Ora Hall v. Jo Bennett and United Services Automobile Association

Judgment rendered April 5, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 54,995-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

ORA HALL Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

JO BENNETT and UNITED Defendants-Appellees
SERVICES AUTOMOBILE
ASSOCIATION

*****

Appealed from the
Fourth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Ouachita, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2019-2946

Honorable C. Wendell Manning, Judge

*****

EDDIE M. CLARK & ASSOCIATES, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: Eddie M. Clark

MAYER, SMITH & ROBERTS, LLP Counsel for Appellees
By: Frank Knox Carroll

*****

Before PITMAN, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Ora Hall appeals a jury verdict and judgment that awarded her

$100,000 for past pain and suffering and $86,748.52 for past medical

expenses arising from an auto accident, but denied her claims for mental

anguish, future medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life. For the

reasons expressed, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ms. Hall was a 43-year-old certified nursing assistant who worked at

the Northeast Louisiana Veterans Home, on Hwy. 165 North (Sterlington

Road) in Monroe. On November 1, 2018, she had left her shift and was

driving her 2011 Hyundai Sonata north on Sterlington Rd., in the left lane.

At that moment, Jo Bennett was pulling out of the Veterans Home’s public

parking lot, turning right onto Sterlington Rd. in her 2012 Jeep Grand

Cherokee. Ms. Bennett was not paying adequate attention to the traffic. She

ran the front driver’s side of her Jeep into the rear passenger side of Ms.

Hall’s Hyundai. Ms. Hall estimated she was going about 50 mph at the

time; Ms. Bennett estimated she was going about 5 mph, having just pulled

onto the road. Ms. Hall was able to drive her Hyundai home.

Ms. Hall told police at the scene that she was not hurt, but the next

day, November 2, she went to University Health (also called, in the

transcript, “E.A. Conway”) with pain in her lumbar spine and right posterior

upper leg, which she rated as “mild.” They gave her a Toradol injection and

released her to return to work November 5. According to her husband’s

testimony, Ms. Hall missed less than one week of work.

A week later, however, on November 8, Ms. Hall went to a

chiropractor, Dr. G.G. Grant IV, complaining of headaches, upper and lower

back pain, and right hip pain that radiated down her leg. Dr. Grant found

that her back movement was not 100%, and started her on a course of

treatments that ran about four months. By the time these concluded, on

March 3, 2019, she had dropped her rating of lower back pain (“LBP”) from

“8” to “3,” but manipulations did not completely resolve the issue, so Dr.

Grant had advised seeing a pain management specialist. Based on her

symptoms and her reported history of being pain-free before, Dr. Grant

ascribed all her current problems to the accident.

Ms. Hall went to the pain specialist, Dr. John Ledbetter, on January

23, 2019. He ordered an MRI, which showed mildly exaggerated lumbar

lordosis, advanced facet osteoarthropathy at C4-5 (suggesting active

apophysitis), and degenerative changes at L4-5. Starting in March 2019, Dr.

Ledbetter performed lumbar medial branch block procedures (called, in the

record, “ablations” or “neurotomies”), on the left and right sides, two weeks

apart. Each of these resulted in excellent, 100% pain relief, but the results

were only temporary. The process had to be repeated in April-May 2019,

April-May 2020, and May 2021, resulting in 90% pain reduction and no

needed medication, but with the likelihood of having to repeat the process

annually. Dr. Ledbetter conceded that Ms. Hall’s arthritic changes may have

predated the accident, but, based on her reported history of being pain-free

before, they were asymptomatic. He therefore ascribed all her current

complaints, and future medical treatment, to the accident.

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PROCEDURAL AND LITIGATION HISTORY

Ms. Hall filed this suit in September 2019 against Ms. Bennett and her

auto insurance carrier, United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”).

