State of Louisiana v. Reginald Ruffins

Judgment rendered August 13, 2025.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

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ON REMAND
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No. 55,952-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

REGINALD RUFFINS Appellant

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On Remand from the
Louisiana Supreme Court

Originally Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 390,262

Honorable Donald Edgar Hathaway, Jr., Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

JASON W. WALTMAN
REBECCA A. EDWARDS
COURTNEY RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

STEPHENS, J.

This case is on remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court for this

Court to address two claims that were pretermitted by this Court previously.

See, State v. Ruffins, 24-01512 (La. 6/25/25), ___ So. 3d ___, 2025 WL

17878821 (which reversed and remanded this Court’s judgment in State v.

Ruffins, 55,952 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/20/24), 401 So. 3d 9032). For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm Ruffins’ convictions and 20-year sentence as a

habitual offender.

DISCUSSION

Admission of Other Crimes Evidence

Prior to Ruffins’ trial, the State filed a 404(B) notice informing the

defense of its intent to introduce evidence at trial of two prior offenses—the

defendant’s 2006 conviction for false personation of a peace officer and his

2016 conviction in Texas for impersonating a public servant. A hearing was

held on March 7, 2023, and the trial court found the other crimes evidence to

be admissible to establish motive, intent, plan, preparation, knowledge, and

absence of mistake or accident.

According to Ruffins, the trial court erred in allowing the introduction

of this other crimes evidence, as introduction of evidence of his prior

convictions did not satisfy one of the exceptions set forth for the admission

of other crimes evidence. Also, Ruffins received a first offender pardon for

the 2006 conviction, and the prejudicial effect significantly outweighed any

probative value of this evidence.

1
Attached hereto as” Exhibit A.”
2
Attached hereto as “Exhibit B.”

On the other hand, the State argues that there was no abuse of the trial

court’s discretion in its determination that the evidence of the prior

convictions was admissible. The two prior convictions were relevant to

prove that Ruffins had the requisite specific intent to commit the crime as

well as his preparation, plan, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake as

found by the trial court.

Applicable Legal Principles

Generally, courts may not admit evidence of other crimes to show the

defendant is a person of bad character who has acted in conformity with his

bad character. La. C.E. art. 404(B)(1); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La.

1973). However, the State may introduce evidence of other crimes if the

prosecutor establishes an independent and relevant reason. La. C.E. art.

404(B)(1); State v. Miner, 17-1586, p. 1 (La. 1/14/18), 232 So. 3d 551, 552.

This evidence must have substantial relevance independent from showing

the defendant’s general criminal character in that it tends to prove a material

fact genuinely at issue. State v. Jones, 17-00658, p. 10 (La. 10/22/19), 285

So. 3d 1074, 1080; State v. Lee, 05-2098, p. 44 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So. 2d

109, 139, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 S. Ct. 143, 172 L. Ed. 2d 93

(2008); State v. Moore, 440 So. 2d 134, 137 (La. 1983). The probative value

of the other crimes evidence must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice.

La. C.E. art. 403.

A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of other crimes evidence will

not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Scales, 93-03 (La.

5/22/95), 655 So. 2d 1326, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1050, 116 S. Ct. 716, 133

L. Ed. 2d 670 (1996); State v. Caston, 43,565 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/08), 996

So. 2d 480.
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Analysis

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

the other crimes evidence in this case—a 2006 conviction for false

personation of a peace officer in Louisiana and a 2016 conviction in Texas

for impersonating a public servant—met the requirements of La. C.E. art.

404(B).

This evidence was relevant to prove a material fact at issue, i.e.,

whether Ruffins had the specific intent to intentionally impersonate a police

officer when he met with Ms. Kennedy in an attempt to obtain a security

contract with the Cooper Road Plaza Apartments. It further showed that the

defendant knew what he was doing in claiming to be an SPD officer,

wearing clothing and gear similar to that worn by police officers, and in

outfitting his vehicle with lights and other equipment that a police vehicle

would have. The prior convictions were also relevant to show preparation,

plan, motive, opportunity, and absence of mistake as found by the trial court.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Constitutionality of Habitual Offender Sentence

In his third assignment of error, while he acknowledges that he

received the mandatory minimum as a fourth felony offender, Ruffins asserts

that the trial court imposed an unconstitutionally harsh and excessive

sentence under the facts and circumstances of this case.

The State contends that, since Ruffins failed to file a motion to

reconsider sentence, on appeal, he is limited to a review for a bare claim of

constitutional excessiveness.

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Applicable Legal Principles

When a defendant fails to make a motion to reconsider sentence, the

appellate court’s review of the sentence is limited to a bare claim of

constitutional excessiveness. State v. Cooksey, 53,660 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/26/21), 316 So. 3d 1284, writ denied, 21-00901 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So. 3d

1074; State v. Benson, 53,578 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/10/20), 305 So. 3d 135.

