State of Louisiana v. Logan Smith

Judgment rendered November 15, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,314-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

LOGAN SMITH Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Webster, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 95870

Honorable Charles A. Smith, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

LOGAN SMITH Pro Se

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

RICHARD RUSSELL RAY
MARCUS RAY PATILLO
JIMMY WAYNE “JIMBO” YOCOM, JR.
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before PITMAN, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

HUNTER, J.

Defendant, Logan Smith, was charged by bill of indictment with

second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. Following a trial, a

unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to

serve life in prison without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Glennis McCotter last saw her son, Anthony Bruns, in Springhill,

Louisiana, on June 19, 2020, between 11:15 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. Later that

evening, at approximately 6:45 p.m., Derrick Gavin was driving on Percy

Burns Road in Webster Parish, near the Louisiana-Arkansas state line, when

he noticed a “human laying on the side” of the eastbound shoulder of the

road. The body was later identified as Anthony Bruns, who had sustained a

single gunshot wound to the back of the head.1

A house located near the location of Bruns’ body had a security

camera system. The camera captured a video depicting a Ford F-150 pickup

truck driving on Percy Burns Road. It was later determined Ronald Aycock

was the owner of the truck; Aycock is the grandfather of Abbett Echols.

Later that day, witnesses saw defendant and Echols on some property

in Taylor, Arkansas. 2 The property was owned by Allen Dawson,

defendant’s stepfather. According to witnesses, defendant and Echols were

1
During the trial, Major Phillip Krouse testified the identity of the victim was
unknown when the body was initially discovered. He stated the victim had a tattoo of the
name, “Bruns,” on his leg. According to Maj. Krouse, he obtained a tentative identity by
taking a photograph of the tattoo and running the name through a computer database.
Once the officer ascertained the victim’s name, his photograph was generated, and they
were able to locate his family.
2
Taylor, Arkansas is located near the Louisiana-Arkansas border.

on the Dawson property attempting to burn some items, including carpet and

rubber mats. At the direction of Allen Dawson, defendant placed the items

in a “junk car” on the property. One witness testified defendant and Echols

had removed the seats from the Ford F-150 pickup truck.

The following day, June 20, 2020, Jerry Brown drove defendant’s

mother to Shreveport, Louisiana to pick up defendant, who claimed to have

abandoned Aycock’s pickup truck due to a flat tire. During an interview

with law enforcement officers, Brown stated defendant told him he

(defendant) and Echols had “shot somebody.” According to Brown,

defendant did not display any emotion when he made the statement, and

defendant told him he felt “relief” after he shot the person.

Chad Dawson, defendant’s stepbrother, also contacted the Webster

Parish Sheriff’s Office (“WPSO”) on June 20, 2020, and reported he was in

possession of a firearm which was possibly connected to the murder of

Bruns. Major Philip Krouse, a detective in charge of criminal investigations

and narcotics for the WPSO, met Chad at a church in Taylor, Arkansas.

Chad gave Maj. Krouse a .357 Magnum firearm and told him he had

purchased the firearm from Echols. Bullet fragments recovered from Bruns’

body matched a bullet test-fired from the .357 Magnum.

Subsequently, Maj. Krouse went to the property owned by Dawson.

After speaking with Dawson, the officers walked around the property and

detected “an odor of decomposition.” The officers lifted a mattress on the

back of an abandoned pickup truck and recovered two floor mats, a blood-

soaked red bath towel, carpet, insulation from carpet, a cell phone, and

2

Bruns’ missing shoe.3 Bruns’ DNA was obtained from the cell phone, bath

towel, carpet, and shoe.

On the night of June 20, 2020, defendant was apprehended at his

stepfather’s property and transported to the Springhill Police Department.

Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver of rights

form. However, the interview was not recorded. The police officers decided

to detain defendant because he had a warrant for his arrest on an unrelated

matter. Thereafter, defendant was transported to the WPSO, where he was

readvised of his Miranda rights and signed another waiver of rights form.

During the interview, defendant confessed to shooting Bruns.

On June 21, 2020, the deputies from the WPSO went to Shreveport

and recovered the Ford F-150 owned by Echols’ grandfather. An

examination of the truck revealed the carpet had been removed from the

truck, and the missing carpet was consistent with the carpet found in the

truck on the property of defendant’s stepfather. Law enforcement officers

ascertained Bruns was likely inside the truck when he was shot.

