State of Louisiana v. Jeremy Walker

Judgment rendered August 9, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,255-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JEREMY WALKER Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
First Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Caddo, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 383,677

Honorable Christopher T. Victory, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAMES E. STEWART, SR. Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TOMMY J. JOHNSON
KODIE K. SMITH
BRITTANY B. ARVIE
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before HUNTER, MARCOTTE, and ELLENDER, JJ.

MARCOTTE, J.

This appeal arises from the First Judicial District Court, Parish of

Caddo, the Honorable Chris Victory presiding. Defendant, Jeremy Walker,

was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape and sentenced to life

imprisonment at hard labor without benefits for each count, to be served

consecutively. For the following reasons, we affirm Walker’s convictions

and sentences and remand with instructions.

Walker was initially charged by bill of information with two counts of

molestation of a juvenile under the age of 13. However, on September 30,

2021, Walker was charged by bill of indictment with two counts of first-

degree rape, in violation of La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4). Count one stated that

Walker had oral sexual intercourse and anal sexual intercourse with M.W.

(DOB: 12/24/07), without consent and when the victim was under the age of

13.1 Count two stated that Walker had oral sexual intercourse and anal

sexual intercourse with R.D. (DOB: 2/11/11), without consent and when the

victim was under the age of 13. Both offenses occurred on or about

December 24, 2014.

Following the empaneling of a 12-member jury, a trial was held on

July 26-27, 2022. M.W., who was 14 years old at the time of trial, testified

that he knew Walker as his babysitter’s friend; he identified Walker in court.

M.W. stated that he gave an interview at the Gingerbread House Children’s

Advocacy Center (“Gingerbread House”) on May 21, 2021, when he was 13

years old. The audio and video recording of that interview was admitted and

played for the jury.

1
Victims’ initials and their family members’ first names are provided throughout
this memorandum to protect victims’ identities in accordance with La. R.S. 46:1844(W).

In the Gingerbread interview, M.W. spoke about something that

happened at his babysitter’s house when he was seven years old. His

babysitter was named Latoya.2 M.W. said that Latoya had a friend named

Jeremy who had sex with him. M.W. recalled a time that he was at Latoya’s

house and Jeremy was playing hide-and-go-seek with him and the other

kids. Jeremy separated him from the other children, took him to a room,

pulled M.W.’s pants down and “sucked me off.” M.W. said he urinated in

Jeremy’s mouth.

M.W. described another incident that happened on the couch at

Latoya’s house where Jeremy made him “stick it inside of him,” and forced

M.W. to kiss him and perform oral sex on him. M.W. recalled that Jeremy

would make him sit on his penis, and Jeremy would put his penis into

M.W.’s butt, which “would kinda sting.” M.W. said those incidents would

take place in the living room. When Jeremy finished, he would wipe

M.W.’s butt, because his butt was wet. M.W. also stated that he saw Jeremy

do these same things to Latoya’s son, R.D. M.W. said R.D. was younger

than him.

M.W. described Jeremy as light-skinned, real tall, wears glasses,

tattoos on his arms, pink lips, and was “kinda big,” at the time.

M.W. testified that he told the truth in his Gingerbread House

interview. On cross-examination, M.W. affirmed that Walker would call

Latoya’s house and ask her if he was present. M.W. confirmed that when

Walker performed oral sexual intercourse on him, he urinated in Walker’s

mouth and Walker spit it out. M.W. stated that what Walker spit out was

2
Latoya is the mother of victim, R.D.
2

“the color of pee.” M.W. said that when Walker made him stick his penis

inside Walker’s butt, Walker was lying on his stomach and he was on top of

Walker, with Walker’s hand on his butt pushing him down. M.W. stated

that Walker had been “chubby,” but he knew Walker had been “working

out,” because his mother showed him a picture of Walker and asked him,

“This the man?”

F.J., who is M.W.’s stepsister, and was 13 years old at the time of

trial, testified that she knew Walker as her babysitter’s friend. She identified

Walker in court. F.J. was interviewed at the Gingerbread House, and the

audio and video recording of the interview was played for the jury. In her

Gingerbread interview, when asked if she knew why she was there, F.J.

responded that she was there to talk about the man that did something to

M.W. F.J. explained that she and M.W. are close, and he told her what

happened to him when they went to Latoya’s house. F.J. said that

sometimes “the man” would come over and M.W. would act differently

when the man would be there. F.J. said that M.W. acted “scared.” She also

said that everyone would be in Latoya’s daughter’s room, except for M.W.

and the man.

