State of Louisiana v. David D. Windham

Judgment rendered October 2, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,840-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

DAVID D. WINDHAM Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 380,099

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Douglas Lee Harville

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

REBECCA ARMAND EDWARDS
SAMUEL S. CRICHTON
MICHAEL T. ANDERSON
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, HUNTER, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

COX, J.

This case arises out of the First Judicial District Court, Caddo Parish,

Louisiana. Defendant, David D. Windham (“Windham”), was convicted of

two counts of resisting an officer with force or violence in violation of La.

R.S. 14:108.2. Following a unanimous jury verdict of guilty for both counts,

Windham was sentenced to three years at hard labor for both counts, to be

served consecutively, and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine for each count. For

the following reasons, we affirm Windham’s conviction and sentence.

FACTS

On June 19, 2023, by an amended bill of information, the State

charged Windham with two counts of resisting an officer with force or

violence in violation of La. R.S. 14:108.2. Windham pled not guilty to both

counts. A jury trial was held on September 21, 2023, where the following

testimony was presented:

Constable Melvin Presley (“Constable Presley”) testified that he was

elected as constable in Caddo Parish for Ward 3 and has served in that

position for the last 12 years, where he conducts traffic stops and other tasks

in his official capacity. Constable Presley stated that the boundaries of his

jurisdiction are marked by “the 12-mile Bayou on North Market and goes to

Caddo Lake, to the Red River, to the state line.” He explained that those

boundaries included the townships of Blanchard, Longwood, and

Mooringsport.

In recalling the events of the instant offense, Constable Presley

testified that on December 8, 2020, he and his deputy, Constable Samuel

Yount (“Constable Yount”) left a meeting for the Fraternal Order of Police

in the Cross Lake area. Constable Presley explained that although he was in

plain clothes, he had his badge and was in a marked vehicle equipped with

lights and sirens. He then stated that when he is in his jurisdiction, he is “on

duty 24-7.” Constable Presley testified that he drove southbound on

Blanchard Furrh Road, toward Blanchard, and that as he began to make a

left turn onto Billie Lee Drive,1 another vehicle almost struck him.

Constable Presley recalled that the vehicle traveled at a high rate of speed,

and it seemed as though the driver was distracted and unaware of what

happened.

Constable Presley stated that if he had not been paying attention and

had not moved his vehicle out of the way, it was likely the other vehicle

would have struck his driver’s door. He stated that at that point, he activated

his lights and followed the vehicle, where he observed the driver make

several traffic violations including speeding, reaching up to 70 miles an hour

in a 55-mile-an-hour, crossing over into the center line of the highway, and

generally weaving as he drove.

Constable Presley explained that as he followed behind the vehicle, he

noticed the driver had the interior vehicle lights on and was doing something

in the passenger seat. Constable Presley further stated that he followed the

vehicle for almost a quarter of a mile before the driver finally stopped. He

explained that as he approached the vehicle, he stood near the left rear of the

driver’s vehicle, and Constable Yount stood by the rear passenger side of the

vehicle. He stated that the driver approached him and asked, “What do you

need?” Constable Presley explained that he then identified himself and

asked if the driver was okay or needed help, to which the driver responded,

1
The incident report generated for this matter indicates that the intersection was
between Par Road 4/Blanchard Furrh Road and Billie Lee Lane.
2

“You’re a constable?” and “F*** a constable,” before he shoved Constable

Presley in the chest with both hands.

Constable Presley stated that after this, the driver then went back to

his vehicle and put the vehicle in gear. Constable Presley stated that he

managed to get a hold of the driver before he drove off to try and pull him

out of the vehicle, but the driver took off anyway, leaving him hanging out

of the vehicle. Constable Presley testified that he was in the vehicle from

the waist up and was dragged approximately two or three yards before the

vehicle finally came to a stop. He explained that during this time, the driver

struggled against him and continued to resist until Constable Yount was able

to grab the driver and pull him out of the vehicle. Constable Presley stated

that he and Constable Yount struggled to restrain the driver for about two or

three minutes because of his actions. Constable Presley stated that

approximately six or ten minutes later, a Caddo Parish Sheriff’s deputy

arrived to transport the driver.

On cross-examination, Constable Presley clarified that his incident

report did not reflect that he was wearing his badge because it was standard

procedure to wear it, and did not feel the need to include this information.