She alleged that the collision “caused or aggravated any pre-existing

injuries”; in a discovery deposition in February 2020, she denied any prior

low-back issues and stated that all her current pain resulted from this

accident. USAA found, however, that 16 months before the accident, in

June 2017, Ms. Hall had gone to a family doctor, Dr. Marshall Sanson, with

complaints of LBP shooting down her right leg, precisely her postaccident

complaint to Dr. Ledbetter. At trial, she admitted this, as well as seeing a

chiropractor some 10-11 years prior, but insisted these were soft-tissue

injuries, and they had totally cleared up before Ms. Bennett rear-ended her.

USAA sent Ms. Hall’s medical records to Dr. Alan Kaye, a noted

expert in interventional pain care and pharmacology, and lead author of a

textbook called Case Studies in Pain Management, which describes a

condition called Bertolotti’s syndrome. Dr. Kaye agreed that Ms. Hall’s

February 2019 MRI showed edema, which he deemed clear proof of acute

trauma and a recent accident. However, the MRI also showed arthritic and

degenerative changes that were present on the 2017 X-ray taken at Dr.

Sanson’s office. He testified that these changes predated the accident and

would continue to give her chronic problems the rest of her life. He also felt

that her current condition was aggravated by her obesity (5′5″, 195 lbs.) and

the nature of her work as a CNA. Although he did not mention it in his

initial report, he stated in his deposition that this was a classic case of

Bertolotti’s syndrome, which affects 4-8% of the population and is

permanent.
3

Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that Ms. Bennett was solely at fault

in the accident; Ms. Hall’s medical expenses, to date, were $86,748.52; Ms.

Hall’s medical records were true and correct copies; and USAA insured Ms.

Bennett for the accident.

TRIAL EVIDENCE

The parties proceeded to jury trial over six days from January 31

through February 9, 2022. After the jury was selected, on the third day of

trial, Ms. Hall filed an “Emergency Daubert Motion” to exclude Dr. Kaye

from referring to the accident as a “low impact” or “low speed” wreck

(USAA ultimately agreed to this) and from expressing any opinion regarding

Bertolotti’s syndrome. She contended that no doctor had ever diagnosed her

with this and no medical records supported it. The court denied this motion

as untimely, adding that Ms. Hall’s counsel had known about Dr. Kaye’s

opinion for over five months and thus had adequate time to hire his own

expert.

On the fifth day of trial, Ms. Hall filed a “Motion to Extend Time

Limitation” for closing arguments, seeking 60 minutes instead of 30. The

court denied this also, noting (1) it was untimely, (2) Ms. Hall’s counsel had

not objected when 30 minutes was listed in the pretrial order, and (3) the

stipulations obviated the need to argue many normal evidentiary issues.

On the merits, Dr. Grant, the chiropractor, testified as outlined above.

He found “no evidence” that Ms. Hall suffered from her symptoms before

the accident or was malingering. He admitted that she had seen Dr. Sanson

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for LBP earlier, but he took her word that those complaints were completely

resolved before the accident.1

Dr. Ledbetter, Ms. Hall’s expert in anesthesiology and pain

management, testified by deposition as described above. He admitted that

her chronic condition may have predated the accident, and he was surprised

to hear (at trial, for the first time) that she had seen another doctor earlier for

LBP. He also agreed that her work as a CNA and her obesity might have

contributed to her current state. Still, he believed she was asymptomatic

before the accident, the ablations gave her good relief, and she would need

these annually. At first, he said she would need them the rest of her life, but

later amended this to say for the next 10-15 years.

Elizabeth Peralta, an expert in lifecare planning, testified that Ms.

Hall’s life expectancy was 37.9 years; annual ablations, plus follow-up care,

would cost $836,945.70. Chad Garland, an expert forensic accountant,

testified the present value of her needed lifetime care was $1,701,583.06, but

if ablations were limited to only 10 years, it would be $249,125.23.

Ms. Hall’s husband testified that she had no back pain before the

accident, but since, she has “good days and bad days.” He described having

to help walk her back to the car after each ablation. On cross-examination,

he admitted she was making no claim for lost wages.

