State of Louisiana v. Ryan Chapman Writ Granted; Judgment Reversed; Remanded.

Judgment rendered December 6, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 2166,
La. C.C.P.

No. 55,213-KW

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Respondent

versus

RYAN CHAPMAN Applicant

*****

On Application for Writs from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 383,881

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

*****

RONALD J. MICIOTTO, L.L.C. Counsel for Applicant
By: Justin P. Smith

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Respondent
By: William J. Edwards

*****

Before STEPHENS, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ.

HUNTER, J., dissents with written reasons.

STEPHENS, J.

Defendant, Ryan Chapman, a Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office (“CPSO”)

deputy, was charged by bill of indictment with malfeasance in office, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:134. Deputy Chapman filed a motion to quash the

indictment, which was denied by the trial court. Dep. Chapman sought

supervisory review of the ruling with this Court, and by Order dated April

26, 2023, the writ was granted to docket for resolution. For the reasons set

forth below, we reverse the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to quash

the bill of indictment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

FACTS

On March 18, 2021, CPSO deputies got a tip concerning the

whereabouts of Chad Deloach, a wanted felon with an active arrest warrant.

Deloach was reported to be located at 14554 Pecan Road in Keithville,

Louisiana. Dep. Chapman, along with two other deputies, went to 14554

Pecan Road to search for Deloach. Upon their arrival, the deputies observed

two mobile homes on the property. William Walls exited one of the mobile

homes, and Dep. Chapman explained to him that the deputies were looking

for Deloach.

According to Dep. Chapman’s motion to quash, Walls gave the

deputies verbal consent to search his home. Dep. Chapman entered and

searched the residence. After exiting Walls’ home, Dep. Chapman began

walking toward the second mobile home on the property. Dep. Chapman

asserted that, at that time, Walls came back out of his home and became

verbally hostile and argumentative. According to Dep. Chapman, Walls was

holding up his phone and yelling, “I have someone you can talk to,

otherwise you can get the f**k off my property.” Walls then walked back

into his home with Dep. Chapman following him. Dep. Chapman decided at

that time to detain Walls for officer safety while he attempted to search the

second mobile home. Dep. Chapman handcuffed Walls and placed him in

the back of a patrol unit. Very soon thereafter, Walls suffered an apparent

heart attack from which he ultimately passed away.1

Following the incident, the CPSO completed an internal investigation

and cleared Dep. Chapman of any wrongdoing.2 The CPSO concluded that

he had not violated the department’s policies and procedures during the

incident. Dep. Chapman has continued to work for the CPSO as a deputy

since the completion of the department’s investigation into the incident.

Shortly thereafter, the State instituted the instant prosecution against

Dep. Chapman, alleging that he had committed malfeasance in office by

intentionally performing his duties in an unlawful manner while being

employed as a law enforcement officer. On June 30, 2021, a Caddo Parish

grand jury returned a secret indictment charging Dep. Chapman as follows:

COUNT 1: MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE as defined by
La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1) or (2)

1
An autopsy revealed that William Walls had an enlarged heart (one
approximately 33% larger than a normal heart), and all three of his coronary arteries
contained calcified atherosclerotic plaques and were narrowed between 80 and 90%.
2
As part of the internal investigation, Detective Christopher Daniel with the
Criminal Investigation Division interviewed Brian Walls, son of William Walls.
Unbeknown to deputies the day of the incident, Brian was living in the second mobile
home on William Walls’ property. Brian told Det. Daniel that he was home the day of
the incident. He saw the deputies arrive and heard them knock on the day of his mobile
home. Because Brian thought they had a warrant for his arrest, he did not answer the
door. He acknowledged that Deloach, the man the deputies were looking for, had stayed
at his mobile home the previous night but had left prior to the deputies’ arrival.
Brian Walls stated that he saw the deputies walk his father from the first mobile
home in handcuffs, and he saw them place his father in the back of the patrol car. Brian
told Det. Daniel that it was no longer than 30 seconds before deputies returned to the car
to begin administering CPR to his father.
2

COUNT 1: in that he did intentionally refuse or fail any duty
lawfully required of him, as such officer or employer; or did
intentionally perform his duties in an unlawful manner while
being employed as a law enforcement officer [of] the Caddo
Parish Sheriff’s Office

Contrary to the Laws of the STATE OF LOUISIANA and
against the peace and dignity of the same.