Constable Presley also stated that although he did not use his radar gun to

determine the driver’s precise speed, he was certified in 1979 by the

Shreveport Police Department to determine the speed of a vehicle and “ran

radar for three years in selective enforcement on motorcycles and in radar

cars.” Constable Presley reiterated that he stopped the driver because of the

near collision, that there were no tags on the vehicle, and because the driver

was speeding, and driving erratically. Constable Presley explained again

how he had to climb in the driver’s vehicle and the ensuing struggle he and
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Constable Yount endured to arrest him. He then stated that once the driver

was taken into custody, he was originally charged with speeding and battery

of an officer.

Constable Presley then stated that he wasn’t issued a police unit and

was required to pay for the vehicle himself and have his official decals put

on it. He then identified a picture of his patrol unit. Constable Presley then

admitted that he was subject to a few disciplinary matters, including an

incident where he “crossed into another district” without permission from

his supervisor. He then testified that normally, when he makes a stop, he is

in uniform but has effected arrests and stops in plain clothes as well.

Constable Presley also stated that he usually presents his identification card

but was unable to do so in this case because the driver shoved and fled

before he had the opportunity to do so. On redirect, Constable Presley

clarified that he also had to increase his speed to catch up to the driver, and

his speedometer reflected that he reached approximately 70 miles per hour

during the chase.

Next, Constable Yount testified that he worked for the Blanchard

Police Department and served as a constable for Ward 3 in Caddo Parish.

He testified that on December 8, 2020, he and Constable Presley left a

meeting together in a marked vehicle equipped with lights and the words

“Constable” on it. Constable Yount explained that as Constable Presley

attempted to make a left turn from Blanchard Furrh Road, a vehicle nearly

hit them. Constable Yount stated that to avoid being hit, Constable Presley

was forced to yank the wheel to the right. Constable Yount stated that the

sudden motion caused him to slam into his passenger door. He then recalled

seeing the other driver leave the road, drive down into a ditch, and then back
4

onto the road. Constable Yount noted that they had to accelerate to catch up

with the driver and estimated that the other driver traveled around 65 to 70

miles per hour in a 55-mile-an-hour zone.

Constable Yount testified that after he noticed that the vehicle did not

have any tags, Constable Presley activated his lights and pursued the vehicle.

He then confirmed that a traffic stop can be lawfully executed for missing

vehicle tags. Constable Yount stated that the vehicle did not come to an

immediate stop, and the driver “was all over the road and kept reaching to

the passenger side of the vehicle.” Constable Yount stated that when the

vehicle finally stopped, he approached the passenger side of the vehicle to

see if there was a passenger inside, and Constable Presley exited and

approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. Constable Yount stated that

although he could not see if Constable Presley had his badge on when he

exited the vehicle, he knew that Constable Presley always carried his badge.

Constable Yount stated that he wore his badge on his holster, and that it was

easily identifiable.

Constable Yount testified that as Constable Presley approached the

vehicle, the driver exited his vehicle and went immediately toward

Constable Presley. Constable Yount explained that because the driver

moved quickly, Constable Yount went toward the passenger door to ensure

there were no weapons or other passengers that would be a safety hazard.

Constable Yount stated that as he checked through the front windshield,

Constable Presley identified himself to the defendant, and in response, the

defendant stated, “F*** a constable,” and then shoved Constable Presley in

the chest before getting back in the vehicle. Constable Yount explained that

as he was coming around the front of the vehicle, the driver “threw the car in
5

gear and it lunged toward me.” He stated that at that time, he drew his

weapon, but when he noticed Constable Presley was halfway in the vehicle,

attempting to shut the ignition off, he withdrew his weapon. He stated that

he attempted to assist; however, the vehicle accelerated, went past him,

caught him in the left knee with the door, and spun him around.

Constable Yount testified that when he got oriented, he saw Constable

Presley being pulled down the road and got back in the patrol unit to follow.

Constable Yount stated that the vehicle eventually came to an abrupt stop,

and when he exited the vehicle to assist, he heard Constable Presley

repeatedly state, “stop resisting.” Constable Yount stated that after he pulled

the defendant out of the vehicle, the defendant began to fight him and

continued to do so even when he was pinned against the vehicle. Constable

Yount stated that the defendant continued to resist until he drew his weapon,

to which the defendant then apologized. Constable Yount noted that when

another deputy arrived to assist, the defendant still struggled some, but that it

was not as violent, and stopped resisting only when he was handcuffed.

