State of Louisiana v. Jeremiah Lee Todd

Judgment rendered August 9, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,253-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JEREMIAH LEE TODD Appellant

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Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Bossier, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 222,298

Honorable Douglas M. Stinson, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Paula C. Marx

JEREMIAH LEE TODD Pro Se

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

RICHARD R. RAY
J. CHANCELLOR NERRON
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before PITMAN, ROBINSON, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

PITMAN, C. J.

Defendant Jeremiah Lee Todd appeals his sentence of 35 years in

prison without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, which

was rendered after he pled guilty to second degree rape. He also appeals the

sentence on the basis of due process because it was rendered by a judge who

did not hear his guilty plea but was later assigned the case by the Louisiana

Supreme Court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS

Defendant was charged with first degree rape, a violation of La.

R.S. 14:42(A)(4), in that on or about August 1, 2020, he performed oral sex

upon his 11-year-old stepdaughter, O.M. The state offered Defendant a plea

bargain agreement, by which he would plead guilty to second degree rape, a

violation of La. R.S. 14:42.1, and would avoid a possible sentence of life in

prison without parole. The penalty for violating La. R.S. 14:42.1 is

imprisonment for not less than 5 years nor more than 40 years. According to

the plea bargain agreement, a presentencing investigation (“PSI”) would be

conducted, and Defendant’s sentence would be left to the trial court’s

discretion. Defendant accepted the plea bargain agreement.

The guilty plea was heard in Bossier Parish on February 7, 2022,

before Judge Parker Self. The terms of the plea bargain agreement were

conveyed to Defendant, including the length of possible sentence and that

following the PSI, “the sentence would be up to the Court.” Defendant

stated that he understood. The state’s attorney read the factual basis for the

plea and stated as follows:

On or about August 1, 2020, Jeremiah Lee Todd did at the
address of 1001 Greenwood Circle in Haughton, Louisiana,
that’s the Parish of Bossier, State of Louisiana, did sneak into

his minor step-daughter’s bedroom, minor step-daughter with
the initials O.M., date of birth 05/20/09, did sneak into his
minor step-daughter’s bedroom in the middle of the night and
performed oral sex upon her without her consent. And he did
so contrary to the laws of the State of Louisiana.

The trial court determined Defendant voluntarily pled guilty and

waived his rights and accepted the guilty plea. It ordered that a PSI be

conducted, and a date for sentencing was set. Defendant was also informed

of sex offender notification laws.

Prior to the date of the sentencing hearing, the Louisiana Supreme

Court ordered that Judge Douglas Stinson (Division D) be allotted

Judge Self’s (Division F) cases because prior to his election as a judge of

Division D, Judge Stinson was an assistant district attorney in that division.

Therefore, cases in Division D had to be transferred to another division and

Judge Stinson assumed cases from Division F.

Defendant filed a motion requesting that he be sentenced by

Judge Self, who heard the guilty plea, but Judge Self denied the motion,

reasoning that he could not pick and choose which cases he would continue

to hear because it could give the appearance of favoritism. For that reason,

Judge Stinson sentenced Defendant.

Judge Stinson had the benefit of the PSI report, the transcript of the

guilty plea and all documents concerning the crime. He considered La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1 and articulated his reasons for sentencing, including that

Defendant, by accepting the plea bargain agreement, drastically reduced his

exposure to incarceration from life in prison without parole to, at most,

40 years. He emphasized the young age of the victim; that Defendant was

her stepfather, who had known her most of her life; and that Defendant was

in a position of power. He noted that this was Defendant’s first felony
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conviction but stated that it was a very heinous crime. After considering

these factors, he imposed a sentence of 35 years at hard labor without benefit

of parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied.

He now appeals his sentence, arguing it is unconstitutionally excessive, and

that he was denied due process because the judge who sentenced him was

not the judge who heard his guilty plea and to whose discretion he agreed to

rely upon regarding the length of sentence.

DISCUSSION

Excessive Sentence

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a near-

maximum sentence that is unconstitutionally excessive because he is a

remorseful 36-year-old first-felony offender who needs treatment, rather

than 35 years in prison. He contends that maximum sentences are to be

reserved for the most egregious and blameworthy of offenders, of which he

is not. He asserts that his sentence should be vacated and remanded for

imposition of a lesser constitutional sentence particularized to this offender

and offense.

The state argues that the sentence imposed is not unconstitutionally

excessive and falls within the parameters for sentences pursuant to the

statute, which is up to 40 years in prison. It points out that Defendant

potentially faced life in prison without parole had he been convicted of the

crime initially charged, i.e., first degree rape of a child under the age of

13 years. It contends that Defendant has already received a significant

reduction in exposure to incarceration by acceptance of the plea bargain

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agreement. For these reasons, it argues the trial court did not err when

sentencing him to 35 years without benefits.

When reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court uses

a two-prong test. First, the record must demonstrate that the trial court

complied with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not required to list

every aggravating and mitigating circumstance, but the record must reflect

that it adequately considered the guidelines of La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. State

v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983). The trial court should consider the

defendant’s personal history and prior criminal record, the seriousness of the

offense, the likelihood that the defendant will commit another crime and the

defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. State v. Jones, 398 So. 2d 1049 (La.

