State of Louisiana v. Clay Landis Riggs

Judgment rendered July 23, 2025.

No. 55,736-KA
No. 55,954-KA
(Consolidated Cases)

ON REHEARING

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****
STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

CLAY LANDIS RIGGS Appellant

*****

On Rehearing
Originally Appealed from the
Eighth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Winn, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 45,329 and 45,550

Honorable Anastasia Stacy Wiley, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

CLAY LANDIS RIGGS Pro Se

RICHARD CHRISTOPHER NEVILS Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

STEVEN D. CREWS
MATTHEW S. KELLEY
COLE B. SMITH
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STONE, STEPHENS, THOMPSON, HUNTER,
and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J., concurs with written reasons.

ELLENDER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with written reasons.

THOMPSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part for reasons assigned by
J. Ellender.

STONE, J.

This consolidated1 criminal case has returned to us on remand from

the Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Riggs, 25-00299 (La. 5/29/25), --So.

3d--, 2025 WL 1527023.

The defendant is Clay L. Riggs (“Riggs”). This case was originally

decided in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Anastasia Wiley

presiding. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence,2

Riggs was convicted of aggravated flight from an officer pursuant to La.

R.S. 14:108.1 and subsequently was adjudicated a fourth felony offender

pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1. Thereupon, the trial court sentenced Riggs to

life imprisonment.

We previously issued an opinion in this appeal that addressed only

matters concerning Riggs’s habitual offender sentencing (i.e., docket no.

55954-KA). That opinion affirmed Riggs’s conviction without addressing

his assignment of error in a brief his attorney separately filed in docket no.

55736-KA on February 8, 2024. That brief argues Riggs’s motion to

suppress should have been granted. Additionally, we failed to address

Riggs’s pro se appellate brief. Due to the remand, we have recalled our

initial opinion in this appeal and now replace it with the instant opinion.

However, the outcome of the case remains unchanged; this new opinion is

essentially identical to the initial one, except that we have added

1
Riggs appealed his initial conviction and sentence in this court’s docket no.
55736-KA. Subsequently, based on that conviction, he was adjudicated a fourth felony
offender and was resentenced accordingly; he separately appealed his enhanced sentence
in this court’s docket no. 55954-KA.
2
The trial court heard the motion on October 24, 2022, and signed the order
denying it that same day.

explanations as to why the trial court was right in denying the motion to

suppress, and why Riggs’s pro se assignments of error lack merit.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 30, 2022, the arresting officer was parked in his marked

patrol vehicle in a “hole” in the woods watching traffic from a concealed

viewpoint. The officer saw and heard Riggs’s SUV drive past and followed

Riggs’s vehicle because he heard its exhaust making a “very, very loud

noise.” This indicated to him that Riggs’s vehicle had an illegally modified

exhaust system. After the arresting officer followed Riggs for a minute or

two, Riggs abruptly accelerated to 60 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour

zone. At this point the officer activated his lights and began pursuit. Riggs

did not stop, but instead, led the officer on a “high-speed”3 chase on rural

roads, which were largely unpaved and were subject to varying speed limits

of no more than 30 miles per hour. The video of the chase demonstrates that

it lasted over 19 minutes, involved slogging through muddy stretches, and

wound through wooded areas. The chase ended when Riggs attempted to

cross a narrow wooden bridge in his SUV, but Riggs’s vehicle fell off the

bridge and flipped into the bayou. (Riggs did all of this with three

passengers in his vehicle.) The officer testified that he identified Riggs as

the driver when Riggs made a turn during the chase, and when Riggs was

pulled from the driver’s seat at the conclusion of the chase.

Riggs filed a timely motion to suppress, which the trial court denied.

Riggs was convicted at trial. He was later adjudicated a fourth felony

offender and sentenced as such. After a presentence investigation (in which

3
The officer’s dash cam footage shows that speeds varied widely, but only briefly
exceeded 70 miles per hour.
2

Riggs refused to participate), the trial court sentenced Riggs to life in prison.

The trial court issued written reasons for the sentence, noting Riggs’s

extensive criminal history, past failures in probation, lack of intent to stop

committing crimes, and the fact that there were others present in the vehicle

with him during the chase.