On July 27, 2020, defendant was charged by bill of indictment with

second degree murder, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. On August 1, 2022,

defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession. On August 8, 2022, the

trial court conducted a free and voluntary hearing and determined

defendant’s post-Miranda statements had been made freely and voluntarily

and were, therefore, admissible.

3
The victim was wearing one Levi Strauss house shoe when his body was
discovered; the other shoe was not found at the scene.

3

Following a trial, a unanimous jury found defendant guilty as charged

of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to serve life in prison without

the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove, beyond a

reasonable doubt, he was the person who killed Bruns. Although defendant

admitted to shooting Bruns, he also erroneously stated Bruns had been shot

twice – once by him and once by Echols. However, the statement is

contradicted by the physical evidence which established Bruns sustained

only one gunshot wound.

Further, defendant maintains Echols lied to law enforcement officers

about his involvement in the crime; Echols was driving his grandfather’s

truck on the day of the murder; Echols sold the murder weapon; and Echols

was behaving strangely after the murder. Defendant asserts it is reasonable

to believe Echols committed the murder, framed defendant because of his

“known mental health issues,” went to Allen Dawson’s property to burn the

incriminating evidence and to sell the murder weapon, and later “hid” the

truck in Shreveport.

When a defendant challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict and one or more trial errors, the reviewing court first reviews

sufficiency, as a failure to satisfy the sufficiency standard will moot the trial

errors. State v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731 (La. 1992); State v. Patterson,

50,305 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 184 So. 3d 739, writ denied, 15-2333 (La.

3/24/16), 190 So. 3d 1190.

4

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the

appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the

evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06),

922 So. 2d 517; State v. Burch, 52,247 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 259 So.

3d 1190.

The Jackson standard is applicable in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of

evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by

viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When

the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct

evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that evidence

must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime. State

v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983); State v. Norman, 51,258 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/17/17), 222 So. 3d 96, writ denied, 17-1152 (La. 4/20/18), 240 So. 3d

926.

Direct evidence provides proof of the existence of a fact, for example,

a witness’s testimony that he saw or heard something. State v. Lilly, 468 So.

5

2d 1154 (La. 1985); State v. Baker, 49,175 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/27/14), 148

So. 3d 217. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and

circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred

according to reason and common experience. State v. Broome, 49,004 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So. 3d 979, writ denied, 14-0990 (La. 1/16/15), 157

So. 3d 1127. For a case resting essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; State v. Christopher, 50,943 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d

255, writ denied, 16-2187 (La. 9/6/17), 224 So. 3d 985.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442;

State v. Walker, 51,217 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So. 3d 951, writ

denied, 17-1101 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. Where there is conflicting

testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Ward, 50,872 (La. App. 2

Cir. 11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 228, writ denied, 17-0164 (La. 9/22/17), 227 So.

3d 827.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with

physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Hust, 51,015

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/17), 214 So. 3d 174, writ denied, 17-0352 (La.

11/17/17), 229 So. 3d 928. The trier of fact is charged to make a credibility

evaluation and may, within the bounds of rationality, accept or reject the

testimony of any witness; the reviewing court may impinge on that

6

discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental due

process of law. State v. Sosa, 05-0213 (La. 1/19/06), 921 So. 2d 94; State v.

Hust, supra. A reviewing court accords great deference to a fact finder’s

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

State v. Brown, 51,352 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/2/17), 223 So. 3d 88, writ denied,

17-1154 (La. 5/11/18), 241 So. 3d 1013.

Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the

offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.

14:30.1(A)(1).

This is a circumstantial evidence case. Maj. Krouse testified he was

notified of the discovery of a body on the side of a road on June 19, 2020.

He stated he went to the scene and observed the victim had “a gunshot

wound to the back of his head approximately two inches behind his left ear.”

Maj. Krouse also noticed the victim was wearing one Levi Strauss house

shoe; the other shoe was missing. At that time, law enforcement officers did

not know the identity of the shooter. Subsequently, defendant was

developed as a suspect after his stepbrother, Chad Dawson, came forward

the following day. Maj. Krouse stated Chad was in possession of a firearm

and informed him defendant had hidden the weapon “on the property,” he

was “scared of the way [defendant] had been acting over the last few days,”

and he was concerned the firearm had been used in the murder.4

4
During the trial, Chad Dawson testified on the day of the murder, he saw
defendant and Echols riding in the truck owned by Echols’ grandfather; Echols was
driving, and defendant was riding in the back seat. Chad also testified he noticed the
driver’s seat, passenger seat, and back seat were “out,” and the front seat was “totally
removed.” He also stated he was told “they” were hiding a .357 Magnum handgun.
According to Chad, he purchased the gun from Echols because he did not want defendant
to have possession of a firearm, due, in part, to his volatile relationship with his (Chad’s)
father.