On cross-examination, Constable Yount stated that as a deputy

constable, he was required to be certified every two years. He explained that

on the date of the offense he had not received his certification, but he had

one year from date of hire to receive his certifications, so he was still

authorized to execute detentions and arrests but with supervision from

another officer. Constable Yount reiterated that both he and Constable

Presley were in plain clothes, but his badge was still visible. On redirect,

Constable Presley stated that at no point did the defendant ever ask for either

officer to identify themselves, and if asked, either would have provided

further information beyond the initial identification.
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Next Deputy Jon Daughtery (“Deputy Daughtery”), of the Caddo

Parish Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was dispatched to assist Constable

Presley and Constable Yount following the detention of an erratic and

combative driver. He stated that when he arrived, he saw both officers

restraining the defendant against a vehicle. Deputy Daughtery recalled that

he saw both officers’ badges when he handcuffed the defendant before

transporting him to Caddo Correctional Center. On cross-examination,

Deputy Daughtery stated that while he remembered seeing both officers

wearing their badges, he could not recall where the badges were located. He

also clarified that since he arrived after the incident, he did not witness the

events which led to the detention. Deputy Daughtery stated that he could

not recall if either officer was injured, and that his focus was on getting the

defendant handcuffed.

Deputy Daughtery stated that when he arrived the defendant was

agitated and resisting both officers, but the defendant was calm by the time

he was handcuffed. He then recalled that the defendant stated that he did not

know that “constables were the real police.” Deputy Daughtery explained

that constables are empowered with the ability to conduct arrests and

detentions and that he has assisted constables in the past.

Finally, Rodger Swan (“Swan”), an investigator for the public

defender’s officer, testified. Defense counsel then introduced photographs

of Constable Presley’s vehicle with the lights activated. Swan explained that

the pictures depicted the vehicle from the front, rear, and side views of the

vehicle. He stated that the word “constable” is displayed on the tailgate and

an emblem of the State of Louisiana is on the driver’s door. Swan also

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described another picture of radar equipment mounted on the inside of the

vehicle with the light on projecting the word “patrol” below it.

At the close of testimony, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of

guilty for both counts. Following a hearing, the defendant’s motions for

post-verdict judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial were both

denied. Windham waived sentencing delays, and the trial court sentenced

him to pay a fine of $1,000 on each count and to serve three years at hard

labor for each count, with both sentences to be served consecutively. This

appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

By his first assignment of error, Windham argues that the State

presented insufficient evidence to convict him of resisting an officer with

force or violence. Specifically, Windham claims that the Blanchard Furrh

Road and Billie Lee Lane intersection, where the incident occurred, is

outside the geographical boundaries of Ward 3 where Constable Presley and

Constable Yount are limited for purposes of exercising their authority. In

support, Windham included a copy of a map in his brief that he claims

reflects the intersection of Blanchard Furrh Road and Billie Lee Lane,

allegedly showing that these roads lie outside Ward 3.

From this, Windham argues that when the incident occurred, neither

constable had the authority to effect the arrest and they were not acting in

the performance of their official duties, so he could not have resisted arrest

while either officer was acting in the official performance of their duties.

In response, the State argues that the map included in Windham’s

brief does not accurately and readily identify whether the intersection of
8

Blanchard Furrh Road and Billie Lee Lane is within Ward 3’s jurisdiction.

It requests instead that this Court take judicial notice of the official map of

Ward 3 located on the Caddo Parish Public Works website because it is

readily available and accurately reflects that the intersection is located

within Ward 3.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L.Ed. 2d 248 (2004). The Jackson standard, now

legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art 821, does not afford the appellate

court with a means to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that

of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517;

State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17), 245 So. 3d 224, writ

denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797.

The Jackson standard also applies in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court which reviews the sufficiency

of the evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence

by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

When the direct evidence is viewed as such, the facts established by the

direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that

evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of

the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983).
9

Likewise, if a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence, that

evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S.

15:438; see also, State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244 So.

3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. The appellate

court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution

and determine whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable

that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417; State v.

Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584, writ not cons., 12-

0062 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.

In the absence of any internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, the testimony of the witness, if believed by the trier

of fact, alone, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v.

Elkins, 48,972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 138 So. 3d 769, writ denied, 14-

0992 (La. 12/8/14), 153 So. 3d 438; State v. Wiltcher, 41,981 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So. 2d 769.

Where there is conflicting testimony concerning factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.

State v. Allen, 36,180 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied,

02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So. 2d 1255. The appellate court neither

assesses the credibility of witnesses nor reweighs evidence. State v. Smith,

94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442. Rather, the reviewing court affords

great deference to the jury’s decision to accept or reject the testimony of a

witness in whole or in part. State v. Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir.

10

8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d

422.

In the present case, Windham was charged with two counts of

resisting a police officer with force or violence, in violation of La. R.S.

