55,256-KA Precedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Javier A. Hernandez

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · Filed August 9, 2023

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

Opinion text

Judgment rendered August 9, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,256-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

JAVIER A. HERNANDEZ Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Twenty-Sixth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Webster, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 96,252

Honorable Charles A. Smith, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JAVIER A. HERNANDEZ Pro Se

J. SCHUYLER MARVIN Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

HUGO A. HOLLAND, JR.
RICHARD R. RAY
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, STEPHENS, and MARCOTTE, JJ.

COX, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the 26th Judicial District Court,

Webster Parish, Louisiana. Defendant, Javier Hernandez (“Hernandez”),

was unanimously convicted of molestation of a juvenile and sentenced to

five years at hard labor. Hernandez now appeals his conviction, arguing

insufficiency of the evidence in establishing that he behaved in a lewd and

lascivious manner toward the victim and that he acted in a position of

control or supervision over the victim. For the reasons set forth below,

Hernandez’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

FACTS

M.M., the victim in this matter, was born December 27, 2005, and

was 14 years old when she was hired to work at Los Compas Mexican

Restaurant during the summer of 2020. At this time, the restaurant was co-

owned by Hernandez and his wife, Lacee Hernandez (“Lacee”). M.M., and

two other victims, L.B. and H.I., later reported that Hernandez had engaged

in inappropriate behavior with them. Following M.M. and H.I.’s

Gingerbread House interviews, Hernandez was arrested and on December

16, 2020, was charged with molestation of a juvenile, in violation of La. R.S.

14:81.2(A)(1) and 14:81.2(B)(2).

On May 2, 2022, trial commenced, wherein the following testimony

was adduced:

First, Alisha Crane (“Crane”), M.M.’s aunt and legal guardian,

testified that she, her brother, Troy Manning (“Manning”), and her sister,

Ashley Lamb (“Lamb”), all worked at Los Compas together. Crane testified

that she also got M.M. a job working at the restaurant for a few months. She

stated that since she and Lamb lived together with M.M., and Manning lived

nearby, someone was always there to supervise and give M.M. a ride to and

from work when she was scheduled to work. Although she never witnessed

any inappropriate behavior between Hernandez and M.M., Crane recalled an

incident in which Hernandez asked if M.M. was allowed to drink, in which

he stated, “You know, it won’t hurt her. Y’all are at the restaurant. She’s

going home with you.” Crane stated that in response, she told Hernandez

twice that M.M. was underage and was not allowed to drink.1

Crane further testified that despite riding to and from work with her,

M.M. never told her that anything inappropriate occurred between her and

Hernandez and that she only learned about the allegations after she spoke

with H.I. However, Crane testified that while she felt that M.M. could have

discussed this with her, she was not surprised that M.M. did not disclose this

information. Crane elaborated that M.M. had been molested when she was

younger and immediately reported it, to which M.M.’s biological mother

dismissed the allegations and accused M.M. of lying, and since then, M.M.

had always been closed off and tended not to talk about her feelings.

Regarding H.I., Crane testified that she was close with H.I.’s mother

and while not biologically related, considered herself to be H.I.’s aunt, and

H.I. and M.M. referred to each other as cousins and communicated through

social media. Crane testified that when H.I. started work at the restaurant,

M.M. had already quit, so their shifts never overlapped. Crane stated that

H.I. was a minor when she started working, and only worked there for two

days. Crane testified that after H.I.’s first day, she told Crane that

1
Crane also explained that although the bar was centrally located in the
restaurant, where it could be seen by waitstaff, it was partially enclosed by panels with
only an opening for an entrance, so she could not always see if someone was at the bar.
Crane testified that while she saw M.M. sitting at the bar once, she told M.M. that she
could not be there and that she had not known M.M. to drink.
2

Hernandez and Lacee sent her a friend request on Facebook and that

Hernandez messaged her. Crane stated that she told H.I. to simply block

them and not to respond to anything.