7

Maj. Krouse testified he and other officers went to defendant’s

residence at approximately 11:30 p.m. and encountered Allen Dawson.

Dawson told the detective defendant, Echols, and an unknown black male

came to his property between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. to “clean out” a truck;

however, defendant refused to allow Dawson to approach the truck. Dawson

also stated defendant and Echols had asked to burn some carpet and rubber

floor mats in his burn barrel. Dawson testified defendant placed the items in

one of the vehicles in the salvage yard on his property.

After listening to Dawson’s statements, the law enforcement officers

began looking around the property and soon detected the odor of “real bad

decomposition.” Maj. Krouse stated he looked into the back of one of the

trucks and saw an old mattress; he lifted the mattress and saw what appeared

to be bloody carpet and the victim’s other shoe. He testified he called the

law enforcement agency in Columbia County, Arkansas, to process the

scene and collect the evidence.5

Prior to taking defendant into custody, Maj. Krouse also interviewed

Jerry Paul Brown, who stated he saw defendant and another man on Allen

Dawson’s property on June 19, 2020. Brown also asserted he overheard

Dawson “fussing at” defendant and the unidentified man “about wanting to

burn rubber mats in a burn barrel.” As stated above, Brown drove

defendant’s mother to Shreveport to pick defendant up, and during the drive

back to Arkansas, defendant told him he had “shot someone,” and he “felt

5
The officers collected bloody carpet, carpet insulation, two floormats, bloody
red towels, a cell phone, and a Levi Strauss house shoe.

8

relieved” after he did so. Defendant also told Brown Echols had also shot

the person.

Days after defendant’s arrest, police officers went to Shreveport to

retrieve the truck they believed defendant had driven to Shreveport. They

discovered the carpet was missing from the floorboard on the front

passenger side and the front center of the vehicle. Maj. Krouse testified the

carpet found at defendant’s residence matched the carpet in the truck.

Furthermore, during the trial, Alma Pickard, the mother of Chad

Dawson’s girlfriend, testified on the day of the murder, defendant came to

her house.6 She described defendant’s demeanor as “nervous or scared,” and

stated he was “looking down and fiddling.” Pickard testified after defendant

left, she noticed “some slide shoes” next to her swimming pool, and she

noticed blood on the shoes.

Shelby Pickard, Chad’s girlfriend, testified she went to her mother’s

house and retrieved a “mismatched” pair of “Nike slides” “a day or two”

after she heard about the murder. She stated her mother had heard about the

murder and wanted her to turn the shoes over to the authorities “because

they didn’t want no dealings with anything.” Shelby testified she picked up

the shoes and turned them over to law enforcement officers.

On June 20, 2020, defendant agreed to accompany the officers from

Taylor, Arkansas, to Springhill, Louisiana. Maj. Krouse testified he advised

defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant initially denied knowing the

victim or anything about the homicide. Hours later, during a second

interview, defendant initially stated he did not know the victim, and he did

6
Pickard lived in Louisiana, “very close” to the Arkansas state line.

9

not know anything about the items discovered on his stepfather’s property.

After additional questioning, defendant confessed to shooting the victim.

Katie Traweek, a forensic deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) analyst at

the North Louisiana Crime Lab, testified as an expert in forensic DNA

analysis. She stated she analyzed the Smith & Wesson handgun, a house

shoe, three towels with suspected blood, two cell phones with suspected

blood, a pair of shorts with suspected blood, a tank top with suspected blood,

several swabs of suspected blood, and Nike slides with suspected blood.

Traweek testified the blood on one of the cell phones, towels, and

carpet contained the victim’s DNA. The DNA on the house shoe was

consistent with three people; the victim was a major contributor of the DNA

obtained from the inside of the shoe. Traweek also testified she tested the

DNA obtained from a pair of Nike slides, and the blood on the slides

contained the victim’s DNA. Additionally, the DNA derived from the inside

of the shoes “was a mixture of at least two people”; however, there was not

enough DNA in the specimen to include or exclude anyone as the

contributor. Further, Traweek testified defendant’s DNA was found on his

belongings – one of the cell phones, the tank top, and the pair of shorts. The

victim’s blood was not found on any of defendant’s items.