1981). The trial court is not required to assign any particular weight to any

specific matters at sentencing. State v. Quiambao, 36,587 (La. App. 2 Cir.

12/11/02), 833 So. 2d 1103, writ denied, 03-0477 (La. 5/16/03), 843 So. 2d

1130.

Second, the appellate court must determine if the sentence is

unconstitutionally excessive. A sentence is excessive and violates La. Const.

art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime or is

nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and

suffering. State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). A sentence is

grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered

in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. Id.

The trial court is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences

within the statutory limits, and the sentence imposed by the trial court should

not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of its

discretion. State v. Williams, 03-3514 (La. 12/13/04), 893 So. 2d 7. The
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trial court is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case and, therefore, is given broad discretion in

sentencing. Id. On review, an appellate court does not determine whether

another sentence may have been more appropriate but whether the trial court

abused its discretion. Id.

La. R.S. 14:42.1(B) provides that whoever commits the crime of

second degree rape shall be imprisoned at hard labor, without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for not less than 5 nor more

than 40 years.

In this case, Defendant pled guilty to the charge of second degree rape

knowing that he was pleading guilty to a crime for which the punishment

would not exceed 40 years. The crime with which he was originally

charged, first degree rape, was punishable by life in prison without benefits.

Defendant significantly decreased his exposure to incarceration by pleading

guilty and agreeing to allow the trial court to determine sentence after the

PSI report was rendered.

The sentencing judge reviewed the transcript of the guilty plea,

considered the facts provided in the PSI report and specifically stated that

the heinous nature of the crime warranted the sentence of 35 years without

benefits. It was noted that Defendant was a first-felony offender but that the

child victim was very young and was his own stepdaughter, whom he had

known for a very long time. The sentence falls within the statutory

guidelines for this crime, and the sentencing judge easily satisfied La. C. Cr.

P. art. 894.1. Furthermore, the record of the guilty plea supports the

sentence even without the trial court’s well-expressed reasoning. This

assignment of error is without merit.
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Due Process and the Reassignment of the Case

Defendant argues that he was denied due process when the judge who

handled his pretrial proceedings and accepted his guilty plea was not the

judge who sentenced him. He claims that he was prejudiced when the trial

judge, who was in the best position to particularize the sentence in this case,

was not the sentencing judge. He also asserts that Judge Self told him that

after he received the PSI report, he would share it with the attorneys and

“then the sentence would be up to the court.” He argues that Judge Self had

no conflicts that would have precluded him from imposing a sentence in his

case, but the judge declined to pick and choose the cases he would continue

to adjudicate.

Defendant further argues it was fundamentally unfair for a judge who

had not accepted his guilty plea to sentence him to 35 years. He contends

that at the sentencing hearing, Judge Stinson considered the PSI report and

letters submitted on his behalf and that of the victim, but there was no

mention of review of the transcripts of the pretrial hearings or other

proceedings handled by Judge Self. For these reasons, he asserts that his

sentence should be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing to

impose a lesser, constitutional sentence.

The state argues that the sentence is not excessive and was properly

imposed by a judge to whom the case had been assigned by the Louisiana

Supreme Court. The sentence falls within the parameters set out in the

statute for the crime to which he pled guilty and, in fact, was greatly reduced

as a result of the plea bargain agreement.

The state further argues that well-established law provides that a

change in judge prior to sentencing is not prohibited, and the law allows for
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the reassignment of a case at any time for good cause. The state claims that

Defendant has failed to show any evidence of prejudice that resulted from

the random assignment of his case to Judge Stinson.

To meet due process requirements, capital and other felony cases must

be allotted for trial to the various divisions of the court, or to judges assigned

criminal court duty, on a random or rotating basis or under some other

procedure adopted by the court which does not vest the district attorney with

power to choose the judge to whom a particular case is assigned. State v.

Simpson, 551 So. 2d 1303 (La. 1989). The random allotment of criminal

cases is required to ensure that the accused is tried before an impartial judge.

State v. Sebastien, 31,750 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/31/99), 730 So. 2d 1040, writ

denied, 99-1426 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So. 2d 1157; State v. Beene, 49,612

(La. App. 2 Cir. 4/15/15), 164 So. 3d 299, writ denied, 15-0944 (La. 4/4/16),

190 So. 3d 1200.

The supreme court has found that “a criminal defendant does not have

a right to have his case heard by a particular judge.” State v. Cooper,

10-2344 (La. 11/16/10), 50 So. 3d 115. The Cooper court recognized that

the “one judge/one case arrangement” is not practical and stated as follows:

We recognize the impracticality of such a requirement—judges
get sick, take vacation, have conflicts within their own dockets,
resign, or are elected to a different bench. All of these
circumstances often result in a case being assigned to another
judge for adjudication. The fact that more than one judge
handles aspects of any one criminal case does not, in and of
itself, prejudice the criminal defendant.

We find that Defendant was not prejudiced by the substitution of

Judge Stinson for Judge Self, pursuant to the order of the Louisiana

Supreme Court. The allotment of cases was not made on the basis of who

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the defendant was or for any reason personal to the case. Therefore, this

assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the conviction and sentence of

Defendant Jeremiah Lee Todd are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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