State of Louisiana v. Patrick Conley

Judgment rendered January 10, 2024.
Application for rehearing may be filed
within the delay allowed by Art. 922,
La. C. Cr. P.

No. 55,269-KA

COURT OF APPEAL
SECOND CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STATE OF LOUISIANA Appellee

versus

PATRICK AARON CONLEY Appellant

*****

Appealed from the
Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana
Trial Court No. 75,690

Honorable Bruce E. Hampton, Judge

*****

LOUISIANA APPELLATE PROJECT Counsel for Appellant
By: Peggy J. Sullivan

JOHN FITZGERALD BELTON Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney

TRACY WAYNE HOUCK
LEWIS ALLEN JONES
MICHAEL R. SMITH
Assistant District Attorneys

*****

Before STEPHENS, ROBINSON, and ELLENDER, JJ.

ELLENDER, J.

Patrick Aaron Conley was convicted by a unanimous jury of multiple

sex crimes perpetrated against his wife, including second degree rape,

second degree sexual battery, sexual battery, aggravated second degree

battery, and domestic abuse battery-child endangerment. Following his

convictions, Conley was sentenced to a total of 95 years at hard labor. He

now appeals both his convictions and sentences alleging the evidence

presented was insufficient, the trial court erred in excluding two witnesses,

and the sentences imposed were unconstitutionally excessive. For the

reasons expressed, we affirm.

FACTS

Conley met KC,1 who was 19 years old at the time, when she was a

customer at a store where he was working in Ruston called Pack and Mail.

Even though Conley was around 20 years older the KC, they began dating

and ultimately got married in 2010. Not long thereafter, KC discovered she

was pregnant and gave birth to their first child, followed a few years later by

their second child. Conley also had two daughters prior to the marriage, the

younger whom KC adopted.

Soon after the birth of their first child, KC said Conley started to

become very possessive, isolating her from others and forcing her to do

things against her will. Conley would get angry, repeatedly accusing KC of

talking to other men, though she denied it. He would also get mad if he

believed KC was not doing things he expected her to, or failed to act in ways

he desired. KC claimed Conley said he needed to “break her” because she

1
KC is referred to by her initials since she was the victim of sex crimes. See La.
R.S. 46:1844(W).

was a defiant wife, resulting in her being punished with physical and sexual

abuse throughout their marriage. In addition to being slapped, cut, beaten,

and bruised, KC claimed Conley used nonconsensual deviant sexual

behavior as a form of punishment. Their sex life became rough and

disturbing, devolving into various forms of role play, bondage, and the use

of sexual objects such as leather collars, cuffs, butt plugs, costumes, and

aids. Some of the more extreme and violent nonconsensual sexual

encounters form the basis of Conley’s crimes. The facts and circumstances

of these incidents are largely drawn from the accounts given by KC.2

Conley denies each accusation made, claiming their abnormal sexual

behavior was all consensual, and was actually the result of KC’s own

deviant sexual desires.

Conley, a physically imposing muscular white male, was the fire chief

for the town of Grambling and KC, a 5-foot-2, 110-pound white female, said

he often used this position of authority to his advantage throughout their

marriage. KC claimed Conley made numerous death threats, including

telling her he could kill her with a ball-peen hammer by hitting the right spot

on her neck, making it look like an accident because of his medical

knowledge; he could push her down the stairs, making it appear to be an

accident; and, with his knowledge of fires, he could burn down the house

with her in it without getting caught. Conley claimed he knew cops, judges,

and senators, and they would not believe her if she ever tried to report him.

KC also believed Conley was tracking her movement when they were not

together with GPS in her car and through her phone. KC lived under the

2
KC and Conley both testified at trial.
2

duress of these general threats most of their ten-year marriage, believing if

she ever tried to leave, he would kill her. Conley also threatened if she left

and he did not kill her, he would prevent her from having any contact with

their children.

The incidents forming the factual basis for Conley’s convictions

began in 2019. KC claimed that in February of that year the gas bill became

due at their residence and she asked Conley for money to pay it, but he

refused and their gas was shut off. Conley became angry and ignored KC

for several days, one of which was their anniversary, telling her he was

thinking of an appropriate punishment. Ultimately, Conley had KC lie on

the bed completely naked and pick a belt for him to hit her with. He then

struck her ten times in spite of her pleas to stop, at one point switching to a

belt with rhinestones that broke and scattered during the beating. KC

claimed Conley said he hit her ten times because it was their tenth wedding

anniversary. KC said Conley took his time to ensure each mark made with

the belt was in a symmetrical pattern. KC was cut multiple times during this

incident and her blood covered the sheets, but she refused to call the police

because of the many death threats Conley had previously made and because

of what he told her about being well connected, thus no one would believe

her.

Also, in 2019, KC said Conley carved the letter “A” into her lower

back. Conley, who went by his middle name “Aaron,” first bit her skin off

then used an X-acto knife to cut “A” into her body. KC remarked the pain

was unbearable but she could not scream and had to bite a towel during this

“carving” because Conley had informed her if she resisted, he would cut her

more. The record is unclear whether this happened in January or August of
3

2019; however, KC was clear about the details of what actually occurred and

that it did take place in 2019. For clarity, this incident will be described as

having occurred in August 2019. Later that year, in December 2019, KC

claimed Conley bit her, pulled her hair, and raped her.