F.J. affirmed that she told the truth in her Gingerbread House

interview. F.J. stated that she was six years old when she was at Latoya’s

house and she was not afraid of Walker, but she noticed that M.W. was

afraid of Walker when he came over. She did not discuss that with M.W.

when she was little, but she did talk to him about it once he revealed his

experiences to his family. F.J. said that she only recalled one other adult

coming to M.W.’s house, but it was “not that often” that that person came to

the house.
3

Christina, M.W.’s mother, testified that Latoya babysat M.W. and F.J.

when they were six to seven years old. Christina stated that Latoya’s son,

R.D., is autistic and at the time Latoya was babysitting her kids, R.D. was

nonverbal. Latoya babysat M.W. and F.J. before and after school, and all

day in the summer. Christina knew Walker as Latoya’s best friend; she

identified him in court. She saw Walker at Latoya’s house a couple of

times, but not regularly. She stated that she exchanged few words with

Walker and did not really know him.

Christina stated that, on the Monday after Easter 2021, her sister

called her about M.W. M.W. told his aunt what Walker did to him. She said

that her sister was a therapist and her son felt comfortable speaking with her.

After M.W. told his mother what had happened to him, Christina took him to

the Shreveport Police Department (“SPD”) and reported that her son had

been molested by Walker.

Christina said that when she spoke with M.W. about what happened,

he told her that he was six or seven years old at the time the abuse occurred

and everything happened at Latoya’s house. Christina said that M.W. told

her that it was Latoya’s friend who had abused him. Christina recalled two

male friends being present at times at Latoya’s house, so, using her phone,

she showed M.W. a picture from Latoya’s Facebook page taken during one

of the birthday parties. The picture depicted Walker, and she asked M.W. if

he was the person who abused him, and he said, “Yes.”

Christina testified that an SPD detective arranged a Gingerbread

House interview and following the interview, M.W. attended therapy.

Christina said that since attending therapy, M.W. “seems fine,” but there are

times when he gets “pretty isolated.”
4

Christina spoke with Latoya every few months after she stopped

babysitting her kids, and she attended children’s birthday parties at Latoya’s

house afterwards. Walker was present at those parties. She stated that if she

had learned of any abuse, she would have reported it immediately. Christina

said that she was unaware of any sexual abuse experienced by R.D.

On cross-examination, Christina said that she gave SPD Walker’s full

name and reported him as the person who abused her son. She got his name

from Facebook, because the Facebook photo she showed to M.W. was

tagged with his name. Christina testified that she also showed M.W. a

Facebook picture of the other man she remembered being at Latoya’s house

and that he stated that was not the person who molested him.

Corporal Roland Garner (“Cpl. Garner”) testified that he was working

SPD patrol on April 5, 2021, when he responded to a report of a sexual

assault at the police station. He met with Christina who informed him that

her son had been molested when he was six or seven years old. Christina

told Cpl. Garner that when M.W. was with his family he had an emotional

breakdown and let his mother know that he had been molested while at his

babysitter’s house. Christina informed Cpl. Garner that while M.W. was

there, he was forced to perform oral sex on a male and the offender would

do the same to him. He passed the information on to Detective Sherrie

Stump (“Det. Stump”), of the SPD Sex Crimes Unit, who investigated the

matter.

On cross-examination, Cpl. Garner stated that he mostly spoke with

Christina about what happened to M.W., but M.W. was present while he

took the report and he was “all emotional.” Cpl. Garner stated that Christina

told him that the offender was “Jeremy Walker” and he wrote his name into
5

his report. Cpl. Garner affirmed that Christina said she thought the offender

was a friend of the babysitter’s, but she was not sure.

Lacie Hadley (“Hadley”), a forensic interviewer at the Gingerbread

House, testified that she conducted forensic interviews with M.W. on May

21, 2021, F.J. on May 26, 2021, and R.D. on May 28, 2021. She followed

the legal guidelines when conducting all three interviews. Hadley stated that

during her interview with R.D., he did not make any disclosures. During all

three interviews, Hadley took notes which were admitted into evidence.