Crane testified that on H.I.’s second day at the restaurant, they worked

the same shift, but Hernandez sent her to the store to pick up items for the

restaurant. Crane stated this was unusual because Hernandez did not usually

work Sunday shifts, and she was never asked to pick items up items before

this time. Crane testified that although she did not drive to work that day,

Hernandez gave her his keys and she left at his order so that the only other

adults present with H.I. were Manning and another waitress, Savannah.

Crane made clear that because Hernandez and Lacee owned the restaurant, if

either ordered an employee to do something, they did as they were told.

Crane stated that a few days later, H.I. called and informed her about

several incidents in which: (1) Hernandez asked H.I. to unblock him on

Facebook and sent several explicit messages, and (2) Hernandez called H.I.

into his office after Crane left to run errands, and groped H.I. Crane testified

that after she convinced H.I. to tell her mother about the incidents, H.I.

revealed that M.M. confided that Hernandez had done something similar to

her as well. Crane stated that she then spoke to M.M., who admitted that

Hernandez had been inappropriate with her and both girls provided their

statements to officers.2

2
Chief of Police for the Dixie Inn Police Department, Detective James Edwards
(“Det. Edwards”), also testified generally that M.M. filed a preliminary report with
officers and read her statement aloud for the jury. Det. Edwards stated that sometimes
people leave events out of their initial statement. He testified that after the victims were
interviewed, he secured an arrest warrant and searched the restaurant for employee
records, and discovered that there were no records for any of the workers.

Detective Heather Boucher also testified and generally gave an overview of crime
lab procedure. Det. Boucher testified that in this case, no rape kit or physical
3

Next, the State called M.M., who identified Hernandez in open court.

The State introduced and played a portion of M.M.’s recorded Gingerbread

House interview and M.M. testified generally that she worked at Los

Compas restaurant for about three months when she was 14 years old. M.M.

stated that although her aunts or uncle were present when she was scheduled

to work, Hernandez, nevertheless, engaged in inappropriate behavior with

her. M.M. then recalled an incident in which Hernandez “poked her butt”

with his finger. M.M. stated that she initially did not think much of the

matter because Hernandez said “Excuse me,” but that he would frequently

hug her as a pretense to touch her bottom. M.M. stated that Hernandez

would also call her into his office where no one would see, and touch her.

M.M. testified that Hernandez touched her more than once over the

course of her employment and recalled several statements in which

Hernandez: (1) told M.M. that he and one of the cooks would take her to

Ruston to have sex; (2) stated that he would pay M.M. any amount of money

to “have her butt”; (3) mentioned that M.M. could wash cars in a bikini, to

which Manning told Hernandez no; and (4) commented that M.M. had sexy

shoes, to which M.M. explained that she thought Hernandez might not have

known what he was saying and did not specifically intend to call her sexy.

M.M. then testified to two incidents in which Hernandez gave her and

L.B. alcohol at the restaurant. M.M. stated that during that time, there were

only a few customers present as well as Manning, Crane, and a few cooks.

M.M. explained that Hernandez initially left the alcohol at the bar, but then

moved the drink to his office, so that the only person who witnessed her

examination was conducted because the report was done outside of the 72-hour window
from the date of the incident.
4

drinking was L.B. M.M. stated that when either girl went to Hernandez’s

office to get another drink, he would touch or grope them. She stated that

when her shift ended and she rode home with Manning, she felt “woozy”

and had trouble walking.

M.M. then recalled another incident in which Hernandez touched her

twice while in the restroom. M.M. stated that the first time Hernandez

touched her, he helped her change the toilet paper dispenser, and after Lamb

came in the restroom and left, he touched her bottom and said, “There you

go, girl.” She stated that the second time Hernandez touched her, she was

refilling the soap dispenser when he entered the restroom to tell her he was

leaving and touched her chest and bottom. M.M. stated that she was

unaware if anyone saw Hernandez behaving inappropriately toward her, but

she believed that Hernandez made sure no one was around when he touched

her. M.M. admitted that while she did not discuss the incidents with her

aunts and uncle, she did confide in L.B., and later H.I. M.M. admitted that

after she quit, she went back to the restaurant to help a friend. M.M. stated

that although she was still terrified of Hernandez, she felt better going back

because she was free to leave because she no longer worked for him and did

not have to wait on her aunts or uncle to take her home.