In our original opinion, we addressed only one assignment of error:

that Riggs’s sentence is constitutionally excessive. Below, this opinion will:

(1) address Riggs’s counseled assignment of error, i.e., that his conviction is

invalid because it depends on evidence that should have been suppressed; (2)

address Riggs’s pro se assignments of error; and (3) finally, restate the

original opinion reducing Riggs’s sentence to twenty years. He did not file a

motion to reconsider the sentence.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS (COUNSELED)

As previously stated, the defendant filed a motion to suppress in the

trial court. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Riggs argues that

the officer who initiated the chase lacked reasonable suspicion to believe

that Riggs’s vehicle had an illegal exhaust system, and therefore lacked

justification to stop Riggs. As explained below, this argument lacks merit.

In State v. Robinson, 52,974 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/18/20), 293 So. 3d

193, 201, writ denied, 20-00525 (La. 10/20/20), 303 So. 3d 315, we

explained the constitutional boundaries on searches and seizures by law

enforcement:

The right of every person to be secure in his person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, § 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution. However, that declaration of rights
“presupposes that there must be an invasion of [the] right

3

to privacy before there can be an unreasonable search.”
State v. Jackson, 09-1983 (La. 7/6/10), 42 So. 3d 368.
(Emphasis added). Simply stated, if there has been no
“search” or “seizure,” as defined by the constitutional
jurisprudence, then there cannot be a constitutional
violation. With regard to whether a search has occurred,
the inquiry is whether there was “an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area.” Id.

In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991), the

United States Supreme Court held that an individual is not “seized” within

the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until that individual either submits to

the police show of authority or is physically contacted by the police. In

State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 712-13 (La.), opinion reinstated on reh’g,

626 So. 2d 720 (La. 1993), the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Hodari D.,

but also held that the Louisiana constitution provides more protection than

its federal counterpart:

Today we adopt Hodari D.’s definition for determining
when an “actual stop” has occurred. We additionally adopt
a standard for determining [under the Louisiana
constitution’s additional protection] the “imminency” of
an actual stop which focuses on whether an “actual stop”
is “virtually certain” to result from the police encounter.
To the extent this decision conflicts with our prior
decisions, they are hereby overruled.

Id. Tucker articulated the additional protection as follows:

In determining whether an “actual stop” of an individual is
“imminent,” we find that the focus must be on the degree
of certainty that the individual will be “actually stopped”
as a result of the police encounter…It is only when the
police come upon an individual with such force that,
regardless of the individual’s attempts to flee or elude the
encounter, an actual stop of the individual is virtually
certain, that an “actual stop” of the individual is
“imminent.”

Id. Tucker also provided a list of factors a court may consider in

determining when an imminent actual stop was virtually certain:

4

[T]he following factors may be useful in assessing the
extent of police force employed and determining whether
that force was virtually certain to result in an “actual stop”
of the individual: (1) the proximity of the police in relation
to the defendant at the outset of the encounter; (2) whether
the individual has been surrounded by the police; (3)
whether the police approached the individual with their
weapons drawn; (4) whether the police and/or the
individual are on foot or in motorized vehicles during the
encounter; (5) the location and characteristics of the area
where the encounter takes place; and (6) the number of
police officers involved in the encounter.

Id.

In relevant part, La. C. Cr. P. art. 703 provides:

A. A defendant adversely affected may move to
suppress any evidence from use at the trial on the merits
on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained.
...
C. A motion filed under the provisions of this
Article must be filed in accordance with Article 521,4
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or neither the
defendant nor his counsel was aware of the existence of
the evidence or the ground of the motion, or unless the
failure to file the motion was otherwise excusable. The
court in its discretion may permit the filing of a motion to
suppress at any time before or during the trial.
D. On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under
the provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is on the
defendant to prove the ground of his motion, except that
the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility
of a purported confession or statement by the defendant or
of any evidence seized without a warrant.
E. (1) An evidentiary hearing on a motion to
suppress shall be held only when the defendant alleges
facts that would require the granting of relief. The state
may file an answer to the motion.
…
F. A ruling prior to trial on the merits, upon a
motion to suppress, is binding at the trial. Failure to file a

4
In relevant part, La. C. Cr. P. art. 521 states:

A. Pretrial motions shall be made or filed within thirty days after
receipt of initial discovery, unless a different time is provided by law
or fixed by the court upon a showing of good cause why thirty days
is inadequate.
B. Upon written motion at any time and a showing of good cause,
the court shall allow additional time to file pretrial motions.