Ms. Hall admitted she had been to Dr. Sanson for LBP about 16

months before the accident, but this was “muscle pain” and she had

completely got over it. She added that her normal activities had been limited

1
On cross-examination, Dr. Grant admitted that by arrangement with Ms. Hall’s
counsel, he would receive no payment for his services (some $7,400) unless Ms. Hall got
a favorable verdict.
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by her pain, and that she intended to get the ablations annually, as long as

they continued to help her.

For USAA, Ms. Bennett testified that she was going only about 5 mph

when she struck the rear of Ms. Hall’s Hyundai: the Hyundai’s bumper came

off, but Ms. Hall was able to drive the car away. The damage to her own

Jeep was negligible, $1,623.2

Dr. Robert Eisenstadt, Ph.D., an expert economist and retired

University of Louisiana-Monroe professor, projected Ms. Hall’s future

medicals as $354,468 (based on 15 years of ablations) or $229,479 (based on

10 years).

Dr. Kaye, USAA’s expert in interventional pain management, testified

by deposition that he had not physically examined Ms. Hall. However, her

MRI showed “enlarged transverse process forming pseudo arthritis with

sacral ala,” the very definition of Bertolotti’s syndrome, as well as enlarged

lumbar facets, both predating the accident. He also stated that her physical

work as a CNA, her obesity, and probably her genetics contributed to her

condition. He agreed that Dr. Ledbetter’s treatment had been appropriate,

but felt the direct effects of the accident had subsided and Ms. Hall was now

experiencing pain she would have encountered anyway because of

Bertolotti’s syndrome.

ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT

The 12-member jury deliberated slightly under one hour and returned

the verdict awarding past and future pain and suffering of $100,000 and past

medicals of $86,748.52 (per the stipulation) but denying the claims of

2
The damage estimate for Ms. Hall’s Hyundai was $4,657.48.
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mental anguish, future medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life. The

court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and later denied Ms.

Hall’s motion for JNOV, new trial, or additur.

Ms. Hall took this devolutive appeal designating three assignments of

error.

DISCUSSION

Extent of Injuries

By her first assignment of error, Ms. Hall urges the jury manifestly

erred in failing to apply the legal presumption that her low back symptoms

that immediately appeared and continuously manifested themselves after the

accident were, in fact, caused by the accident. She reiterates her testimony

that her pain started with the accident, and argues that minor symptoms she

took to Dr. Sanson months earlier were completely resolved before the

accident. She cites the presumption of causation, Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.

2d 973 (La. 1991); the rule of taking the victim as you find her, Touchard v.

Slemco Elec. Found., 99-3577 (La. 10/17/00), 769 So. 2d 1200; the

plaintiff’s burden of proof, Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 94-

2603 (La. 2/20/95), 650 So. 2d 757; and the application of manifest error to

the presumption of causation, Detraz v. Lee, 05-1263 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.

2d 557.

She extensively recites her medical evidence, stressing that she met

every element of the Housley standard, and arguing that the only contrary

evidence was the 2017 visit to Dr. Sanson, for muscle pain that had

completely resolved by the time of the accident. She also argues that Dr.

Kaye provided no basis to find when her aggravated condition may have

returned to pre-accident status. She concludes it was manifest error for the
7

jury not to award the full extent of her injuries, as was found in Saunders v.

ANPAC La. Ins. Co., 43,405 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 988 So. 2d 896.

She also argues that her damages are not really regulated by manifest

error but by “res nova review,” as stated in Mart v. Hill, 505 So. 2d 1120

(La. 1987): because the jury failed to consider the full extent of her damages,

she is entitled to review unhindered by manifest error. She argues she is

entitled to full indemnification. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Berthelot,

98-1011 (La. 4/13/99), 732 So. 2d 1230. She concludes that the judgment

should be amended to award her $400,000 for pain and suffering, $150,000

for loss of enjoyment of life, and $1,701,583.06 for future medical expenses.