On February 19, 2020, in an attempt to punish KC for what she

believed was failing to answer the phone, KC said Conley bound her to their

coffee table, naked, using zip ties. Prior to being constrained, Conley

instructed KC to “get right,” which meant for her to put on high heels and a

leather collar around her neck, as well as leather cuffs on her ankles and

thighs. While tied down, Conley placed a bag over KC’s head, inserted a

butt plug into her anus, and beat her with a spoon, as well as with his hand,

on her vagina. He also wrapped his arms around KC’s neck and choked her,

causing a loss of consciousness and control of bodily fluids, an act which

KC said occurred frequently throughout their marriage.

In December 2020, KC claimed Conley grabbed her, raped her, and

told her that when she was weak, it made him feel strong and more like a

man.

Finally, on the night of April 20, 2021, KC said she was taking a bath

prior to bed when Conley became aggravated and accused her of having an

affair. He continued to yell at her so she informed him she was going

downstairs, but Conley would not allow it and, after some wrestling, he

grabbed her in a bear hug and would not let her go. KC knew she could not

get away, so she lay with him in bed and they fell asleep. At some point that

evening, Conley attempted to force KC to perform oral sex by grabbing her

head and pushing it toward his pelvic region, until KC complied with his

demand. Either during the wrestling, or when she was forced to perform
4

oral sex, KC’s lip was busted. KC also claimed Conley ripped her clothes

off, got on top of her, held her arms down, and forced her to engage in

vaginal sex. After these incidents, KC said she just could not take it

anymore and decided to finally leave Conley, in spite of his many threats.

The next morning, after she brought the children to school, KC came

back home thinking Conley would be gone for work and that she could get

her and the children’s things ready to leave, but he was still there. She then

gave Conley her wedding ring and told him she was done. When she

attempted to run out of the house to get away from him, Conley blocked her

from leaving through both the front and rear doors, so she ran upstairs,

locked herself in the bathroom, and called the police. Conley ultimately

unlocked the bathroom door with a coat hanger, but left after realizing the

police were on their way.

Officer Brian Davis with the Ruston Police Department arrived

shortly thereafter on the morning of April 21 and found KC to be very

emotional, with shaky hands and an injured lip. Conley was no longer at

their home when the police arrived. After brief questioning, Ofc. Davis took

KC to the hospital to be evaluated, but a PERK3 was not administered. The

nurse who examined KC told officers the kit was not used because it had

been several hours since the alleged sexual encounter, and KC had cleaned

herself prior to arriving at the hospital. Later that day, Conley was taken

into custody.

3
PERK is an acronym for Physical Evidence Recovery Kit, used to collect
biological evidence from victims of sexual assault.
5

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Conley was originally charged by bill of indictment with nine separate

offenses: four counts of second degree rape, three counts of second degree

sexual battery, one count of aggravated second degree battery, and one count

of domestic abuse battery-child endangerment. The bill was later amended

to strike one of Conley’s charges of second degree rape and two of his

charges of second degree sexual battery, as well as to amend the dates of

some of the counts. As such, Conley stood trial on a six-count indictment,

including: count 1, domestic abuse battery-child endangerment, La. R.S.

14:35.3(A) & (I), occurring on or about April 20, 2021; counts 2, 3, and 4,

second degree rape, La. R.S. 14:42.1, occurring on or about April 20, 2021,

February 19, 2020, and December 19, 2020; count 5, second degree sexual

battery, La R.S. 14:43.2, occurring in December 2019; and count 6,

aggravated second degree battery, La. R.S. 14:34.7, occurring in February

2019, August 2019, and February 2020. For count 6, the amended bill of

indictment has a typewritten date of February 19, 2020, then also includes

handwritten dates of February 2019 and August 2019.4

Jury trial commenced on March 28, 2022, and Conley was ultimately

found guilty as charged, except for one count of second degree rape,

occurring on December 19, 2020, to which the jury found him guilty

responsively of sexual battery.

4
Curiously, the state chose to charge only one count, as opposed to three separate
offenses. As discussed later in this opinion, any of these three separate incidents
provided an adequate factual basis for aggravated second degree battery.
6

SENTENCING

On July 12, 2022, Conley appeared for sentencing. At the hearing, the

trial court first noted its review of the presentence investigation report and

the statements made by KC and Conley prior to sentencing. The trial court

opined it had found KC to be “extremely credible” and found Conley to have

no credibility at all. The trial court further articulated this was a textbook

domestic abuse case where Conley had exercised dominance, power, and

control over KC while keeping her in isolation. It also emphasized the jury

had determined there was no consent by convicting him of these heinous

crimes.

Following a thorough compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, Conley

was sentenced, at hard labor and consecutively, to 30 years each for both

counts of second degree rape, 12 years for second degree sexual battery, 12

years for second degree aggravated battery, and eight years for sexual

battery. For his domestic abuse battery conviction, Conley was sentenced to

the six-month maximum in the parish jail, to run concurrently with a three-

year maximum hard labor sentence for the child endangerment portion of the

conviction, and consecutively with the other sentences. Conley’s sentences

totaled 95 years at hard labor, with 80 years to be served without benefits.