L.B. then identified Hernandez in open court and testified that she

worked at Los Compas for approximately two months. L.B. stated that

when she worked there, there was not always a supervising adult present and

if there was, it was usually Hernandez or Manning. She also explained that

because Hernandez was one of the owners, if he gave an order, employees

would have to follow it. L.B. then testified that she moved in with

Hernandez and Lacee after her relationship ended. L.B. stated that while
5

there, Hernandez would show her pictures of naked women that he paid for,

and asked if either she or a friend would send him similar pictures and he

would pay for them, but she told him no. L.B. testified that Hernandez’s

actions elevated to him physically touching her.

L.B. explained that she would ask Hernandez to stop, and while he

sometimes listened to her, other times, she would have to physically remove

his hands. L.B. then recalled incidents in which Hernandez followed her

into the restroom while she was cleaning and touched her chest, attempted to

pull her into his office to touch her, or try and put his hands in her pants.

L.B. noted that if others were present, Hernandez would not do or say those

things.

Regarding M.M., L.B. testified that M.M. would often confide in her

about things Hernandez said. L.B. stated that while she did not see

Hernandez touch M.M., she did hear him say inappropriate things to M.M.,

but stated that on one occasion, Hernandez asked her to make M.M. have

sex with him. L.B. also testified that Hernandez would give her and M.M.

alcohol on at least four or five different occasions and that it would be

enough to get them intoxicated.

H.I. also identified Hernandez in open court and generally testified

that she worked at Los Compas for two days before she quit.3 H.I. explained

that she no longer wanted to work at the restaurant because of Hernandez’s

behavior and the series of explicit and inappropriate messages he sent her.

The State introduced several Facebook messages Hernandez sent H.I., and

3
H.I. clarified that while Crane referred her for the job, Manning actually hired
her. H.I. also clarified that when she started working, M.M. had already quit so they
never worked a shift together.
6

Lacey McGrew (“McGrew”), H.I.’s mother, testified that H.I. showed her

the messages Hernandez sent her, which primarily consisted of messages in

which Hernandez attempted to proposition H.I. to send him nude pictures for

money.

McGrew testified that throughout the messages, Hernandez would

constantly ask if H.I. or a friend would send him pictures and would ask H.I

to either delete the messages or keep them private. McGrew stated that on

several occasions, H.I. told Hernandez that she was only 16 and did not want

to send him anything or be involved with him. McGrew also testified that

H.I. told her about several incidents in which Hernandez would rub his hand

down her back and her bottom, and offered her $100 dollars for pictures.

Next, Manning testified generally that he worked at Los Compas for

about 15 months. Manning testified that while he did not see anything

inappropriate happen between Hernandez and M.M., he did see an incident

in which Hernandez walked up to L.B. and put his hand on the inside of her

thigh and she moved his hand. Manning stated that he could not recall ever

seeing M.M. drunk and that she never disclosed any inappropriate behavior

to him, but noted that the two were not particularly close. Lamb also

testified that she did not see any inappropriate behavior between Hernandez

and M.M. and that M.M. never told her about any incidents that occurred,

but noted that M.M. tended to be closed off and the two were not close.

Regarding M.M.’s testimony that Hernandez touched her in the

restroom, Lamb testified that when she entered the restroom, she saw M.M.

inside the stall and Hernandez on the outside. Lamb stated that she asked

what was going on, and Hernandez explained that he was showing M.M.

how to change the toilet paper dispenser. Lamb stated that the two then left,
7

and she used the restroom. Lamb, however, admitted that she did not see

what occurred before she entered the restroom. Lamb stated that she never

saw M.M. drinking at work, and couldn’t recall a conversation in which

Hernandez told M.M. her shoes were “sexy.” Finally, Lamb stated that

because Hernandez and Lacee owned the restaurant, they were the

supervisors and if either gave an order, employees would have to follow it.