5

motion to suppress evidence in accordance with this
Article prevents the defendant from objecting to its
admissibility at the trial on the merits on a ground
assertable by a motion to suppress.

In Robinson, supra, we also explained the procedural and evidentiary

aspects of enforcing these constitutional freedoms:

Generally, if evidence was derived from an unlawful
search or seizure, the proper remedy is exclusion of the
evidence from trial. On a motion to suppress evidence on
the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the admissibility of
any evidence seized without a warrant. La. C.Cr.P. art.
703(D).
The standard of review applicable to a trial court’s
decision on a motion to suppress is bifurcated as follows:
(1) legal findings or conclusions are subject to de novo
review; and (2) findings of fact are subject to manifest
error review. Manifest error review requires great
deference to the factfinder’s decisions regarding witness
credibility.

Id.

By the time that Riggs unintentionally cast himself into the bayou, the

officers already had acquired the evidence needed to convict Riggs of

aggravated flight from an officer. Riggs was not virtually certain to

imminently be stopped until he had already been recorded on video speeding

and committing aggravated flight from an officer. The exclusionary

sanction, by definition, only excludes evidence derived from an unlawful

arrest, detention, search, or seizure. Given the facts of this case, it is

logically impossible that the testimony and video of what Riggs did before

his vehicle was stopped was derived from the stop of his vehicle. That is so

under the rule of Hodari D., supra, and the heightened protection under

Tucker, supra. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that the

6

officer lacked reasonable suspicion at the time he began to follow Riggs, the

trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress such evidence.

Furthermore, the officer had probable cause to arrest Riggs by the

time the arrest was actually made as the officer had quite personal

knowledge that Riggs was speeding and committing flight from the arresting

officer himself. Riggs’s arrest was lawful. Therefore, any evidence derived

from the arrest, such as confirming Riggs’s identity as the driver, is not

subject to suppression under either the federal constitution or Louisiana

constitution.

Additionally, even if the exclusionary sanction somehow magically

expanded to cover evidence derived from an officer’s merely following a

vehicle without reasonable suspicion, it still would not apply here. La. R.S.

32:352 prohibits excessively loud mufflers. In the motion hearing, the

officer testified that, based on his own hearing, the muffler noise was

excessive—it was “emitting a very, very, loud noise” which caused him to

suspect it had been modified. The trial court could easily have accepted the

officer’s testimony without committing manifest error. The defense brief to

this court cites trial testimony of Amy Jordan, who was a passenger during

the chase and often drove the vehicle herself. She said the muffler was not

loud that night. The defense has failed to cite any such testimony given

during the motion hearing. Even if the defendant had done so, the court

would not have committed a manifest error in rejecting this testimony in

favor of the officer’s testimony. Therefore, the trial court would not have

erred in affirmatively finding the officer had reasonable suspicion for merely

following Riggs’s vehicle (which, again, did not constitute an arrest or a

detention). This argument is without merit and is rejected.
7

However, out of an overabundance of caution, we explain further:

Riggs seems to potentially argue that the officers pulling him out the driver

seat of his vehicle—and thereby seeing his face and confirming that he was

the driver—was somehow an unlawful search of his vehicle or seizure of

him.

While there is a recognized constitutional right to privacy in one’s

vehicle, that cannot support an argument that the identification of Riggs as

the driver was the product of an unlawful search or arrest. Neither an arrest

warrant nor a search warrant is needed to arrest a felony suspect from his

vehicle; probable cause alone is sufficient. This reality is embedded in our

law at the presuppositional level,5 and is codified in La. C. Cr. P. art.

213(A)(1): Because the officers had the authority to arrest the driver of the

Riggs vehicle without a warrant, they had the right to see his face. For this

reason alone, this argument is without merit.

However, we also note that the emergency exception to the warrant

requirement is applicable here:

One carefully defined exception to the warrant
requirement which is recognized throughout the United
States is the so called “emergency exception”. Mincey v.
5
State v. McGraw, 43,778 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/10/08), 1 So. 3d 645, 655, writ
denied, 2009-0317 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So. 3d 297; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 454,
101 S. Ct. 2860, 2861, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009); State v. Monroe, 49,365 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 152
So. 3d 1011; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 107, 98 S. Ct. 330, 331 (1977)
(requiring driver to get out of car as part of a traffic stop does not violate the Fourth
Amendment; (requiring driver to get out of car as part of a traffic stop does not violate
Article 1 Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution).
It is a strong general rule, if not an absolute rule, that no arrest warrant is required
for a felony suspect unless he is to be arrested inside his home. Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (1980) (warrant is required to arrest someone inside his home);
State v. Walker, 06-1045 (La. 4/11/07) 953 So.2d 786 (no warrant required to arrest
someone from the residence of a third party); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96
S. Ct. 820 (1976) (no warrant required to arrest felony suspect inside restaurant open to
the public).

