State of Louisiana v. Sebastian Brass

Judgment rendered September 27, 2023.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,265-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

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STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

Versus

SEBASTIAN BRASS Appellant

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Appealed from the
Fifth Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Franklin, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 2021555F

Honorable John Clay Hamilton, Judge

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LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Holli Herrle-Castillo

PENNY WISE DOUCIERE Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

CAROLINE E. HEMPHILL
AMANDA M. WILKINS
Assistant District Attorneys

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Before STEPHENS, HUNTER, and ELLENDER, JJ.

HUNTER, J., dissents with written reasons.

STEPHENS, J.

This criminal appeal arises out of the Fifth Judicial District Court,

Parish of Franklin, State of Louisiana, the Honorable John Clay Hamilton,

Judge, presiding. Defendant, Sebastian Brass, was charged by bill of

indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and

obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence, a violation of La. R.S.

14:130.1. In accordance with a plea agreement, Brass pled guilty to

manslaughter and obstruction of justice. The trial court sentenced him to 40

years’ imprisonment at hard labor on the manslaughter conviction and 20

years on the obstruction of justice conviction, with the sentences to run

consecutively. Brass has appealed, urging excessiveness of his 60-year

cumulative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 24, 2021, Brass stabbed the victim, Kourtney Malone,1 in

the chest with a kitchen knife. Malone died as a result of the injuries

inflicted by Brass. After the stabbing, Brass gave the knife to his mother

and paid a witness to refrain from speaking to the police. In a statement to

officers, Brass admitted to stabbing Malone. He was charged by bill of

indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1, and

obstruction of justice by tampering with evidence, a violation of La. R.S.

14:130.1.

On August 2, 2022, Brass and the State reached a plea agreement

whereby he agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter and obstruction of

justice, and the State agreed not to charge Brass as a habitual offender.

1
The record contains variations of the spelling of the victim’s first name,
including “Kourtney,” “Kortney,” and “Courtney.”

Additionally, sentencing was left to the trial court’s discretion. At the guilty

plea hearing, the State provided the following basis for the plea.2 On August

24, 2021, Brass committed the manslaughter of Kourtney Malone, and he

obstructed justice by providing a witness with “money to leave and also he

provided his mother with some knives which she put in her purse.”

In the guilty plea colloquy, the trial court determined that Brass had

completed the ninth grade and was not under the influence of alcohol or

drugs at the time of the plea. The court advised Brass that by pleading

guilty, he was waiving his rights to a jury trial, to challenge the State’s

evidence against him, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against

him, to call witnesses on his own behalf, to testify, to remain silent, and to

appeal his conviction. Brass confirmed that he had discussed his case with

counsel, and he understood the rights that he was waiving. Brass also

acknowledged that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, not as a

result of any threats, duress, or coercion.

The trial court sentenced Brass on October 4, 2022. Prior to imposing

sentence, the trial court denied a motion made by Brass’s attorney to take

judicial notice of and consider as a mitigating factor in sentencing the “level

of methamphetamine or other substance based on the serology in the

victim’s system at the time of his death.” The trial court complied with La.

C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 by setting forth the factors it considered and noted its

consideration of the pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, law

enforcement reports, and victim impact statements on the record before

2
The Winnsboro Police Department’s Investigative Reports and the Franklin
Parish Sheriff’s Office’s Arrest Report were also introduced in support of the factual
basis of the plea.
2

sentencing Brass to 40 years’ imprisonment at hard labor on the

manslaughter conviction and 20 years’ imprisonment at hard labor on the

obstruction of justice conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run

consecutively under La. C. Cr. P. art. 883, “[b]ased on the detailed criminal

history of this defendant and [his] being a fourth felony offender[.]”

Brass has appealed his sentences as unconstitutionally excessive.

DISCUSSION

Brass argues that his consecutive sentences are excessive. In this

case, not only did the trial court impose the maximum penalty for each

conviction, it made the sentences consecutive. According to Brass, the

cumulative 60-year sentence is excessive by constitutional standards.

When, as in this case, a defendant fails to make a motion to reconsider

sentence, the appellate court’s review of the sentence is limited to a bare

claim of constitutional excessiveness. La. C. Cr. P. art. 881.1(E)(1); State v.

Mims, 619 So. 2d 1059 (La. 1993); State v. Taylor, 54,876 (La. App. 2 Cir.

1/11/23), 354 So. 3d 1257; State v. Cooksey, 53,660 (La. App. 2 Cir.

5/26/21), 316 So. 3d 1284, writ denied, 21-00901 (La. 10/12/21), 325 So. 3d

1074; State v. Flores, 52,639 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/10/19), 268 So. 3d 1199,

writ denied, 19-00877 (La. 11/25/19), 283 So. 3d 496.

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, ⸹20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Smith, 01-

2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So. 2d 1; State v. Dorthey, 623 So. 2d 1276 (La.