Following sentencing, Conley filed this motion to appeal both his

convictions and sentences. A motion to reconsider sentence was not filed.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Conley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for all of his

convictions. The standard of appellate review for sufficiency of the

evidence to uphold a conviction is whether, after reviewing the evidence in
7

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);

State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So. 2d 921, cert denied, 541 U.S.

905, 124 S. Ct. 1604, 158 L. Ed. 2d 248 (2004). This standard does not

provide an appellate court with a vehicle for substituting its appreciation of

the evidence for that of the fact finder. State v. Pigford, 05-0477 (La.

2/22/06), 922 So. 2d 517.

The trier of fact makes credibility determinations and may accept or

reject the testimony of any witness. State v. Casey, 99-0023 (La. 1/26/00),

775 So. 2d 1022. A reviewing court accords great deference to a jury’s

decision to accept or reject the testimony of a witness in whole or in part.

State v. Moody, 50,001 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/30/15), 178 So. 3d 1031; State v.

Gilliam, 36,118 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So. 2d 508, writ denied, 02-

3090 (La. 11/14/03), 858 So. 2d 422. The appellate court does not assess

credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith, 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95),

661 So. 2d 442. It is the province of the fact finder to resolve conflicting

inferences from the evidence. State v. Brooks, 52,249 (La. App. 2 Cir.

9/26/18), 256 So. 3d 524; State v. Steines, 51,698 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/15/17),

245 So. 3d 224, writ denied, 17-2174 (La. 10/8/18), 253 So. 3d 797. In the

absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical

evidence, the testimony of one witness—if believed by the trier of fact—is

sufficient to support the requisite factual conclusion. Id. Such testimony

alone is sufficient even where the state does not introduce medical,

scientific, or physical evidence. Id. This is equally applicable to the

testimony of sexual assault victims. Id.
8

Conley addresses his convictions separately and claims the evidence

presented by the state for each count was insufficient.

Count 1: Domestic Abuse Battery-Child Endangerment, on or about April
20, 2021.

Conley was convicted of domestic abuse battery-child endangerment

from the incident on April 20, 2021, when he wrapped his arms around KC

in a bear hug and would not let her go, pulled her hair, injured her lip, and

forced her head toward his pelvic region. Conley concedes domestic abuse

battery is the intentional use of force or violence, but argues such intent was

not present here as he did not forcibly grab and hug KC, he “accidently”

pulled her hair, and, if he did injure her lip, which he does not recall, it was

unintentional. He claims the oral sex he had with his wife that night was

consensual and not the result of him forcing KC’s head toward his pelvic

region. Conley also submits the children were downstairs during the

incident and did not hear or see anything.

La. R.S. 14:35.3 provides, in pertinent part:

A. Domestic abuse battery is the intentional use of force or
violence committed by one household member or family
member upon the person of another household member or
family member.

***

I. This Subsection shall be cited as the “Domestic Abuse Child
Endangerment Law”. Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, when the state proves, in addition to the
elements of the crime as set forth in Subsection A of this
Section, that a minor child thirteen years of age or younger
was present at the residence or any other scene at the time of
the commission of the offense.

On the night of April 20, in addition to nonconsensual oral and

vaginal sex, Conley used force and violence against KC in a number of

ways: (1) pulling her hair and busting her lip, (2) wrapping his arms around
9

KC and restraining her from running away, and (3) forcing her head toward

his pelvic region. While Conley suggests any injuries KC sustained were

unintentional during these consensual encounters, KC’s testimony

contradicts these assertions. The record sufficiently supports the jury’s

finding that the essential elements of domestic abuse battery existed here on

multiple occasions that night. Additionally, Conley, by his own admission,

concedes the couple’s young children were home and downstairs during this

incident. This easily supports the child endangerment enhancement

provided under La. R.S. 14:35.3(I), as this statute does not require a child

actually witness the abuse, merely that they are “present at the residence”

when it occurs.

Count 2: Second Degree Rape, on or about April 20, 2021.

On this same night, April 20, 2021, KC claimed Conley also forced

her to perform oral sex, ripped her clothes off, and vaginally raped her.

Second degree rape is defined, in pertinent part, in La. R.S. 14:42.1:

A. Second degree rape is rape committed when the anal, oral,
or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed
under any one or more of the following circumstances:

(1) When the victim is prevented from resisting the act by
force or threats of physical violence under
circumstances where the victim reasonably believes
that such resistance would not prevent the rape.

Conley argues this sexual encounter he had with KC was consensual,

providing a far different account of the events on the night of April 20,

exemplifying why the jury likely did not find him credible. Conley claims

he went to bed with a headache and fell asleep right after KC began taking a

bath. A short time later, he awoke to her hand on his stomach, which he

interpreted as her initiating oral sex. He went along with it, but his hand
10

became tangled in her hair and an argument ensued between the two of

them. Conley also claimed she punched him with her fist. The argument

eventually subsided and the couple got in bed together and “spooned” one

another, with Conley lovingly hugging KC until they both fell asleep.

Around 2:30 the next morning, Conley awoke again, this time to KC

pushing her butt against his pelvic region. He then assisted KC in pulling

her pants off and positioned himself on top of her as they engaged in

consensual vaginal sex. After this, they both went back to sleep.

