State of Louisiana v. Anthony D. Carter

Judgment rendered September 27, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,262-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

ANTHONY D. CARTER Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Richland, Louisiana
Trial Court No. F-202106

Honorable Stephen Gayle Dean, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Edward K. Bauman

PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

KENNETH DOUGLAS WHEELER
AMANDA MICHELE WILKINS
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before COX, THOMPSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

COX, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the Fifth Judicial District Court,

Richland Parish, Louisiana. A unanimous jury convicted Anthony Carter

(“Carter”) as charged with one count of first degree vehicular negligent

injuring in violation of La. R.S. 14:39.2, and one count of hit-and-run

driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury, in violation of La. R.S.

14:100. The trial court sentenced Carter to 5 years at hard labor for the first

count and 10 years at hard labor for the second count, with each sentence to

be served concurrently. Carter now appeals, alleging insufficiency of

evidence and excessive sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm

Carter’s convictions and sentences.

FACTS

On January 19, 2021, Carter was charged by bill of information with

one count of first degree vehicular negligent injuring and one count of hit-

and-run driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury. On April 18,

2022, trial commenced, wherein the following testimony was adduced:

First, Raven Lampley (“Lampley”), the victim in this matter, testified

and identified Carter in open court. Lampley stated that she and Carter had

previously dated. Regarding the incident, Lampley testified that she went to

a Halloween party at the Delhi Civic Center (“Civic Center”) on October 31,

2020, with Lakeisha Hale (“Hale”) and a few other friends. Lampley

acknowledged that while en route to the party, she drank about half of a

frozen daquiri, but stated that she did not “feel the effects” of the drink.

Lampley explained that when she arrived at the party, she parked on the

right side of the road near a ditch, across from the Civic Center, facing south

so the driver’s side door was exposed to the road.

Lampley stated that before she went into the Civic Center, she saw a

man carrying Carter out of the building and that Carter was “acting a fool,”

and appeared to be intoxicated. Lampley testified that she had been at the

party for about an hour before she went outside with Hale to call her

boyfriend and get something from her car. Lampley explained that although

she had to cross the street and walk some distance down from the Civic

Center to get to her car, she did not have any trouble seeing her surroundings

because there were “a lot of light poles” and people outside. She stated that

when she and Hale crossed the street, she made another phone call, and

noticed that a black Charger exited the Civic Center parking lot, which

paused at a stop sign at the end of the road, and began spinning.

Lampley stated that because the Charger was about five cars away

from her, and she was almost to her car, she thought she was in a safe

location. Lampley testified, however, that when she got to the car door,

Hale yelled at her to watch out, but before she could react, the Charger

crashed into her and pinned her against the car. Lampley stated that she did

not know who hit her until the Charger left the scene and other people began

yelling that “Ink” ran into her. She then clarified that “Ink” was Carter’s

nickname. Lampley testified that she was unable to move after she was hit,

and she was eventually airlifted to University Medical Center in Jackson,

Mississippi.

Lampley then recalled the extent of her injuries, which included two

broken legs, a dislocated knee, a fractured hip, a hematoma, a shift in her

pelvic bones, and the tissue from the bottom of her leg was torn and

shredded off. Lampley then generally explained that she underwent

numerous medical procedures and surgeries, and was still awaiting further
2

procedures to address additional issues and complications. Lampley

testified that since the accident, she was unable to keep her jobs as a CNA

and Sonic employee, she had to learn to walk again, struggled climbing

stairs, and had a diminished relationship with her four-year-old son, in part,

because she could no longer pick him up.

Lampley then testified that she received several Facebook messages

from Carter after he was released. The State introduced the initial message

Carter sent, and Lampley read as follows:

Hey, I am sorry. I didn’t know I hit nobody. I thought I just hit
the ditch. But you know if I knew I hit anybody, especially
you, I wouldn’t got out the car. I just got out last night. I
wanted to come see you and check on you but with the charges
and everything, people saying it might not be a good idea
because all y’all mad at me. And I don’t need to be in no more
that I am in now. But I do deeply apologize. I don’t know
what it might mean to you but I am. And if you don’t mind me
coming to check on you, I’m gonna ask momma to bring me.
But if not, I can understand that too. But my number is ***-
***-2748, if you need anything and you can “Inbox” or text
back? I can come. Hope you doing all right. Get well.

