State of Louisiana v. Ramon D. Grant

+-Judgment rendered August 28, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,722-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

RAMON D. GRANT Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 387,027

Honorable Erin Leigh Waddell Garrett, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TOMMY JAN JOHNSON
ROSS S. OWEN
ERICA N. JEFFERSON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

COX, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the First Judicial District Court,

Caddo Parish, Louisiana. Following a jury trial, Ramon D. Grant (“Grant”)

was unanimously convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count one); possession with the intent to

distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.

R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and (B)(1)(a) (count two); and illegal carrying of a

weapon while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation

of La. R.S. 14:95(E) (count three).

Regarding count one, Grant was ordered to pay $1,000 or in default,

serve 60 days in jail, and serve 18 years at hard labor without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. As to count two, Grant was

ordered to serve seven years at hard labor, and as to count three, Grant was

ordered to serve eight years at hard labor without benefits, with each

sentence to run concurrently. For the following reasons, we affirm Grant’s

convictions and amend his sentence as to count one to vacate the portion of

the sentence imposing jail time in default of payment of fines imposed.

FACTS

On February 16, 2022, the State filed a bill of information charging

Grant with the following three offenses: possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1, possession with the intent to

distribute a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.

R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and (B)(1)(a), and illegal carrying of a weapon while in

possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S.

14:95(E). The State alleged that on January 4, 2022, Grant was engaged in a

high-speed chase, where he was discovered to be a convicted felon in

possession of a firearm and methamphetamine.

A preliminary hearing regarding probable cause for the arrest was

held on May 19, 2022. Deputy Justin Dunn (“Deputy Dunn”), of Caddo

Parish Sheriff’s Narcotics Division, and the arresting officer, testified

generally about the circumstances leading to Grant’s arrest. Following

Deputy Dunn’s testimony, the court reviewed Grant’s criminal record and

noted that Grant was previously convicted of first-degree murder in Texas.

In response to the court’s inquiry about the conviction, Grant stated on the

record that he was not on parole and served his sentence. The court then

determined probable cause existed for Grant’s arrest.

Thereafter, on March 6, 2023, trial commenced wherein the following

pertinent testimony was presented:

Deputy Dunn testified that on January 4, 2022, while en route to work

in an unmarked patrol unit, he was almost hit twice by a vehicle that sped

past him as he turned onto the highway. Deputy Dunn stated that the vehicle

traveled “well over 100 miles an hour,” and that he had to accelerate to

almost 120 miles per hour to catch up. Deputy Dunn explained that during

the chase, he initiated his sirens for the driver to pull over, but the driver

continued to accelerate, failed to yield for traffic, ran through a red light, and

wove in and out of traffic. He further detailed that during the chase, the

driver accelerated at full speed and made a few turns before he encountered

a large truck that was forced to drive onto the curb to avoid being hit.

Deputy Dunn testified that at one point, he lost sight of the vehicle for

a few seconds but discovered that the driver crashed his vehicle. Deputy

Dunn stated that as he drove up to the scene, the driver had already exited
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the vehicle and jumped on the hood of the unmarked patrol unit. Deputy

Dunn explained that as he exited his vehicle, he identified himself as an

officer and ordered the man to get on the ground, but the driver jumped from

the hood of the patrol unit and fled on foot. Deputy Dunn testified that he

chased the driver for approximately 100 yards before he apprehended the

driver. Deputy Dunn testified that he conducted a pat-down, handcuffed,

and Mirandized the driver. According to Deputy Dunn, the driver informed

him there was a gun in the crashed vehicle, that he drove erratically because

he had to pay a bill, and fled because he was a convicted felon and did not

want to be caught with the firearm.

Deputy Dunn then identified Grant in open court as the driver he

encountered on January 4, 2022. Deputy Dunn then explained that when he

searched Grant’s vehicle, he discovered a loaded semi-automatic handgun

on the floorboard of the driver’s seat and a digital scale in the console.1

Deputy Dunn stated that he also found a small bag of what appeared to be

methamphetamine under his patrol unit where Grant stood just before he was

handcuffed. Deputy Dunn explained that no other person was present when

he apprehended Grant or searched the vehicle, so there could be no other

way the drugs could have gotten underneath the patrol unit.