Philip Stout, a firearm section supervisor at the North Louisiana

Crime lab, was accepted by the trial court as an expert in firearm

identification. Stout testified he analyzed a bullet and the firearm in this

10

case, and the “bullet jacket and bullet jacket fragment were identified as

being fired from the revolver.”7

The jury was also provided with defendant’s interview with law

enforcement officers. During the interview, defendant related to the officers

he shot the victim.

The totality of the evidence presented was sufficient to establish

defendant shot the victim with the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

As evidenced by defendant’s conviction, the jury ultimately determined the

witnesses’ testimony was credible. The defendant was developed as a

suspect in the murder within hours of the body being discovered. As noted

above, witnesses testified defendant had been seen placing items on his

stepfather’s property, including bloody carpet, bloody towels, the victim’s

shoe, and the victim’s cell phone. Further, the jury could have reasonably

rejected defendant’s claim someone else, namely Echols, killed the victim.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Defendant also contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the

murder occurred in Louisiana. He argues the evidence established Bruns

was not killed on the side of the road where his body was discovered. Based

on the physical evidence, Bruns was likely killed in Echols’ truck.

Defendant maintains he and his family lived in Arkansas; therefore, it is

reasonable to assume if he killed Bruns, he did so in Arkansas and merely

dumped the body in Louisiana. Therefore, according to defendant, the State

7
Dr. Frank Peretti, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified he
performed an autopsy on the victim’s body on June 21, 2020. Dr. Peretti testified that the
victim died as a result of a single gunshot wound to the head. He stated he recovered
“multiple pieces of the core and jacket” of the bullet from the victim’s body and sent the
items to the coroner’s office.

11

failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the murder was committed in

Louisiana. Consequently, his conviction and sentence should be vacated,

and a judgment of acquittal should be entered.

In response, the State argues this assignment of error is not properly

before this Court because defendant did not file a motion to quash the bill of

indictment or make any objections thereto.

Every person charged with a crime is entitled to a speedy, public, and

impartial trial in the parish where the offense or an element of the offense

occurred, unless venue is changed in accordance with law. La. Const. art. I,

§ 16. La. C. Cr. P. art. 611 governs the jurisdiction and venue of criminal

trials and provides, in pertinent part:

A. All trials shall take place in the parish where the offense has
been committed, unless the venue is changed. If acts
constituting an offense or if the elements of an offense occurred
in more than one place, in or out of the parish or state, the
offense is deemed to have been committed in any parish in this
state in which any such act or element occurred.
B. If the offender is charged with any criminal homicide
enumerated in R.S. 14:29 or any other crime involving the
death of a human being and it cannot be determined where the
offense or the elements of the offense occurred, the offense is
deemed to have been committed in the parish where the body of
the victim was found.
***
Venue is not an essential element of the offense; rather, it is a

jurisdictional matter. See La. C. Cr. P. arts. 611A and 615. Objections to

venue must be raised by a motion to quash to be ruled on by the court in

advance of the trial. State v. Brooks, 20-0454 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/21), 320

So. 3d 419; State v. Ford, 17-0471 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/17), 232 So. 3d

576, writ denied, 17-1901 (La. 4/22/19), 268 So. 3d 295.

The general rule is that appellate courts will not consider issues raised

for the first time on appeal. State v. Revish, 19-01732 (La. 10/1/20), 340 So.

12

3d 864, citing Segura v. Frank, 630 So. 2d 714, 725 (La. 1994). An

exception exists to the general rule when the successful proponent of a

motion to suppress in the district court offers additional reasons a reviewing

court should sustain the district court’s ruling, which reasons can be

evaluated by the reviewing court without venturing beyond the record. See

State v. Butler, 12-2359 (La. 5/17/13), 117 So. 3d 87.

Defendant did not object to venue by filing a motion to quash in

advance of trial. Therefore, defendant’s alleged error is not properly before

us for review.