8

Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290
(1978). Under the emergency exception, police officers
may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render
emergency assistance to a person reasonably believed to
be in distress and in need of such assistance.

State v. Murphy, 465 So. 2d 811, 815 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1985). The

emergency exception applies because the officers were not required to

obtain any warrant before rescuing Riggs and his passengers/victims from

drowning in the bayou. Thus, even if we pretend that a warrant was

otherwise required, this argument still would fail.

RIGGS’S PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Riggs filed a pro se brief wherein he introduces himself as “Clay

Landis Johnson who is a Pre-Amble Non-Franchised Private American

Man.”6

In his assignments of error, Riggs conjures mountains of anti-logic

and legal nonsense as support for his claims: (1) that he is not a person,

natural or juridical, but instead is a sovereign entity, and therefore, is not

subject to the law except in that his constitutional rights are being violated;

(2) that the Suburban he was driving is not a “motor vehicle,” and therefore,

he cannot have been the “driver” or “operator” thereof; (3) he did not ask for

any of the benefits that the government provides to all, and therefore, he is

not subject to the law; and (4) somehow, Uniform Commercial Code

(“UCC”) Article 9 militates in favor of his appeal. These are all of Riggs’s

enumerated assignments of error. As to these claims, it suffices to say that

being subject to objective reality and to the law is not optional for anyone,

6
Riggs later styles himself as a “Private Natural Man,” “The Natural Petitioner,”
“He,” and as the “Secured Party” in connection with his argument regarding Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9.

9

including Clay Riggs; nonetheless, this Court endeavors to address his

assignments of error with more specificity. Additionally, (5) Riggs makes a

substantive argument that is not specially enumerated as an assignment of

error. This argument is addressed at the end of this portion of this opinion.

In his first assignment of error, Riggs denies his/its own “corporate

existence” yet contends that his constitutional rights have been violated in

this case. This quote seems to reflect the linchpin of his argument:

The creation of the ENTITY/PERSON CLAY LANDIS
RIGGS that is associated with the Government owned
Social Security Card Number XXX-XX-XXXX was created by
Bessie Leona Riggs by false information on birth registry
record in Colorado Springs Colorado on or about the 19th
day of December 1970.

That is, Riggs maintains he is not the entity/person that was “created” by the

filing of the false birth certificate. A person is not created by the filing of a

birth certificate. The entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs also seems to

contend that, because he has a fraudulent birth certificate and that his/its

social security number was issued by fraud,7 he/it is not a “person,” and,

therefore, is not subject to the law. This is a contradiction: if the

entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs were not a person (natural or

juridical), he/it could not have constitutional rights. Again, in objective

reality, the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs does exist, is a human

being (a “natural person”), is fully subject to the law, and has the full

protection of the constitution. However, Due Process does not require the

7
Riggs alleges his mother: (1) birthed him with a midwife, not at a hospital; (2)
was disabled at the time of his infancy; and (3) therefore gave him to his aunt to raise as
her own child. He alleges that his aunt thus falsified the birth certificate and social
security information to establish herself as the biological mother in the eyes of the
government.
10

state to litigate whether the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs, a live

human being, is a person or not.

The entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs further argues that because

he/it did not agree to be subject to the law or request any of the benefits

which the government provides to everyone, he/it is not subject to the law.

Again, if the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs were not subject to the

law, then the law would not provide him/it with any rights, constitutional or

otherwise. The law applies to the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs

without his/its consent.

In the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs’s second assignment of

error, the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs argues that his/its

constitutional right to travel has been violated through the enforcement of

Louisiana traffic laws against him/it. He/it claims that he/it is not a “driver”

or an “operator” of a “motor vehicle.” He/it elaborates that his/its GMC

Suburban/SUV is not a “motor vehicle,” but instead, is a “Private

Conveyance/Carriage.” The problem with this argument is that the

entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs’s so-called “Private

Conveyance/Carriage” fits squarely within the legal definition of a “motor

vehicle,” and he/it himself/itself fits the law’s definition of a “driver” or

“operator.” The entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs cannot render traffic

laws inapplicable to himself/itself by rejecting the law’s terminology and

replacing it with his/its own terminology (nor otherwise).