Deputy Dunn stated that after Grant was arrested, he was taken to

Caddo Correctional Center where Grant made a recorded phone call to an

unidentified female caller. Deputy Dunn explained that during the call,

Grant disclosed that the firearm and drugs that were in the vehicle had been

found and that he was aware he was chased by law enforcement.

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Deputy Dunn explained that a digital scale, like the one he recovered from
Grant’s vehicle, is typically used to weigh and measure drugs for distribution.
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Next, Randall Robillard (“Robillard”), tendered as an expert in

forensic chemistry, testified that he tested and confirmed that the bag of

drugs discovered under Deputy Dunn’s patrol unit was methamphetamine.

Agent Kevin Harris (“Agent Harris”) of the Caddo Parish Narcotics Division

also testified generally that the 18 grams of methamphetamine recovered

from the arrest is more than one person would generally have for personal

use and was more consistent with the sale or distribution of drugs. Agent

Harris stated that it was common for people to possess a firearm registered

in another person’s name, particularly so for convicted felons because they

cannot legally purchase a firearm on their own.

John Rowe (“Rowe”) of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety

and Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole Division, testified that he

was a specialist in probation and parole. Rowe stated that in reference to

this case, he researched the criminal records for Ramon Deshon Grant. The

State then introduced Exhibit 6, which Rowe identified as court documents

from Texas indicating that an individual named “Ramon Grant” was arrested

for first degree murder on June 14, 2006, convicted on February 28, 2008,

and sentenced to serve 15 years. Rowe testified that the ten-year cleansing

period for firearm possession for convicted felons in Louisiana had not yet

lapsed as of the date of the offense.

Rowe testified that he identified the individual who was convicted in

the documents from Exhibit 6 and could likewise identify that person in the

courtroom. Rowe stated that the district attorney’s office sent additional

discovery information, and he “went through that and pulled out [his] date of

birth, social security number, State ID number, and ran his criminal history

which provided a photograph of him.” Rowe then confirmed that Grant was
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the same individual who was convicted of first degree murder in Texas as

identified in Exhibit 6. On cross-examination, Rowe confirmed that, based

on the documents in Exhibit 6, Grant took a plea agreement to serve 15 years

for the offense.

Finally, Keriosha Buford (“Buford”), Grant’s girlfriend, testified that

the morning Grant was arrested, Grant dropped her off at work and took her

vehicle to pay a bill. After defense counsel introduced a photograph of the

firearm recovered from the vehicle, Buford stated that she purchased a 9-

millimeter firearm approximately four or five months prior, but before she

met Grant. Buford stated she kept the firearm under the seat in her vehicle

because she worked nights and needed it for her safety.

Buford explained that while she and Grant lived together, he did not

know she kept the weapon in the vehicle, and she did not tell him because

Grant did not normally drive her vehicle. On cross-examination, Buford

admitted she knew Grant had a prior felony conviction for murder and that

he was not permitted to possess a firearm. Buford, however, denied

knowing that there was a digital scale found in the console of the vehicle.

Buford stated that she only learned that Grant used drugs after her vehicle

was wrecked but did not think that Grant sold drugs.

At the close of testimony, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict

for each count. Thereafter, Grant filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of

acquittal and a motion for new trial, both of which were denied by the trial

court. A sentencing hearing was held on May 31, 2023, where the trial court

considered the enumerated factors of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 and sentenced

Grant as follows:

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So considering the factors of 894.1[,] on the possession of a
firearm while carrying a concealed weapon by a convicted
felon, the Court is going to sentence you to 18 years [at] hard
labor without benefit. On the possession with intent to
distribute Schedule II less than 28, I’m going to sentence you to
seven years hard labor. On illegal carrying of weapons while
also in the possession of a controlled dangerous substance, I’m
going to sentence you to eight years without benefit in
accordance with statutory guidelines.

I’m going to run them all concurrent with each other but
consecutive to anything else. . . He gets credit for time served.