A person injured through the fault of another is entitled to full

indemnification for the damages caused thereby. La. C.C. art. 2315; State v.

La. Land & Expl. Co., 12-0884 (La. 1/30/13), 110 So. 3d 1038; Wainwright

v. Fontenot, 00-0492 (La. 10/17/00), 774 So. 2d 70. A claimant’s injury is

presumed to have resulted from an accident, if before the accident the

injured person was in good health, but commencing with the accident the

symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest

themselves afterwards, providing that the medical evidence shows there to

be a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the

disabling condition. Housley v. Cerise, supra; Davis v. Wheeler, 53,233 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 3/4/20), 293 So. 3d 173, writ denied, 20-00781 (La. 10/14/20),

302 So. 3d 1124. Moreover, a defendant takes his victim as he finds her and

is responsible for all natural and probable consequences of his tortious

conduct. Wainwright v. Fontenot, supra; Davis v. Wheeler, supra.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence a causal connection between the accident and
8

injuries. Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra; Davis v. Wheeler,

supra. The plaintiff satisfies this burden by proving through medical and lay

testimony that it was more probable than not that the injury was caused by

the accident. Maranto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., supra; Davis v.

Wheeler, supra.

Whether an injury caused a person’s injuries is a question of fact, and

an appellate court may not set aside a finding of fact made by a judge or jury

in the absence of manifest error or unless it is clearly wrong. Hayes Fund

for First United Methodist Church of Welsh v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mtn.

LLC, 14-2592 (La. 12/8/15), 193 So. 3d 1110; Davis v. Wheeler, supra.

When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of

witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great

deference to the trier of fact’s findings, for only the factfinder can be aware

of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the

listener’s understanding and belief in what is said. Hayes Fund v. Kerr-

McGee Rocky Mtn., supra; Taylor v. Nexion Health at Pierremont Inc.,

54,802 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/14/22), 353 So. 3d 403.

At the outset, we must dismiss Ms. Hall’s argument, confected from

certain wording in Mart v. Hill, supra, that she is entitled to de novo review.

Subsequent cases have made it abundantly clear that de novo review is

available only when “a trial court legal error interdicts the fact-finding

process,” Evans v. Lungrin, 97-541 (La. 2/6/98), 708 So. 2d 731, and not

even in every such case, Hicks v. USAA Gen’l Indem. Co., 21-00840 (La.

3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 1106. The finding of causation is a distinctly factual

matter and subject to manifest error review. Hayes Fund v. Kerr-McGee

Rocky Mtn., supra; Davis v. Wheeler, supra. Under this standard, reversal is
9

warranted only if the appellate court finds that a reasonable factual basis

does not exist for the trial court’s finding and the record establishes that the

finding is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous. Ryan v. Zurich Amer. Ins.

Co., 07-2302 (La. 7/1/08), 988 So. 2d 214; Davis v. Wheeler, supra. On

thorough review, we find nothing in this record that prevented the jury from

receiving the relevant evidence, analyzing it, and assessing the competing

claims. The request for de novo review lacks merit.

On manifest error review, we find the jury was faced with conflicting

evidence regarding the causation and extent of Ms. Hall’s injuries. Her

chiropractor, Dr. Grant, and her pain specialist, Dr. Ledbetter, were uniform

in their view that all of Ms. Hall’s current problems stemmed from this

accident, but both admitted that their view was informed by Ms. Hall’s

reported history of being completely pain-free before the accident. Notably,

Dr. Ledbetter had never heard of her earlier treatment for very similar

symptoms with Dr. Sanson until he gave his trial deposition. Ms. Hall’s

husband testified, contrary to the medical records, that she had no LBP

before the accident; Ms. Hall admitted that, in a deposition, she denied any

prior LBP, but conceded at trial that she had indeed gone to Dr. Sanson for

LBP with pain “shooting down right leg,” and to a chiropractor some years

before that for unspecified treatment. On this evidence, a rational juror

could find that Ms. Hall was not truly pain-free, or in “good health,” so as to

activate the presumption of causation traced in Housley v. Cerise, supra.