In his/its third assignment of error, the entity/person referred to as

Clay Riggs has much to say about the Uniform Commercial Code (the

“UCC”) and claims that he/it is a “Secured Party Creditor” thereunder, he/it

is exempt from levy, and that the government is his/its perpetual debtor. The
11

entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs also states that he/it has been

“estopped from paying debt with lawful constitutional money.” There is a

vast gulf between: (1) what the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs

apparently thinks he/it knows about the UCC and its relevance to this case;

and (2) reality concerning the UCC and the reality of its absolute irrelevance

to this case.

In another assignment of error not specially enumerated in his/its

brief, the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs makes a substantive

argument. He/it argues that the arresting officer had no jurisdiction to arrest

him/it because the chase began on Bright Road, which the entity/person

referred to as Clay Riggs says is a federal game reserve road with no posted

speed limit signs. Though substantive, this argument nonetheless fails for

multiple reasons. First, as already explained, the officers had all the

evidence needed to convict the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs before

he/it was arrested. Videoing the motor vehicle of the entity/person referred

to as Clay Riggs as it was speeding and fleeing from an officer was not a

search or a seizure. Nor was the arresting officer’s identification of the

entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs as the driver during the chase.

Because the officer had probable cause to arrest at the time the entity/person

referred to as Clay Riggs was pulled from his/its vehicle in the bayou, this

confirmation of the entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs as the driver was

not the product of an unlawful arrest.

Furthermore, there is no legal prohibition on a state officer gathering

evidence that is not constitutionally protected (at the Louisiana or federal

level) on a federal preserve or making an arrest thereon. That is especially

so because (1) Louisiana has (concurrent) criminal jurisdiction regarding
12

crimes committed in a national forest; and (2) the enforcement of speed

limits and noise regulations is totally consistent with the federal purpose of a

national forest. La. R.S. 3:4283; Bartlett v. Collector of Revenue, 285 So. 2d

346 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1973); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 7(3), 1111(b); see United States

v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 556 U.S. 1167, 129

S.Ct. 1905 (2009). The entity/person referred to as Clay Riggs also sees the

alleged location of where the officer initially attempted to stop him/it as

depriving the Eighth Judicial District Court of Louisiana of jurisdiction over

this case. The aforementioned authorities disprove this argument as well.

Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Riggs’s arrest

was a jurisdictional violation, such would not avail Riggs of the

exclusionary sanction:

Not all violations of statutory restrictions on arrest are
constitutional violations. Bickham, 404 So.2d at 933. Nor
have we extended the exclusionary rule to include non-
constitutional violations of statutes which are not designed
to protect the privacy interests of citizens. “When the
statutory limitation (or duty) alleged to have been violated
by the officer is not designed to implement fundamental
rights of privacy, this court should not employ the
exclusionary rule as a device to enforce such legislative
directives. This is, of course, particularly true when the
facts strongly support a finding that the officer acted
reasonably and in good faith in arguably exceeding the
bounds of his authority.” Bickham, 404 So.2d at 933.

State v. Gates, 13-1422 (La. 5/7/14), 145 So. 3d 288, 299.

SENTENCING

Error patent

An illegal sentence8 is an error patent and therefore may be vacated

and corrected at any time. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882; State v. Boowell, 406 So.

8
An “illegal sentence” is a sentence that is “not authorized by the statute or
statutes which govern the penalty for the crime of conviction.” State v. Williams, 23-0765
13

2d 213, 215 (La. 1981). As previously stated, the defendant’s maximum

possible sentence for the instant offense (without habitual offender

adjudication) is five years. La. R.S. 14:108.1. The predicate offenses are

two convictions of attempted possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

(La. R.S. 14:27 and 14:95.1) and one conviction of possession of

methamphetamine (La. R.S. 40:967). The trial court, in its written reasons

for sentence, indicated that it was applying La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) in

determining that the sentencing range is imprisonment of a minimum of 20

years to a maximum of the remainder of the defendant’s natural life.