In response, Dep. Chapman filed a motion for a bill of particulars

requesting that the State identify the specific affirmative duty that he

allegedly refused or failed to perform and/or performed in an unlawful

manner; any criminal statutes forming the basis for the malfeasance charge;

a list of facts the State believed would result in a conviction of malfeasance;

a list of the specific intentional acts which Dep. Chaman undertook which

subjected him to the charge; and copies of the expressed written duty he had

allegedly violated.

The State responded to the bill of particulars, urging that it was not

alleging an affirmative duty that Dep. Chapman had failed to perform

pursuant to La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1). Instead, the State indicated that the

affirmative duty Dep. Chapman performed in an unlawful manner in

violation of La. R.S. 14:134(A)(2) was:

The failure of Ryan Chapman’s sworn duties to support the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the Constitution
and Laws of Louisiana and to faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on him.
Specifically, Ryan Chapman made a warrantless entry into the
residence of William Walls, 14554 Pecan Road, Keithville, LA.

Regarding the other points of the bill of particulars, the State’s

response was:

Specifically, Ryan Chapman made a warrantless entry into the
residence of William Walls, 14554 Pecan Road, Keithville, LA.
The entry was made in violation of the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution
Article 1 Section 5. While William Walls had earlier given
3

consent for Ryan Chapman to enter his residence, William
Walls revoked said consent prior to Ryan chapman’s second
entry into William Walls’ residence. This is also a violation of
Louisiana Revised Statute 14:63 Criminal Trespass. After said
second entry, Ryan Chapman arrested William Walls without
probable cause that William Walls had committed an offense
which is in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution Article 1 Section
5. Pursuant to the illegal arrest, Ryan Chapman committed
simple battery upon William Walls in violation of La. R.S.
14:35.

The State did not provide a list of facts it would prove in order to

obtain a conviction, nor did it provide a list of the specific, intentional acts

undertaken by Dep. Chapman which were “outside the scope of a bill of

particulars,” contending that it was required to provide neither under State v.

Nance, 315 So. 2d 695 (La. 1975).

Dep. Chapman filed a motion to quash on October 28, 2021, arguing

that, under current Louisiana law, prosecutions for malfeasance in office

presuppose the existence of a statute or provision of the law which

delineates an affirmative duty upon the official, meaning the duty must be

expressly imposed by law upon the official who is entitled to know exactly

what conduct is expected of him in his official capacity and what conduct

will lead to criminal charges.3 Dep. Chapman further urged that the State

failed to specify what expressed affirmative duty he was tasked with and

how he violated that affirmative duty. Dep. Chapman noted his anticipation

that the State would argue that any crime committed by a police officer

while on duty would result in the commission of malfeasance in office.

According to Dep. Chapman, this assumption by the State would be

3
In support, Dep. Chapman cites State v. Harris, 46,721 (La. App. 2 Cir.
12/9/11), 79 So. 3d 1248, writ denied, 12-0100 (La. 5/4/12), 88 So. 3d 461, writ denied,
13-0270 (La. 8/30/13), 120 So. 3d 260.
4

incorrect, as it would lead to absurd consequences such as anytime an officer

committed a misdemeanor while on duty, and regardless of his lack of intent

to commit malfeasance, he could then be charged with and convicted of, a

felony.4

The State provided the following in opposition to Dep. Chapman’s

motion to quash:

The failure of Ryan Chapman’s sworn duties to support the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the Constitution
and Laws of Louisiana and to faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on him.
Specifically, Ryan Chapman made a warrantless entry into the
residence of William Walls, 14554 Pecan Road, Keithville,
Louisiana. The entry was made in violation of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Louisiana
Constitution Article 1 Section 5. While William Walls had
earlier given consent for Ryan Chapman to enter his residence,
William Walls revoked said consent prior to Ryan Chapman’s
second entry into Williams Walls’ residence. This is also a
violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:63 Criminal Trespass.
After said second entry, Ryan Chapman arrested William Walls
without probable cause that William Walls had committed an
offense which is in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution Article 1
Section 5. Pursuant to the illegal arrest Ryan Chapman
committed simple battery upon William Walls in violation of
La. R.S. 14:35.

The State of Louisiana alleges that these are duties lawfully
required of Ryan Chapman at the time of the offense through
the defendant’s violation of his sworn duty to support the
Constitution and laws of the United States and the Constitution
and Laws of Louisiana and to faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on him.

