a full buggy was responsible for the

substance being on the floor that caused Ms. Cotton to fall because that

customer was in the exact spot several minutes before the fall, and if that

customer did not cause the substance to be on the floor, the substance

appeared to be on the floor before the video surveillance footage.1

He testified that Walmart floors are supposed to be cleaned daily, but

they are not because associates do not come to work, and the floors are not

cleaned as frequently as they should be. Mr. Thomas admitted that there

were no caution signs, wet floor signs, or warnings of any kind in the area

where Ms. Cotton fell to put her on notice that was a substance on the floor

prior to her fall. He testified that it is all the employees’ responsibilities to

look for spills, debris, and clean it up when they see it and that no specific

employee is assigned to the produce section of the store to inspect the floor

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Mr. Thomas did not see Ms. Cotton’s fall. He formed this opinion after viewing
the video surveillance.
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for hazards. Mr. Thomas also testified that it could take an hour before an

employee discovered a substance on the floor.

On April 18, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the MSJ and ruled

in favor of Walmart. The trial court held that Walmart did not have actual or

constructive knowledge of the substance’s presence on the floor, and all of

Ms. Cotton’s assertions were speculative. Ms. Cotton now appeals, urging

that there are multiple genuine issues of material fact that render summary

judgment improper including: (1) the trial court erred in finding that it was

immaterial whether the substance was on the floor either seven minutes or

an hour before Ms. Cotton’s fall; (2) the trial court erred in not finding that

there were issues of material fact regarding the stains created from the dried

liquid produce; (3) the trial court erred in finding that Walmart’s failure to

clean the floor did not create a genuine issue of material fact; and (4) the

trial court erred in finding that there was no issue regarding Walmart’s

alleged negligence in failing to place a mat in or near the fruit and vegetable

section.

DISCUSSION

Ms. Cotton argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she

failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the

substance was on the floor either seven minutes or an hour before her fall

and whether Walmart had actual or constructive knowledge of the substance

on the floor. Furthermore, she contends that the trial court erred in finding

that the stains created from the dried produce did not create a genuine issue

of material fact regarding the length of time the liquid was on the floor, and

when Walmart should have discovered it. Ms. Cotton further asserts that

Walmart’s failure to exercise reasonable care by regularly cleaning the
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floors and by placing mats in or near the fruit and vegetable section created

genuine issues of material fact.

Walmart argues that Ms. Cotton cannot prove that it had actual or

constructive knowledge that the substance was on the floor and that all of

Ms. Cotton’s claims rely on speculation.

Appellate courts review motions for summary judgment de novo,

using the same criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether

summary judgment is appropriate. Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 12-2292

(La. 6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791; Coleman v. Lowery Carnival Co., 53,467 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/22/20), 295 So. 3d 427, writ denied, 20-00594 (La. 9/23/20),

301 So. 3d 1179. We view the record and all reasonable inferences to be

drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hines v.

Garrett, 04-0806 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So. 2d 764; Coleman v. Lowery

Carnival Co., supra. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if

the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no

genuine issue as to material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). A fact is “material” when its

existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff’s cause of action

under the applicable theory of recovery. Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co.,

supra. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could

disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no

need for a trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Hines v.

Garrett, supra; Franklin v. Dick, 51,479 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So.

3d 1130. In determining whether an issue is genuine, a court should not

consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony or

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weigh evidence. Marioneaux v. Marioneaux, 52,212 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/15/18), 254 So. 3d 13.

La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1) allocates the burden of proof on a motion for

summary judgment as follows:

The burden of proof rests with the mover. Nevertheless, if the
mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that
is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the
mover’s burden on the motion does not require him to negate
all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or
defense, but rather to point out to the court the absence of
factual support for one or more elements essential to the
adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. The burden is on the
adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the
mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to

the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and

admissions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). Furthermore, the court may consider

only those documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for

summary judgment and shall consider any documents to which no objection

is made. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(2).