Hadley said that M.W. disclosed to her during his interview that there was a

man named Jeremy who performed sexual acts on him. Hadley testified that

F.J. informed her that something happened to her brother, M.W., and “she

would go over there and would play with the children there.”

Hadley discussed delayed disclosure, which is where there is a gap in

time between when the abuse occurred and when the child discloses the

abuse. Hadley testified that delayed disclosure is a factor in this case, and

that young children may not comprehend the abuse that is happening to

them, which makes telling another person about the abuse challenging and

scary for them.

On cross-examination, Hadley said that due to R.D.’s developmental

capacities, he did not mention any abuse that he suffered. She said that she

reviewed the interviews she conducted with M.W. and F.J., but not her

interview of R.D., because he did not disclose anything. When asked if she

treated an affirmative denial of abuse as if the child did not disclose

anything, she answered negatively.

R.D. testified that he was 11 years old at the time of the trial. He

stated that he knew Jeremy and he identified him in court. When asked if he
6

told his mom that Jeremy did anything bad to him, R.D. said, “Actually he

just wiped me.” R.D. said that Jeremy wiped him on his mouth and when

asked what he was doing that required Jeremy to wipe his mouth, R.D.

responded, “I don’t even know.” When asked if anyone did anything bad to

him, R.D. said, “No.” When asked if Jeremy did anything bad to him, R.D.

responded, “No.”

Latoya testified that R.D. has high-functioning autism and that he

learns at a slower level. She said that when he was younger, R.D. was

nonverbal, but he started talking at five or six years of age after he started

taking speech classes. R.D. is uncomfortable speaking to or in front of

people he doesn’t know.

Latoya stated that Walker was her best friend and she had known him

for 17-18 years. She identified Walker in court. In 2014-2015, Latoya ran

her own in-home daycare on Marquette Street, Shreveport, Louisiana, where

she supervised about six children between the age of newborn infants to 12

or 13 years old. She was friends with Walker at that time, and he would

come to her home while she was running that business, if she needed help.

She recalled that M.W. and F.J. were two of the children she watched; they

would be dropped off around 6:00-7:00 a.m. and be picked up around 5:00

p.m. Latoya said that she trusted Walker around the children, including

R.D., and she would leave them alone with him when she was not present at

her house.

Latoya testified that she spoke with an SPD detective in May 2021,

who informed her that she needed to bring R.D. to the Gingerbread House

for an interview, which she did the next day. Latoya told the forensic

interviewer that R.D. has autism and that he barely speaks to anyone he does
7

not know and that he might not answer any questions. Following the

interview, the detective told Latoya that R.D. did not make any disclosures.

When asked if she spoke with her son again after he was interviewed,

Latoya testified that he told her what had happened to him. Defense counsel

objected to any further statements about Latoya’s conversations with her son

as hearsay. A bench conference was held, but the trial court did not make a

ruling on the objection.

Latoya said that when she spoke with R.D., “He told me that Jeremy

forced him to put his penis in his mouth and touched him some.” She said

that R.D. “didn’t say much,” but he began disclosing more once he started

going to counseling. Latoya said that he “[j]ust broke down crying and just

stayed in my arms for a while,” and that is a type of emotion that R.D. does

not usually show. Latoya reported what R.D. said to Det. Stump.

On cross-examination, Latoya testified that Christina encountered

Walker a few times while he was in her home. The last time Latoya spoke

with Walker was in June 2021. Latoya could not recall whether Walker had

ever called her home while she was babysitting to ask if a particular child

was there, but if he had she would have thought that strange. Walker would

come to her home one or two times a week when she needed help. Latoya

did not speak with Christina about what happened.

Latoya said that the only time that R.D. said that nothing happened

was at the Gingerbread House, because he did not want to tell them

anything. She did not recall any of the children she supervised being afraid

of Walker.

Det. Stump testified that she was the lead detective in Walker’s case;

she identified Walker in court. Det. Stump supervised Hadley’s interview of
8

M.W. at the Gingerbread House where he stated that Walker sexually

assaulted him when he was seven years old. Det. Stump said that M.W.

stated in his interview that Walker performed oral sex on him, made M.W.