Since the habitual offender law is constitutional in its entirety, the

minimum sentences it imposes upon recidivists are also presumed to be

constitutional. State v. Johnson, 97-1906 (La. 3/4/98), 709 So. 2d 672; State

v. Miller, 54,897 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/11/23), 355 So. 3d 1165, writ denied, 23-

00200 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So. 3d 713; State v. Gay, 34,371 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/4/01), 784 So. 2d 714. While the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized

that courts have the power to declare a mandatory minimum sentence

excessive under La. Const. art. I, § 20, our highest court has cautioned that

this power should only be exercised in rare cases and only when the court is

firmly convinced that the minimum sentence is excessive. State v. Johnson,

supra at 676-77; State v. Boyd, 54,950 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 360 So. 3d

1264; State v. Ponsell, 33,543 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/00), 766 So. 2d 678, writ

denied, 00-2726 (La. 10/12/01), 799 So. 2d 490.

The burden is on the defendant to rebut the presumption that a

mandatory minimum sentence is constitutional. State v. Johnson, supra;

State v. Miller, supra; State v. Robbins, 43,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08), 986

So. 2d 828, writ denied, 08-1438 (La. 2/20/09), 1 So. 3d 494. To do so, the

defendant must “clearly and convincingly show that he is exceptional which

in this context means that because of unusual circumstances this defendant is

a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully
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tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the

circumstances of the case.” State v. Johnson, 709 So. 2d at p. 676, citing

State v. Young, 94-1636, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95), 663 So. 2d 525,

528 (Plotkin, J., concurring), writ denied, 95-3010 (La. 3/22/96), 669 So. 2d

1223; State v. Miller, supra at p. 7, 355 So. 3d at 1173; State v. Fisher,

50,301, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/30/15), 185 So. 3d 842, 845, writ denied, 16-

0228 (La. 2/3/17), 215 So. 3d 687; State v. Mead, 44,47, p. 7 (La. App. 2 Cir.

7/1/09), 16 So. 3d 470, 474, writ denied, 09-2065 (La. 4/9/10), 31 So. 3d

388. The court may not rely solely on the nonviolent nature of the instant or

past crimes as evidence to justify rebutting the presumption of

constitutionality. The lack of violence cannot be the only reason, or even the

major reason, for declaring such a sentence excessive. State v. Boyd, supra

at p. 14, 360 So. 3d at 1273.

Analysis

After reviewing this record, we find that Ruffins did not prove by

clear and convincing evidence any unusual circumstances which would

demonstrate that he is a victim of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences

meaningfully tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the

offense, and the circumstances of the case. There was nothing in his

personal, social, or employment history (or this history considered in toto) to

warrant a deviation from the mandatory minimum sentence for a fourth

felony offender, notwithstanding the fact that this 20-year sentence was more

than ten times the maximum penalty provided for a person convicted of false

personation of a police officer (two years’ imprisonment at hard labor and

imposition of a fine of not more than $1,000). Furthermore, Ruffins’

criminal history warranted his adjudication as a fourth felony offender and
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imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. The disparity between the

sentence for false personation of a police officer and the mandatory

minimum sentence for a habitual offender is something that was considered

by the Louisiana Legislature when it fashioned the mandatory minimum and

maximum multiple offender sentences. It is not for this Court to usurp the

role of the legislature and make a downward departure from the sentencing

guidelines when there has not been the requisite particularized showing by

the defendant.

This 20-year sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of

the offense or shocking to the sense of justice, considering that this is

Ruffins’ third conviction for the same type of conduct, and he has multiple

theft convictions, which provided the predicate offenses upon which his

habitual offender adjudication was based. This assignment of error is

without merit.

Error Patent Review

While technically not error patent, in its brief, the State has pointed

out that Ruffins’ sentence is illegally lenient because it does not include a

proper restriction of benefits as required by La. R.S. 14:529.1(G). A

defendant in a criminal case does not have a constitutional right or a

statutory right to an illegally lenient sentence. State v. Williams, 00-1725

(La. 11/28/01), 800 So. 2d 790. An illegally lenient sentence may be

corrected at any time by the court that imposed the sentence or by an

appellate court on review. La. C. Cr. P. art. 882(A).

However, when the trial court fails to order that a sentence be served

without benefits as statutorily mandated, the sentence will be automatically

served without benefits for the requisite time period. La. R.S. 15:301.1(A);
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State v. Williams, 52,618 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1241. As the

habitual offender statute mandates that the defendant’s sentence be served

without the benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, and the trial

court’s failure to declare that those sentences be served with restricted

benefits is harmless and self-correcting, this Court will take no further action

regarding this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and sentence of the

defendant, Reginald Ruffins, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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