The jury obviously rejected Conley’s version of events and found

KC’s version credible. Based on KC’s testimony, Conley, while making KC

perform oral sex, grabbed her head, forced it toward his pelvic region, and

held it down. Additionally, while Conley raped KC vaginally, he got on top

of her and held her arms down so she could not resist or get away. This

conduct by Conley shows he lacked the consent of KC who was prevented

from resisting his actions by force, in this case being held down and

restrained. In light of these circumstances, we find there was sufficient

evidence presented, and a rational trier of fact could have found, the

essential elements of second degree rape for both the oral sex and vaginal

sex incidents.

Count 3: Second Degree Rape, on or about February 19, 2020.

Conley was convicted of second degree rape stemming from the

incident on February 19, 2020, where KC said she was tied to the coffee

table naked, made to wear a leather collar,5 bound with cuffs, a bag was

placed on her head, she was beaten on the vagina with a spoon, as well as by

5
KC testified that, throughout their marriage, Conley made her go to bed most
nights naked wearing a leather collar.
11

Conley’s hand, she was choked to the point of losing consciousness,6 and a

butt plug was forced into her anus. Conley concedes he only spanked KC on

the butt during this incident but, he asserts, the act was consensual. Conley

also claims the couple’s sex life became increasingly more kinky following

the birth of their first son, and the use of bondage, role play, and outfits was

a common consensual occurrence.

As noted above, in order to convict for second degree rape, the state

must prove Conley (1) had anal, oral, or vaginal intercourse, (2) without the

consent of KC. Here, the record supports that on February 19, 2020, Conley

tied KC to a coffee table and, while she was still bound, forced a butt plug

into her anus. La. R.S. 14:41 provides that anal sexual intercourse can be

accomplished by using any instrumentality to penetrate the victim’s anus.

Further, this form of intercourse was performed without KC’s consent as she

was bound to a coffee table while Conley performed this act. Conley

claimed this incident was consensual, but KC testified it was not. The jury

was free to accept KC’s testimony that she was prevented from resisting the

acts of Conley by force, in this case being tied down.

In light of these circumstances, we find there was sufficient evidence

presented, and a rational trier of fact could have found, the essential

elements of second degree rape.

Count 4: Sexual Battery, on or about December 19, 2020.

Conley’s conviction for sexual battery stemmed from an incident on

December 19, 2020, during which KC claimed she was raped by Conley.

For this incident, Conley was originally charged with, and tried for, second

6
KC claimed this occurred often during their marriage and has left her with
constant neck and spine pain.
12

degree rape, but the jury returned a responsive verdict of sexual battery,

which is defined, in pertinent part, as follows in La. R.S. 14:43.1:

A. Sexual battery is the intentional touching of the anus or
genitals of the victim by the offender using any
instrumentality or any part of the body of the offender,
directly or through clothing, or the touching of the anus or
genitals of the offender by the victim using any
instrumentality or any part of the body of the victim, directly
or through clothing, when any of the following occur:

(1) The offender acts without the consent of the victim.

Conley argues there were no specifics provided at trial about the details of

this December 19, 2020, incident and denies his involvement; however, the

record supports KC testified that Conley grabbed and raped her without

consent on this date. During this incident, Conley informed KC that when

she was weak, it made him feel strong and more like a man. While KC’s

testimony supported a finding of second degree rape, the jury was free to

return a responsive verdict of sexual battery, which we find is supported by

the record.

Count 5: Second Degree Sexual Battery, on or about December 2019.

Conley’s conviction for second degree sexual battery resulted from a

December 2019 incident in which KC claimed Conley bit her, pulled her

hair, and raped her. Conley argues no specific evidence or facts, other than

KC’s testimony, were provided relating to this incident, and continually

maintains all sexual activity with KC was consensual.

La. R.S. 14:43.2 provides, in pertinent part, the following definition

for second degree sexual battery:

A. Second degree sexual battery is the intentional engaging in
any of the following acts with another person when the
offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury on the
victim:

13

(1) The touching of the anus or genitals of the victim by the
offender using any instrumentality or any part of the
body of the offender, directly or through clothing.

Relying on this definition, the state must show Conley intentionally touched

KC’s genitals, and intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury upon her

while doing so. Though the record provides limited details of this incident,

the testimony of KC indicated Conley bit her, pulled her hair, then

ultimately raped her, events that KC said occurred on a frequent basis. This

conduct satisfies the essential elements of second degree sexual battery, and

there is sufficient evidence in the record to support this conviction.

Count 6: Aggravated Second Degree Battery, on or about February 2019,
August 2019, and February 19, 2020.

The amended indictment for count six, aggravated second degree

battery, provides three possible dates when this crime could have occurred,

February 2019, August 2019, and February 19, 2020. The evidence

presented at trial supported a conviction for any of these dates. In brief

before this Court, Conley addresses both the February 2019 and August

2019 incidents, while the state only addresses the incident of February 2019.

Considering the amended bill of indictment curiously provides three separate

dates to support only one count, we will address whether the evidence

supports that the essential elements have been provided for each separate

date.

La. R.S. 14:34.7 provides the following definition, in pertinent part,

for aggravated second degree battery:

A. Aggravated second degree battery is battery committed
with a dangerous weapon when the offender intentionally
inflicts serious bodily injury.

14

La. R.S. 14:2(A)(3) provides the definition for a dangerous weapon:

“Dangerous weapon” includes any gas, liquid or other
substance or instrumentality, which, in the manner used, is
calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.