“stick it inside of him, made me kiss him and suck him off.” M.W. also

remembered that Walker would make him sit on his penis, which would

sting. M.W. stated that afterward, his butt would be wet, and Walker would

then “wipe his butt off.” M.W. said that he also saw Walker do the same

things to R.D.

After M.W.’s interview, she spoke with Christina who provided her

with Latoya’s name and phone number. Det. Stump also supervised F.J.’s

interview at the Gingerbread House. F.J. stated that she and M.W. were

close and he told her what happened to him when they were at Latoya’s

house. F.J. also said that M.W.’s demeanor would change when Walker was

around, and he would act scared.

Det. Stump supervised R.D.’s interview at the Gingerbread House.

Det. Stump said that R.D. is autistic and did not disclose any incidents of

sexual assault, but she had a follow-up interview with Latoya after R.D.’s

Gingerbread House interview. Defense counsel then objected to Det. Stump

testifying about what Latoya told her R.D. said. The court did not rule on

the objection. Det. Stump said that Latoya informed her that R.D. disclosed

to his mother that Walker had put his penis in his mouth and butt and told

him not to tell anyone. Latoya said that R.D. asked his mother to forgive

him and said that he was sorry for not telling her.

On cross-examination, Det. Stump testified that after she supervised

M.W.’s Gingerbread House interview, she contacted Latoya and told her that

one of the children in her care may have been a victim of sexual abuse. She
9

also informed Latoya that R.D. might have been a victim as well. Det.

Stump said that Latoya was shocked to learn that Walker was identified as a

suspect in the sexual assault of M.W. and R.D., because she had been best

friends with him for years. Latoya never expressed to Det. Stump that she

was suspicious of Walker.

Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel clarified his argument

regarding his objection to both Latoya’s and Det. Stump’s testimony.

Defense counsel argued that Latoya’s statement regarding R.D.’s disclosure

of abuse to her and Det. Stump’s recounting of what Latoya told her that her

son said constituted impermissible hearsay testimony. Defense counsel

claimed that the state was attempting to impeach its own witness. Defense

counsel stated that Det. Stump recounting what Latoya told her R.D. said did

not describe anything that happened in the investigation after the

Gingerbread House interview, except to make the conclusion that sexual

assault occurred. The state contended that Det. Stump’s testimony about

what Latoya told her about R.D.’s statement to his mother explained why the

detective then charged Walker with an additional count of first-degree rape.

The trial court said that it was clear that Det. Stump’s testimony was

not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather she was

able to testify based on her personal knowledge of what the mother of the

victim told her, which led to Walker’s indictment, arrest, and trial. The trial

court stated that R.D. testified that Walker did not do anything to him, and

he was available for cross-examination and provided an inconsistent

statement. The trial court noted that this is a special case where there is a

juvenile and sex allegation. The state rested.

10

Walker was advised of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent; he

elected to testify in his own defense. Walker stated that he did not sexually

assault M.W. or R.D. He testified that other adult “guy friends” were

present at Latoya’s daycare and that she “had a lot of traffic” at her house at

the time.

On cross-examination, Walker stated that he had known Latoya since

2004 and he considered her his best friend at the time the offenses were

committed. He affirmed that he was at her house one or two times a week

after school to help her with her daycare and that M.W., R.D., and F.J. were

at times present while he was at Latoya’s house. He stated that there were

times that Latoya would leave him alone at her house with those kids to pick

up other kids from school. Walker stated that he had a good relationship

with Latoya at the time that she came forward with charges of him sexually

abusing her son. Walker also said that he never had any negative

interactions with Christina when he saw her in passing at Latoya’s house.

Walker said that when he was left in charge of the children at

Latoya’s house all of the children would be in one room, “[be]cause I can’t

watch kids running around the house and stuff like that.” He stated that he

would be using the computer in the same room while the kids were in the

living room playing. Walker testified that he did play with R.D. every once

in a while, because he was Latoya’s son. He said that when he was alone

with the kids, he would watch them and make sure they didn’t break

anything.

On redirect, Walker stated that he never “played” with the kids, but he

was in charge of them and he had them in the same room together. The

defense rested.
11

The state called Latoya as a rebuttal witness. She said that when she

ran her daycare business, she did not allow guests to come over, because she

had other people’s children in her home. She said that she did not have a lot

of traffic through her house during business hours.

Following deliberation, the jury found Walker guilty as charged on

both counts. The jury was polled, and the verdict was unanimous.