On May 4, 2022, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding

Defendant guilty of molestation of a juvenile where the offender has control

or supervision over the juvenile. On May 23, 2022, Hernandez filed a

motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial, in

which he alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction. However, no contradictory hearing was held to address either

motion. On June 6, 2022, the trial court denied both motions. On August 8,

2022, the sentencing hearing was held, and after reviewing Hernandez’s

criminal history and the factors listed under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1(A) and

(B), the trial court sentenced Hernandez to five years at hard labor.

Hernandez now appeals his conviction and sentence.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Hernandez argues that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he had control or supervision over M.M., or that he

committed “lewd or lascivious acts.” Specifically, Hernandez contends that

his status as owner alone, without further evidence or testimony of specific

acts, is insufficient to establish that he exercised any control or supervision

over M.M. Hernandez further argues that M.M.’s statements and testimony

contained several inconsistencies that prevented the State from establishing

that he committed any “lewd or lascivious acts.”
8

In particular, Hernandez highlights two incidents4 in which he asserts

M.M.’s statements or testimony was either contradicted by testimony from

other witnesses or did not reflect that he committed any “lewd or lascivious

acts.” First, Hernandez maintains that M.M.’s claim that he provided her

and L.B. with alcohol under the pretense of getting both girls in his office to

touch them, is unfounded. He argues that other than L.B., no one, including

customers or employees, saw him give either L.B. or M.M. alcohol. He

notes that in contrast to M.M.’s statements that she only drank once in the

restaurant, L.B. testified that Hernandez gave both girls alcohol on at least

four to five different occasions. Moreover, he notes that despite M.M.’s

claim that on the night in question, she was “woozy” and could barely stand,

Manning, who drove her home, testified that he never saw Hernandez give

M.M. alcohol and M.M. did not appear intoxicated.

Next, Hernandez argues that M.M.’s claim that he touched her in the

restroom was directly contradicted by Lamb’s testimony. Hernandez first

notes that M.M. initially testified that he touched her once, but later claimed

he touched her two times. Hernandez further argues that M.M. claimed that,

while they were in the restroom, Lamb entered, and Hernandez touched her

bottom after Lamb left. Hernandez contends, that contrary to this statement,

Lamb testified that once she entered the restroom, both he and M.M. left the

restroom.

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

4
Hernandez also notes several other incidents in which M.M. accused him of
touching her inappropriately, to which he primarily argues that there were no witnesses to
those incidents, no one testified to ever seeing any inappropriate behavior between the
two, M.M. never reported any of the incidents to Lamb or Manning, and that M.M. only
reported the incident after H.I. filed her report.
9

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v.

Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124

S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard, now legislatively

embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does not provide the appellate court with

a vehicle to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the

factfinder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.

In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with

physical evidence, one witness’s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Coffey, 54,729

La. App. 2 Cir. 9/21/22), 349 So. 3d 647, writ denied, 22-01574 (La.

12/20/22), 352 So. 3d 89; State v. Wilson, 50,418 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/6/16),

189 So. 3d 513, writ denied, 16-0793 (La. 4/13/17), 218 So. 3d 629.

Likewise, the sole testimony of a sexual assault victim is sufficient to

support a requisite factual finding. Id. Such testimony is sufficient even

where the state does not introduce medical, scientific, or physical evidence

to prove the commission of the offense by the defendant. Id.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may, within the

bounds of rationality, accept or reject the testimony of any witness. State v.