There is sufficient evidence, through KC’s testimony, to support Conley

battered KC with a dangerous weapon, with the intent to inflict serious

bodily injury, when he beat her ten times with a belt in February 2019,

carved an “A” into her back with a knife in August of 2019, and struck her

vagina with a spoon on February 19, 2020.

In February 2019, Conley lashed KC ten different times on the back

with multiple belts, one of which had rhinestones embedded in it. During

this beating, the rhinestones on the belt shattered sending shards of glass

throughout the room. KC was left severely cut and bruised, with blood

covering the bed and sheets where she was lying.

In the August 2019 incident, Conley used an X-acto knife to carve the

letter “A” into KC’s lower back. Even though the pain was intense, KC was

not allowed to scream due to threats by Conley he would cut her more if she

resisted, so she bit down on a towel placed in her mouth.7 A photograph

admitted into evidence clearly shows the “A” on her back, and the jury was

shown KC’s back with this letter carved into it. Conley astonishingly

implied KC carved this “A” into her own back as he found her one day in

the bathroom biting a towel and bleeding from the mark.

While the February 19, 2020, incident included second degree rape

when Conley placed a butt plug in KC’s anus, it also included placing a bag

over her head and beating her vagina with a spoon.

7
KC testified Conley would also frequently place a bit in her mouth while he
abused her so she would not scream or make noises.
15

Any, and all three, of these incidents easily fit the definition of

aggravated second degree battery, that Conley used a dangerous weapon to

intentionally inflict serious bodily injury, providing sufficient evidence to

support this conviction.

Sufficiency Conclusion

In addition to testifying that all of their sexual encounters were

consensual, Conley introduced a series of photographs graphically depicting

KC, arguing they supported his position that his wife was actually the

sexually deviant one, with many sexual fetishes. Conley claimed KC was an

exhibitionist and would send him titillating pictures she had taken of herself

while he was at work. Some of these images showed KC in extremely

revealing clothing. Others showed her mostly naked wearing nothing but

various sexually explicit outfits, several depicting her as “catwoman,” and,

in many images, she was completely naked in provocative poses. KC

admitted she had taken some of these pictures herself, but that Conley

wanted her to, and that he had also taken many of them. KC explained she

would sometimes send pictures to Conley at work so he would not be angry

at her when he got home.

It was argued at trial that KC either suffered untold torment at the

hands of Conley, or is a liar. The jury obviously believed KC. Though

Conley’s testimony recounting all of his convictions largely conflicts with

that of KC, as stated in State v. Smith, supra, this Court does not assess

credibility or reweigh the evidence. Instead, the trier of fact makes

credibility determinations and may accept or reject the testimony of any of

the witnesses, State v. Casey, supra, and the sole testimony of a sexual

assault victim is sufficient to support a requisite factual finding, State v.
16

Moody, supra; see also: State v. Brooks, supra; State v. Steines, supra. In

light of these holdings, it was up to the jury to weigh the testimony of KC

against that of Conley and determine credibility. The jury did so and

obviously found KC to be credible, rejecting Conley’s testimony. The trial

court at sentencing also noted it found KC to be extremely credible, with

Conley lacking any credibility at all. We find no internal contradiction with

KC’s testimony, nor any irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence

admitted. In fact, the state introduced photographs supporting her testimony,

depicting some of KC’s bruises, cuts, and carvings at the hands of Conley.

The victimization of KC by her own husband is unfathomable.

Conley stripped his wife of her very human dignity. By his threats, lies,

abuse, and dominance, Conley reduced KC to an object for his own pleasure

in a cesspool of violence, sexual deviance, and debauchery. Marriage

should be a safe harbor from such terror, where the couple gives themselves

freely to one another in sacrificial love, not a chamber of horrors where one

spouse becomes enslaved to the dominion of the other.

After thoroughly reviewing each of Conley’s convictions, and

reviewing all of the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury

could find beyond a reasonable doubt each essential element for all six of the

crimes for which Conley was convicted.

This assignment of error is without merit.

Exclusion of Witnesses

In his second assignment of error, Conley argues the trial court erred

in barring two of his witnesses from testifying. Raven, the oldest daughter

of Conley from a previous relationship, and Makara Jones, a close family
17

friend of the Conleys’ who frequently visited and stayed in their home, were

sworn and placed under the rule of sequestration prior to commencement of

trial. It was discovered they were present in the courtroom during a portion

of the state’s opening statement because defense counsel had advised them

they could be present. The trial court did find defense counsel to be in direct

contempt of court for encouraging violation of the rule of sequestration, but

initially ruled the witnesses could still testify. The state then objected on the

grounds the defense did not provide notification that Raven and Makara

would be called as witnesses, even though Conley had filed a motion,

pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 717, which then required such disclosure. After

a review of the record, the trial court found this to be true and excluded both

witnesses from testifying.

Before the defense rested, another incident occurred with these two

potential witnesses when the state discovered Conley had been calling both

Raven and Makara frequently from the jail at night during the course of trial.

A recording of the conversations was played in which it appeared Conley

was trying to influence testimony, and he also asked one of them to acquire a

“Go Phone” so he could continue contacting them. After hearing the

recordings, the trial court gave this as an additional reason for excluding

Raven and Makara as witnesses.