On August 8, 2022, a sentencing hearing was held. Walker filed a

post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial. Both

motions were denied and the defense waived any delay in sentencing. The

trial court advised Walker of his appeal and post-conviction relief time

delays. The trial court considered La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 in sentencing

Walker and found that there was a risk that he would commit another crime,

he needed custodial treatment, and a lesser sentence would deprecate the

seriousness of his crimes.

The trial court also listed several aggravating factors found in La. C.

Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court found that Walker having no prior criminal

history was a mitigating factor.

The trial court sentenced Walker to life imprisonment at hard labor

without benefits on each count, to run consecutively. The trial court

informed Walker that if he should get out of prison, he would be required to

register as a sex offender for life. However, no written notice of the sex

offender registration requirement appears in the record. Walker now

appeals.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

12

Walker’s first assignment of error is that the evidence is insufficient to

support either of his convictions. He argues that Latoya testified that none

of the children at the daycare seemed afraid of him, including F.J., who did

not disclose that M.W. seemed afraid of him until after he reported that he

had been assaulted. Walker argues that M.W.’s description of abuse,

specifically that Walker would have M.W. lie of top of him and push

M.W.’s butt down from that position “seems an unlikely manner in which

this would happen with others present to whom M.W. could have gone to get

out of that situation.”

Walker states that no one else saw him take M.W. off by himself

despite others being present in the home, and M.W. did not complain about

the abuse until six or more years later. Walker argues that M.W.’s statement

that Walker would call Latoya’s house to see if he was there was not

corroborated by her. Walker also complains that Christina conducted her

own investigation by showing M.W. a picture of him, which he argues is the

equivalent of a police photo lineup influencing a witness’ testimony.

Walker contends that R.D. denied being a victim of sexual assault and

the only thing Walker did was wipe his mouth, which is not evidence of

sexual assault. Walker says the only evidence that R.D. was a victim of

sexual assault was his mother’s hearsay testimony and M.W.’s statement.

The state contends that M.W. described Walker performing oral sex

on him and sticking his penis in his butt, which caused a stinging sensation,

proving the elements of oral and anal sexual intercourse as required by La.

R.S. 14:42. M.W. testified that he was seven years old at the time of the

offense, meeting the burden of proving the victim was under the age of 13.

F.J. reported that Walker would separate M.W. from the other children and
13

that M.W. acted differently when Walker was around. M.W. described in

his Gingerbread interview seeing Walker make R.D. perform oral sex on

him and wiping his mouth off. Walker had control over M.W. and R.D.

when Latoya was absent.

The state argues that the members of the jury saw that R.D. did not

disclose that he was abused, but they were informed that R.D. is autistic, is

uncomfortable speaking with people he does not know, and his mother

explained that he might not answer questions he does not understand.

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must

consider whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Leger, 17-2084 (La. 6/26/19), 284 So. 3d 609; State v. McFarlin, 54,754

(La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/23), 354 So. 3d 888. The Jackson standard does not

provide the appellate court with a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation

of the evidence for that of the fact finder. La. C. Cr. P. art. 821; State v.

Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.

The appellate court does not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh evidence, and accords great deference to the trier of fact’s decision

to accept or reject witness testimony in whole or in part. State v. McFarlin,

supra. Where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the

resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the

witnesses, the issue is the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. In the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is
14

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. Id.; State v. Gullette,

43,032 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So. 2d 753. This principle is equally

applicable to victims of sexual assault; such testimony alone is sufficient

even when the state offers no medical, scientific or physical evidence to

prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. State v. McFarlin,

supra; State ex rel. P.R.R., Jr., 45,405 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/19/10), 36 So. 3d

1138.

La. R.S. 14:42(A)(4) provides:

A. First degree rape is a rape ...where the anal, oral, or vaginal
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of
the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the
following circumstances:
...

(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of
knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defense.3

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

the state presented sufficient evidence at trial for a reasonable jury to convict

the defendant of first-degree rape of a victim under the age of 13. The state

established that both victims were under the age of 13 when the sexual

assaults occurred. M.W., in his Gingerbread interview, gave his age when

he was assaulted, and his mother testified to his age when he went to

Latoya’s house for daycare. M.W. stated that R.D. was younger than him

when he went to Latoya’s house for daycare. Latoya testified that that she

operated a daycare from her home in 2014-2015, which corresponds with

R.D. being approximately four years old at the time.