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4) contains three separate provisions for

determining the applicable sentencing range; which provision (or provisions)

applies depends on certain circumstances. The instant case falls under both

La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) and La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(b).9 These

provisions state:

(4) If the fourth or subsequent felony is such that,
upon a first conviction the offender would be punishable
by imprisonment for any term less than his natural life
then the following sentences apply:
(a) The person shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for the fourth or subsequent felony for a determinate term
not less than the longest prescribed for a first conviction
but in no event less than twenty years and not more than
his natural life.
(b) If the fourth felony and no prior felony is
defined as a crime of violence under R.S. 14:2(B) or as a
sex offense under R.S. 15:541, the person shall be
imprisoned for not less than twenty years nor more than
twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first
conviction. If twice the possible sentence prescribed for a
first conviction is less than twenty years, the person shall
be imprisoned for twenty years.

(La. App. 4 Cir. 12/11/23), 382 So. 3d 1018, writ denied, 24-00081 (La. 4/16/24), 383 So.
3d 144.

9
Hereinafter, “subparagraph (a)” and “subparagraph (b).”
14

The instant offense, aggravated flight from an officer (La. R.S. 14:108.1), is

a “crime of violence.” La. R.S. 14:2(B)(39). None of the predicate offenses

are crimes of violence or sex offenses. Therefore, subparagraph (b), by its

terms, applies and dictates a sentence of twenty years while, simultaneously,

subparagraph (a) applies and dictates a sentencing range of a minimum of 20

years to a maximum of the remainder of the defendant’s natural life.

In State v. Newton, 42,743 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/19/07), 973 So. 2d 916,

921, writ denied, 08-1147 (La. 1/16/09), 998 So. 2d 90, this court stated:

In the absence of express legislative intent, principles of
lenity require that any ambiguity in a sentencing statute be
resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Burns, 29,632
(La. App. 2d Cir. 9/24/97), 699 So. 2d 1179.
The rule of lenity applies not only to interpretations of the
substantive ambit of criminal laws, but also to the
penalties imposed by those laws. When a criminal statute
provides inconsistent penalties, the rule of lenity directs
the court to impose the least severe penalty. State v.
Campbell, 2003–3035 (La. 7/6/04), 877 So. 2d 112.

It strikes the court as quite odd that the legislature would (under

subparagraph (b)) be more lenient toward a defendant whose instant offense

is a crime of violence—i.e., more lenient than toward defendants with no

crimes of violence (subparagraph (a)). However, we find no “express

legislative intent” that resolves the inconsistency. To render subparagraph

(b) inapplicable in this case, it would be necessary for us to, in effect, rewrite

that provision of the legislation; moreover, if we did so, Riggs’s sentencing

exposure would be severely increased. Such is not the province of the

judiciary, with or without supposed “express legislative intent.” Newton,

supra. Therefore, Riggs’s sentence of life imprisonment is illegal,

regardless of whether it is constitutionally prohibited as “cruel or unusual.”

15

Cruel or unusual

By failing to file a motion to reconsider sentence, Riggs has waived

his right to have the sentence reviewed for compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1. The sole remaining question in this appeal is whether his sentence

exceeds the punishment allowed by the state and federal constitutions. The

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20, of

the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive

punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be

excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979). The appellate

court must determine if the sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v.

Smith, 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1. A sentence is unconstitutionally

excessive when it imposes punishment, grossly disproportionate to the

severity of the offense or constitutes nothing more than needless infliction of

pain and suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980); State v.

Smith, supra. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its

broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been

more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957,

cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S. Ct. 615, 136 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1996). A

sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and

punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;

State v. Meadows, 51,843 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/10/18), 246 So. 3d 639, writ

denied, 18-0259 (La. 10/29/18), 254 So. 3d 1208. The sentencing court has

wide discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory limits, and the

16

sentence imposed will not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse

of that discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7.

In this case, we find that Riggs’s life sentence exceeds what is

constitutionally permissible. It shocks the sense of justice for a person to be

subjected to such punishment for leading the police on a chase through a

rural, unpopulated area. That crime, alone, would have exposed Riggs to a

maximum of five years of incarceration. His mandatory sentence of 20

years under subparagraph (b), supra, thus quadruples the maximum sentence

for Riggs’s violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1. Riggs’s violation of La. R.S.

