Christopher Williams v. Quirida Williams

Judgment rendered April 10, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,501-CA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS Plaintiff-Appellant

versus

QUIRIDA WILLIAMS Defendant-Appellee

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Appealed from the
Second Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Jackson, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 34,730

Honorable William R. “Rick” Warren, Judge

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RON CHRISTOPHER STAMPS, LLC Counsel for Appellant
By: Ron Christopher Stamps

DOUGLAS LEON STOKES, JR. Counsel for Appellee

*****

Before PITMAN, STEPHENS, and ROBINSON, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.,

This civil proceeding arises from the Second Judicial District, Parish

of Jackson, the Honorable Rick Warren, presiding. Plaintiff, Christopher

Williams, seeks review of the trial court’s increase of spousal support in

favor of defendant, Quirida Bradford. For the reasons expressed, we reverse

the increase in spousal support, and affirm the original order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Christopher Williams (“Mr. Williams”) and Quirida Bradford (“Ms.

Bradford”) married on September 17, 1994, in Jackson Parish. The couple

had two children together, a son born on July 8, 1997, and a daughter born

on May 1, 2003. On September 26, 2016, Mr. Williams filed a petition for

divorce on the grounds of living separate and apart for 365 days pursuant to

La. C.C. art. 103(1) and La. C.C. art. 103.1(2). In response, Ms. Bradford

stated that she was not at fault for the breakup of the marriage, and that she

was entitled to permanent spousal support. The trial court entered a

judgment of divorce on March 6, 2017, and terminated the community of

acquets and gains existing between the parties retroactive to September 26,

2016. The court awarded Ms. Bradford permanent spousal support in the

amount of $400 per month. On December 13, 2018, the trial court entered

judgment partitioning the community property.

On October 20, 2022, Mr. Williams filed a motion to terminate Ms.

Bradford’s permanent spousal support. In his motion, Mr. Williams alleged

that Ms. Bradford had a change in circumstances and had the ability to

provide for herself. Specifically, “[D]efendant, QUIRIDA WILLAIMS, is

now gainfully employed, operating a housekeeper business, is a

cosmetologist, and recently obtained her pharmacy tech certificate.” Ms.

Bradford, in a reconventional demand, requested that her spousal support be

increased from $400 per month to $600 due to her necessitous circumstances

in being unable to meet her month-to-month living expenses. She alleged

that Mr. Williams is able to pay more than $400 per month in permanent

spousal support.

On April 20, 2023, the trial court held a hearing to determine the issue

of spousal support. Ms. Bradford testified about her employment

background and discussed her previous work as a cosmetologist, a pharmacy

technician, and a paraprofessional. In her testimony, Ms. Bradford

explained that she worked as a cosmetologist and as a paraprofessional

before leaving those positions to work at a plant in Simsboro, Louisiana.

Following her work at the plant, Ms. Bradford attended school to become a

pharmacy technician. Ms. Bradford explained that she did not pass the test

to complete the requirements to become a pharmacy technician. Although

Ms. Bradford was a licensed cosmetologist at one point, she testified that she

no longer holds a license for cosmetology. Ms. Bradford indicated to the

court that she is now self-employed as a housekeeper and makes about

$1,500-$2,000 per month. According to Ms. Bradford’s testimony, she pays

all expenses associated with her business.

According to Ms. Bradford’s affidavit of monthly income and

expenses, her gross monthly income is $2,655. This includes the original

$400 monthly spousal support order. Her estimated total expenses indicated

on the affidavit are $3,094.63. These expenses include payments on a

Victoria’s Secret credit card and an Ulta Beauty credit card. When

questioned about the Victoria’s Secret and Ulta credit cards indicated on her

affidavit of monthly income and expenses, Ms. Bradford stated that
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Victoria’s Secret is a lingerie store and Ulta is a beauty supply store. She

indicated in her testimony that she purchases clothes from Victoria’s Secret

and makeup and hair supplies form Ulta. Ms. Bradford also included a $350

expense for purchasing supplies and equipment for her cleaning business.

Similarly, Ms. Bradford indicated that she pays $100 each month for life

insurance for her two children. As she explained the affidavit, Ms. Bradford

testified that she is “barely making it” on paying her bills, and she believes it

is in her best interest to attempt grow her cleaning business.

In Mr. Williams’ testimony, he described that he had been working

for the same company since the divorce and original spousal support award.

When the original award was ordered, Mr. Williams made $32.90 an hour at

his job, but his wages increased to $38.16 an hour at the time he filed for the

modification of support. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

determined that Ms. Bradford remained in necessitous circumstances, and

Mr. Williams’ income had substantially increased since the original support

order was set. As a result, the trial court modified the award and increased

the monthly spousal support award to $600. Mr. Williams objected to the

ruling and now appeals the trial court’s judgment.