Lampley stated that Carter contacted her several times thereafter, and in

March of 2022, Carter asked her to drop the charges against him, and in turn,

he would pay her medical bills, as well as additional money for pain and

suffering. Lampley explained that she never received any money from

Carter, and because he had not contacted her in almost a year, felt that he

only contacted her because he needed help.

Next, Hale testified that she attended the party with Lampley. Hale

admitted she also had a daquiri, but did not “feel [any] effects,” and that

Lampley did not appear intoxicated that night. Hale testified that at some

point, she and Lampley left the building so Lampley could get something

from her car. Hale explained that they crossed the street and walked a little
3

further down from the Civic Center to get to Lampley’s car. Hale stated that

when she and Lampley approached the car, they noticed a black Charger

near a stop sign at the end of the road. Hale admitted she was not alarmed

when she first saw the Charger because she did not think it would come

toward them.

Hale then explained that because she was behind Lampley, she saw

the Charger hit and pin Lampley to her car. She testified that the driver

never got out, and instead, reversed and left the scene. On cross-

examination, Hale acknowledged she initially told officers the driver hit

Lampley’s car and then Lampley, but stated the officer misinterpreted her

statement. Hale then read from her written report, in which she primarily

provided that she saw the driver of a black Charger hit Lampley and then

Lampley’s car.

The State then called Lakendra Finley (“Finley”), who identified

Carter in open court. Finley testified she was parked in the Civic Center

parking lot when she noticed a black Charger in the lot “spinning and

burning rubber” before it exited the lot, went across the street, “fishtailed,”

and hit Lampley. Finley stated she called 911 and pursued the Charger

when the driver drove away from the scene. Finley recalled that the driver

was speeding, swerving, and at one point, ran off the side of the road. She

then stated that after she gave the operator the Charger’s plate numbers, she

provided directions until an officer found them, and the driver returned to

the Civic Center parking lot.

Next, Officer Tyrone Williams (“Officer Williams”), with the

Louisiana State Police (“LSP”), testified that he was dispatched to the Civic

Center concerning a pedestrian injury following a hit-and-run. Officer
4

Williams stated that when he arrived, he observed approximately 75 to 100

people in the area, Lampley was lying in a ditch, with a lot of blood around

her, and had several open cuts that he described as almost unbearable to see.

Officer Williams testified that dispatch then informed him that a concerned

citizen followed and identified the vehicle involved as a black 2006 Charger.

Officer Williams stated that when he came in contact with the Charger, it

was swerving, and he followed it back to the Civic Center parking lot, where

he identified Carter as the driver.

Officer Williams testified he could detect a strong odor of alcohol on

Carter and observed an open bottle of beer between the driver and passenger

seats as well as a half-empty bottle of gin on the passenger side floor.

Officer Williams explained that because he smelled alcohol, and because

Carter stumbled out of the vehicle and struggled to stand up, it was not safe

to administer a field sobriety test; instead he arrested Carter and transported

him to the Delhi Police Department, where an Intoxilyzer was administered.

Trooper Jason Henson (“Tpr. Henson”), of the LSP, testified that he

administered the Intoxilyzer for Carter. He explained that to administer the

test, he instructs people to blow air into the Intoxilyzer tube for several

seconds; if the person expels air with enough force, the Intoxilyzer will

indicate a sufficient breath was given to capture a sample. Tpr. Henson

noted that the more impaired a person is, there is an increased difficulty in

providing a sufficient sample. After he reviewed the video of Carter’s

Intoxilyzer test, Tpr. Henson testified Carter was argumentative,

uncooperative, and struggled to expel a sufficient amount of air to yield a

proper result. Tpr. Henson stated that during the second administration, the

Intoxilyzer indicated that Carter’s BAC was .256 grams percent. On cross-
5

examination, Tpr. Henson clarified that the Intoxilyzer functioned properly

at all times and Carter’s speech was not severely slurred so he understood

what Carter said during the administration.