On the other hand, there was the evidence that Ms. Hall sought

medical treatment from Dr. Sanson for similar LBP symptoms 16 months

before the accident, and from a chiropractor for unspecified back pain before

that. Then there was Dr. Kaye’s assessment, based on the MRI taken three
10

months after the accident, that Ms. Hall was still showing “acute process”

from the accident, and the X-ray taken 16 months before the accident,

showing significant preexisting issues. From these films, and from his study

of Dr. Grant’s and Dr. Ledbetter’s reports, he surmised that Ms. Hall was

having LBP before the accident, the accident aggravated it, and at some

point prior to trial it returned to pre-accident status. From the totality of the

evidence, we cannot say this explanation lacked reasonable factual basis.

We also consider the role of credibility in the jury’s decision. The

weight to be given to an expert’s testimony depends on the expert’s

qualifications and experience and especially on the facts on which that

expert’s opinion is based; the validity of the underlying facts relied on by the

expert is crucial. Mayes v. Morehouse Parish Sch. Bd., 54,796 (La. App. 2

Cir. 2/8/23), 355 So. 3d 750; Davis v. Sweeney, 44,997 (La. App. 2 Cir.

3/3/10), 31 So. 3d 1184; McDonnell v. Brammer Mach. Shop Inc., 22-116

(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22), 349 So. 3d 1151. Ms. Hall did not disclose any

prior LBP to Drs. Grant and Ledbetter, and this may have diminished the

jury’s reliance on their opinions. Also, Ms. Hall’s minimal treatment with

Dr. Sanson in June 2017 was deemed inadequate by Dr. Kaye, as the

symptoms reported then warranted a full spinal exam and MRI, which were

not provided; a reasonable juror may have found that her pre-accident

condition was not as trivial as she claimed. On this record, we will not

disturb the jury’s credibility calls.

Finally, Ms. Hall urges the verdict was manifestly erroneous because

there was no factual basis to determine when her aggravated condition

returned to pre-accident status. Juries and judges routinely must assess the

duration of an aggravation of preexisting injury, and their finding is subject
11

to manifest error review. Perry v. Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., 52,720 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/25/19), 280 So. 3d 813; Peters v. Williams, 40,403 (La. App. 2

Cir. 12/14/05), 917 So. 2d 702; Tompkins v. Savoie, 08-808 (La. App. 5 Cir.

3/24/09), 10 So. 3d 294. Dr. Kaye testified that all medical treatment

provided by Dr. Ledbetter was appropriate, and this provided a reasonable

basis for finding that the aggravation had subsided by the time of trial. We

perceive no manifest error.

The first assignment lacks merit.

Admission of Expert Testimony

By her second assignment of error, Ms. Hall urges the district court

erred in denying her Daubert motion to exclude all testimony on Bertolotti’s

syndrome. She argues that inadmissible evidence should not be presented to

the jury, La. C.E. art. 103 C. She then cites La. C.E. art. 702 A:

A. A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;
(2) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(3) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(4) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
to the facts of the case.

She concedes that the trial court has broad discretion in determining

whether expert testimony should be admissible and who should be permitted

to testify as an expert, Cheairs v. State, 03-0680 (La. 12/3/03), 861 So. 2d

536, Daubert v. Merrell Down Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786,

125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). She then contends that Dr. Kaye was unqualified

to render any medical opinion regarding the “alleged Bertolotti’s syndrome”

as no foundation had been laid and the diagnosis is “not remotely reliable.”
12

In support, she asserts that no evidence was ever introduced showing that

she had been diagnosed with this disease; hence, his testimony was just

conjecture and mere speculation.