On February 22, 2023, the trial court denied Dep. Chapman’s motion

to quash, stating:

4
In support, Dep. Chapman cites State v. Hessler, 570 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1990), wherein the appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision to quash a bill of
information charging a police officer with malfeasance in office. In Hessler, the State
argued that the police officer unlawfully violated his duty to “ensure the health and
welfare of arrested subjects” when a battery was committed on an arrestee. The court in
Hessler found that no expressed duty existed, and the sworn oath of a police officer to
ensure the health and welfare of arrestees was vague and not expressed, as required.
5

The standard that this Court must follow and apply to any
Motion to Quash is recited in State v. Perez [464 So. 2d 737
(La. 1985)] and State v. Thomas. It’s a 1985 Supreme Court
case and a 1996 Second Circuit case, along with many other
cases. “In considering a Motion to Quash, the Court must
accept as true the facts contained in the Bill of Information and
in the Bill of Particulars and determine, as a matter of law, and
from the face of the pleadings, whether a crime has been
charged. While evidence may be adduced such may not include
a defense on the merits.”

I determine, as a matter of law and from the face of the
pleadings, that a crime has been charged; therefore, I am
denying the Motion to Quash.

This writ application was filed shortly after this ruling.

DISCUSSION

Deputy Chapman asserts that the trial court erred in denying the

motion to quash inasmuch as the facts set forth in the bill of particulars,

including by reference the entire discovery filed in the court proceedings and

the indictment, are insufficient to constitute a crime. According to Dep.

Chapman, the motion to quash should have been granted because the

indictment fails to charge an offense punishable under a valid statute as

required by Louisiana law.

The State, on the other hand, argues that Dep. Chapman had a duty to

uphold federal and state laws, and when he reentered William Walls’ house,

handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of the patrol car, Dep. Chapman

intentionally failed to perform the previously stated, expressly written,

affirmative duty imposed upon him as a law enforcement officer. The State

contends that Dep. Chapman’s argument is that the evidence will show that

William Walls did not revoke his consent to enter his residence, and this

would not be appropriately considered under a motion to quash as doing so

would be determining the merits of the case. According to the State, the sole

6

issue for the trial court and this Court is whether the allegations contained in

the bill of information and within the bill of particulars, if taken as true,

constitute a malfeasance in office. The State urges that, when taken as a

whole, the bill of information and the bill of particulars support a charge of

malfeasance in office.

The motion to quash is essentially a mechanism by which to raise

pretrial pleas of defense, i.e., matters which do not go to the merits of the

charge. La. C. Cr. P. arts. 531-534; State v. Armstard, 43,333 (La. App. 2

Cir. 8/13/08), 991 So. 2d 116, writ denied, 08-2440 (La. 1/16/09), 998 So.

2d 89, cert. denied, 557 U.S. 905, 129 S. Ct. 279, 174 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2009).

In considering a motion to quash, a court must accept as true the facts

contained in the bill of information and in the bills of particulars, and

determine as a matter of law and from the face of the pleadings, whether a

crime has been charged. While evidence may be adduced, such may not

include a defense on the merits. The question of factual guilt or innocence

of the offense charged is not raised by the motion to quash. Id. In cases in

which the State cannot establish an essential element of the offense under

any set of facts conceivably provable at trial, the motion to quash is the

proper procedural vehicle. Id.

An appellate court may reverse a trial court’s judgment on a motion to

quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

State v. Love, 00-3347 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So. 2d 1198; State v. Armstard,

supra.

La. R.S. 14:134 provides:

(A) Malfeasance in office is committed when any public
officer or public employee shall:

7

(1) intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty
lawfully required of him, as such officer or
employee; or
(2) intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful
manner; or
(3) knowingly permit any other public officer or
public employee, under his authority, to
intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty
lawfully required of him, or to perform any
such duty in an unlawful manner.

(B) Any duty lawfully required of a public officer or public
employee shall be deemed to be a lawful duty of such public
officer or employee. The delegation of such lawful duty shall
not relieve the public officer or employee of his lawful duty.

(C) (1) Whoever commits the crime of malfeasance in office
shall be imprisoned for not more than five years with or
without hard labor or shall be fined not more than five
thousand dollars, or both.
(2) In addition to the penalty provided for in Paragraph (1) of
this Subsection, a person convicted of the provisions of
this Section may be ordered to pay restitution to the state
if the state suffered a loss as a result of the offense.
Restitution shall include the payment of legal interest at
the rate provided in R.S. 13:4202.
(3) If the individual convicted of the crime of malfeasance in
office is a P.O.S.T. certified full-time, part-time, or
reserve peace officer, the P.O.S.T. certification of that
peace officer shall be immediately revoked pursuant to
R.S. 40:2405(J).