14:108.2. This statute provides, in pertinent part:

A. Resisting a police officer with force or violence is any of the
following when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe
the victim is a police officer who is arresting, detaining, seizing
property, serving process, or is otherwise acting in the
performance of his official duty:

(1) Using threatening force or violence by one sought to be
arrested or detained before the arresting officer can restrain him
and after notice is given that he is under arrest or detention.

(2) Using threatening force or violence toward or any resistance
or opposition using force or violence to the arresting officer
after the arrested party is actually placed under arrest and before
he is incarcerated in jail.

(3) Injuring or attempting to injure a police officer engaged in
the performance of his duties as a police officer.

(4) Using or threating force or violence toward a police officer
performing any official duty.

On appeal, Windham does not argue whether he reasonably knew the

constables were officers, or that he used force or violence against either

during the arrest. He only asserts that neither constable was within their

jurisdiction to effectuate the arrest, and thus, were not acting within the

“performance of [their] official duty.”

In this case, Constable Presley testified that on the night of the

incident, he and Constable Yount left a meeting in the Cross Lake area. He

then provided a general boundary description of his jurisdiction in Ward 3,

which was marked by “the 12-mile Bayou on North Market and goes to

Caddo Lake, to the Red River, to the state line.” Constable Presley then

11

stated that when he is in his jurisdiction, he is “on duty 24-7.” Regardless of

Constable Presley’s general boundary description of his jurisdiction, La. C.

Cr. P. art. 213 provides, in part, that a peace officer may, without a warrant,

arrest a person when the offense has been committed in his presence, and if

the arrest is for a misdemeanor, it must be made immediately or on close

pursuit.

It is undisputed that on the night in question, Windham nearly struck

Constable Presley’s vehicle, that he was seen speeding, traveling some 70

miles per hour in a 55-mile-an-hour zone, that Windham crossed over the

center line of the highway, that Windham was seen weaving in and out as he

drove, and had expired tags on his vehicle. Having witnessed Windham

drive erratically and commit several traffic violations, Constable Presley and

Constable Yount were well within their authority to stop Windham.

Moreover, the officers were also within their authority to arrest Windham

after he shoved Constable Presley and fled, dragging Constable Presley

down the road to stop Windham from leaving the scene.

Accordingly, this Court finds that there is no need to take judicial

notice of the map associated with Ward 3, which encompasses Constable

Presley’s and Constable Yount’s jurisdiction. The constables in this case

observed Windham commit several traffic violations and were within their

authority to stop him, and then initiate the arrest thereafter. Therefore, we

find that this assignment of error lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

By his second assignment of error, Windham argues that the

imposition of six years at hard labor is constitutionally excessive because he

has no prior felony convictions or any previous convictions for resisting
12

arrest. Windham essentially argues he is not the worst of offenders and a

maximum sentence for both counts is not an appropriate punishment for this

offense. Moreover, Windham notes that his criminal history does not justify

the imposition of consecutive sentences such that a consecutive maximum

sentence is grossly disproportionate and serves nothing more than a needless

infliction of pain and suffering.

Appellate review to determine whether a sentence is constitutionally

excessive is a two-pronged inquiry whereby the court first considers whether

the trial court took cognizance of the guidelines set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, and the second considers constitutional excessiveness. State v. Wing,

51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711. However, in this case, no

motion to reconsider sentence was filed; therefore, this Court’s review is

limited to the constitutional excessiveness of the sentence alone. La. C. Cr.

P. art. 881.1; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 245 So. 3d

131, writ not cons., 18-0017 (La. 8/3/18), 248 So. 3d 322; State v. Turner,

50,221 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/20/16), 186 So. 3d 720, writ denied, 16-0283 (La.

2/10/17), 215 So. 3d 700.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-

2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1; State v. Mandigo, 48,801 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 292, writ denied, 14-0630 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d

600. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166;

State v. Wing, supra. The trial court maintains wide discretion in the
13

imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and absent a showing of

manifest abuse, an imposed sentence will not be set aside as excessive. State

v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081. Therefore,

appellate review does not consider whether another sentence may have been

more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v.

Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031; State v. Davis,

50,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 200.

In this case, Windham was sentenced under La. R.S. 14:108.2 (C),

which provides a penalty for this crime of a fine of not more than $2,000

and/or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not less than one year

and not more than three years. The trial court ordered each sentence to be

served consecutively.

With respect to whether two or more sentences should be served

concurrently or consecutively, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883 provides in part:

If the defendant is convicted of two or more offenses based on
the same act or transaction, or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served
concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all
be served consecutively. Other sentences of imprisonment shall
be served consecutively unless the court expressly directs that
some or all of them be served concurrently.