Conley argues the state had ample knowledge of his intention to call

Raven and Makara as witnesses and was provided copies of their subpoena

letters. He claims the state faced no prejudice if they were allowed to

testify. On the other hand, the state argues the witnesses were not properly

disclosed pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 725.1. The state claims this, coupled

with the witnesses’ presence in the courtroom during opening statements,
18

and Conley repeatedly contacting them by phone from jail during the course

of trial, was sufficient to disqualify both as witnesses.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 725.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. If the defendant moves, pursuant to Article 717 of this Code,
for disclosure of the records of arrests and convictions of
witnesses to be called by the state in its case in chief, the
defendant shall disclose to the district attorney, prior to
those witnesses being sworn, the name and date of birth of
the witnesses to be called by the defendant in his case in
chief.

Conley filed a motion and order for discovery requesting the state provide

the arrest and conviction history of any witnesses the state intended to call at

trial. As such, after this filing, Conley was required to disclose the names

and dates of birth of any witnesses he intended to call, pursuant to Art.

725.1. Our review of the record indicates he failed to do so, as no witnesses

list was furnished and no witnesses names or dates of birth were provided.

La. C. Cr. P. art. 729.5 provides, in pertinent part:

A. If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this Chapter or with an order issued pursuant to
this Chapter, the court may order such party to permit the
discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, order a mistrial
on motion of the defendant, prohibit the party from
introducing into evidence the subject matter not disclosed, or
enter such other order, other than dismissal, as may be
appropriate.

Under this article, the trial court has the discretion to issue an appropriate

order when a party fails to comply with discovery. Here, since Conley failed

to adhere to the provisions of Art. 725.1, the trial court had the authority to

order Raven and Makara to be excluded as witnesses. We do not need to

address the issue of whether it was an abuse of discretion to bar these

witnesses from testifying on this basis only, as there were additional reasons

to justify not allowing them to testify.
19

Raven and Makara violated the rule of sequestration for being present

in the courtroom during opening statements, and for having frequent

telephone contact with Conley during the course of trial. The sequestration

rule is contained in La. C.E. art. 615:

A. As a matter of right. On its own motion the court may, and on
request of a party the court shall, order that the witnesses be
excluded from the courtroom or from a place where they can
see or hear the proceedings, and refrain from discussing the
facts of the case with anyone other than counsel in the case. In
the interests of justice, the court may exempt any witness from
its order of exclusion.
***
C. Violation of exclusion order. A court may impose appropriate
sanctions for violations of its exclusion order including
contempt, appropriate instructions to the jury, or when such
sanctions are insufficient, disqualification of the witness.

The purpose of sequestration is to assure a witness will testify as to his own

knowledge. State v. Brown, 18-01999 (La. 9/30/21), 330 So. 3d 199, 232,

cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1702, 212 L. Ed. 2d 596 (2022); State v. Trahan, 576

So. 2d 1 (La. 1990). A primary purpose underlying the rule of sequestration

is to prevent the fact witnesses from being influenced by prior testimony.

Cory v. Cory, 43,447 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/13/08), 989 So. 2d 855; Trejo v.

Canaan Constr., LLC, 52,697 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/26/19), 277 So. 3d 499.

The particular remedy imposed for sequestration violations rests within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Trejo v. Canaan Constr., LLC, Id.

Though they were in the courtroom on the advice of defense counsel,

Raven and Makara had already been sworn and sequestered as witnesses by

the court. As such, they were not allowed to be present in the courtroom

during proceedings pursuant to Art. 615(A), and their presence during

opening statements violated the rule of sequestration. The trial court did not

20

bar these two witnesses from testifying on this basis alone, as their presence

in the courtroom was brief.

Most significantly, however, Conley contacted Raven and Makara and

spoke with them from jail on multiple occasions during the course of trial in

an attempt to influence testimony, a clear violation of the rule of

sequestration. Included in the list of actions a trial court may take when a

witness violates the rule of sequestration, found in Art. 615(C), is

disqualification of the witness. As noted by this Court in Trejo v. Canaan

Constr., LLC, Comment (f) to this statute explains disqualification is the

most drastic remedy. In light of our holding in Trejo v. Canaan Constr.,

LLC, and the provisions of Art. 615(C), the trial court had the discretion to

exclude Raven and Makara as witnesses.

Conley’s contacting Raven and Makara, who both freely and

frequently spoke with him, is a substantial and justifiable ground for barring

their testimony. This egregious behavior was initiated by the defendant

himself, attempting to influence these witnesses. While their brief time in

the courtroom during opening statements, or the failure to list Raven and

Makara as witnesses, each standing alone, may not have been enough to

disqualify them as witnesses, those incidents, coupled with repeated

jailhouse contact during the course of trial with Conley, provides a more

than adequate basis for disqualification.

Despite being excluded as witnesses, the testimony of Raven and

Makara was proffered by defense counsel and made part of this record. We

have thoroughly reviewed this testimony and find it would not have changed

the outcome of this case, even if it had been included. This proffer generally

set forth that Raven observed KC and Conley arguing, but never observed
21

them engaging in physical altercations. Both Raven and Makara stated they

never heard any of the interactions between KC and Conley in the upstairs

portion of the house, and they both believed KC and Conley got along well

as they observed them showing affection toward each other on multiple

occasions. Raven also observed KC dressing inappropriately at times and,

on one occasion, watching “Fifty Shades of Grey,” a movie with strong

sexually explicit content. Further, neither Raven nor Makara ever observed

KC with any injuries or markings.

