State of Louisiana v. Jamar Dewayne Trotter

Judgment rendered February 28, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,477-KA
No. 55,478-KA
No. 55,479-KA
(Consolidated Cases)

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JAMAR DEWAYNE TROTTER Appellant

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Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court Nos. 379904, 379940, 382341

Honorable Donald E. Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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THE HARVILLE LAW FIRM, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TOMMY J. JOHNSON
JASON W. WALTMAN
ALEX. L. PORUBSKY
VICTORIA T. WASHINGTON
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

THOMPSON, J.

Jamar Dewayne Trotter used a handgun to rob a delivery truck driver

of a liquor distributor in Shreveport, Louisiana. Two eyewitnesses to the

robbery, including the delivery truck driver, identified Trotter from a photo

lineup; and, at trial, he was found guilty of armed robbery by a unanimous

jury. Although the defendant was a fourth felony offender and the crime of

armed robbery carries a sentence range of 10-99 years, Trotter was

sentenced to 45 years at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. On Trotter’s first appeal, this court remanded the

case to the trial court for resentencing to adequately consider on the record

all mitigating and aggravating factors contained in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1.

On remand, the trial court detailed its considerations in fashioning its

sentence and again sentenced Trotter to 45 years at hard labor, without

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Trotter now appeals

his sentence a second time, claiming the trial court again failed to adequately

consider the mitigating factors contained in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and that

his sentence is constitutionally excessive. For the following reasons, we

affirm his conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 22, 2020, Jamar Dewayne Trotter threatened a delivery

driver with a gun while his accomplice took a case of liquor from the

driver’s delivery truck in Shreveport, Louisiana. During the robbery, the

delivery truck driver and Trotter’s accomplice were each pulling the case of

alcohol back and forth. Trotter emerged from the passenger side of a

vehicle, climbed onto the back of the vehicle, and pointed a handgun at the

delivery truck driver. Trotter instructed the driver to let go of the case of

liquor, a command the driver complied with at gunpoint, and then the two

robbers fled the scene with the goods. The delivery truck driver was able to

provide police with a description of both suspects. Though initially unable

to identify him from a photo line-up shown at his home, the delivery driver

was later able to identify Trotter in a photo line-up as the armed man who

robbed him. A second eyewitness also picked Trotter out of a six-person

line-up and identified him as the armed robber.

On April 15, 2021, Trotter was charged by bill of information with

two counts: armed robbery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:64, and the use of a

firearm enhancement. Following trial on April 19-20, 2021, a unanimous

12-person jury found Trotter guilty of armed robbery. At the conclusion of

the two-day trial, an amended bill of information was submitted, dropping

the firearm enhancement charge. On May 19, 2021, the trial court sentenced

Trotter, who had four prior felony convictions, to 45 years at hard labor

without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He

appealed, alleging that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive

sentence.

On June 29, 2022, Trotter’s first appeal appeared before this court.

State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d 1116. In that

opinion this court vacated the 45-year sentence and remanded it for

resentencing, finding that the record did not show that the sentencing court

adequately considered the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. This court

at that time noted that the trial court did not refer to any specific aggravating

or mitigating circumstances listed in Article 894.1, nor did it discuss

Trotter’s background, personal life, education, employment, family, or other

relevant acts. The trial court ended the sentencing proceedings by stating:
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“And just for the record, on Mr. Trotter, I considered the factors in Code of

Criminal Procedure Articles 893 and 894 in arriving at a just sentence.”

This court determined that the statement by the trial court merely reflected a

superficial consideration of the factors. This court noted that this was

largely due to the fact that there was no Presentence Investigation Report

(“PSI”), which could have greatly assisted the trial court in sentencing. This

court remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

On remand, the trial court did not order a PSI. Trotter’s attorney did

not request a PSI, submit a sentencing memorandum, or submit any post-

appeal sentencing memorandum. However, the State submitted a thorough

sentencing memorandum with details about Trotter’s extensive criminal

history.

On September 7, 2022, the trial judge resentenced Trotter, again to 45

years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence. Before resentencing Trotter, the trial court stated:

The court is required to consider Article 894.1(A), paragraphs
one, two, and three.