Mark Troha (“Troha”), an EMT paramedic for Northeast Louisiana

Ambulance Service, testified he was dispatched to the Civic Center to assist

with injuries related to a hit-and-run. Troha stated when he approached

Lampley, she was in a ditch across from the Civic Center and appeared as

though she had been run over, with open wounds and bones protruding from

her leg. Troha stated the area was “pitch black” and he had to use phone

lights from pedestrians at the scene and the light he brought with him, but

transported Lampley to a nearby baseball field for better lighting to properly

treat her injuries.

Troha testified that in his cursory examination of Lampley, there was

no evidence she was intoxicated because she was alert, could provide her

name, date, and location, but he noted Lampley was in a lot of pain. In his

review of the extent of Lampley’s injuries, Troha testified Lampley had a

visibly open hole in her left leg where the bone broke through the skin and

re-entered the body; the bone in her right leg was exposed and protruded

outward; and he was unable to put her leg in a splint because body tissue

immediately began to fall when her pant leg was cut. Troha testified that

Lampley was labeled as a trauma patient and was administered 100

micrograms of Fentanyl, which he noted was about 50 times more potent

than morphine and could have made Lampley appear to be intoxicated later.

6

Finally, Kerry Johnson (“Johnson”),of LSP’s Applied Technology

Unit,1 was entered as an expert witness regarding Intoxilyzers and breath

analysis. Johnson primarily testified that he repairs, inspects, and certifies

Intoxilyzers. Johnson explained that in general, some factors can prevent

Intoxilyzers from yielding a result; however, the instrument notifies the

administrator of any error and no test can be given until the issue is resolved.

Johnson stated that the Intoxilyzer issued to the Delhi Police Department

was fairly new, was checked for calibration every four months, and the

instrument itself is self-checking. Regarding the Intoxilyzer administered to

Carter, Johnson stated the instrument was functioning properly eight days

before and the day it was administered to Carter. After Johnson viewed the

video of Carter using the Intoxilyzer, Johnson stated that nothing indicated

the test was administered improperly, and Carter’s results yielded a result of

.256 grams percent, three times the legal limit.

After the State rested, Carter testified on his behalf.2 First, Carter

acknowledged his previous criminal history, which consisted of a 2016

misdemeanor conviction for disturbing the peace. Carter then testified that

his sister hosted the party at the Civic Center. He stated he had only been at

the party for a few hours before he decided to leave after an argument with

some men at the party. Carter explained that after he left the parking lot, he

drove to the stop sign at the end of the road, pressed the gas pedal too hard,

1
Eugene Williams, an officer in the same unit, testified that the Intoxilyzers have
built-in mechanisms to detect if anything interfered with the results. He also confirmed
that the Intoxilyzer issued to the Delhi Police Department was functioning properly and
yielded accurate results.

2
Defense counsel recalled Lampley, who admitted she filed an insurance claim
against Carter, but was informed Carter did not have insurance. Lampley stated she
never received any money for her injuries or damages to her car.
7

and lost control of the vehicle. He stated that he tried to gain control of the

vehicle but “fishtailed” instead. Carter stated that because it was dark, he

thought he hit a ditch and left the scene.

Carter stated that after he left, he noticed a car followed him, so he

stopped at his aunt’s home and returned to the Civic Center when the car

passed him because he thought something was wrong. He stated that when

he got back to the parking lot, Officer Williams pulled him over and arrested

him. Carter testified that after he was released, he never filed a report with

his insurance company because his vehicle was not damaged, and he was

never contacted about property damage stemming from the night in question.

Carter then admitted he offered to pay Lampley’s medical bills and asked

her to drop the charges against him; he explained that he believed Lampley

was the only one who could help him and his offer was a “good-faith

showing.”