Defendant further contends the trial court erred in finding his

statements to law enforcement officers were free and voluntary. He argues

he “was in an extremely disturbed mental state” when he confessed to

shooting Bruns, and witnesses stated he was “not acting like himself” on the

day of the murder. Defendant asserts he was “awakened and taken from his

Arkansas home to a Louisiana jail in the middle of the night.” Further,

defendant argues Maj. Krouse implied if he did not confess, his mother and

other family members might be arrested. According to defendant, under

these circumstances, his Miranda waiver and subsequent confession were

not knowing and voluntary, and his conviction must be reversed and his

sentence vacated.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694

(1966), the United States Supreme Court held the prosecution may not

introduce at trial a statement stemming from custodial interrogation of a

defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective

to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda applies when a

13

person is questioned (i.e., interrogated) by law enforcement while in police

custody (or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant

way).

A confession is involuntary, and therefore inadmissible, if it is

obtained by “techniques and methods offensive to due process, or under

circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise ‘a

free and unconstrained will.’” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S.

Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985); U.S. v. Ortiz, 943 F. Supp. 2d 447, 456

(S.D.N.Y. 2013).

As a general matter, before inculpatory statements may be admitted

into evidence, the State has the burden of affirmatively showing they were

made freely and voluntarily and not the influence of fear, duress,

intimidation, menace, threats, inducements or promises. La. R.S. 15:451; La.

C. Cr. P. art. 703(D); State v. Holliday, 17-01921 (La. 1/29/20), 340 So. 3d

648, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1271, 209 L. Ed. 2d 10 (2021). The question of

voluntariness of a confession, including a determination of the defendant’s

state of mind, must be resolved from the facts and circumstances of the

particular case. State v. Demming, 40,033 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/05), 911 So.

2d 894; State v. Hahn, 526 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1988), writ denied,

532 So. 2d 150 (La. 1988). Voluntariness is determined on a case-by-case

basis, under a totality of the circumstances standard. State v. Garner, 52,047

(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 250 So. 3d 1152, writ denied, 18-1290 (La.

2/25/19), 266 So. 3d 288; State v. Demming, supra.

A trial court’s finding as to the free and voluntary nature of a

statement carries great weight and will not be disturbed unless not supported

14

by the evidence. State v. Benoit, 440 So. 2d 129 (La. 1983); State v.

Richardson, 33,272 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/1/00), 779 So. 2d 771, writ denied,

00-3295 (La. 10/26/01), 799 So. 2d 1151. Credibility determinations lie

within the sound discretion of the trial court and its rulings will not be

disturbed unless clearly contrary to the evidence. State v. Vessell, 450 So. 2d

938 (La. 1984).

The transcript of the defendant’s interview with law enforcement was

introduced into evidence. The colloquy was as follows:

***
[SGT. KEMP]: [W]e had a conversation with [your mother and
stepfather] for a little while. And we found some – some things
at the house such as some bloody carpet that came out of a
vehicle and the right house shoe that we were looking for and
some bloody floor mats and some bloody blue jeans and three
bloody red towels. Does any of that sound familiar to you?

[DEFENDANT]: No, sir.

[SGT. KEMP]: Well, I guess then, I guess in order to shift
gears and since your memory seems to be extremely short,
we’ve got statements saying that you put that stuff in there.
And we’re gonna send it all up to the crime lab and get it – you
know, have a blood comparison done that’s probably we think
is gonna belong to this fellow in the picture that you say you
don’t know.

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: And we also have the truck in our
possession with the carpet tore out of it, okay?

[DEFENDANT]: Yeah.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: You still don’t know nothing about it?

[DEFENDANT]: No, sir.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: Okay. So, our next step now is, is to arrest
your mother, arrest your stepfather, and arrest the other
gentleman that’s in the house ‘cause that’s the only way any of
this is gonna happen because you know nothing about it –

15

[SGT. KEMP]: And it’s at their house.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: - it’s at their house.

[DEFENDANT]: They ain’t taking my mama to jail so –

[MAJ. KROUSE]: Well, here’s the –

[DEFENDANT]: Well, I did the sh*t then. Let’s go. Take me
to –

[MAJ. KROUSE]: *** Sit down.

[DEFENDANT]: Just don’t take my mama to jail. My mama’s
sick. No, she’s gonna die.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: Well, here’s the thing.

[DEFENDANT]: She can’t.
***
[MAJ. KROUSE]: You just need to tell the truth, because we
have no choice. It’s on the property.

[DEFENDANT]: I know that.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: If you don’t know nothing about it –

[DEFENDANT]: Look, if it’s on the property, I’ll take the lick
for it, dude.