I find one, two, and three to be applicable in this case. There is
an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime.

The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial
environment that can be provided most effectively by his
commitment to an institution.

And a lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the
defendant’s crime.

The court has considered all of the factors enumerated in Code
of Criminal Procedure article 894.1(B), both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, in determining what sentence to
impose. The court specifically finds the following aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to apply. Aggravating
circumstances: (1) the offender knowingly created a risk of
death or great bodily harm to more than one person; (2) the
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offender used threats of or actual violence in the commissions
of the offense; (3) the offender used a dangerous weapon in the
commission of the offense; (4) the offender used a firearm or
other dangerous weapon while committing or attempting to
commit an offense which has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another which, by its very nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course of
committing the offense; and (5) the offender has four prior
felony convictions […]. Mr. Trotter is a recidivist.

There are no mitigating factors the court could find.

At the conclusion of sentencing, counsel for Trotter stated: “Please note our

objection for the record.” Trotter did not file a motion to reconsider

sentence. Trotter now appeals.

DISCUSSION

Trotter asserts two assignments of error, arguing the trial court failed

to adequately consider the mitigating factors contained in La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1 and that his sentence is constitutionally excessive.

Assignment of Error No. 1: This Court remanded this matter so the
record on appeal could be expanded so this court would have an
adequate basis to review Trotter’s sentence. On remand, the trial court
and Trotter’s attorney failed to consider or to develop any mitigating
factors. Accordingly, should this Court again vacate Trotter’s sentence
and again remand this matter so a sufficient record on appeal can be
developed for this Court’s review?

Trotter notes that in the opinion from his first appeal, this court

specifically stated the trial court did not consider any personal information

about him, including his personal life, family, education, employment

background, or any other possible mitigating or aggravating factors. Trotter

argues that a PSI would have greatly aided the court in sentencing. Trotter

asserts that the only information known about him for purposes of

sentencing is his age and his prior felony convictions. As noted above, the

trial court did not order a PSI, and Trotter’s trial counsel did not request the

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PSI or submit a sentencing memorandum or motion to reconsider sentence

on his behalf. Trotter argues that the trial court and his trial counsel failed to

comply with the purpose of the remand from this court. Trotter asserts that

the record on appeal remains inadequate for this court to review the

reasonableness of his sentence. We disagree, and find that the trial court, as

requested, adequately considered the factors contained in La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1 during resentencing and detailed those considerations on the record.

An excessive sentence claim is reviewed by examining whether the

trial court adequately considered the guidelines established in La. C. Cr. P.

art. 894.1 and whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Dowles, 54,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 339 So. 3d 749; State v. Vanhorn,

52,583 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 357, writ denied, 19-00745 (La.

11/19/19), 282 So. 3d 1065. First, the record must show that the trial court

took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The

articulation of the factual basis for a sentence is the goal of La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, not rigid or mechanical compliance with its provisions. The trial

court is not required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance, so

long as the record reflects that it adequately considered the guidelines of the

article. State v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Croskey, 53,505

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/20/20), 296 So. 3d 1151.

The important elements which should be considered are the

defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, and

employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of offense, and the

likelihood of rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981);

Dowles, supra. There is no requirement that specific matters be given any

particular weight at sentencing. Dowles, supra. The record clearly indicates
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the trial court took each of these elements into consideration in reaching its

final decision on sentencing for Trotter.

A presentence investigation report is an aid to help the court, not a

right of the defendant, and the court is not required to order a presentence

investigation. La. C. Cr. P. art. 875; State v. Scott, 50,920 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/16/16), 209 So. 3d 248, 253, writ denied, 17-0353 (La. 11/13/17), 229

So. 3d 478.

As detailed above, the transcript at sentencing demonstrates that the

trial court had command of the record before administering the sentence.