On cross-examination, Carter stated he was sober when the incident

occurred, he only had one cup of punch while at the party, and the two open

bottles of alcohol Officer Williams found belonged to his brother. He then

acknowledged that his Intoxilyzer results yielded a BAC of .256 grams

percent. Carter admitted that there were cars parked on either side of the

road and there were a lot of people at the party, but maintained that he never

saw anyone outside. Carter admitted he had headlights on, but stated it was

dark and did not realize he hit Lampley or her car. Carter reiterated he went

back to the Civic Center because he felt something was wrong. Carter stated

that he noticed that an officer followed him, but he did not pull over because

the officer did not activate his lights.

8

After closing arguments, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict

for both charges. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed

Lampley’s impact statement and Carter’s PSI and letter to the court. The

trial court explained that although Carter’s criminal history consisted only of

a misdemeanor conviction and a misdemeanor charge, it noted that

Lampley’s injuries were severe and several aspects of her life were now

significantly impaired. Moreover, the trial court highlighted that Carter

never expressed remorse for his actions and his letter submitted to the court

focused only on the hardships and difficulties he would face.

Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Carter to five years at hard labor

for the first count and 10 years at hard labor for the second count, with each

sentence to be served concurrently. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of the evidence

claim is whether, after viewing the case in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979); State v. Tate, 01-1658

(La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S. Ct. 1604,

158 L.Ed. 2d 248 (2004); State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17),

245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797. The

Jackson standard, now legislatively embodied in La. C. Cr. P. art. 821, does

not afford appellate courts with a means to substitute its own appreciation of

the evidence for that of the fact finder. Steines, supra.

9

The Jackson standard also applies in cases involving both direct and

circumstantial evidence. An appellate court which reviews the sufficiency

of the evidence in such cases must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence

by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

When the direct evidence is viewed as such, the facts established by the

direct evidence and inferred from the circumstances established by that

evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of

the crime. State v. Sutton, 436 So. 2d 471 (La. 1983).

Likewise, if a case rests essentially upon circumstantial evidence,

that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.

R.S. 15:438; see also, State v. Mingo, 51,647 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 244

So. 3d 629, writ denied, 17-1894 (La. 6/1/18), 243 So. 3d 1064. The

appellate court will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and determine whether an alternative hypothesis is sufficiently

reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d

417; State v. Garner, 45,474 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/18/10), 47 So. 3d 584, writ

not cons., 12-0062 (La. 4/20/12), 85 So. 3d 1256.

In the absence of any internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict

with physical evidence, the testimony of the witness, if believed by the trier

of fact, alone is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v.

Elkins, 48,972 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/9/14), 138 So. 3d 769, writ denied, 14-

0992 (La. 12/8/14), 153 So. 3d 438; State v. Wiltcher, 41,981 (La. App. 2

Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So. 2d 769. Where there is conflicting testimony

concerning factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a
10

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the

weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Allen, 36, 180 (La. App.

2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So. 2d 622, writ denied, 02-2997 (La. 6/27/03), 847 So.

2d 1255. The appellate court neither assesses the credibility of witnesses nor

reweighs evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So. 2d 442.

Rather, the reviewing court affords great deference to the jury’s decision to

accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part. State v.

Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-

3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422.

Here, Carter was charged with one count of first degree vehicular

negligent injuring, and one count of hit-and-run driving resulting in death or

serious bodily injury. Regarding count one, La. R.S. 14:39.2 provides:

A. First degree vehicular negligent injuring is the inflicting of
serious bodily injury upon the person of a human being when
caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged
in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor
vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of conveyance
whenever any of the following conditions exists:

(1) The offender is under the influence of alcoholic
beverages.

(2) The offender’s blood alcohol concentration is 0.08
percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol
per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.

To establish that an offender committed either vehicular homicide or first

degree vehicular negligent injuring, the State must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the offender’s unlawful blood alcohol concentration at

the time of the accident, combined with his operation of a vehicle, caused

serious bodily injury to someone. La. R.S. 14:39.2; State v. Louis-Juste,

50,806 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 201 So. 3d 308; State v. Christophe, 12-82

11

(La. App. 5 Cir. 10/16/12), 102 So. 3d 935, writ denied, 12-2432 (La.

4/19/13), 111 So. 3d 1029.