[MAJ. KROUSE]: We – we just want to know the truth.

[DEFENDANT]: I shot that motherfu*ker.
***
[MAJ. KROUSE]: Why did you shoot him?

[DEFENDANT]: Because man, the fu*king devil’s been on
me. I been going through it, y’all. I been having hell the last
three months of my life, dude. And I don’t know man, I don’t
know.
***

During the trial, when questioned about defendant’s interview, Maj.

Krouse testified as follows:

We explained to [defendant] what we had found on the
Dawsons’ property, [he] stated he did not know anything about
that. It’s 3 o’clock in the morning, we’re getting tired, we had
found bloody carpet, we had found bloody items, it was no

16

threats by no means. It’s just somebody on that property knew
something about this crime. So, at this point, I told Mr. Smith
that we would need, at this point, everyone there is going to go
to jail because we have to figure out what happened to Mr.
Bruns.
***

In U.S. v. Hufstetler, 782 F. 3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 577

U.S. 884, 136 S. Ct. 191, 193 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2015), the defendant

challenged his conviction, arguing he was coerced into confessing. At the

time of the defendant’s confession, his girlfriend had also been taken into

custody, and a substantial portion of the defendant’s interview dealt with his

girlfriend’s prospects for release. Prior to the interview, law enforcement

officers had obtained photographs from the bank video depicting the

defendant, and they had interviewed witnesses who had seen the defendant

and his girlfriend sitting in a car and driving around the bank prior to the

robbery. At several points during the interview, the officers referred to the

evidence and noted the purpose of the interrogation was, in part, to

determine the girlfriend’s role in the robbery. One officer stated, “This is

your opportunity to explain to us what her role is.” Another officer asked,

“[W]as she there on her own accord or did she not know what was going

on?” In an attempt to spare his girlfriend, the defendant confessed, taking

full responsibility for the robbery. He later appealed, arguing his confession

was not free and voluntary. The court reviewed cases in which law

enforcement officers used threats to a family member as a tool, noting “One

cluster of cases implies that the use of a family member uniquely tugs at a

suspect’s emotions and thus can have an undue impact.” 782 F. 3d at 22.

The court further noted, “At a minimum, these cases illustrate that we must

be on alert when an officer utilizes a family member as a tool during an

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interrogation.” 782 F. 3d at 23. The court concluded the defendant’s

confession was voluntary, stating:

[W]e can discern no improper threat or promise. At the outset,
we note that the officers had probable cause to hold [the
defendant’s girlfriend]. In such a circumstance where the
referenced relative is both a family member and a co-suspect,
probable cause for holding that individual helps to place the
officers’ statements in context. Without more, an officer’s
truthful description of the family member’s predicament is
permissible since it merely constitutes an attempt to both
accurately depict the situation to the suspect and to elicit more
information about the family member’s culpability.
***
In context, it is difficult to view the officers’ actions, in their
totality, as improper. The officers’ statements were undoubtedly
difficult for [the defendant] to swallow, and the officers were
clearly aware that [the defendant] was in a rough spot. But, they
never lied, exaggerated the situation, or conditioned either
individual’s release on [the defendant’s] willingness to speak.
Instead, they told [the defendant] that [his girlfriend] was a
suspect and unless new information came to light to discount
her culpability she would continue to be criminally liable. We
take no issue with the officers’ utilization of this indisputably
true fact to both gain more information about [the girlfriend]
and to elicit more intelligence about [the defendant’s] own
actions.

782 F. 3d at 23. The court noted the defendant’s age, education,

intelligence, and mental condition, and found he was not susceptible to the

alleged illegal police conduct.

In U.S. v. Ortiz, supra, the defendant sought to suppress the

statements he made to police officers following the discovery of an illegal

gun in the apartment he shared with his mother and elderly aunt. The

defendant argued the officers’ threat to arrest everyone in the apartment,

including his mother and aunt, in connection with the gun coerced him into

confessing his ownership of the gun. The court reviewed the evidence and

concluded the officers’ threat to arrest the defendant’s mother and aunt “was

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improper unless the police had probable cause to arrest those individuals and

thus could lawfully act on the threat.” The court stated:

A reasonable officer could not have concluded that there was
probable cause to arrest [the mother and aunt] for constructive
possession of the gun. [The officer] therefore had no basis for
threatening to arrest either [the mother or the aunt] and so his
threat to do so was sufficiently overreaching as to warrant
suppression of Defendant’s self-incriminating statements[.]