14:108.1 was not the worst of such offenses. Because the offense of

conviction adequately reflects the wrongful nature of Riggs’s conduct, and

his violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1 is not the worst of such violations,

imprisonment beyond quadruple the maximum is nothing but a purposeless

infliction of pain and suffering. At the end of his 20-year term, Riggs will

be approximately 73 years old. Even an offender as recalcitrant as Riggs has

a significant prospect of non-recidivism at such an age.

CONCLUSION

Riggs’s conviction for violation of La. R.S. 14:108.1 and his

adjudication as a fourth felony offender are AFFIRMED. Riggs’s sentence

is VACATED and this matter is REMANDED for resentencing in

accordance with this opinion.

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STEPHENS, J., concurring,

I agree with Judge Stone that the motion to suppress was properly

denied by the trial court. While I agree with Judges Ellender and Thompson

that the trial court correctly applied La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(4)(a) in

determining the sentencing range applicable to this case, I find, as did

Judges Stone and Hunter, that the sentence imposed in this case is

unconstitutionally excessive. Though a fourth felony offender, the defendant

is not the “worst type of offender,” nor is he deserving of a maximum

sentence, which, in this case, as a fourth felony offender, is life

imprisonment.

1

ELLENDER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
I respectfully concur with the results, except for the issue of

sentencing, for the reasons previously given, restated here. Initially, I do not

agree La. R.S. 15:529.1 (A)(4)(b) applies to this case. Contrary to the

majority’s reading, this subsection applies only if neither the crime of

conviction nor any of the prior felonies is defined as a crime of violence.

See, e.g., State v. Brown, 19-695 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/6/20), 297 So. 3d 947,

writ denied, 20-00713 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So. 3d 1194. Obviously, Riggs’s

crime of conviction, aggravated flight from an officer, is defined as a crime

of violence. La. R.S. 14:2 (B)(39). I am unaware of any reported case

supporting the majority’s view that the statute is ambiguous and subsection

529.1 (A)(4)(b) somehow applies. Consequently, I believe the trial court was

correct in applying R.S. 15:529.1 (A)(4)(a) and determining Riggs’s

sentencing range was 20 years to life.

As for the life sentence imposed, I do not agree it is unconstitutionally

excessive. The emphasis of the majority is that the offense of conviction

occurred in a rural, unpopulated area, and that the maximum sentence he

could have received under R.S. 14:108.1 was five years at hard labor. While

this chase did occur primarily on unpopulated, rural Forest Service roads, it

was not a minor incident. Riggs ultimately flipped and crashed his SUV off a

narrow, wooden bridge and into a creek, with three occupants in the vehicle.

At least one of his passengers hit her head on the windshield and told

officers she “was scared and cold and wet” once pulled from the overturned

SUV. Not only did Riggs put his life and that of the pursuing officer in

danger, but also the lives of his three passengers.

1

The majority also gives inadequate weight to Riggs’s significant

criminal history and his defiant insistence that the laws of our state do not

apply to him. As pointed out by Judge Wiley in her detailed written

sentencing reasons, Riggs is at least an eight-time felony offender, with prior

crimes including not only those used to adjudicate him a fourth felony

offender, but also convictions for simple burglary (twice), aggravated

battery, theft, simple assault, and simple battery. Some of these offenses

were committed while on probation or parole, resulting in revocation.

Parenthetically, two of the predicate offenses used to support Riggs’s

adjudication as a multiple offender, attempted possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, were redesignated, shortly after the offense of conviction, as

crimes of violence. 2022 La. Acts No. 702 (effective June 18, 2022). In these

circumstances, the life sentence would now be mandatory. La. R.S. 15:529.1

(A)(4)(c). This places Judge Wiley’s sentencing choice in a favorable

perspective.

At 53 years old, Riggs is not a youthful offender and, in spite of a life

of crime spanning from 1992 to the present resulting in long stretches of

incarceration, he continues to believe the laws of this state do not apply to

him. It is one thing to file a multitude of pleadings challenging “corporate

existence” as a so-called “sovereign citizen,” but it is quite another to

habitually defy our criminal laws and refuse to accept responsibility for

one’s actions. By his words and deeds, Riggs has steadfastly demonstrated

his utter refusal to ever become a law-abiding citizen.

On review, an appellate court does not determine whether another

sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused

its discretion. State v. Fruge, 14-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So. 3d 579. I
2

believe this record supports Judge Wiley did not abuse her vast sentencing

discretion within the statutory limits. For these reasons, I respectfully

dissent.

3