Here, Carter does not contest that he was driving or that he was under

the influence at the time of the accident. Therefore, the only matter at issue

is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter’s

intoxication was the cause of Lampley’s injuries as a result of the accident.

La. R.S. 14:39.2 further requires the State to establish a causal connection

between the defendant’s unlawful blood alcohol concentration and the

victim’s injuries. Causation is a question of fact to be considered in light of

the totality of circumstances surrounding the ultimate harm and its relation

to the prohibited conduct. State v. Louis-Juste, supra.

In brief, Carter asserts that Lampley having drunk half a daiquiri

contributed to her injuries. However, Lampley testified that although she

drank on the night of the accident, she did not “feel the effects” of the drink.

Moreover, Troha testified that one of his first tasks was to determine

whether Lampley was intoxicated before he could administer any

medication. In his assessment, Troha testified there was no evidence

Lampley was intoxicated as she was alert and could answer several

questions including her name, date, and location.

Carter further asserts that the area around the Convention Center was

“pitch black” so he did not realize he hit Lampley or her vehicle but was

under the impression he ran into a ditch. Although Troha confirmed there

was little lighting at the scene of the accident, Carter testified his headlights

were on during that time and no testimony was presented that there were any

obstacles or roadblocks thwarting Carter’s ability to see clearly; as such, he

should have reasonably been able to see if any pedestrians or other obstacles
12

were on the roadway. Moreover, Finley testified that she witnessed Carter

speeding and swerving, and at one point, witnessed him run off the side of

the road. Likewise, Officer Williams testified that he also witnessed Carter

swerving, could smell a strong odor of alcohol on Carter, observed two open

bottles of alcohol in Carter’s vehicle, and importantly, noted that Carter was

so impaired he stumbled getting out of his vehicle and was unable to safely

perform a field sobriety test.

Given Carter’s excessive BAC, eyewitness testimony that Carter was

swerving while driving, and that Carter had his headlights so he could see

his surroundings, we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to

support the jury’s conclusion that but for Carter’s intoxication, Lampley’s

injuries would not have occurred.

Regarding count two, La. R.S. 14:100 provides:

A. Hit and run driving is the intentional failure of the driver of a
vehicle involved in or causing any accident, to stop such
vehicle at the scene of the accident, to give his identity, and to
render reasonable aid.

B. For the purposes of this Section:

(1) “To give his identity,” means that the driver of any vehicle
involved in any accident shall give his name, address, and the
license number of his vehicle, or shall report the accident to the
police.

(2) “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which involves
unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, or protracted and
obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a
substantial risk of death.

In this case, it has been established that Carter operated a motor

vehicle and was involved in the accident that caused Lampley’s injuries.

Moreover, Lampley, Hale, and Finley all testified that after Carter collided

with Lampley, he never stopped to render any form of aid or identify
13

himself. Moreover, Carter also testified that he never got out of his vehicle

to see what happened, but instead, reversed and left the scene. Although

Carter eventually returned to the Convention Center parking lot, he testified

that he only did so because he thought something was wrong and not to

identify himself as the person who struck Lampley.

Carter maintains that he was unaware he ever hit a person but was

under the impression he hit a ditch. However, at trial, Carter stated that at

the time of the accident, he was aware there was a party with a significant

number of people in attendance in a poorly lit environment with cars parked

on either side of the road. Given this, we find there was sufficient evidence

for a jury to conclude that Carter knew or should have known that he struck

Lampley with his vehicle. It is uncontroverted that Carter failed to exit his

vehicle, identify himself, or render aid; moreover, there was no justification

for Carter in failing to check his surroundings under these circumstances.

After a review of the evidence and testimony presented, we find that

the jury did not err in rejecting Carter’s claim, as there was more than

sufficient evidence for any rational trier of fact to conclude that all of the

essential elements for Carter’s convictions were proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

By his second assignment of error, Carter argues that his sentences are

excessive and in violation of the 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment. Carter alleges that his concurrent sentences were

not particularized to him as an offender with a criminal record that consists

only of a “few misdemeanor charges, and a misdemeanor conviction for

disturbing the peace.” He further argues that his sentences were not “within
14

the limits of appropriate sentences for similar crimes,” i.e., that maximum

sentences for these offenses have typically been imposed in cases where the

defendant had a significant history of a similar prior offense.