Higgins, 03-1980, p. 17 (La. 4/1/05), 898 So. 2d 1219, 1232, cert. denied,

546 U.S. 883, 126 S. Ct. 182, 163 L. Ed. 2d 187 (2005). When there is

conflicting evidence about factual matters, the resolution of which depends

on a determination of the credibility of witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,

10

46, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2220-21, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982); State v. Reed, 14-

1980 (La. 9/7/16), 200 So. 3d 291.

To convict an accused of molestation of a juvenile, the state must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) was over the age of

17 and more than two years older than the victim; (2) committed a lewd or

lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age

of 17; (3) had the specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of

himself or the victim; and (4) committed the act by use of force, duress,

psychological intimidation or by the use of influence by virtue of a position

of control or supervision over the juvenile. La. R.S. 14:81.2; State v. Lewis,

52,367 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 1220. A lewd or lascivious

act is one which tends to excite lust and to deprave morals with respect to

sexual relations and which is indecent. State v. Redfearn, 44,709 (La. App.

2 Cir. 9/23/09), 22 So. 3d 1078, writ denied, 09-2206 (La. 4/9/10), 31 So. 3d

381.

The harsher penalty provision for molestation of a juvenile where the

offender has control or supervision over a juvenile exists because an

offender who has control or supervision over a juvenile is in a position of

trust. Id. The meaning of the phrase “influence by virtue of a position of

control or supervision” in La. R.S. 14:81.2 is not restricted in its application

to persons to whom the parent entrusts the child for care, usually for a fee,

such as babysitters, childcare workers, or teachers. Id. Rather, the statute

permits finding evidence of supervision or control by noncustodial parents,

relatives, friends, and neighbors of young victims. Id. Living in the home

with the victim, acting as a father figure to the victim, and exercising

emotional control over the victim have been found to be sufficient to support
11

a finding of supervision or control. Id. Louisiana courts consider the

following factors when determining whether a defendant used influence by

virtue of his position of supervision or control over the victim: (1) the

amount of time the defendant spent alone with the victim;5 (2) the nature of

the relationship between the victim and the defendant; (3) the defendant’s

age; and (4) the defendant’s authority to discipline. Id.

In this case, it is undisputed that at the time of the offense, M.M. was

only 14 years old, Hernandez was over the age of 17, and the age difference

between M.M. and Hernandez was more than two years. The only issues,

therefore, are whether Hernandez’s conduct was considered “lewd and

lascivious” and whether he had a position of supervision or control over

M.M. After reviewing this record in its entirety, we find that the evidence

was sufficient to prove that Hernandez committed the instant offense.

First, M.M. testified that on multiple occasions throughout her

employment at Los Compas, Hernandez either made multiple inappropriate

comments to her, including a statement that he and another employee would

have sex with her, and the implied solicitation of M.M. that he would offer

any amount of money to “have her butt.” Accompanying such remarks was

M.M.’s testimony that Hernandez often touched or groped her breasts or

bottom, and on at least one occasion, provided her with alcohol in the

confined privacy of his office where he could again proceed to touch her

bottom.

5
While a busy restaurant may not be the typical environment in which a manager
would spend time alone with his employee, in this case, testimony reveals that Hernandez
carved time out to be alone with M.M., as evidenced by both M.M. and L.B.’s testimony
that he placed alcohol in his office, away from the open restaurant, to get each girl away
from a public space.

12

To corroborate M.M.’s testimony that Hernandez often engaged in

this, both L.B. and H.I. testified that Hernandez attempted to solicit vulgar

pictures from them in exchange for money. L.B. further testified that on

numerous occasions Hernandez would grope her, often attempting to pull

her into his office to touch her and that on some occasions she would have to

physically remove his hands from her body. Importantly, L.B. testified that

M.M. often confided in her about Hernandez’s behavior and although she

did not see him touch M.M., she did hear remarks he made to M.M. and

recalled an incident in which Hernandez asked her to proposition M.M. for

him.