In correcting count one, the trial court provided:

I’m going to in [c]ount 1, I think, is the firearm felon, the
statute requires that I also sentence you to [a] $1,000 fine, but
what I’m going to do is I’m going to execute that and convert it
to days in lieu and have you serve 60 days in lieu and I’m going
to run that concurrent too.

Grant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence on June 27, 2023, and the

motion was denied on July 5, 2023. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Grant contends that the State failed to

present sufficient evidence to convict him of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. Specifically, Grant argues that the State did not sufficiently

prove he was the same Ramon Grant who committed the predicate offense

of first degree murder in Texas to sustain the current conviction.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed. 2d 248 (2004). The Jackson standard, now

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legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art 821, does not afford the appellate

court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that

of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517;

State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ

denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.

The Jackson standard also applies in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court which reviews the sufficiency

of the evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence

by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

When the direct evidence is viewed as such, the facts established by the

direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that

evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of

the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983).

Likewise, if a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; see also, State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So.

3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. The appellate

court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution

and determine whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable

that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v.

Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584, writ not cons., 12-

0062 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.

In the absence of any internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, the testimony of the witness, if believed by the trier
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of fact, alone, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v.

Elkins, 48,972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 138 So. 3d 769, writ denied, 14-

0992 (La. 12/8/14), 153 So. 3d 438; State v. Wiltcher, 41,981 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So. 2d 769.

Where there is conflicting testimony concerning factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied,

02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255. The appellate court neither

assesses the credibility of witnesses nor reweighs evidence. State v. Smith,

94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442. Rather, the reviewing court affords

great deference to the jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a

witness in whole or in part. State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir.

8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d

422.

When the key issue is the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator,

rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate

any reasonable probability of misidentification. Positive identification by

one eyewitness or victim may suffice to support a conviction. State v.

Hughes, 05-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 1047. It is the factfinder who

weighs the respective credibility of the witnesses, and this Court will

generally not second-guess those determinations. Id.

Grant challenges his conviction for possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, arguing that the State did not meet its burden because its

witness, Rowe, was never asked to identify Grant in court; the photograph of

the individual identified as “Ramon Deshun Grant” in State’s Exhibit 6 was
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not placed in evidence; and neither Grant’s date of birth, driver’s license, nor

social security number was introduced as evidence. After a review of the

record and exhibits presented before this court, we disagree with Grant’s

assertion that Rowe failed to identify Grant as the same individual identified

in Exhibit 6.

La. R.S. 14:95.1 provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful for any

person who has been convicted of a crime of violence, in this case, first

degree murder, to possess a firearm or carry a concealed weapon. To

support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the

State must prove: (1) the possession of the firearm; (2) a previous conviction

of an enumerated felony; (3) absence of the 10-year statute of limitation; and

(4) general intent to commit the offense. State v. Green, 51,784 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/10/18), 245 So. 3d 1105, reh’g denied, (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/22/18).

The State has the burden of proving the existence of the prior felony

convictions. Courts have recognized various methods that may be used to

establish a defendant’s previous conviction identity, including witness

testimony, expert opinion regarding the fingerprints of the accused when

compared to those of the person previously convicted, photographs

contained in an authenticated record, or evidence of identical driver’s license

numbers, sex, race, and date of birth. Id.; State v. Jones, 41,429 (La. App. 2

Cir. 9/27/06), 940 So. 2d 131, writ denied, 06-2769 (La. 9/14/07), 963 So.

2d 394. The mere fact that the defendant on trial and the person previously

convicted have the same name does not constitute sufficient evidence of

identity. Id.; State v. Watson, 40,059 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/05), 911 So. 2d

396.

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In this case, the State filed a bill of information charging Grant,

identified as “Ramon D. Grant,” in part, with possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. In establishing Grant’s identity as a previously convicted

felon, the State introduced Exhibit 6, documents from Texas detailing that an

individual identified as “Ramon Deshon Grant” pled guilty to first degree

murder in Texas in 2008. In reviewing those documents, Rowe testified that

the individual, “Ramon Grant,” was convicted of first degree murder and

was sentenced to 15 years.