3
At the time of the offenses, La. R.S. 14:42 titled the offense “aggravated rape,”
which was subsequently retitled “first degree rape.” The pertinent language from the
statute remains the same.
15

The state also established that Walker performed oral and/or anal

intercourse upon the victims without their consent. M.W., R.D., F.J.,

Christina, and Latoya all identified Walker in court. In his Gingerbread

interview, M.W. described the sexual acts that Walker performed on him or

made him perform on Walker, which included anal and oral intercourse. He

also described Walker engaging in similar behavior with R.D. The behavior

witnesses described meets with the statutory definition of “rape” found in

La. R.S. 14:41. Walker had control over M.W. and R.D. when Latoya was

absent. F.J. testified that Walker would separate M.W. from the other

children and her stepbrother acted differently when Walker was around.

Latoya testified that R.D. disclosed Walker’s abuse stating that

“Jeremy forced him to put his penis in his mouth and touched him some.”

The jury clearly accepted the testimony of the state’s witnesses as more

credible than Walker’s. It was within the discretion of the trier of fact to

make such a credibility determination, and this court will not disturb this

determination on appeal. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Hearsay Testimony

In Walker’s second assignment of error, he claims that impermissible

hearsay testimony was offered at trial by Latoya and Det. Stump. Walker

states that since R.D. denied any sexual assault occurred during his

testimony, the hearsay was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Walker argues that extrinsic evidence is admissible to attack the credibility

of a witness including inconsistent statements contradicting the testimony of

a witness, but only when offered to attack the credibility of that witness and

only if the probative value is outweighed by the unfair prejudice of the

16

evidence. Walker contends that a prior inconsistent statement may not be

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Walker says that here, the hearsay evidence presented was not

consistent with R.D.’s testimony, but rather Latoya’s testimony was the

opposite of that of her son. Walker acknowledges that testimony regarding

initial reports or complaints concerning sexual assault is an exception to the

hearsay rule, but Det. Stump’s testimony was not a statement made by R.D.

and was not the initial complaint. Walker argues that La. C.E. art. 801

requires that that the victim must testify consistently with the initial

complaint and be available for cross-examination for the statement to be

admitted. Walker contends that the hearsay offered here did not fit within

the permitted exceptions and its probative value was greatly outweighed by

its prejudicial effect. Walker also argues that the evidence was not properly

introduced as impeachment evidence. Walker maintains that the error in

allowing the hearsay testimony rendered his trial unfair. Walker asks this

court to vacate his convictions and order a new trial.

The state argues that the testimony of a law enforcement officer

taking particular action in response to information received from an out-of-

court declarant during her investigation will not be considered hearsay,

because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather

to explain the events leading to the defendant’s arrest. The trial court ruled

at trial that Det. Stump’s statements were not offered to prove the truth of

the matter asserted and the court noted that the statements were inconsistent

with R.D.’s testimony. The state notes that defense counsel did not request a

limiting instruction at the introduction of the statements.

17

The state argues that the jurisprudence has relaxed evidentiary

standards applied in cases involving sex crimes against children. The state

contends that R.D. is autistic, was very young at the time the crimes

occurred, and was reluctant to open up to strangers. The state maintains that

Latoya’s reporting of R.D.’s statement to Det. Stump provided a basis for

her to proceed with the investigation, but also placed at issue his mental and

emotional condition at the time he made the statement. The state says that

the hearsay exception found in La. C.E. art. 803 is based upon the idea that

the spontaneous expression of the declarant’s mental and emotional

condition at the time the statement is made is generally a reliable indication

of his state of mind. The state contends that R.D.’s state of mind was at

issue to explain the declaration to his mother in light of the Gingerbread

non-disclosure and his testimony in court.

The state contends that R.D. was available for cross-examination and

defense counsel did not question him on his declarations. The state also

argues that the statements attributed to R.D. by his mother and Det. Stump

corroborated the eyewitness testimony of M.W. and their testimony was

cumulative. The state asks this court to affirm Walker’s convictions and

sentences.

Hearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by the

Louisiana Code of Evidence or other legislation. La. C.E. art. 802.

“Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. La. C.E. art. 801(C). La. C.E. art. 804(B)(5),

provides:

18

B. Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
….

(5) Complaint of sexually assaultive behavior. A statement
made by a person under the age of twelve years and the
statement is one of initial or otherwise trustworthy complaint of
sexually assaultive behavior.

We note that R.D. was under 12 years of age when he made his

statement to his mother regarding Walker’s sexual abuse. Yet, R.D. was

available as a witness at trial, so at first glance, La. C.E. art. 804(B)(5) does

not appear to apply to his mother’s testimony regarding his disclosure of

abuse. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Folse v. Folse, 98-

1976 (La. 6/29/99), 738 So. 2d 1040, 1047:

It is well known and documented that sexual abuse of children
is extremely difficult to detect because “the offense often takes
place in secret, the victim is young, vulnerable, and reluctant to
testify, and there is often no physical or other evidence the
abuse took place.” State v. Miller, 98–0301 (La. 9/9/98), 718
So. 2d 960, 962. The evidence is rarely direct, but is
circumstantial. ... Thus, the purposes of unearthing the truth
under the difficult circumstances of child sexual abuse would
be served by permitting a judge to use the rules of evidence as
guides rather than blinders because the relaxed standard is
responsive to the circumstances in which child abuse occurs
and is exposed.

Furthermore, even if hearsay evidence is erroneously admitted at trial,

confrontation errors are subject to a harmless error analysis. State v. Dillard,

45,633 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/3/10), 55 So. 3d 56, writ denied, 10-2853 (La.

11/18/11), 75 So. 3d 454. An error is harmless when the guilty verdict was

surely unattributable to the error. State v. Robertson, 06-1537 (La. 1/16/08),

988 So. 2d 166. Factors to be considered include the importance of the

evidence to the state’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the

presence or absence of additional corroboration of the evidence, the extent

19

of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of the state’s case.

State v. Dillard, supra.

This case presents a unique factual scenario because R.D. was an

available witness and his mother testified about his out-of-court statement.

But, R.D. was four years old and nonverbal at the time the crime was

committed, he has autism, and he struggles to communicate with strangers.

This court finds that a relaxed evidentiary standard is applicable here given

the exceptional circumstances. Additionally, Walker was allowed to cross-

examine R.D., and Latoya’s testimony was corroborated by M.W. who

stated in his Gingerbread House interview that he witnessed Walker abusing

R.D., making her testimony cumulative.

Regarding Det. Stump’s statement about what Latoya told him about

R.D. disclosing abuse, the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the

matter asserted and does not amount to hearsay. The state claimed, and we

agree, that Det. Stump’s statement was offered to explain why, during the

course of her investigation, she arrested Walker and he was charged with the

first-degree rape of R.D. Any oversight in allowing hearsay testimony from

Latoya or Det. Stump was harmless error. This assignment of error lacks

merit.

Errors Patent

In conducting our review for errors patent in accordance with La. C.

Cr. P. art. 920, we note the trial court failed to provide defendant with

written notice of the sex offender notification and registration requirements,

as mandated by La. R.S. 15:543. Walker’s convictions of two counts of

first-degree rape, as defined by La. R.S. 15:541, require he be subjected to

the sex offender notification and registration requirements. La. R.S. 15:542.
20

Pursuant to R.S. 15:543, the trial court is required, using the form contained

in La. R.S. 15:543.1, to notify a defendant convicted of a sex offense in

writing of the registration and notification requirements. The statute further

requires that an entry be made in the court minutes stating the written

notification was provided.

Here, a review of the record and minutes reveals that the trial court

verbally informed Walker of his sex-offender notification and registration

requirements, but the written form does not appear in the record. As a result,

remand is required with instructions to the trial court to provide the

appropriate written notice to defendant of the sex offender registration

requirements and to make an entry in the court minutes stating such notice

was provided. La. R.S. 15:543; State v. Vinson, 54,580 (La. App. 2 Cir.

6/29/22) 342 So. 3d 469, writ denied, 22-01188 (La. 10/4/22), 347 So. 3d

888.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. This matter is

remanded to the trial court with instructions to provide defendant with

written notice of the requirement that he register as a sex offender and make

an entry in the court minutes stating that he was provided with such notice.

CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; SENTENCES AFFIRMED;

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

21