Assignment of Error No. One:

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Williams argues that the trial court

abused its discretion when it denied termination of the original spousal

support order because Ms. Bradford’s income has increased since the

original award and her alleged necessitous circumstances involve excessive

or nonmaintenance expenses.

Mr. Williams argues that Ms. Bradford’s income has increased since

the original order was rendered, and her monthly expenses have decreased
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since the original order. At the time of the original spousal support order,

Ms. Bradford’s monthly income was $1,406.04, and her estimated monthly

expenses were $3,182. In 2022, Ms. Bradford’s monthly income had

increased to $2,655, which includes the original $400 monthly spousal

support payment. Her monthly expenses in 2022 decreased to $3,094.63.

Along with Ms. Bradford’s increase in income and decrease in

expenses, Mr. Williams also argues that several of her expenses fall outside

the scope of “maintenance” as it pertains to the purpose of spousal support.

Mr. Williams alleges that the $200 credit card payments, including the

Victoria’s Secret and Ulta Beauty credit cards, are miscellaneous expenses,

and Ms. Bradford failed to tie these credit card payments to living or

maintenance expenses. Ms. Bradford also pays $100 to maintain life

insurance on two adult children. Along with expenses for “church and

charity” and “recreation,” Mr. Williams argues that the $350 expense for

Ms. Bradford’s business should not be accounted for in a spousal support

order. Ultimately, Mr. Williams suggests that if the items listed above are

removed from consideration, Ms. Bradford’s monthly expenses are

$2,019.63, leaving Ms. Bradford with $235.37 per month of disposable

income.

Ms. Bradford urges that she has proved her need for support and Mr.

Williams’ ability to pay. To support this contention, Ms. Bradford argues

that maintenance is broader than merely food, shelter, and clothing. For this

reason, the Victoria’s Secret and Ulta payments should be considered as

maintenance as these are expenses for clothing and general hair and makeup

products. Similarly, Ms. Bradford’s recreation expense is essential for the

health and well-being of an individual. As to the life insurance payments on
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her two adult children, Ms. Bradford argues that obtaining life insurance for

burial expenses is a prudent step and one which the parties were taking prior

to their divorce. Furthermore, Ms. Bradford asserts that the trial court did

not consider all of her listed expenses when it awarded her $600 per month

in permanent spousal support. She asserts that this is evidenced by the fact

that her monthly income without any spousal support is $2,255, while her

expenses total $3,092.63; there is a difference of $837.63. Therefore, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding monthly spousal support

in the amount of $600.

Assignment of Error No. Two:

In his second assignment of error, Mr. Williams urges that Ms.

Bradford is not entitled to spousal support because her necessitous

circumstances are caused by her underemployment with her cleaning

business. Mr. Williams argues that a spouse’s earning capacity is a proper

consideration in awarding alimony to that spouse. As such, Ms. Bradford

possesses training and skills, has been active in the workforce, and has no

physical impairments that would prevent her from pursuing a variety of jobs.

Mr. Williams asserts that Ms. Bradford insists on operating the

cleaning business, an endeavor that does not cover her living expenses. In

her testimony, Ms. Bradford stated she does not want to return to any of her

former job experiences, and Mr. Williams maintains that her purposeful

underemployment is the reason why her necessitous circumstances exist. He

suggests that he should not be “saddled” with funding his ex-wife’s

unsuccessful business venture. Mr. Williams argues that Ms. Bradford’s

underemployment undercuts any claims for increased or continuing

permanent spousal support.
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Ms. Bradford urges that none of the evidence suggests she could be

making more money by returning to one of her prior work experiences.

Instead, Mr. Williams speculates that these purported “better jobs” would

create more income for Ms. Bradford. This speculation is not grounds for

establishing an abuse of discretion by the trial court. In operating her own

business, Ms. Bradford suggests that she has made a reasonable employment

decision as she can grow her business in the future, she is her own boss, and

she is not subject to being laid off.

DISCUSSION

A spouse may be awarded final periodic support when he or she has

not been at fault for the breakup of the marriage and is in need of support.

Final periodic support is based on the needs of that party and the ability of

the other party to pay. A claimant spouse does not need to prove

“necessitous circumstances.” King v. King, 48,881 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 941; Richards v. Richards, 49,260 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/13/14), 147 So. 3d 800; Anderson v. Anderson, 48,027 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/15/13), 117 So. 3d 208. Final periodic spousal support, formerly known

as permanent alimony, is limited to an amount sufficient for maintenance, as

opposed to continuing an accustomed style of living. The court shall

consider all relevant factors in determining the amount and duration of final

support. La. C.C. art. 112; King, supra; Richards, supra. Maintenance

includes the basic necessities of life, such as food, shelter, clothing,

transportation, medical and drug expenses, utilities, household maintenance,

and income tax liability generated by alimony payments. Id.; Jones v.