In order to prove malfeasance in office, the State must prove the

existence of a law or statute imposing an affirmative duty on Dep. Chapman

as a public officer and that Dep Chapman intentionally refused or failed to

perform that duty or intentionally performed that duty in an unlawful

manner. The duty must be one expressly imposed by law on the public

officer because the officer is entitled to know exactly what conduct is

expected of him in his official capacity and what conduct will expose him to

criminal charges. In considering a motion to quash, a court must accept as

true the facts contained in the bill of information and in the bill of

particulars, and determine as a matter of law and from the face of the
8

pleadings whether a crime has been charged. State v. Petitto, 10-0581 (La.

3/15/11), 59 So. 3d 1245; State v. Perez, 464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985).

Thus, the sole issue for this Court is whether the allegations contained

within the indictment and the bill of particulars, taken as true, constitute

malfeasance in office. The Indictment charged Dep. Chapman with

malfeasance in office as defined by La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1) or (A)(2)—either

he had intentionally refused or failed to perform any duty lawfully required

of him as such officer or employee (La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1) or he had

intentionally performed any such duty in an unlawful manner while being

employed as a law enforcement officer (La. R.S. 14:134(A)(2). In its

response to Dep. Chapman’s motion for bill of particulars, the State admitted

that it is not alleging an affirmative duty that he intentionally refused or

failed to perform (La. R.S. 14:134(A)(1)). This leaves only La. R.S.

14:134(A)(2) as an option for prosecution.

As stated above, and much like the exception of no cause of action in

a civil matter, in considering a motion to quash a court must accept as true

the facts contained in the bill of information (in this case, the bill of

indictment) and the bill of particulars. In this case, the allegations are that

Dep. Chapman is charged with malfeasance in office for intentionally

performing a duty in an unlawful manner. Specifically, the State has

alleged that Dep. Chapman returned to William Walls’ home after Walls

made the statement, “I have someone you can talk to, otherwise, you can get

the f**k off my property,” and that Dep. Chapman handcuffed Walls and

detained him in Dep. Chapman’s patrol unit. The State contends that

William Walls’ statement was a revocation of his previously given consent

to enter Walls’ residence, and that Dep. Chapman’s re-entry of Walls’ home
9

and his subsequent detainment of Walls was a violation of Walls’ Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The

State has argued that Dep. Chapman’s actions as described above constitute

violations of La. R.S. 14:63 (criminal trespass) and 14:35 (simple battery),

and that those same actions violated Dep. Chapman’s sworn duties to

support the Constitution and laws of the United States and Constitution and

laws of Louisiana and to faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all

the duties incumbent on him.

Once the facts have been determined, the Court must determine as a

matter of law and from the face of the pleadings whether a crime has been

charged. This Court considers the underlying actions described by the State

as true (as required when considering whether malfeasance in office has

been properly charged), but the legal conclusions asserted by the State, that

Dep. Chapman committed two misdemeanors, trespass and battery, and

violated William Walls’ Fourth Amendment rights, are unproven at this

point and as such, merely speculative.

This Court does not see William Walls’ statement through the same

lens as does the State, i.e., as a revocation of consent previously given. In

fact, there are multiple ways that Walls’ outburst to Dep. Chapman could

have been taken. The statement, “I have someone you can talk to, otherwise,

you can get the f**k off my property,” while likely verbally aggressive, gave

Dep. Chapman a couple of options where reentry of Walls’ residence was

concerned, one of which was for the deputy to go back inside the home with

Walls to speak to someone either on the phone or in person. Another was

out of concern for the officers’ safety, given the abrupt change in Walls’

demeanor. Accepting Walls’ statement at face value, the deputy’s following
10

him back into the mobile home constitutes neither a criminal activity or an

intentional act in direct violation of Dep. Chapman’s duties as a law

enforcement officer. Public safety requires some flexibility for police

officers to investigate and prevent crime. State v. Davenport, 32,329 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 9/22/99), 801 So. 2d 380; State v. Wesley, 28,012 (La. App. 2

Cir. 4/3/96), 671 So. 2d 1257, writ denied, 96-1127 (La. 10/4/96), 679 So.

2d 1379. Dep. Chapman had a legal right to be on the premises. CPSO had

received a tip that Deloach, who had an active arrest warrant, was at 14554

Pecan Road, which was William Walls’ property. Walls had given consent

to search his mobile home and had not revoked said consent, or had not done

so unequivocally. Dep. Chapman did not arrest Walls, but merely detained

him for officer safety so the deputies could effect a search of the second

mobile home on the property.