Rowe was then asked if he could identify the individual in those

documents “here in the courtroom today?” Rowe confirmed that he was

able to identify that person. Rowe further testified that he received

additional information from the district attorney’s office and was able to

obtain his “date of birth, social security number, State ID number, and ran

his criminal history which provided a photograph of him.” Rowe was asked

once again if he could identify that individual, to which Rowe responded in

the affirmative. Rowe was then asked if this was the “same individual that

was convicted in those documents,” and Rowe again responded that it was.

In addition to Rowe’s testimony, Buford, Grant’s girlfriend, testified

that she was aware Grant had a prior felony conviction for murder. Further,

Deputy Dunn testified that Grant admitted that he only fled because he was a

convicted felon and was prevented from being in possession of a firearm.

Although the supplemental documents Rowe stated he received from

the district attorney’s office were not submitted into evidence, the State

presented sufficient evidence to show that the “Ramon Deshon Grant”

convicted in Texas is the same “Ramon D. Grant” convicted in the present

case. Moreover, the jury, who heard the testimony from all witnesses, was
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free to make a credibility determination regarding Grant’s identity as a

previously convicted felon based on the testimony presented. Because great

deference is given toward a jury’s decision to either accept or reject the

testimony of a witness in whole or in part, this Court will not re-evaluate the

credibility of a witness or reweigh the evidence presented.

Therefore, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, as required under the Jackson standard, we find that the State

presented sufficient evidence as to Grant’s identity as a previously convicted

felon for any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

Grant was the same individual who committed the predicate offense of first

degree murder as identified in State’s Exhibit 6 to convict him as charged.

This Court, however, notes that careful consideration must be made

toward the introduction of all evidence to establish each element of the

offense for which a defendant stands accused. Because the State bears the

burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty, it must

prove each element by solid evidence which firmly convinces and leaves no

reasonable doubt. Regarding a defendant’s identity, the State maintains the

burden to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification.

In this case, the State relied primarily on Rowe’s testimony to satisfy

this portion of its burden. While witness and expert testimony may be used

to establish a defendant’s identity, in this case, the State possessed additional

information regarding Grant’s identity: discovery documents which

contained his photograph, date of birth, social security number, and State ID.

These documents could have only served to bolster the State’s case and

dispel any confusion as to Grant’s identity. The jury was free to accept or

reject Rowe’s testimony and should the jury have not taken Rowe at his
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word that he verified Grant’s identity to confirm that he was the same

individual identified in Exhibit 6, this case could have taken a very different

turn regarding Grant’s identity as a previously convicted felon.

This Court urges caution for the State in the future to present its

evidence to the fullest to solidify its case.

Error Patent

Our review of the record has disclosed an error patent discoverable on

the face of the record and which requires amending.

Specifically, we note that the trial court, in sentencing Grant as to his

conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, provided that

Grant was to pay $1,000 or in default, serve 60 days in jail, and serve 18

years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence.

It is well settled that an indigent defendant cannot be subjected to

default jail time in lieu of the payment of a fine, costs, or restitution. State v.

Jarratt, 53,525 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 299 So. 3d 1202. A defendant’s

indigent status may be discerned from the record. Id. This court considers it

error for a trial court to impose jail time in default of payment and may

amend an indigent defendant’s sentence to vacate that portion imposing a

fine in lieu of jail time. State v. Modique, 50,413 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/27/16),

writ denied, 16-0464 (La. 3/13/17), 216 So.3d 801.

The record reveals that counsel from the indigent defender’s office

was appointed to represent Grant at trial and he is represented on appeal by

the appellate project. We therefore conclude that this is presumptive

evidence of indigency. State v. Benavides, 54,265 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/9/22),

336 So. 3d 114. Because of the defendant’s indigent status, the trial court
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erred in imposing jail time in the event of default on payment of the imposed

fines and fees. Therefore, we amend the sentences imposed to vacate the

imposition of jail time in lieu of payment of fines and fees.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Grant’s convictions are affirmed. Grant’s

sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is amended to

vacate the default time in lieu of payment of the fines imposed. All other

sentences are affirmed.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCE ON COUNT I

AMENDED, AND AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED; SENTENCES ON

COUNT II AND COUNT III AFFIRMED.

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