Id. at 458.

In State v. McClain, 12-1766 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/7/13), writ denied, 13-

1637 (La. 1/27/14), 131 So. 3d 53, law enforcement officers executed a

search warrant at a residence and recovered large amounts of powdered

cocaine and crack cocaine from various rooms in the residence. The

defendant lived at the residence with his mother. The defendant sought to

suppress his statement to police officers, arguing he made the statement in

response to an officer’s alleged threat to arrest his mother if he did not

confess to owning the drugs. The police officer admitted to telling the

defendant it was a possibility his mother would be arrested if he did not

agree to an interview with law enforcement. The trial court denied the

defendant’s motion to suppress, and the court of appeal affirmed, stating:

In finding defendant’s statement at the residence to be freely
and voluntarily given, the trial judge opined that as one of the
several occupants of the residence where drugs were found, it
was a possibility that defendant’s mother would be arrested.
Therefore, she found that [the police officer’s] statements to
defendant and his mother about the possibility of her arrest
were not threats, but statements of fact.
***
After a careful review of the record, we find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
suppress defendant’s statement. The testimony at the hearing on
the motion to suppress and at trial, in addition to the videotaped
recording of defendant’s statement, clearly establish that
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and that he
executed a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. [The

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police officer’s] testimony at the hearing, which the district
court found to be credible, showed that defendant appeared to
understand his rights. The district court also found credible [the
police officer’s] testimony that he did not coerce or threaten
defendant into implicating himself in order to exonerate his
mother. Although defendant may have had a genuine concern
for the welfare of his mother, it is evident that he was in no way
coerced into incriminating himself in order to exonerate her.
The test for voluntariness of a confession requires a review of
the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was
given. We conclude, as did the district court, that under a
totality of the circumstances, defendant’s confession was
voluntary. Therefore, the trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to suppress his statement.

Id. at 3 (internal citations omitted).

In State v. Brown, 504 So. 2d 1025 (La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 507

So. 2d 225 (La. 1987), police officers stopped a stolen vehicle and arrested

the two female occupants. One of the females was the defendant’s sister,

and the other was his girlfriend. The defendant alleged his statements to law

enforcement officers were obtained by promises that his girlfriend and sister

would be released only if he confessed. The trial court found the police

officers’ statements did not constitute inducements or promises and ruled the

defendant’s confession was admissible. The court of appeal affirmed,

stating, “Although defendant may have had a genuine concern for the

welfare of his sister and girlfriend, it is evident that he was in no way

coerced into incriminating himself in order to corroborate the women’s

claim of innocence.” Id. at 1031.

In the case sub judice, in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the

confession, the trial court stated:

*** I watched the video, and frankly, I considered what Major
Krouse said to him just a practical, “Well, you don’t know
anything about it; this is what we have to do next.” I did not
consider that a threat or coercion. Now, his reaction to it and
what he thought out it may have been, but I could tell nothing

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from my viewing of it and listening to it that the officer was
doing anything more than saying this is the next logical step.
His reaction was different[.] *** [T]he defense will be able to
argue regarding, well, what weight should be given to it by the
jury based on the totality of the circumstances, but I do not find
the circumstances to have been such that it would violate the
defendant’s rights, and therefore, the statement is admissible.

The testimony confirmed Maj. Krouse advised defendant of his

Miranda rights, and defendant indicated he understood those rights by

executing a written waiver of rights form. The record reveals defendant’s

mother and stepfather lived on the property where the evidence was

discovered. The stark reality of the situation was a dead body had been

discovered, and much of the evidence related to the murder had been

discovered on the Dawson property. Due to the nature of the evidence (a

bloody house shoe matching the one the victim was wearing, bloody carpet,

and bloody floormats), the officers had a strong reason to suspect someone

who resided on the property either committed the murder or knew the

identity of the person who committed the murder. Maj. Krouse’s statement

to defendant (regarding the possible arrest of other family members)

provided information regarding the next possible steps in the investigation.

The statement revealed the gravity of the situation and was not exaggerated

or improper. A review of the totality of the circumstances under which

defendant confessed does not clearly establish defendant was coerced into

incriminating himself. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in

concluding defendant’s confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible.

We have reviewed this record for errors patent. We have found none.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, defendant’s conviction and sentence

are hereby affirmed.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE AFFIRMED.

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