Imposition of liability against a merchant for a patron’s injuries

resulting from an accident on the merchant’s premises is governed by the

merchant liability statute, La. R.S. 9:2800.6, which provides, in part:

A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to
exercise reasonable care to keep his aisles, passageways, and
floors in a reasonably safe condition. This duty includes a
reasonable effort to keep the premises free of any hazardous
conditions which reasonably might give rise to damage.

B. In a negligence claim brought against a merchant by a person
lawfully on the merchant’s premises for damages as a result of
an injury…sustained because of a fall due to a condition
existing in or on a merchant’s premises, the claimant shall have
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the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his
cause of action, all of the following:

(1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of
harm to the claimant and that risk of harm was
reasonably foreseeable.
(2) The merchant either created or had actual or
constructive notice of the condition which caused the
damage, prior to the occurrence.
(3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care.
In determining reasonable care, the absence of a
written or verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure
is insufficient, alone, to prove failure to exercise
reasonable care.

C. Definitions:

(1) “Constructive notice” means the claimant has
proven that the condition existed for such a period
of time that it would have been discovered if the
merchant had exercised reasonable care. The
presence of an employee of the merchant in the
vicinity in which the condition exists does not,
alone, constitute constructive notice, unless it is
shown that the employee knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known, of the
condition.

Plaintiffs who slip and fall in merchants’ premises bear a heavy

burden of proof. McDonald v. PNK (Bossier City), LLC, 53,561 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/23/20), 304 So. 3d 143, writ denied, 20-01416 (La. 2/9/21), 310 So.

3d 179. A plaintiff must establish that a defendant had constructive notice of

an unreasonably dangerous condition. La. R.S. 9:2800.6(C)(1).

In the case sub judice, there are genuine issues of material fact. The

evidence shows that Ms. Cotton was shopping in the Walmart produce

section when she slipped and fell, a fact that Mr. Thomas did not dispute.

The evidence establishes a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Walmart kept its floors in a reasonably safe condition. Mr. Thomas testified

that Walmart failed to follow its own standard procedure because he

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admitted that the floors were not being cleaned daily as company policy

requires because of lack of employees coming to work. Furthermore, he

testified that there are no employees assigned to inspect the produce

section, although every employee is responsible for inspecting for hazards

and knowing to clean up spills, should an employee encounter one. Ms.

Cotton testified that she did not see any wet floor signs prior to her fall,

but signs were placed after her fall.

It is undisputed that Walmart knew that fruits and vegetables were

capable of leaking liquid while being weighed, handled, and bagged, yet

Walmart failed to place a mat in that area. Furthermore, Mr. Thomas stated

that it would not cost much for Walmart to place a slip resistant mat in the

vicinity where Ms. Cotton fell. This evidence creates a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether Walmart created an unreasonably dangerous

condition for customers by not ensuring that the floors were cleaned

properly and not placing a mat by the produce stand.

After viewing the picture taken of the area following the accident, Mr.

Thomas testified that the brown stains at the base of the produce weight

stand appeared to have dried, and those stains on the floor apparently existed

for a while. He answered “it is possible” when asked if those stains came

from customers handling, weighing, and bagging the fruits and vegetables.

Furthermore, in his deposition testimony, Mr. Thomas stated that no specific

employee was assigned to monitor the floor of the produce section, store

employees failed to conduct regular walk-throughs of the store, and that it

was all the employee’s responsibility to look for spills. He also testified

that it could take an hour for an employee to discover the substance on the

floor.
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Ms. Cotton produced evidence establishing genuine issues of

material fact. Based on the summary judgment evidence, a trier of fact

could determine that the floor where Ms. Cotton fell was wet for a

sufficient length of time that reasonable diligence would have led to its

discovery and remediation.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the summary judgment is hereby reversed, and the

matter remanded for further proceedings. All costs of this appeal are

assessed to appellee.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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