Further, the trial court is not required to order a PSI, and Trotter does not

have a statutory right to demand one be prepared. The trial court did

acknowledge on the record the State’s sentencing memorandum filed in the

record. The sentencing memorandum provided ample support for the

sentence, including his criminal history, which revealed he had numerous

prior felony and misdemeanor convictions in Caddo Parish (including

criminal mischief, simply burglary, misdemeanor carnal knowledge of a

juvenile, simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling, illegal possession of a

stolen firearm, and possession of a schedule II CDS). The record shows that

the trial court considered this extensive criminal history at sentencing and

reviewed La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(B) regarding mitigating and aggravating

circumstances. Accordingly, Trotter’s first assignment of error is without

merit.

Assignment of Error No. 2: Although Trotter was accused of using a
firearm in this matter, no shots were fired, the value of the property
stolen was relatively small, and nobody was hurt. Moreover, although
Trotter had four prior felony convictions, he had no prior felony
convictions for crimes involving violence. Accordingly, did the trial
court err by sentencing Trotter, who was a 25-year-old, to 45 years of

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imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or
suspension of sentence.

Trotter argues that his sentence is excessive given the facts of this

case. Trotter attempts to distinguish this case from State v. Atkins, 46,613

(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/11), 74 So. 3d 238, 239. In Atkins, supra, the

defendant, Atkins, kicked down a door, barged into a home, and demanded

money from his victim. Atkins proceeded to beat the victim with the butt of

his firearm. Another individual intervened and was also struck by the

firearm. An eyewitness observed the altercation, as well as Atkins taking

money from one victim’s pockets. Atkins was sentenced to 35 years at hard

labor without benefits for armed robbery, consecutive with 10 years at hard

labor for aggravated burglary. Trotter argues that receiving the same

sentence as Atkins in his case is not appropriate because Trotter was not

violent during the commission of the offense and did not injure his victim.

The delivery driver, looking down the barrel of the gun in Trotter’s hand and

listening to commands given at gunpoint during a robbery, may disagree

with any assertions about the gentle nature of Trotter’s actions. Armed

robbery is a very serious and dangerous crime. Additionally, Trotter argues

that because no PSI was ordered, either before the original sentencing or on

resentencing, the trial court was unable to discern whether he deserved a

more lenient sentence based on his nonviolent criminal history.

The court must determine whether the sentence is constitutionally

excessive. Id. Constitutional review turns upon whether the sentence is

illegal, grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or shocking to

the sense of justice. A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly

out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than the

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purposeless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are viewed in light of

the harm to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.; State v. Baker, 51,933

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/18), 247 So. 3d 990, writ denied, 18-0858 (La.

12/3/18), 257 So. 3d 195, and writ denied, 18-0833 (La. 12/3/18), 257 So. 3d

196.

The penalty for armed robbery is imprisonment at hard labor for not

less than 10 years and for not more than 99 years, without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. La. R.S. 14:64(B). The trial

court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within the statutory

limits, and sentences should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of

manifest abuse of discretion. Dowles, supra. A trial judge is in the best

position to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of a

particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion in sentencing. Id.

Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute

its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a

particular sentence. Id.

We find that Trotter’s 45-year sentence is not constitutionally

excessive, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to

what is a midrange sentence for armed robbery. The trial court correctly

noted that Trotter was a recidivist. The trial court stated that it did not find

any mitigating factors applied to his case. The State’s sentencing

memorandum, which was submitted to the trial court, provides, in pertinent

part:

Since his 18th birthday of October 22, 2014, and when the
instant offense was committed on October 22, 2020 (notably his
25th birthday), Trotter has spent the entirety of those seven
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years either on probation, in jail, or on parole. To date, Trotter
has never successfully completed either his probation or parole
requirements without being arrested for new criminal offenses,
all of which have subsequently resulted in a conviction and
dismissal pursuant to a plea agreement.

The record also shows that while Trotter’s codefendant actually removed the

liquor from the back of the delivery truck, Trotter opted to emerge from the

vehicle, participate in the robbery, and seriously escalate the situation by

producing a firearm and pointing it at the delivery truck driver. In doing so,

Trotter knowingly created risk of great bodily harm or death to the driver, as

well as store patrons. As such, we find that the midrange sentence of 45

years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence is not constitutionally excessive. Trotter’s second assignment of

error is likewise without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Jamar

Dewayne Trotter are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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