1993); State v. Bonanno, 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980). A sentence is

considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are

viewed in the light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice.
3

State v. Weaver, 01-0467 (La.1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166; State v. Flores,

supra.

La. R.S. 14:31(B) provides in part that whoever commits

manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years.

La. R.S. 130.1(B)(2) provides that whoever commits the crime of

obstruction of justice when the obstruction of justice involves a criminal

proceeding in which a sentence of imprisonment necessarily at hard labor for

any period less than a life sentence may be imposed, the offender may be

fined not more than fifty thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than

twenty years at hard labor, or both.

In sentencing Brass, the trial court made a thorough C. Cr. P. art.

894.1 analysis and noted its consideration of the PSI report, law enforcement

reports, and victim impact statements, as well as 34 letters submitted in

support of the defendant.

Regarding Brass’s criminal history, the trial court noted it included

aggravated burglary (2006); possession of cocaine (2008); domestic abuse

battery (2014); simple burglary (2014); criminal damage to property (2015);

aggravated assault with a knife and simple criminal damage to property

(2017); aggravated assault with a knife and crowbar (2018); aggravated

battery, aggravated flight from an officer, and battery involving a firearm

(2018); aggravated battery/aggravated assault with a box cutter (2019); and

aggravated battery (2021).

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Defense counsel pointed out defendant’s medical and psychological

issues noted in the PSI report.3 Brass addressed the trial court and

apologized for his conduct, stating, “I’m just sorry everything went on like

this. It’s nothing much I could really say but when you just read that record

out and all those—I don’t even really know what to say. I’m sorry.”

Statements on behalf of the victim were made by his mother and

father. Andria Malone, the mother, expressed her pain and suffering

sustained as a result of her son’s death. Mrs. Malone related that she had

saved Brass’s life in the past when “four guys [were] going to kill him[.]”

According to Mrs. Malone, “If I knew then that he was going to kill my son,

I wish they would have killed him.” The father, Monyea Malone, stated that

he “helped raise” Brass, “changed his diapers,” and “taught him how to ride

a bicycle, what to do and what not to do.” Mr. Malone stated that he did not

hate Brass, but he had no remorse for him.

The specific aggravating factors set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1

found applicable by the trial court were: (1) the defendant’s conduct in

stabbing the victim in the chest manifested deliberate cruelty; (2) the actual

violence and severity of the crime which caused the victim’s death; (3) the

defendant used a dangerous weapon and significant force in committing the

offense; (4) the defendant had been placed on probation for similar offenses

but had never successfully completed any term of probation; (5) the

defendant contemplated that his conduct would cause serious harm or death;

(6) there was no indication the defendant acted under strong provocation; (7)

3
The PSI report reflects that, in November 2019, Brass was admitted to a facility
following “suicidal ideations and severe depression.” He was diagnosed with bipolar
disorder and manic depression, for which he was prescribed medication.
5

there were no substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the

defendant’s actions; (8) there is no indication the victim induced or

facilitated the defendant’s actions; (9) there is no possibility the defendant

could possibly compensate the victim for his death; (10) the defendant is the

father of ten children; however, they will not likely face hardship due to the

defendant’s incarceration because he was “neither raising nor supporting”

the children; and (11) the defendant benefited from the State’s agreement to

reduce the charge from second degree murder to manslaughter and to

dismiss a pending charge of aggravated assault.

The trial court also noted that pursuant to the terms of the plea

bargain, the State forfeited its right to charge Brass as a habitual offender.

The PSI showed that Brass would have been considered a fourth felony

offender and, as such, would have been exposed to the possibility of a life

sentence if sentenced as a habitual offender.

In mitigation, the trial court considered Brass’s lack of a juvenile

record and the number of letters it had received in his support.

Although the 60-year cumulative sentence is harsh, and had this Court

been tasked with sentencing the defendant, it may have considered a lesser

penalty, it is not this Court’s job to nitpick and “woulda, shoulda, coulda” in

vain. As set forth above, the trial court gave detailed reasons for imposing

the maximum penalties for each offense and for its decision to run the

sentences consecutively rather than concurrently.4 Therefore, we do not find

the sentence to be either grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the

4
Although, in light of the prosecution’s agreement to forgo pursuing habitual
offender proceedings against Brass, it is somewhat disingenuous for the trial court to
nonetheless impose consecutive terms in part in consideration of “his being a fourth
felony offender.”
6

offenses or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain

and suffering. We cannot say that the sentence imposed in the instant case is

unconstitutionally excessive.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the convictions and sentences of the

defendant, Sebastian Brass, are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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HUNTER, J., dissenting.

I believe the two maximum sentences of 40 years and 20 years,

totaling 60 years’ imprisonment, are equivalent to a life sentence, serve no

purpose other than to inflict pain and suffering, and make no meaningful

contribution to acceptable penal goals. Therefore, the sentences are

constitutionally excessive. These offenses arose out of a single course of

conduct, and the sentences should have been ordered to be served

concurrently. See, La. C. Cr. P. art. 883.

Consequently, I respectfully dissent.

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