Jones, 38,790 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/25/04), 877 So. 2d 1061.

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An award of interim spousal support or final periodic support may be

modified if the circumstances of either party materially change and shall be

terminated if it has become unnecessary. The subsequent remarriage of the

obligor spouse shall not constitute a change of circumstance. La. C.C. art.

114. An award for support shall not be modified unless the party seeking the

modification shows a material change in circumstances of one of the parties

between the time of the previous award and the time of the rule for

modification of the award. The material change in circumstances must be

substantial and continuing since the last award for support. La. R.S.

9:311(A)(1).

In determining whether the final spousal support award should be

modified or terminated based on the changed circumstances of either party,

the trial court should consider the relevant factors listed in La. C.C. art.

112. La. C.C. art. 114, Comment (b), Revision Comments—1997; Freeman

v. Freeman, 16-0580 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So. 3d 653. A finding

of a change in circumstances does not automatically result in a modification

or termination of support; rather, the effect of a finding of a change in

circumstances is to shift the burden to the party opposing the termination of

spousal support to prove need and the relevant Article

112 factors. See Martin v. Martin, 16-0324 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/16/16), 204

So. 3d 717, 722; Freeman, 218 So. 3d at 657.

A trial court’s determination regarding final spousal support is subject

to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bloxom v. Bloxom, 52,728

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/14/19), 279 So. 2d 474; Tarbutton v. Tarbutton, 52,102

(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/27/18), 251 So. 2d 590; Freeman, supra. It is within the

trial court’s sound discretion to fix the amount of spousal support and is to
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be exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is just and

proper under the facts of the case. Wascom v. Wascom, 97-0547 (La. App. 1

Cir. 6/29/98), 713 So. 2d 1271, writ denied, 98-2028 (La. 11/6/98), 728 So.

2d 391; Freeman, supra. The abuse of discretion standard is highly

deferential to the trial court’s rulings. See Fin & Feather, LLC v.

Plaquemines Par. Gov’t, 16-0256 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/28/16), 202 So. 3d

1028. A court necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an

erroneous view of the law or results from a conclusion reached capriciously

or in an arbitrary manner. Fin & Feather, LLC, supra; Freeman, supra.

Whether a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed is a

question of good faith. Martin, supra; Freeman, supra. Voluntary

underemployment is a fact-based determination subject to the manifest error

standard of review. Id. The manifest error standard of review is based in

part on the trial court’s ability to better evaluate the testimony of live

witnesses, compared with an appellate court’s sole reliance upon a written

record. Id. When presented with two permissible views of the evidence, the

trier of fact’s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. Id.

In order to modify the existing spousal support award, both Mr.

Williams and Ms. Bradford in this case had the burden of showing a material

change in circumstances between the time of the original award and the time

of the rule for modification of the award because both parties sought a

modification. Furthermore, jurisprudence explains that this material change

must be substantial and continuing since the last award for support. Mr.

Williams suggests that the material change is Ms. Bradford’s voluntary

underemployment as well as miscellaneous expenses that should not be

considered in awarding support, and Ms. Bradford argues that Mr. Williams’
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increase in income constitutes a material change. Neither of these

arguments satisfies the burden of showing a material change in

circumstances.

Our review of the trial court’s ruling shows that the trial court

determined, after evaluating the evidence and testimony, Ms. Bradford was

not voluntarily underemployed by running her own cleaning business.

However, the trial court clearly found that Ms. Bradford was still in need of

support as it did not see fit to completely terminate support. In Ms.

Bradford’s case, we find that the original $400 per month spousal support

award, together with her means of support in operating her own cleaning

business, is enough to meet Ms. Bradford’s “maintenance” expenses,

maintenance meaning the basic necessities of life, such as food, shelter,

clothing, transportation, medical and drug expenses, etc.

Under the circumstances presented by this record, we acknowledge

that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Ms.

Bradford needs support and that Mr. Williams has the ability to pay spousal

support. However, we cannot conclude that Mr. Williams’ increase in

income is a change in circumstances justifying an increase in spousal

support. For these reasons, we find that the trial court abused its discretion

in increasing the monthly spousal support obligation from $400 to $600.

CONCLUSION

At Ms. Bradford’s costs, we REVERSE the judgment increasing Mr.

Williams’ monthly spousal support obligation to $600, and we AFFIRM the

original spousal support order of $400.

REVERSED IN PART; AFFIRMED.

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