On the other hand, KC testified the abuse she endured occurred either

while the children were gone from the house, or while they were sleeping.

KC also stated she would conceal any bruises or black eyes she had with

makeup or glasses, so the children and others would not have seen it. KC

conceded she would sometimes wear revealing and inappropriate clothing,

but only because Conley made her do it. KC did deny watching the movie

“Fifty Shades of Grey.”

Our review of the record, and the applicable law, indicates Raven and

Makara were properly excluded as witnesses. Even if their testimony had

been included, we do not find it would have been substantial enough to have

changed the results. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Excessive Sentence

In his third assignment of error, Conley argues his 95-year total

sentence is excessive. Conley, who was 52 years old at the time of trial,

emphasizes he essentially received a life sentence. Conley claims he

suffered from PTSD, only has one prior misdemeanor conviction, for

domestic abuse battery, and contends his service to the community as a fire

chief, an EMT, and in the military was not considered. He also states there
22

were no allegations he harmed his children and that he was very involved in

their lives.

A reviewing court applies a two-prong test to determine whether a

sentence is excessive. First, we examine the record to see if the trial court

used the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The trial court is not

required to list every aggravating or mitigating circumstance so long as the

record reflects adequate consideration of the guidelines of the article. State

v. Smith, 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983); State v. Boehm, 51,229 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/5/17), 217 So. 3d 596. The court shall state for the record the

considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing

sentence. La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1 (C). The goal of Art. 894.1 is an

articulation of the factual basis for the sentence, not simply a mechanical

compliance with its provisions. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475 (La. 1982).

When a defendant fails to timely file a motion to reconsider sentence,

the appellate court’s review of the sentence is limited to a bare claim of

constitutional excessiveness. State v. Benson, 53,578 (La. App. 2 Cir.

11/10/20), 305 So. 3d 135. Here, Conley did not make an oral request to

reconsider sentence at the sentencing hearing, nor did he file a written

motion. Therefore, he did not preserve whether the trial court complied with

La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, and thus, our review is limited to whether or not

Conley’s sentence is constitutionally excessive. State v. Dickerson, 55,088

(La. App. 2 Cir. 6/28/23) 367 So. 3d 958; State v. Cooksey, 53,660 (La. App.

2 Cir. 5/26/21), 316 So. 3d 1284, writ denied, 21-00901 (La. 10/12/21), 325

So. 3d 1074. We do note the trial court more than adequately considered the

provisions of Art 894.1 and provided an extremely thorough account of its

applications of these provisions to the facts of Conley’s case.
23

A sentence violates La. Const. art. I, § 20, if it is grossly out of

proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a

purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering, State v. Dorthey,

623 So. 2d 1276 (La. 1993). A sentence is considered grossly

disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light

of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Weaver,

01-0467 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So. 2d 166. A trial court has wide discretion to

sentence within the statutory limits; absent a showing of manifest abuse of

that discretion, such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive. On

review, an appellate court does not determine whether another sentence may

have been more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Fruge, 14-1172 (La. 10/14/15), 179 So. 3d 579. The sentencing

court is not limited to considering only prior convictions and may review all

evidence of prior criminal activity, including evidence that would otherwise

be inadmissible at trial, e.g., prior arrests, hearsay evidence of suspected

criminal acts, conviction records, and evidence of uncharged or nol prossed

offenses. State v. Washington, 414 So. 2d 313 (La. 1982); State v. Dale,

53,736 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 309 So. 3d 1031, and citations therein. A

trial judge is in the best position to consider the aggravating and mitigating

circumstances of a particular case, and, therefore, is given broad discretion

in sentencing. State v. Trotter, 54,496 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/29/22), 342 So. 3d

1116; State v. Bell, 53,712 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/13/21), 310 So. 3d 307.

Conley was convicted of all six counts he faced, five as charged, and

one responsively to sexual battery. The sentencing guidelines for each, and

the sentences given by the trial court, are as follows.

24

Count 1: Domestic Abuse Battery-Child Endangerment, La. R.S.
14:35.3, provides a range of 30 days to six months, with an additional
three-year hard labor maximum for child endangerment.

For the domestic abuse battery portion of his conviction, Conley was

sentenced to the six-month maximum in the parish jail, to run concurrently

with a three-year maximum hard labor sentence for the child endangerment

enhancement. Both of these sentences were set to run consecutively with his

other sentences.

Count 2: Second Degree Rape, La. R.S. 14:42.1, provides a range of 5
to 40 years at hard labor. Conley was sentenced to 30 years at hard
labor, without benefits.

Count 3: Second Degree Rape occurring on or about February 19,
2020, La. R.S. 14:42.1, provides range of 5 to 40 years at hard labor.
Conley was sentenced to 30 years at hard labor, without benefits.

Count 4: Sexual Battery, La. R.S. 14:43.1, provides a maximum of 10
years at hard labor. Conley was sentenced to 8 years at hard labor,
without benefits.