Having reviewed the applicable law, the indictment and bill of

particulars in this case, this Court finds that the trial court erred in denying

Dep. Chapman’s motion to quash. The State has failed to provide any

affirmative, expressly written duty that was performed by Dep. Chapman in

an unlawful manner beyond the general requirement to “uphold federal and

state laws in the course and scope of employment.” None of the allegations

or actions as described by the State in its response to Dep. Chapman’s

motion for bill of particulars constitutes the unlawful performance of an

affirmative duty, expressly written, that is imposed on Dep. Chapman as a

public officer as required under the law.

In State v. Hessler, 570 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1990), the State

argued that the police officer unlawfully violated his duty to “insure the

health and welfare of … an arrested subject in [his] custody, was properly
11

maintained, and thereby result[ed] in a battery being committed” upon the

arrestee. Id. at 96. The court in State v. Hessler found that no expressed

duty existed, and the sworn oath of a police officer to ensure the health and

welfare of arrestees was vague and not expressed as required. Id. at 97. In

the instant case, as in State v. Hessler, supra, Dep. Chapman’s “duty to

uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States and the laws and

Constitution of Louisiana,” while written, do not create an affirmative duty

specific enough to place any public officer on notice that handcuffing a

person for officer safety during a consensual search for a subject with an

outstanding arrest warrant based on a reliable tip or determining that consent

to search has not been revoked in the midst of such a search in a situation

such as that faced by Dep. Chapman, who was given an ambiguous,

belligerent message subject to multiple interpretations after consent had been

readily given, only one interpretation of which was the revocation of

consent, will result of a charge of malfeasance in office.

We therefore grant the supervisory writ, reverse the judgment of the

trial court denying the motion to quash, and remand the matter to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the writ is granted, the judgment of

the trial court denying the motion to quash is reversed, and the matter is

remanded to the trial court.

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED; REMANDED.

12

HUNTER, J., dissents with written reasons.

I respectfully dissent.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]”

Similarly, Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protects a citizen’s

right to privacy.

The State has alleged the defendant violated his sworn oath to uphold

the constitution and laws of this State when he purportedly violated Walls’

constitutional rights. The dying declaration of Walls, a private citizen,

constituting a withdrawal of his consent, could not have been more evident,

as he emphatically ordered the deputies to “Get the f**k off my property!”

However, not only were Walls’ directives ignored, but he was bound with

handcuffs and placed in the back of a patrol car where he subsequently

expired.

Despite the alleged actions of the defendant, the State, acting within

its constitutionally derived discretion, chose to initially charge the defendant

with the crime of malfeasance in office. The general public and the Courts

have grown increasingly aware of the reluctance of prosecutors to charge

government actors for any actions committed during the course and scope of

their employment. The hesitancy to prosecute evidences the societal and

jurisprudential tightropes each branch of government undertakes to

understand the difficulties of the professions, protect the general public, as

well as considering the actions of those acting in service thereof, and

interpreting the laws informally for all citizenry without respect to position.

1

Any other efforts would ultimately contaminate and weaken the

constitutional scheme under which America operates.

Would this privilege or protection have been afforded to regular

citizenry, i.e., would similar charges have been brought absent the public

service component? If a private citizen had committed the actions defendant

allegedly committed, would the charges range from aggravated

kidnapping/battery (for handcuffing Walls and placing him in the back of a

squad car while armed with a firearm) to negligent homicide (for Walls’

demise)?

I am well aware of the difficulties, dangers, and stressors law

enforcement encounters in the day-to-day service to our communities.

Nevertheless, officers hold positions of trust which cannot be insulated from

all criminal prosecution for violating the very laws they have been sworn to

uphold and enforce.

The malfeasance in office statute is applicable to any and all public

officers and employees. In State v. Petitto, 10-0581 (La. 3/15/11), 59 So. 3d

1245, a grand jury returned an indictment charging a parish councilman with

two counts of malfeasance in office based upon violations of duties imposed

on public officials under the provisions of the Code of Governmental Ethics.