Next, we note that as both co-owner and supervising manager, it is

clear Hernandez had supervising authority over each employee, including

M.M. Irrespective of M.M.’s family working at the restaurant, Hernandez,

as testified to by several witnesses, maintained a position of authority over

all employees, which arguably included the power to hire and fire, set

compensation, and assign work responsibilities, such that if he assigned a

task to any particular employee, they were required to act and carry out that

assignment. As such, we find that Hernandez, as both an adult and

employer, had a position of authority over M.M. that superseded the

presence of her family members. Given the totality of the testimony, we

find that his actions were lewd and lascivious and reflected Hernandez’s

intent to excite himself by virtue of his position of control or supervision

over M.M.

Moreover, any inconsistencies in M.M.’s testimony or statements

were fully considered by the jury; credibility determinations are matters of

weight, not sufficiency and as such, do not cause the evidence to be
13

insufficient to convict. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without

merit.

Hernandez further asserts that the trial court erred in denying both his

motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal before a

contradictory hearing was held; in support, Hernandez cites La. C. Cr. P.

arts. 852 and 860. With respect to the motion for new trial, Hernandez

primarily asserts that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to convict

of the instant offense and based on the evidence presented, the verdict was

contrary to the evidence presented. We disagree.

The grounds for which a new trial may be granted under art. 851, in

relevant part, include:

A. The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that
injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is
shown to have been the case the motion shall be denied, no
matter upon what allegations it is grounded.

B. The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial
whenever any of the following occur:

(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.
...
(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice
would be served by the granting of a new trial, although
the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a
matter of strict legal right.

Our Court has previously provided “the method of hearing motions

for a new trial is within the trial court’s discretion.” State v. Moran, 54,281

(La. App. 2 Cir. 5/25/22), 338 So. 3d 1229, writ denied, stay denied, 22-

00935 (La. 10/12/22), 348 So. 3d (La. 2022). Moreover, while art. 852

provides that a motion for new trial shall be tried contradictorily with the

district attorney, the provision does not require an evidentiary hearing. Id.

Further, the decision to grant or deny a hearing before deciding on a motion

14

for a new trial based on a verdict contrary to the evidence is committed to

the trial court’s wide discretion. State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690

(1928).

In State v. Thomas, 48,530 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/4/13), 131 So. 3d 84,

the defendant filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered

evidence which included supporting affidavits. The trial court did not

conduct an evidentiary hearing and this court found that the trial court did

not err in failing to do so. This court stated, “If the reading of the motion

imparts to [the trial judge] sufficient knowledge to enable him to

intelligently dispose of the matter, he cannot be arbitrarily required to delay

his ruling for the purpose of further hearing or argument.” Id. at 91, citing

State v. Varnado, 154 La. 575, 97 So. 865, 868 (La. 1923). Here,

Hernandez’s motion for a new trial is based not on newly discovered

evidence, but rather insufficient evidence. The trial court presided over the

trial and heard all of the evidence presented. The court was capable of

considering and disposing of defendant’s motion without further

argument. Further, this court has considered Hernandez’s assignment of

error based upon insufficient evidence and has found it to be without

merit.

Regarding Hernandez’s motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal,

we note that, in brief, he cites La. C. Cr. P. art. 860, which concerns motions

in arrest of judgment and generally requires a contradictory hearing with the

district attorney. However, Hernandez filed his motion for post-verdict

judgment of acquittal pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, which has no

requirement that a contradictory hearing be held before the trial court rules

15

on the motion. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion on

this basis.

This Court further notes both motions were filed on May 23, 2022, the

trial court denied both motions on June 2, 2022, and Hernandez was later

sentenced on August 8, 2022. Neither party, from the time in which the

motions were denied until the sentencing hearing commenced, made any

motions or contemporaneous objections regarding the denial of the motions

before Hernandez was sentenced. Given that both parties had sufficient time

to address the denial of both motions, and the trial court’s wide discretion to

deny the motions, we find no error in the denial of either motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Hernandez’s conviction and sentence are

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

16