Count 5: Second Degree Sexual Battery, La. R.S. 14:43.2, provides a
maximum of 15 years at hard labor. Conley was sentenced to 12
years at hard labor, without benefits.

Count 6: Aggravated Second Degree Battery, La. R.S. 14:34.7,
provides a maximum of 15 years at hard labor. Conley was sentenced
to 12 years at hard labor.

For these five convictions, each sentence was set to run consecutively.

Conley’s full sentence for all convictions totaled 95 years at hard labor, 80

years to be served without benefits.

Our review of the trial court’s compliance with La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1

is not required because no motion to reconsider sentence was filed;

nevertheless, the trial court’s thorough review of Art. 894.1 is helpful in

assessing whether these sentences are constitutionally excessive. The trial

court listed its multitude of findings: (1) there was an undue risk that if

Conley was not incarcerated he would commit another crime; (2) Conley
25

was in need of a custodial environment; (3) a lesser sentence would

deprecate and make a mockery of the seriousness of the Conley’s crimes; (4)

Conley’s actions during the commissions of the crimes manifested deliberate

cruelty toward KC, specifically the beatings of her genitals, back, and

buttocks, as well as carving an “A” into her back, all extremely vicious

actions that were an obvious use of violence; (5) Conley used his

position/status to facilitate the commission of the offenses and to cover them

up; (6) Conley showed no remorse for his actions so there was no chance for

rehabilitation; (7) there was no provocation that caused Conley to commit

these crimes; (8) Conley had a history of violence, including a previous

simple battery conviction which he did not inform the trial court of during

sentencing; (9) Conley allegedly suffered from PTSD, but this factor is

outweighed by the gravity of the offenses and their vicious and heinous

nature; (10) Conley constitutes an unusual risk of danger to the public in that

he might reoffend; (11) Conley was physically dominating over KC; (12)

KC’s children must go through life without their father and KC’s relatives

will face the challenge of helping her raise the children; (13) evidence

introduced at trial indicated Conley engaged in behavior during trial that

obstructed the trial process by contacting his children in an obvious attempt

to influence their testimony; (14) Conley was given leniency when the state

dropped two of his charges, and by the jury with respect to their responsive

verdict on one charge; (15) the behavior of Conley was particularly

reprehensible and his crimes were some of the most egregious possible.

Next, the court noted its consideration of whether the sentences

should run concurrently or consecutively in light of La. C. Cr. P. art. 883 and

State v. Allen, 52,318 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/14/18), 260 So. 3d 703. The court
26

concluded Conley’s sentences should be served consecutively and gave the

following two reasons: (1) Conley was not engaged in one course of conduct

but, on each count, he made the conscious decision to commit the offense;

and (2) if not consecutive, the sentences would fail to consider the heinous

and egregious nature of each of the separate offenses.

Pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. art. 883, when two or more convictions arise

from the same act or transaction, or constitute parts of a common scheme or

plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court

expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively. However,

concurrent sentences arising out of a single course of conduct are not

mandatory, and consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive. State v.

Green, 54,955 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So. 3d 546; State v. Dale, supra.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to make sentences consecutive rather

than concurrent. State v. Green, supra; State v. Dale, supra.

We find Conley’s sentences are not excessive in light of the factors

considered by the trial court, and the particularly heinous nature of Conley’s

crimes, his prolonged and reprehensible abuse of KC, and his lack of

remorse for his actions. The record supports Conley intentionally and

repeatedly abused and terrorized KC, both physically and sexually, for most

of their ten-year marriage. Conley used violence and threats in order to

control KC and force her into performing deviant acts for him, including

binding herself, dressing in revealing outfits, role playing, and performing

numerous sexual acts stripping her of human dignity and reducing her to an

object for his own pleasure. Further, Conley perpetrated this lewd conduct

even though multiple minor children were present in his home.

27

Despite his despicable behavior, and facing six different serious

criminal convictions, Conley still did not accept responsibility for his actions

or express any remorse toward his victim at the sentencing hearing. Instead,

Conley maintained that he was innocent, claiming KC is the sexually deviant

one and he acquiesced only to satisfy her desires, making himself out to be

the victim.

Conley’s abominable conduct justifies the 95-year total sentence

imposed. Though this is essentially a life sentence for Conley, and though

the trial court may have accomplished this same purpose with a lesser

sentence, it is still the trial court who is in the best position to determine the

sentence and we cannot overturn a sentence absent a clear abuse of

discretion. Here we find there is none. Though it makes no meaningful

difference, we do note that, except for domestic abuse battery-child

endangerment, none of the sentences imposed were the maximum under the

statute.

Further, as emphasized by this Court in State v. Green, supra, and

State v. Dale, supra, it was well within the trial court’s discretion to impose

these sentences consecutively. As noted above, the trial court provided

multiple factors and considerations it contemplated while imposing Conley’s

sentences. The trial court also properly pointed out Conley’s numerous

convictions did not arise from one course of criminal conduct. As evidenced

by the record, Conley repeatedly abused and raped KC over the course of

years. Conley’s habitual, dominating, and reprehensible conduct provide an

adequate basis to support consecutive sentences.

28

We find the 95-year total sentence does not shock the sense of justice,

and is not a needless infliction of pain and suffering.

This assignment of error lacks merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, we affirm all of Conley’s convictions and

sentences.

AFFIRMED.

29