Under the standard set out in Daubert, supra, the district court is

required to perform a “gatekeeping” function to “ensure that any and all

scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. Acting as gatekeeper, the

district court has considerable leeway to determine whether expert testimony

is reliable. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S. Ct. 1167,

143 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1999). “Whether Daubert’s specific factors are, or are

not, reasonable measures of reliability * * * is a matter that * * * the trial

judge [has] broad latitude to determine,” and the decision to admit or

exclude is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id., 526 U.S. 153, 119 S. Ct. at

1176.3

On close review, we find no abuse of the district court’s discretion.

Dr. Kaye cogently explained the physiology of Bertolotti’s syndrome and

how he found it on Ms. Hall’s MRI. He also testified that the syndrome has

been documented in a textbook of which he was the lead author. Aside from

the unsupported claim that the diagnosis is unreliable, Ms. Hall offered

nothing to challenge the “testability” of Dr. Kaye’s method, dispute its peer

review or publication, show its rate of error, or refute its general acceptance

in the medical community.

3
The factors listed in Daubert are (1) the “testability” of the scientific theory or
technique, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the methodology is
generally accepted in the scientific community. See, e.g., LaBauve v. La. Med. Mut. Ins.
Co., 21-00763 (La. 4/13/22), 347 So. 3d 724.
13

We also note that Dr. Kaye disclosed his diagnosis at his discovery

deposition, taken on August 23, 2021, and reiterated it in his trial deposition,

but counsel for Ms. Hall did not file his “emergency” Daubert motion until

the third day of trial, February 2, 2022. Despite over five months’ notice,

counsel produced no expert or other evidence to counter or at least question

Dr. Kaye’s testimony. On this record, we find no abuse of the district

court’s discretion.

This assignment lacks merit.

Time Limitation on Closing Argument

By her third assignment of error, Ms. Hall urges the district court

erred in refusing to grant her motion for extension of time for closing

arguments. She cites the constitutional guarantee of open courts, La. Const.

art. I, § 22, and the trial court’s power to require that the proceedings “be

conducted with dignity and in an orderly and expeditious manner, and to

control the proceedings at the trial, so that justice is done,” La. C.C.P. art.

1631. She concedes that the district court’s ruling on trial procedure will be

reversed only for abuse of discretion, First Nat’l Bank v. Carr, 572 So. 2d

1106 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990). However, she characterizes the trial evidence

as “copious,” including the testimony of her treating physician, her treating

chiropractor, the life care planner, two economics experts, and the

“unfounded and improperly admitted testimony” of Ms. Bennett’s expert.

She concludes that 30 minutes was simply not enough “for either side to

walk the jury through” this complex case, and the limitation hampered the

jury’s factfinding function. She submits that this court should vacate the

verdict and render judgment awarding her $400,000 in physical pain and

14

suffering, $150,000 for loss of enjoyment of life, and $1,701,583.06 in

future medical expenses.

Ms. Hall correctly shows that the district court’s decision in setting

time limits for closing argument is subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Oliveaux v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 39,147 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/15/04), 889

So. 2d 1264, writ denied, 05-0454 (La. 4/29/05), 901 So. 2d 1067; Mercer v.

Fruehauf Corp., 492 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d

350 (1986). In Mercer, the Third Circuit disapproved of giving plaintiff’s

counsel an extra 15 minutes for rebuttal, but did not disapprove giving both

sides 30 minutes for closing argument, in a products liability case. Here, the

district court aptly noted that pretrial stipulations obviated many normal

evidentiary issues, and Ms. Hall has not identified any points, topics, or

arguments that she would have presented but for the time limit.

We note further that at a conference on August 7, 2021, the court

limited closing argument to 30 minutes, and neither side objected. Given the

timing of the motion and the purely generic nature of the claim, we find no

abuse of the district court’s broad discretion.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to

be paid by Ora Hall.

AFFIRMED.

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