Appellate review to determine whether a sentence is constitutionally

excessive is a two-pronged inquiry whereby the first considers whether the

trial court took cognizance of the guidelines set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art.

894.1, and the second considers constitutional excessiveness. State v. Wing,

51,857 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/28/18), 246 So. 3d 711. However, in this case,

no motion to reconsider sentence was filed; therefore, this Court’s review is

limited to the constitutional excessiveness of the sentence alone. La. C. Cr.

P. art. 881.1; State v. Williams, 51,667 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/27/17), 245 So. 3d

131, writ not cons., 18-0017 (La. 8/3/18), 248 So. 3d 322; State v. Turner,

50,221 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/20/16), 186 So. 3d 720, writ denied, 16-0283 (La.

2/10/17), 215 So. 3d 700.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-

2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1; State v. Mandigo, 48,801 (La. App. 2 Cir.

2/26/14), 136 So. 3d 292, writ denied, 14-0630 (La. 10/24/14), 151 So. 3d

600. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime

and punishment are viewed in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the

sense of justice. State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166.

State v. Wing, supra. The trial court maintains wide discretion in the

imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and absent a showing of

manifest abuse, an imposed sentence will not be set aside as excessive. State

v. West, 53,526 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/24/20), 297 So. 3d 1081.
15

Therefore, appellate review does not consider whether another

sentence may have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused

its discretion. State v. Dale, 53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d

1031; State v. Davis, 50,149 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/18/15), 181 So. 3d 200.

Regarding Carter’s conviction for first degree negligent injuring, La.

R.S. 14:39.2(D) provides:

Whoever commits the crime of first degree vehicular negligent
injuring shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars or
imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five
years, or both.

Further, with respect to his conviction for hit-and-run driving resulting in

death or serious bodily injury, La. R.S. 14:100(C)(2) provides:

Whoever commits the crime of hit-and-run driving, when death
or serious bodily injury is a direct result of the accident and
when the driver knew or should have known that death or
serious bodily injury has occurred, shall be fined not more than
five thousand dollars or imprisoned with or without hard labor
for not more than ten years, or both.

After a review of the record and consideration of the facts of the instant case,

we are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

Carter.

The record in this case reflects that the trial court appropriately

sentenced Carter; namely, the trial court fully complied with the factors

enumerated in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, finding that there were no mitigating

factors present, and noting a number of aggravating factors, including

Carter’s “extreme impairment” as evidenced by his BAC of .256 grams

percent, three times the legal limit. The trial court also noted that Carter’s

“complete disregard [for] the safety or well-being of others” ultimately

resulted in the “extremely serious life-threatening injuries” and “serious

permanent disfigurement” Lampley suffered.
16

Further, the trial court reviewed Carter’s social history, PSI, and

several letters written on Carter’s behalf. The trial court acknowledged that

Carter’s criminal history consisted of misdemeanor charges and a

misdemeanor conviction; however, the trial court determined that because of

Carter’s actions during and after the incident, a lesser sentence would

deprecate the seriousness of his actions. Given that Carter expressed no true

remorse for his actions, as evidenced in his letter to the court which

primarily focused on the detriment he and his family would suffer without

ever expressing concern for the burden Lampley and her family would have

to endure, we agree with the trial court’s ruling.

Moreover, we note that when Carter did contact Lampley, it was to

convince her to drop the charges filed against him and to offer Lampley

money for her medical expenses, which she never received. In reviewing

the totality of the facts of this case, this court finds that in light of Carter’s

excessive BAC, lack of remorse for his careless behavior, the extent and

measure of Lampley’s injuries, and that Carter’s sentences fall within the

statutory range for both offenses, Carter’s sentences are neither grossly out

of proportion to the severity of the offenses, nor do they shock the sense of

justice.

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

imposing these sentences, and this assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Carter’s convictions and sentences

are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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