In cases involving multiple offenses and sentences, the trial court has limited

discretion to order that the multiple sentences are to be served concurrently

or consecutively. State v. Nixon, 51,319 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/17), 222 So.

3d 123, writ denied, 17-0966 (La. 4/27/18), 239 So. 3d 836; State v. Allen,

52,318 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 703. Concurrent sentences

that arise from a single course of conduct are not mandatory; likewise,

consecutive sentences under those circumstances are not necessarily

excessive. Id.
14

A judgment directing that sentences arising from a single course of

conduct be served consecutively requires particular justification from the

evidence or record. Id. Accordingly, when consecutive sentences are

imposed, the court shall state the factors considered and its reasons for the

consecutive terms. Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the

defendant’s criminal history; (2) the gravity or dangerousness of the offense;

(3) the viciousness of the crimes; (4) the harm done to the victims; (5)

whether the defendant constitutes an unusual risk of danger to the public;

and (6) the potential for the defendant’s rehabilitation. However, the failure

to articulate specific reasons for consecutive sentences does not require

remand if the record provides an adequate factual basis to support

consecutive sentences. Id.

As a general proposition, maximum or near-maximum sentences are

reserved for the worst offenders and the worst offenses. State v. Collins,

53,704 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 974; State v. Cotten, 50,747

(La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 201 So. 3d 299. However, the trial court

nevertheless remains in the best position to consider the aggravating and

mitigating circumstances of a particular case and is given broad discretion in

sentencing. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La. 5/31/96), 674 So. 2d 957, cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S. Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed. 2d 539 (1996).

In sentencing Windham, the trial court considered the art. 894.1

factors, and reviewed Windham’s criminal and personal history, as well as

the particular facts that led to Windham’s arrest. Specifically, the trial court

highlighted that after Windham was pulled over, he shoved Constable

Presley, proceeded to flee the scene, and in the process hit Constable Yount

with the vehicle, while simultaneously dragging Constable Presley down the
15

road. The trial court found that Windham’s actions constituted “deliberate

cruelty” and created the risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one

person. The trial court then detailed Windham’s criminal history, which

consisted of:

• 2015: Windham pled guilty to simple battery; suspended
sentence and placed on probation for six months.

• 2016: Windham pled guilty to possession of marijuana;
suspended sentence and placed on supervised probation for six
months.

• 2017: Windham pled guilty to possession of marijuana;
suspended sentence and placed on supervised probation for six
months.

• 2019: Windham pled guilty to possession of marijuana; placed
on supervised probation for one year.

• 2022: Windham pled guilty to felony possession of a Schedule
II narcotic; sentence was suspended and placed on supervised
probation for three years. Windham also pled guilty to battery
of a dating partner.

From this, the trial court noted that at the time of the current offense,

Windham was on felony probation. After reviewing the aggravating factors,

the trial court determined that there were no applicable mitigating factors in

this case and found that these crimes reflected Windham’s “violent

tendencies.”

Although the trial court noted that Windham expressed that he was

sorry for his actions, and was unaware that the constables were police

officers, it nevertheless highlighted the seriousness of Windham’s conduct,

reiterating that Windham dragged a constable down the road in his attempt

to flee, and that either constable could have been seriously injured by his

actions. Moreover, the trial court considered Windham to be a risk of

danger to the public given Windham’s past criminal history and conduct in

16

this offense and that his potential for rehabilitation was low given the

numerous times he received a suspended sentence and was placed on

supervised probation, yet continued to commit offenses, which culminated in

the present offense.

In addition to the trial court’s findings, this Court also highlights that

the testimony in this case reflects that Constable Yount stated that Constable

Presley repeatedly told Windham to “stop resisting,” and that he had to assist

Constable Presley in getting Windham out of the vehicle because of the

ensuing struggle. Constable Yount further testified that even when he did

manage to get Windham out of the vehicle, Windham continued to struggle

and fought him even while pinned against the vehicle. Constable Yount

stated that only when he drew his weapon did Windham stop struggling and

resisting but still struggled some until another officer arrived and placed him

in handcuffs. Deputy Daughtery also testified that when he arrived as

backup, Windham was agitated and resisting both officers.

After a thorough review of this case, this Court finds that although

Windham was given a maximum sentence for both counts, neither sentence

was illegal, and both sentences fall within the sentencing range for this

offense. Moreover, the trial court thoroughly articulated its reasonings for

imposing maximum consecutive sentences for the particular facts of this

case. Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the sentence imposed is

not disproportionate to the offense committed, nor can we say that the

sentence is constitutionally excessive in light of the facts of this case.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in imposing this

sentence, and this assignment of error lacks merit.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Windham’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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