The trial court concluded the indictment failed to charge a valid offense, and

the court of appeal affirmed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed,

stating:

The crime of malfeasance in office, which has been a part of
Louisiana’s penal laws for close to a century, is intended to
protect the public by deterring public officers and employees
from abusing their positions of public trust. The language of the
malfeasance statute is comprehensive. The law applies to “any
public officer or public employee” who intentionally refuses or
fails to perform or who intentionally performs in an unlawful
2

manner “any duty lawfully required of him.” In enacting this
provision, the legislature deliberately chose not to specify or
name a particular duty or duties, the abuse of which could lead
to prosecution for malfeasance. This decision not to further
define the duty element is understandable given the multitude
of different public employees and officials covered by the
statute. Indeed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
construct a definition of duty that would encompass all the
derelictions of duty the statute seeks to proscribe. Instead, the
legislature chose to restrict the duty element of the crime to
“any duty lawfully required” of the public officer or employee.

Id. at 1250 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).

This is not a novel issue. Police officers have been charged with, and

convicted of, malfeasance in office for intentionally refusing or failing to

perform their affirmative duties, or intentionally performing their duties in

an unlawful manner.

In State v. Coker, 625 So. 2d 190 (La. App 3 Cir.), writ denied, 624

So. 2d 1204 (La. 1993), the Chief of Police of the town of Glenmora,

Louisiana, was charged with malfeasance in office. Following his

conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, the State failed to

prove he was in violation of “a duty lawfully required of him” through (1)

the introduction of a statute or provision of law which delineates an

affirmative duty upon the official and (2) the showing that the duty was

expressly imposed by law upon the official. The defendant contended a

public official “can never be convicted of malfeasance unless a specific

criminal statute exists which defines the conduct as malfeasance.” Id. at

195. The defendant also argued none of the statutes or ordinances regarding

the responsibilities of law enforcement officers could be considered

“because they were not specifically included in the indictment or bill of

particulars[.]” Id. at 196. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, the court

stated:
3

[T]he defendant contends that a public official can never be
convicted of malfeasance unless a specific criminal statute
exists which defines the conduct as malfeasance. In the
defendant’s case, he asserts that he cannot be found guilty of
malfeasance for maliciously battering helpless prisoners unless
a statute exists which requires that “law enforcement officials
shall ensure the safety, health and wellbeing of all citizens or
persons in their presence or custody, and ensure no batteries are
committed upon the person who is in their custody or
presence.” Such a requirement would render the offense of
malfeasance meaningless and unenforceable. Utilizing the
defendant’s reasoning, every conceivable function and duty of a
public official would have to be specifically included in a
prohibitory statute in order to successfully “notify” the official
of his potential liability for malfeasance. This is clearly
impossible in practice and was obviously not the intent of the
legislature when enacting the malfeasance statute.

In fact, only two offenses are specifically delineated in
Louisiana as constituting malfeasance. See La. R.S. 14:134.1
and La. R.S. 14:134.2. In all other cases, the specific duties
required to support conviction for malfeasance are derived from
other sources.

Id. at 195. The court further stated:

We reject the defendant’s contention that affirming the trial
court’s finding will subject police officers to criminal
malfeasance prosecutions for all violations of the law. Clearly,
the malfeasance statute requires that the offender be acting in
his official capacity and engaged in the performance of a duty
which is required by law, in order to support conviction. The
jurisprudence indicates that prosecution for malfeasance is
reserved for those cases in which a public official has blatantly
abused the authority of his office and violates the public trust
by his direct, personal acts or failure to act.

Id. at 197.

In State v. Deville, 94-0241 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/27/94), 644 So. 2d

1117, the Chief of Police of Washington, Louisiana, was charged with (and

subsequently convicted of) four counts of malfeasance in office. The

defendant appealed his convictions, arguing neither indictment nor the

evidence proved the affirmative duty expressly imposed by law with he

4

violated. Citing State v. Perez, 464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985), and State v.

Coker, supra, the court of appeal affirmed, stating:

[T]he bill of information which included reference to
defendant’s oath of office properly charged the offense of
malfeasance in office. In addition, we note the elementary fact
that certain affirmative duties are inherent in the nature of the
office. Certainly, police officers have the duty not to break the
law when performing the duties of their office.

Id. at 1123.

The State asserted defendant committed the offense of malfeasance in

office by intentionally performing his duties in an unlawful manner. Today,

I believe the majority has usurped the role of the trial court. I see no abuse

of the trial court’s discretion in its determination the bill of indictment,

which referenced a public officer’s oath of office, charged defendant with an

offense which is punishable under a valid statute. Consequently, I would

conclude the judgment below does not require the exercise of this court’s

supervisory authority, recall the Court’s order of April 26, 2023, as

improvidently granted, and deny defendant’s application for supervisory

review.

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